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Yah think? General Gavin is what frustrated Market Garden.

XXX Corps advanced 87 km in 3 days, where they were held up by the uncaptured bridge at Nijmegen, rather than a Bridge to Far it was more like One Bridge Short.

A long and tenuous line of supply, "1 tank wide", could not be severed by the Germans and it took armour to destroy the lightly armed paratroopers in Arnhem / Oosterbeek, even then not. Trapped against the Rhine, out of ammo and with no real means to defend against armour, 20% of the British 1 Para Div were able to withdraw across the almost impassable obstacle.

If 10% of the German heavy armoured divisions escaping Falaise with none of their heavy equipment is a huge cock up what is this then?

Despite the perceived failure of the operation the German showing on the defence during Market Garden was pretty poor.

Armour Plate v Dennison Smocks , 75mm HV Guns v Gammon Bombs and PIATs and as stated above 20% of them got away and they lost most of Holland.

OK....now I have to think about reply why MGen Gavin and his merry men somehow botched Market Garden. :) Answer may be in his brutally honest diary, saying he made a mistake to allocate capture of certain bridges to "least capable"of his regimental commanders.

Not that leadership and communication failure within 1st AB not only allowed smashing of their own unit, but also Polish AB Brigade to boot.

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saying he made a mistake to allocate capture of certain bridges to "least capable"of his regimental commanders.

A good commander takes the shortcomings of his subordinates as his own.

Gavin should have ensured that the primary objective, the Nijmegan Bridge (not certain bridges), was captured. All else was secondary. Failure to do so doomed 1 Abn and the Operation as a whole.

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One thing I won't do is criticize a unit that paid such a heavy cost in blood to hold an objective against overwhelming odds in a very risky plan with a lot of potential for failure. Yeah there is plenty of blame to go around but those guys deserve better. 1st Airborne's stand was worthy of Sparta. As a Yank I tend to focus on my own country's army and history, but these guys are an exception. I hope we can do them justice in the Market Garden module.

A toast Gentlemen to the 1st which despite all the issues it faced held it's objective for twice as long as the plan had intended.

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A good commander takes the shortcomings of his subordinates as his own.

Gavin should have ensured that the primary objective, the Nijmegan Bridge (not certain bridges), was captured. All else was secondary. Failure to do so doomed 1 Abn and the Operation as a whole.

Hmm, where's this axe-to-grind come from? Surely you're trolling? I suppose you have an obvious candidate in mind, in place of Gavin? If Gavin wasn't the right man, at the right time, who was?

Any commander of any army of any nation at any point in history would have been happy to have a Gavin-led 82nd on their OOB, except you. Mr Perfect.

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Hmm, where's this axe-to-grind come from? Surely you're trolling? I suppose you have an obvious candidate in mind, in place of Gavin? If Gavin wasn't the right man, at the right time, who was?

Any commander of any army of any nation at any point in history would have been happy to have a Gavin-led 82nd on their OOB, except you. Mr Perfect.

Not saying I agree with him, but if we WERE to say Gavin was at fault for failing to take Nijmegen Bridge I expect a lot of folks might have preferred that someone else have been in command. As we are so waaaaaay off target of the original post and this sounds like a pretty interesting one (for me anyway as honestly I haven't heard much debate on Market Garden beyond what I have read) how about a new thread specifically on Market Garden?

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One thing I won't do is criticize a unit that paid such a heavy cost in blood to hold an objective against overwhelming odds in a very risky plan with a lot of potential for failure. Yeah there is plenty of blame to go around but those guys deserve better. 1st Airborne's stand was worthy of Sparta. As a Yank I tend to focus on my own country's army and history, but these guys are an exception. I hope we can do them justice in the Market Garden module.

A toast Gentlemen to the 1st which despite all the issues it faced held it's objective for twice as long as the plan had intended.

Certainly, the stands at the Bridge and around the Hartenstein were extraordinary. However that doesn't - and shouldn't - excuse the division from criticism. Over the last years, what, 10 years, while looking into various esoteric subjects like the intracacies of firesupport, or logistics planning, I've come across bits and pieces of muted criticism for 1 A/B. Like you, the authors seem loathe to point the finger, but it seems that staff work within the division really wasn't very good. Or, to put it another way, the staffwork was about as good as the rest of 21st Army Group had been in May 1944, but by September 1944 the units that had been in Normandy had learnt a lot about how to go about their business. 1 A/B missed out on those lessons, and paid for it at Arnhem. Not enough to alter the course of the battle - as it was they held the bridge for as long as was planned, and held a bridgehead for much longer. But enough that they suffered a lot more than another division with better staffwork might have.

I've seen the same criticism with regards to 52nd (Lowland) Division - staffwork not at the level of the rest of 21st AG when they moved to the Continent in Oct 1944.

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Um, they did take the Nijmegan bridge, after a daylight opposed river crossing in rubber boats. It was one of the most impressive outlier feats of the entire campaign. Then XXX Corps decided to wait around and not exploit it. What's with all the revisitionist slander?

As for airborne in general, they attempted to substitute picked men for missing heavy equipment, with the net result that the formations fought about the same but took heavier casualties doing it. In some circumstances where the equipment could not be brought to bear that was certainly useful - and occasionally with heavy cross attachments of such equipment they showed what more they could do. But in general substituting blood and bravery for missing 155mm howitzers or supporting armor was an idiotic bargain. Because howitzers are a heck of a lot cheaper in the long run.

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Um, they did take the Nijmegan bridge

3 days late.

Then XXX Corps decided to wait around and not exploit it.

XXX Corps had to wait round - and help out - because the bridge hadn't been captured when it was supposed to have been. There's no point laying a metaphorical carpet if they're just going to lay about like a literal carpet ;)

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Not saying I agree with him, but if we WERE to say Gavin was at fault for failing to take Nijmegen Bridge I expect a lot of folks might have preferred that someone else have been in command. As we are so waaaaaay off target of the original post and this sounds like a pretty interesting one (for me anyway as honestly I haven't heard much debate on Market Garden beyond what I have read) how about a new thread specifically on Market Garden?

Yeah well, the thread has gone in interesting directions, might as well run with it I reckon - and frankly I think it's really mean-spirited to dump on the 82nd for what happened at Nijmegen - s*&$ happens, they took the bridge eventually (and lost a lot of guys in a frontal assault over the river in broad daylight, such was the haste) - if the plan couldn't absorb that delay then it was fatally flawed from the start, way too risky and guilty of a gross under-estimation of the enemy. Say they had taken the bridge, but then been pushed back by the panzers (surprise) which rolled up the next day, same result. (why mention the delay with the Bailey bridge at the Son, or a thousand other things, that just gets in the way of a good scapegoating)

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Yes, the MG plan was brittle, but nevertheless XXX Corps did get to Nijmegan on schedule. Actually, slightly ahead of schedule.

Who was it that said "What's the best way to take a bridge"?

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:) But that's not what I meant.

Gavin knew the correct thing to do was land on both sides of the Nijmegan bridge, but chose not to. He compounded that by initially sending no one to capture the bridge, then eventually not enough force.

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Actually the best way to take a bridge is when no one is there at all as 2 Para did. This avoids the need to send your men across a river protected only by canvas.

The men of the of the 504th performed one of the bravest acts perhaps of the entire war. The fact that they had to do it at all was a total cock up.

Sure saying "It is all Gavin's fault" is not really fair but it is a major factor in the failure.

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German operational command did their best to make Allies look good. it doesn't make Allies good.

what comes to amazing mobile ops around Minsk, it's curious the Soviets found them amazing enough to sack the commander behind them. comparing to Normandy, Soviets faced thin air in Bagration. on the other hand in Bagration Germans were only made to wait to get pocketed, while in Normandy they were made to move deeper into the pocket, so perhaps that evens it out.

German operational command is mostly senseless. if they don't dare to confront Hitler and OKH then they should not complain about impossible or retarded orders. acknowledging the retarded nature of affairs in diaries etc is of no help if one doesn't do something about it. doing stupid stuff is even more stupid when one is aware of how stupid it is.

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While allied weaknesses also mattered for early war German successes, the operational skill shown in German direction of the "big chess" of the whole war is readily explained by noticing that they let Kasporov play the opening, then shoved him aside to let your uncle Guido play like a fish for the rest of the game.

i couldn't agree more with you. though i'd add a cat to your scenario. every now and then the cat jumps on the table and messes with the pieces randomly.

the problem is that one could continue your list almost endlessly down to division level commanders.

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German operational handling had its last master performance in southern Russian in early 1943, and even that was only recovering from being outplayed operationally over the previous six months. And for the whole remainder of the war, that operational direction, as well as the overall strategic direction, was god-awful. On every front. It is no exaggeration to say a reasonably intelligent boy of 12 could have done better. Fact.

Impressive! And quite true. I'm re-reading Blumenson's account of Kluge trying to get SS General Hauser to make at least a few sensible moves during the Cobra breakout. You have to sympathize with Kluge a little at that point.

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Any airborne operation is replete with dangers, given the 11 day planning cycle, from the adaption of the existing plan to execution I think MG did surprisingly well. Operation Mercury came close to disaster and the Germans had more time to plan a less adventurous operation, as for Kanev, need I say more, though the Russians were hampered by critical logistical/transport shortages. I thought XXX Corps were held up when their infantry were delayed in clearing Nijmegen and did not push on after securing the bridge, if they had only a weak force stood in their way. Second guessing comrmanders, from the comfort of our homes, whilst having access to all the enemy plans and historical hindsight, is rather like comparing Panthers to Shermans in one to one death matches!

URC, gosh that thin air was tough for the Soviets! Over 2,000 AFV;s and 600,000 killed, wounded and missing from thin air, must have been the elite air elemental detatchment! Either that or hitting thin air was a result of a masterful maskirovka operation, I really don't thing the Falaise Pocket and the destruction of army group centre can be compared, to be honest

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Well the Soviet answer to that is, if you throw men's lives into a fight and get a result, the lives aren't thrown away. And protecting life is no more important than any other resource.

I said skilled.

I don't pick on Konev based on that, just on his ability to throw men into battle disregarding their lives. This exceeded even ability of Zhukov or Rokossovski to do it.

He said it so himself.

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German operational handling had its last master performance in southern Russian in early 1943, and even that was only recovering from being outplayed operationally over the previous six months. And for the whole remainder of the war, that operational direction, as well as the overall strategic direction, was god-awful. On every front. It is no exaggeration to say a reasonably intelligent boy of 12 could have done better. Fact

combined with

When you have a handful of chess masters and you throw them all out like used tissue, why is anyone surprised that the rest of the operational direction of the war looks decidedly crappy?

While allied weaknesses also mattered for early war German successes, the operational skill shown in German direction of the "big chess" of the whole war is readily explained by noticing that they let Kasporov play the opening, then shoved him aside to let your uncle Guido play like a fish for the rest of the game.

__________________

I am not convinced about the intellectual inferiority of the "Masters" moving the German pawns against the Allies in the western front.

We can't use the results as a proof they were worse than a "12 year old intelligent boy".

If i use the analogy of chess, i will say that the Masters were forced to play a blind game and on top of that, for each movement of theirs, the Allies could make two moves. Allied air supremacy and high level of mechanization (which Germans never had to such extend, even during their best days), coupled with a Western Front, ideal for rapid maneuvers, gave the Allies a decisive advantage when they found an open space.

This doesn't take away from the fact that Allies performed well, but it is also a fact that Germans could move mostly only at night and their best source of operational level information was basically Signal intelligence which gave less information (and at a slower tempo) compared to aerial reccon.

When Germans were faced with situations of attrition warfare against the Allies, they fought well. They did it in Normandy and in Italy, but they just collapsed when they had to fight a war of maneuvers.

I am not going to blaim the "Masters" for the horrible operational level operations. The thing is that the strategic situation was horrible and as a result, whatever operational sub-set came from the first, was going to be horrible too. If there was any obvious mistake, that was their decision to lead an army in this strategic enviroment and try to win. But the moment they decided to do it, they had to develop an operational plan which was going to be "silly" anyway, since the defeat was certain by the August of 1944.

The truth is that these generals had limited options and none of them was a good solution to the problems they were facing. Sure, they could withdraw from Normandy earlier and preserve more of their army, but at the same time this meant they were comfortable with the idea that they could defend a front ten and twenty times more the one they had in Normandy, the front they had to abandon because they couldn't hold anymore!.

So, if you see it from this perspective, it is not so irrational they decided to go for broke in desperate indeed actions aiming to hold Allies in the Normandy peninsula.

Or take the Ardennes. They aim for an operational level victory-a proper objective for any high rank General fighting to win a war- but at the same time they had to acheive it during a limited window of opportunity when they were unseen from the Allied air force and for a short time they could "play" their "pawns" on equal terms and speed. So they tried to drive deep and fast in a forested area filled with deep snow. Even if they had the logistics and the resources (which they didn't), they couldn't have chosen a worse combination, but on the other hand it wasn't they had a better option to score an operational level victory.

On one hand deep snow and forests do not fit well with rapid decisive results. They pulled it off with just one or the other in previous campaigns, against unskilled opponents and even then, they avoided the worst weather periods in the theater whenever they started decisive operations. But by December of 1944 in the West, they simply didn't have the option to manuever deep into enemy territory in an open country, with horses and barely enough fuel against full mech divisions with better logistical support, or under clear skies with all kinds of Allied planes and eyes monitoring their movement. Nor they had the option to wait and keep committed thousands of men and equipment in the West when the Red Army seemed unstoppable in the East.

Notice that up until now i haven't even discussed the usual issue of casualties because of air power in the battlefront. This, to whatever extend it happened, comes as extra to everything i mentioned above which is more related to the ability to move faster and see the opponent in more detail than he can.

Under these circumstances, playing blind (hearing only the chess notation of the oppnent's moves) and offerring one move for every two the opponent makes, Kasparov couldn't win a game against a decent chess player.

And this comes from someone who has participated in Chess tournaments :)

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pakmak - no the situation wasn't ideal, but sorry the actual command performance was extremely poor. The part about doing OK in attrition periods (which they uniformly lost, in part by bleeding excessively in endless negative odds counterattacks) mean precisely the periods where nobody above the rank of major had anything to do with it.

Unforced errors in the west, off the top of my head.

(1) no unity of command. Jodl holds the keys to the reserves, not Rundstadt. Rundstadt is not allowed to command his armies, instead Rommel gets to decide the plan of campaign beforehand. Then he doesn't get to implement it.

Rundstadt had the better ideas on this subject, and no surprise since he was one of the most successful and professional commanders they had. But he was deprived of the authority of an army group commander, between Jodl and his nominal subordinate.

(2) Freezing 15th army in Pas de Calais. Later they ran reckless risks, but on this key item they were both easily misled, arrogantly sure of themselves, hopelessly wrong and entirely too conservative.

(3) A quarter million men left in the ports. Bay of Biscay defended forever. South only evac'ed against orders and too late for half of them to get out. "He who defends everything defends nothing". Some of the overstretch was unavoidable, but it is a perfectly typical command problem and their performance on it was just horrible.

(4) Reckless counterattacks by the armor, vs. Epsom and then Lehr vs. the Americans for example. They showed when they stood on the defense they could inflict higher losses on attackers for less lost, but they utterly refused to learn that lesson, and threw away easily half their armor strength in the theater on a couple of single day delays, at best.

(5) Mortain. As dumb an operational move as you will find in any war ever. Makes the Romans at Cannae look like fleet footed genuises. Here is a big noose. OK, here is all my remaining armor, stick it as far into the noose as it will go.

(6) New tank production into Panzer brigades instead of rebuilding existing formations, because "let's pretend" is more important than veteran cadres.

(7) Piecemeal commitment of that new armor at the westwall in overall offensive stance, result entirely predictable loss of that armor for nothing.

(8) Rundstadt tells you that the Ardennes offensive will never work. The Ardennes offensive was never going to work, and it wasted 1000 tanks. Men are listened to not based on their intelligence, their objectivity, their military skill, or even their records in such things in pure empiric fashion. No, they are listened to based purely on how delusional they are, and objectivity is a reason for dismissal.

And it is not like the west is the only case of any of these.

They start in the east as early as the winter of 1941 to 1942. They have already decapitated the army that won the great victories of 1939 to mid 1942 by September 1942. In disaster, grudgingly, an occasional junior commander from the same schools is promoted into enough authority to matter (Manstein for example, who was a Rundstadt protege and his chief of staff in the early war), only to get the same treatment soon enough.

Pocketing nothing at Rostov instead of pressing to the Caspian along the Volga.

Half of AG South sent into the Caucasus, to hit nothing.

The reserve needed to win on the north shoulder or to defend anything sent to Leningrad after the Crimea is mopped up.

Correct assessments of Russian strength and the threat to the flanks of the Stalingrad position dismissed, along with the chief of staff who pointed them out.

The hold at all costs order at Stalingrad, instead of breakout.

That's just in 1942 in the east. The same can be found in 1943, 4 and 5 in the east. In the west, besides the ETO errors, there is doubling the force in Tunisia where it was clearly unsupportable and was predictably lost - a quarter million man unforced error.

These are not the actions of operational genuis. Quite the contrary.

The tactical skill of the junior commanders and men were carrying the brass, not the other way around, from September 1942 on. With only a handful of exceptions (e.g. Manstein's brief authority after the Stalingrad disaster, similar brief periods of authority for Model after similar disasters later...)

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Mr. C.,

I agree with all of your points but this one,

"Freezing 15th army in Pas de Calais. Later they ran reckless risks, but on this key item they were both easily misled, arrogantly sure of themselves, hopelessly wrong and entirely too conservative."

I think you are being too harsh. The allied deception effort was enormous, deep, complex, long lasting (the setting up of turned German agents as totally reliable by the XX Committee started before even Cossac was formed), and very well done. To write-off the German response to the most brilliant example of maskirovka of the 20th century as being, "Easily led" is unfair on both the Germans and the deceivers.

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Blackcat - that is an adequate excuse for having an army at the Pas de Calais when Normandy was invaded. It is a barely adequate excuse for not reacting immediately, say in the first week, at most two. It is not remotely an adequate excuse for 15th Army still being frozen in July, let alone at the time of Cobra. When the moves on the map become overwhelmingly obvious and overwhelmingly necessary, paying attention to intel reports instead is simply a command error.

15th Army still had 18 divisions on the 1st of July. It had not lost any strength, net, since the invasion - anything transfered out of the area to Normandy had been replaced by transfers in from Norway and Denmark. Brittany sent 4 divisions, the south of France sent 6 divisions, the panzer reserves were released (mostly) and arrived -but not 15th Army. 116th Panzer wasn't released until after Goodwood, and the rest of didn't "unfreeze" until after Cobra. Then low mobility IDs were thrown in piecemeal trying to relieve fought-out 7th army units, and were rapidly lost. When the Allies pushed up the coast, the army was down to about 5 divisions, but only 3-4 of its original 18 were sent in time to make any difference in Normandy, and that late. Most were utterly wasted in panic commitment during the breakout.

This is poor operational direction by any measure, and nothing excuses it.

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Mr. C.,

We will just have to disagree on this one. The success of the deception operation was such that for many weeks the Germans thought an invasion in the Calais region was on the cards. It was a masterpiece of allied work.

I think you are crediting the Germans with more accurate information than they had and as a result giving them less credit than they deserve. How overwhelmingly obvious was the map at the time of Cobra to them at the time, I wonder.

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