So are German forces "better" on average? Part Deux

[JonS]

Mike (and Vark),

yes, a designer could do that, but I think that still doesn't really capture it. That isn't you, as a commander, making a rational choice to conduct a stealth-based infiltration attack from amongst a range of other viable options. It's you, as a player, being given a force that has already infiltrated.

Tarq,

I wonder how close we can come.

With practice and experience - both as players and designers - probably a lot closer than where we are now. But there's still the issue that both sides know something is definitely going to happen, on this map, with these forces, and soon. If nothing appears to be happening, then in a lot of cases it'd be a reasonable assumption that your opponent is trying infiltration. Which all starts to get a bit meta.

Jon

[winkelried]

If nothing appears to be happening, then in a lot of cases it'd be a reasonable assumption that your opponent is trying infiltration. Which all starts to get a bit meta.

One other aspect is, that a lot of maps are quite "cramped" and the force density does not allow for infiltration. Larger maps - somehow inhibited by the OOM issue - can certainly help.

For your point, you also can make a diversionary attack - in Elite+ mode this should work pretty well since, a relatively small force can give the impression to be a bigger one. Another possibility is harrassing fire so that the enemy keeps their heads down and you have a noise background.

[winkelried]

another aspect, which was not mentioned as far as i have seen in this topic, are the cultural differences between the armies engaged in WW2. these differences lead then to different doctrines and tactics. One such example is Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics) which gives relatively high autonomy to relatively low ranks in the military hierachy.

[RockinHarry]

One idea I have in mind since years, is to make an operation style game (CMX1), where the first scenario in the chain is used for reccon, with following actually stage the true full scale battles. In CMX1 this does not work without special rules for H2H and vs AI it would not work at all due to redeploying forces each turn. Vs human it would also not be a very fun game as it requires the defender to more or less stay idle or just do some basic counter patrolling.

Haven´t dealt with the idea in CMBN yet, so I ask those who already made campaigns for this game. Assuming this would be a vs AI defending campaign only, can one set scenario lengths individually? Does the defending AI redeploys units each battle or can these be more or less fixed for every follow ups?

Another idea is to use the enemy intel settings, maybe setting this as high as 50-70%. So an attacker already would know (from this way simulated thorough reconnaissance) many to most defenders positions and then can focus on actual infitration attacks. Depending on map size, one chooses for the defender a force size, apropiate to simulate a streched or thin defense line. Combine that with bad visibility or night time, you´ll have a good setting for a basic infiltration attack game. Might be more fun playing vs AI, but could also be made interesting for a human defender.

[RockinHarry]

From the horses mouth, so to speak.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/allied-firepower.html

+1 Good article

Describes well the overall situation vs western allies and necessities to deal with it, when it comes to offensive actions.

But germans were lacking prerequisites for most of the time in 1944/45. Mostly unskilled troops, inexperienced low level leaders and general opportunities to apply any such tactics vs a "weak" enemy in favorable terrain. The only opportunity that comes in mind is the first stages of the Bulge battle, particularly in 5th Pz army sector with Manteuffel in command.

For the remainder of the war, germans more or less had to stick with their costly and ineffective (counter) attack methods, as this was the only way to follow Hitlers no step back, no retreat orders. If a defense line portion was lost to the allies, there was no flexibility allowed in adapting to a new defense line, so the only method left, was to try regaining it with mentioned counter attacks.

[winkelried]

One idea I have in mind since years, is to make an operation style game (CMX1), where the first scenario in the chain is used for reccon, with following actually stage the true full scale battles.

This is done in the Panzer Lehr campaign "Panzer Marsch". In the first battle you recon and the level of intel in the second battle depends on the quality of your recon.

[RockinHarry]

This is done in the Panzer Lehr campaign "Panzer Marsch". In the first battle you recon and the level of intel in the second battle depends on the quality of your recon.

Excellent! Finally....

[LongLeftFlank]

So I'm still mulling over the topic in my OP, which is: why do the late war Germans, even battered second line formations, seem to get so much more combat effectiveness out of their small units?

And as I read some source material for my Carillon Nose campaign, in this case the daily logbooks for the 119th Infantry which is part of 30th ID and reckoned to be one of the top performing US divisions, I am struck with how hesitant and robotic they are on the attack. The commanding generals literally have to pep talk the colonels who in turn have to be literally standing in the front line CP to get things moving!

See this post and the ones above it for more..

[JasonC]

Asked and answered - they simply don't. You are cherry picking anecdotes. End of story.

[SelfLoadingRifle]

I think that Rommel hit the nail squarely on the head when (post Kasserine Pass) he said of Americans - and I paraphrase - that he had never seen troops who had performed so badly in their first time in action, but who had improved so much by their second time. The following link would seem to confirm this.

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/doubler/doubler.asp

From reading the likes of Ambrose, Hastings and Beevor, my assessment of the opposing nationalities is as follows:

All the nationalities had their crack forces. Whether (for example) U.S./Brit Airborne, or Waffen SS, I would rate these as crack/veteran with a sprinkling of named elite, for example, Captain Dick Winters, Major John Howard or Captain Michael Wittman.

For bog standard line units, I would rate the Germans as regular with a sprinkling of veterans, and perhaps a very few green. For German REMF units (were they called 'ear and lung'?) you would get a real mix, I would say mostly green/conscript, but with the occasional regular or veteran thrown in.

For the Americans circa D Day, I would rate their bog standard infantry as regular/green. Their armour - or should that be armor? - I would rate as regular/veteran.

I would rate the more experienced British infantry (also circa D Day) as mostly regular with the very occasional veteran. Brit armour, which had already suffered rough handling at the hands of the Germans and were rather more cautious as a result, scores regular/green.

Artillery on all sides was good, and I would award them veteran rating.

As the war progressed, I would say that the Americans became better, the British worse, wereas the Germans - on the whole - remained pretty damn good.

Apologies for ruffled feathers.

SLR

P.S. Feel free to disagree!!!

[Wiggum]

@ SelfLoadingRifle

...looks like you should read the hole thread again.

Its at least ridiculous to call the hole Waffen-SS "crack/veteran".

[SelfLoadingRifle]

@ SelfLoadingRifle

...looks like you should read the hole thread again.

Its at least ridiculous to call the hole Waffen-SS "crack/veteran".

Agreed... CERTAIN Waffen SS...

A small point, the correct spelling for "hole" is WHOLE.

SLR

[DavidFields]

The German infantry Company, with supporting MG and small mortars. Throw in a Mk4.

100-200 years from now, I think that unit is what will define what the land war in WW2 was like. The were the Centurians of the time--complete with the understanding that focusing on those roman forces do an injustice to some of the forces they fought.

As to "better", I agree with Jason C, I think. People are people, so by any number of historical flukes, especially across Europe and the US, could have changed what individual person was fighting on what side of WW2, depending on whose religious group was persecuted where hundreds of years ago.

Then there are things we do not emphasize in CM because we want to have fun:

1. The germans where using horses as transports even late in the war.

2. Massive amounts of HE landing on your head sort of obviates a lot of soldier skills. You are still dead. This was not, generally, broadswords at close range.

3. There was a desperation and bitterness between the germans and the russians, in particular, that was not generally the same with other WW2 European combatants. And in that case, the russians beat the germans. Hence, given the facts, by what criteria does one judge the russian fighters as inferior? Small unit cohesion? So what? If that does not win you the war, if the ability to massively grind down you opponent into submission, and your troops willingness to do that is not a sign of a superior quality.....then I question the definition.

"On average", the russian soldier ended the war in victory. Now, if I only knew how to write "Part Deux" in russian. [Don't get me started. If the germans had never taken Sedan, and the French had stopped them and won the war, would the "German forces 'better' thread still exist? Maybe. But I would have a similar response to what I have written above]

[RockinHarry]

Surely has been mentioned elsewhere, but no matter the quality of the actual frontline soldiers, germans were "lead" by example of their leaders, which incl. Plt, Cpy, Btl, regimental, divisional and oftenly up to corps leaders. It was inherent doctrine that german officers/leaders where with their troops at the point of attack, or during the most critical parts of a defense, although there´s surely enough examples, where it didn´t matter, for lack of experience of leaders or those kind of "leaders" who where thrown into a ground combat unit, coming from Luftwaffe and such previously. The german 5th Para Division in the Bulge battle is one of those examples. Or the many Luftwaffe field divisions, where both, frontline soldiers and officers where not appropiately trained to the standards of german ground combat doctrines.

[LemuelG]

In WWI the German army executed 48 men. By the end of WWII 20,000 men had been executed, 75-80% of them for political crimes: desertion and Wehrkraftzersetzung (undermining fighting spirit). I guess that's one way 'to get more out of' your guys.

[RockinHarry]

In WWI the German army executed 48 men. By the end of WWII 20,000 men had been executed, 75-80% of them for political crimes: desertion and Wehrkraftzersetzung (undermining fighting spirit). I guess that's one way 'to get more out of' your guys.

Yup, ..and I´d be interested in figures for UK, US and finally ...russians! The latter had their frontline execution commando already with them, in form of comrade comissar and NKVD.

Generally the democracy soldier just had to fear the enemy, while the dictatorship soldier had to fear the enemy AND military justice.

[Boche]

Yup, ..and I´d be interested in figures for UK, US and finally ...russians! The latter had their frontline execution commando already with them, in form of comrade comissar and NKVD.

Generally the democracy soldier just had to fear the enemy, while the dictatorship soldier had to fear the enemy AND military justice.

1.Considering a full divisions worth of men where executed by the soviets just in Stalingrad, one can only imagine.

2.Sadly, where I live you still have to fear both...

[quincy]

If I remember correctly this study (called "Fighting Power") by Israeli historian

Martin van Crefeld, he concludes that compared to the US Army the German wehrmacht at the time was more effective especially due its objective focused command structure, called "Auftragstaktik" (as has been mentioned before in this thread). This was in contrast to a stiff and bureaucratical style of leadership on the US side.

Another issue that is being raised, is the duration of the training the soldiers received. In case of the Germans the training began essentially at childs age during Hitlerjugend and earlier with games deliberately designed to train soldier skills like orientation/map-navigation, hide and seek, capture the flag and even grenade tossing.

[DLaurier]

Yup, ..and I´d be interested in figures for UK, US and finally ...russians! The latter had their frontline execution commando already with them, in form of comrade comissar and NKVD.

Generally the democracy soldier just had to fear the enemy, while the dictatorship soldier had to fear the enemy AND military justice.

Most of the peoples colonized by the democracy sent troops to fight for their white masters... And yes, little brown natives were routinely executed for even the smallest infraction.

Colonial troops were taught to fear their white NCOs more than death itself.

[YankeeDog]

If I remember correctly this study (called "Fighting Power") by Israeli historian

Martin van Crefeld, he concludes that compared to the US Army the German wehrmacht at the time was more effective especially due its objective focused command structure, called "Auftragstaktik" (as has been mentioned before in this thread). This was in contrast to a stiff and bureaucratical style of leadership on the US side.

Another issue that is being raised, is the duration of the training the soldiers received. In case of the Germans the training began essentially at childs age during Hitlerjugend and earlier with games deliberately designed to train soldier skills like orientation/map-navigation, hide and seek, capture the flag and even grenade tossing.

I think there is probably some credence to this argument if you look at German forces vs. U.S. Forces in 1942, when they met in ground combat for the first time. But the U.S. ground forces did a lot of learning between November 1942 and June 1944, and the U.S. army changed training, structure and doctrine considerably based on combat lessons learned during this time. A fair number of the U.S. Combat divisions in Normandy had seen action in North Africa, Sicily, and/or Italy, and several of the unbloodied divisions, such as the 101st Airborne and 29th Infantry, had received an unusually high level of training, both in terms of time and intensity.

I also think it's fair to say the Wehrmacht of 1944 was not the same quality force that had nearly stormed the gates of Moscow in 1941. Many of the soldiers, and especially NCOs and junior commissioned officers, who had been so carefully trained and indoctrinated during Germany's long re-militarization in the 1930s had been lost or captured at Yelina, Stalingrad, Kursk, Korsun, and elsewhere. And this only got worse after Falaise and Bagration. By mid-1944, Germany was increasingly having to conscript lower and lower quality draftees and shorten training time and resources in order to make up the losses. For every anecdote of a German formation in WWII that fought with tenacity and inspired initiative in battle after battle, there is another, less interesting and largely forgotten story of a German formation that was thrown into the the front lines with only modest training and middling to poor equipment, that was simply rolled over and destroyed in detail by the Allied Juggernaut.

Similarly, for every story like the 30th ID at Carrilon Nose, where U.S. Army formations seem to be inflexible and hide-bound tactically, there are stories like elements of the 101st at Carentan, the 82nd at La Fiere Causeway, the 4th Armored at Arracourt, etc. where U.S. units displayed small unit creativity and initiative, and carried the day despite difficult odds. By 1944, the U.S. Army was producing and had in its ranks small unit commanders like Sgts. Slaughter, Cpt. Winters, Lt. Col Abrams, and Lt. General Roosevelt, commanders who showed initiative, creativity, and inspired leadership. They and their constituent formations were as good or better than anything the Wehrmacht had at the time.

[Wiggum]

It was inherent doctrine that german officers/leaders where with their troops at the point of attack, or during the most critical parts of a defense, although there´s surely enough examples, where it didn´t matter, for lack of experience of leaders or those kind of "leaders" who where thrown into a ground combat unit, coming from Luftwaffe and such previously.

Due to the lack of proper (if any) communication equipment this was necessary late in the war anyway. While the US company was in radio contact with the battalion, the germans had to send messengers.

Another advantage enjoyed by the average us army infantry unit by the fall of 1944 was the technical means was to call for and coordinate artillery and CAS. American radios and fire-control systems were far superior to and issued in greater numbers then anything the germans possesed.

[...]

The US Army artillery abillity to respond, coordinate and mass fires rapidly gave the average US infantry company, battalion or regiment the upper hand compared to their opponent. On the german side, shortage of radios resultet in Volks-Grenadier units being issued far fewer sets the required. Each german company for example was authorized only one radio set to communicate with the battalion HQ. These sets often failed or were inoperable due to shortages of batteries, forcing company commanders to resort to landline field telephones or the use of messengers to relay important orders or reports.

Source:

Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp by Douglas E. Nash

Combine this with the fact that most late war german infantry units relyed mostly on horses and wagons and other issues like shortages of ammunition. Then take into account that the US leaders/soldiers got more and more experienced while the german leaders/soldiers got more and more inexperienced due to high casualitys and inadequate training.

Ther germans placed a great focus on the offensive, even late in the war when they were in the defense at all fronts. Thats why they counterattacked again and again after losing terrain to the enemy.

These reckless attacks took its toll on the infantry units...

That means, if at all, that by 1944 the americans (allies) are the ones who were "better" on average !

Clearly the germans were even in 1944 a opponent that should not be underestimated, and the allies did not...thats why they won most battles (small or large) late in the war.

[Sublime]

One could make an argument that a large part of the Wehrmachts tenacity in defense on the Eastern Front had to do with knowledge of what would happen with the Red Army unleashed on Germany, and knowledge of what being a Russian PoW meant.

Another good example of U.S. troops taking iniatiative is the river crossing at Nijmegan during Market Garden. I believe it was in Cornelius' Ryans book A Bridge Too Far where a US Colonel was asked by a Brit about how many times the US troops had practiced crossing the river (They crossed with makeshift craft, often without paddles and used rifles under withering fire) The Colonel replied 'None. This is on the job training.'

[Erwin]

Re experience levels of certain troops like SS... it really depends on the year and formation you are talking about.

There was great variance, and as the war took its toll, many SS units became much lower in quality as the SS started to allow "every tom, dick and harry" in. IIRC there was an Islamic SS Division for heaven's sake.

The reason for the huge increase in SS manpower during the war is that by law the Werhmacht could only accept German citizens, while the SS could accept any nationality.

Oh and re "a US Colonel was asked by a Brit about how many times the US troops had practiced crossing the river..." When a Brit asks such a question one should never assume it is a compliment, it's usually quite the opposite...

[winkelried]

Re experience levels of certain troops like SS... it really depends on the year and formation you are talking about.

Not just the SS, also other formations had lots of trouble with experience levels after Normandy and Bagration. The losses were just too big to be replaced. On the other hand the number of experienced troops on the Allied side increased continually. I think the definite tipping point was Cobra (Falaise) and Bagration.

[JonS]

The reason for the huge increase in SS manpower during the war is that by law the Werhmacht could only accept German citizens, while the SS could accept any nationality.

Could you expand on that a bit, please?

AIUI, something like 1 in 3 battalions in the initial stages of the Normandy campaign were Ost Battalions of various non-Germanic nationalities, and every division had a goodly contingent of HiWis.