Panzer V against any US tank

[Bastables]

Agree. The real t34 copy (the panthers competitor) was rejected because of a political scare campaign claiming it did not look german enough.

Wait what?

The report that was key in selecting the MAN versus the DB 30 series veh was: That the MAN suspension was superior, it had a larger turret ring, DB turret did not exist outside of drawings, the MAN panther compartmentalised engine bay was easier to convert for submersion and it had a longer range. Based on this Hitler agreed that the MAN design was the better one as the DB would also take longer to get into service.

DB internal reports about the rejection cite: 1 double torsion bar was selected over our leaf spring suspension.

2.MB 507 (diesel) motor cannot be produced in the number required.

3. Our design requires a new turret, MAN turret is already available.

I'd guess the main factor (from Wa pruf6) was the suspension, letters in speilbergers books dealing with Panther and PIII note that DB was consistently at odds with Wa pruf6 as they (DB) preferred leaf spring over torsion bar types since their PIII design. Looking at the 30 ton protoype sheets MAN has .68kg/cm2 ground pressure and DB had thinner tracks and poorer flotation with .83kg/cm2 with 6cm frontal armour base. Hitler placed greater importance on getting equipment made which also told against the DB

There is no mention of: lolol DB looks too much like T-34

[Michael Emrys]

It means the panther was better than the sherman. But that the Sherman was cheating in every way possible !!!

Cheating? But my boy, war is all about cheating. He who cheats best wins. They don't award the prize to the guys who "play fair" and lose.

All this debate about what was the best tank and under what circumstances and by which criteria we are to decide is a little beside the point, however academically interesting it might be to armchair strategists. The real question is who was able to put together a winning combination of all arms. Hint: It wasn't Germany.

Michael

[Bastables]

I understand trouble with MkIIIs was entirely due to firing AP with a burster charge against spaced armor plate. The rounds would easily pierce the first layer then self-destruct. Excepting that small annoyance, PzIIIs were entirely outclassed by Sherman.

Kass pass and the battles before and after it had US deployed with AP shot. The effectiveness of German AP shells with burster charges was one of the reasons for the push and eventual change over to AP shells. The spaced armour on PIII would not have touched off the burster charge fuses as US AP of 43 lacked a burster.

You can see this where we captured German tanks after they'd been shot up (or worse the germans would recover and referb "knock outs"), and the Germans captured 3 tanks and knocked out circa 190 because the burster charge from 50, 75 and 88mm shells would cause catastrophic damage. If the tank brew's up/burns the armour becomes worthless.

[stikkypixie]

I just cannot argue, when its put like this. The Sherman was a good tank because priority was elsewhere. The panther was a crap tank because the germans prioritised it. I must be a nazi.

Yes, the Sherman did not take away resources from the main war effort while still being able to large degree do what it was designed for. The Panther on the other hand did, and still wasn't good enough to change the tide of war. AKA the Sherman more or about the same as the panther in terms of function, but with much less.

I do wonder though, what they should have build. Don't think it would have mattered much.

[Magpie_Oz]

Yes, the Sherman did not take away resources from the main war effort while still being able to large degree do what it was designed for. The Panther on the other hand did, and still wasn't good enough to change the tide of war. AKA the Sherman more or about the same as the panther in terms of function, but with much less.

I do wonder though, what they should have build. Don't think it would have mattered much.

The big problem with German industry was their lack of efficiency, there were considerably more people in German factories than Soviet but the Soviets far out produced them.

They also made some monumentally bad choices, the battleship Bismark for example, the most powerful ship afloat ..... for 9 months, when it was sunk. almost with all hands having achieved ... SOD ALL.

You could have made 1000 Panthers out of the steel used to build her, or maybe more importantly 40 more Uboats.

[Michael Emrys]

...having achieved ... SOD ALL.

Well, it did sink the Hood (unless you subscribe to the theory that the Prinz Eugene did that). Albeit, tragic as that was, it probably altered the course of the war not at all.

You could have made 1000 Panthers out of the steel used to build her, or maybe more importantly 40 more Uboats.

The German naval program was a sodding mess. Such as it was, it was founded on Hitler's promise of no general war before 1944, so was thrown completely off kilter when the war started five years too soon. In any event, it's hard to see how building capital ships was going to serve any realistic naval strategy at all. If Germany had begun the war with 100 U-boats (not that there was much chance of them building that many, even if they had started in 1936), they might well have forced Britain to come to terms after the fall of France.

Michael

[Other Means]

Operation Bagration:

Soviet Armour: 4070 German Armour: 118 Tanks 377 TD

Soviet Losses: 2957 German Losses : The Eastern front.

Fixed the for ya

[Blackcat]

... even the British produced more tanks than the Germans.

Did we really? I never knew that.

[Magpie_Oz]

Did we really? I never knew that.

No I got that wrong.

You lot did make more of lots of other stuff tho', aircraft in particular which is just as well as they were a lot better than anything that anyone else had.

[Sardaukar]

Sherman was definitely better tank in operational sense...but it didn't do much good for crew confidence when having to meet Panthers or Tigers. And it influenced their combat behaviour.

E.g. US 3rd Armoured Division took 232 Shermans into France, lost 648 completely destroyed and 700 that could be repaired. That is loss rate of 580%.

So it might have not done good for combat morale, if sensing that your tank was very vulnerable to enemy weapons.

[Magpie_Oz]

I think sweeping across western Europe past piles of smouldering German gear and men might have made them a little more chipper?

[Sardaukar]

I think sweeping across western Europe past piles of smouldering German gear and men might have made them a little more chipper?

Don't know if "sweeping" is the right word, considering relatively slow rate of advance in Autumn 1944.

For a tank crew, it was irrelevant to know that your side possessed 10-1 advantage, when confronted about immediate reality that if they fired at Tiger or Panther, their shell was likely to bounce off. And if it fired back, they were likely to brew up...

Sherman was very efficient "war-horse" but in situations like that, could be found bit lacking.

Of course, it didn't matter in big picture, but guys in combat rarely think of big picture.

[stikkypixie]

Don't know if "sweeping" is the right word, considering relatively slow rate of advance in Autumn 1944.

For a tank crew, it was irrelevant to know that your side possessed 10-1 advantage, when confronted about immediate reality that if they fired at Tiger or Panther, their shell was likely to bounce off. And if it fired back, they were likely to brew up...

Sherman was very efficient "war-horse" but in situations like that, could be found bit lacking.

Of course, it didn't matter in big picture, but guys in combat rarely think of big picture.

I wonder how often a Sherman crew came across other enemy tanks given the relative scarcity of German armour (although I fully realize that once is one time too many).

[Sardaukar]

I wonder how often a Sherman crew came across other enemy tanks given the relative scarcity of German armour (although I fully realize that once is one time too many).

I think very large majority of losses were to Panzerfausts and ATGs. But when they came against German armour, many contemporary tank crew members expressed dismay. The effect really was more of psychological than operational reality, but it did make Allied tankers more cautious.

And for every such encounter, there was operational and tactical successes for Allied tankers too. E.g. when Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army attacked 18 September neat Luneville. US MGen. John S. Wood and his 4th Armoured Division handed Germans such a defeat that they were not only beaten but shattered. 111th Pz Div started battle with 98 tanks and ended it 4 days later with 7 tanks and 80 men... Unusually, US casualties were only fraction of German ones.

Of course MGen Wood was very outstanding tank commander, the 4th Armored led the 'race across France' and much of Patton's reputation from the 'sweep' was due to Wood's 4th Armored.

[Magpie_Oz]

Don't know if "sweeping" is the right word, considering relatively slow rate of advance in Autumn 1944.

10 May of 1940 the German forces swept across France and by 25 June France had fallen.

25 July of 1944 the Allies launched the breakout from Normandy, by 25 of August France was liberated and the German Army annihilated.

By the end of September the Grmans were back behind their frontier more or less, "Bradley, for example, by September, had four more divisions than planned and all of his forces were 150 miles ahead of their expected position."

Sounds like a sweep to me ?

[Sardaukar]

10 May of 1940 the German forces swept across France and by 25 June France had fallen.

25 July of 1944 the Allies launched the breakout from Normandy, by 25 of August France was liberated and the German Army annihilated.

By the end of September the Grmans were back behind their frontier more or less, "Bradley, for example, by September, had four more divisions than planned and all of his forces were 150 miles ahead of their expected position."

Sounds like a sweep to me ?

Well..as I was talking about Autumn 1944 when advance slowed (for logistical reasons too) by Germans being able to redeploy. That was the time when Allied tankers were going against prepared positions and momentum was lost. There was also this small Monty thing called Market Garden, taking the focus.

And you are wrong with "Germans annihilated", Allies in France never managed really decisive encirclement etc. Even Falaise Pocket was never closed, allowing large number of German troops to escape. Russians rarely made that mistake in Operation Bagration. Germans were devastated and mauled in West, but it took until 1945 for really decisive encirclements to happen. But before that, Germans were often able to withdraw, regroup and rebuild. That is not annihilation.

[Magpie_Oz]

Well..as I was talking about Autumn 1944 when advance slowed (for logistical reasons too) by Germans being able to redeploy. That was the time when Allied tankers were going against prepared positions and momentum was lost. There was also this small Monty thing called Market Garden, taking the focus.

You mean where they swept 60 miles into Holland in 8 days?

[Sardaukar]

You mean where they swept 60 miles into Holland in 8 days?

And never pushed much more, spending 4 months there. There was at least decent opportunity for war to end by Xmas 1944 if German ability to resist had been decisively crushed in France during summer.

It cost loads of men and equipment from September 1944 onwards, for allowing Germans to regroup. But instead, the strategy of pushing Germans back on wide front was adopted. I don't think it was a good idea..and most recollections from vets of Autumn 1944 seem to reflect that well.

Whatever one may think of German military in WW II, they were quite good to put up bitter fight if you let them time to consolidate.

[Magpie_Oz]

And never pushed much more, spending 4 months there.

....

There was at least decent opportunity for war to end by Xmas 1944 if German ability to resist had been decisively crushed in France during summer.

....

Whatever one may think of German military in WW II, they were quite good to put up bitter fight if you let them time to consolidate.

Sure they stayed there 4 moths, it was winter or fools attack in Winter and they did.

They were decisively crushed 450 000 casulaties and all but 100 odd tanks is a fair bit of a crushing.

They consolidated and then they were attacked and fell to bits... again.

Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, Metz they were costly battles but the Germans lost all of them.

[Blackcat]

No I got that wrong.

You lot did make more of lots of other stuff tho', aircraft in particular which is just as well as they were a lot better than anything that anyone else had.

Actually it seems that you were in part correct. According to Buckley* from the war's begining until May 1943 (the decision to scale back tank production in the UK) the Brits produced 3,000 more tanks that the Germans did. Of course, most of them weren't upto snuff but that is another matter.

We live and learn.

*British Armour in the Normandy Campaign.

[Sardaukar]

Sure they stayed there 4 moths, it was winter or fools attack in Winter and they did.

They were decisively crushed 450 000 casulaties and all but 100 odd tanks is a fair bit of a crushing.

They consolidated and then they were attacked and fell to bits... again.

Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, Metz they were costly battles but the Germans lost all of them.

But Germans were not decisively defeated until in 1945..and I think that could have achieved with less losses and lot earlier if there had been bit more "drive".

Of course there was bad management of logistics by Gen. Lee (who was often target of withering criticism from combat commanders). Then there was bad oversight by Montgomery's 21st Army Group not to clear Antwep and Schelde early, as they could have with probably lot less casualties. This allowed Germans to concentrate tens of thousands of troops and dig in, fact that cost later Canadians and Brits lot of casualties.

And I don't think US troops were wise to go to Hurtgen Forest either, sacrificing their main advantages, mobility and firepower. It caused US divisions quite appalling casualties and gain was not that great.

Understandably soldiers were not too eager to push forward when perceiving that end of war was near, but with 20/20 hindsight, that was wrong decision and cost more lives in longer run. E.g., MGen. Gavin, CO of 101 AB Div. gave quite nasty comments in his diary, even so late as 18 Jan 1945, about lack of aggressiveness of units his paratroopers had to fight with:

"If our infantry would fight, the war would be over now. On our present front, there are two very weak German regiments holding the XVII Corps of four divisions. We all know it and admit it, and yet nothing is done about it. American infantry just simply will not fight. No-one wants to get killed... Our artillery is wonderful and our air corps not bad. But the regular infantry - terrible. Everyone want to live to ripe old age. The sight of a few Germans drives them to their holes. Instead of being imbued with an overwhelming desire to get close to the German and get him by the throat, they want to avoid him if the artillery has not knocked him flat.

Of course this was one of the best US infantry commanders (along Ridgway), leading an elite division, but there is lot of truth about his statement.

In West, Allies should have never allowed measured retreatment for Germans if possible, it cost lot of casualties later. Fortunately, Germans did make several bad counterattacks, most famous being the Ardennes/Battle of Bulge.

My point in this is, while Allied sweep through France was fast, Germans were allowed to escape with lot of their manpower and with unit cadres available for rebuild. Thus the advance was neither annihilation nor decisive, Germans were able to regroup and put up about 6 months of organized resistance from good defensive positions.

German defensive concept was rather good and was well-led even when units participating were shadow of themself. Weakness of remaining German manpower material was more profound when they tried to attack.

This relates to original concept of Panther vs Sherman in a way, that I can well understand reluctance to aggressively close with enemy in those instances. In armour sense, it could be about possibility to meet something really nasty, plus abundance of Panzerfaust used by Germans. In infantry sense, it could be weapons like MG42, which as HMG setup could allow unit to "punch above it's weight" especially psychologically.

[Blackcat]

Sardaukar,

I am intrigued. Once the breakout from Normandy had occurred, in what way did the allies allow the Germans a measured retreat? What do you think they should have done differently?

[Charlie Marlow]

Sardaukar,

I am intrigued. Once the breakout from Normandy had occurred, in what way did the allies allow the Germans a measured retreat? What do you think they should have done differently?

Falase for one. Bradley should never have put the brakes on the Southern Arm, and Monty should have stepped on the gas on the Northern arm. Netting 10s of thousands of more Germans in August would have spared much pain the rest of the year.

Not to say that the Allies let the Germans retreat in an orderly fashion, but more could have been done.

[Blackcat]

Mr. Marlow,

I know about Falaise, thats why I said once the breakout had occurred.

[Charlie Marlow]

Mr. Marlow,

I know about Falaise, thats why I said once the breakout had occurred.

Well, The US at least had already broken out prior to Falaise.

But no matter.