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Panzer V against any US tank


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Secondly, and more relevantly, I could be a spastic illiterate mong who couldn't scrawl his name on the side of a barn with a large crayon, and still be possessed of the entirely valid opinion that, for example, anything by Carell or Irving is only useful as a BBQ fuel.

True. However I think we were hoping you would give some valid* reasons for being dismissive of Zaloga.

*or invalid

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Steven Zaloga is a giant amongst men, in my opinion, if only for his contributions to the scale modelling fraternity.

Yep. But we aren't talking about scale modelling.

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Looking at his wiki page I think he has some credibility, or as much as some authorities are given on this forum

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Zaloga

I was pretty underwhelmed by Zitterling's Korsun Pocket book, he seemed to go out of his way to stress how few tank losses the Germans took and used German unit combat reports verbatim. Strangely his conclusion was that the Red army had brought the overall loss rate, of AFV's, down to 3:1, far better than Kursk, I must say I was surprised at this, as the book had been full of, 'the Russians opened fire and missed and all the AT guns/tanks/assault guns were quickly destroyed.

I seem to remember in the late 70's or early 80's a UK documentary programme using Zaloga to question the effectiveness of Soviet weapons, namely the the T-62 and BMP (there had been a habit for the press to endow Soviet weapons with near magical qualities in such programmes, whilst criticising qualitatively superior Western equipment).

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Yep. But we aren't talking about scale modelling.

Too bad there are no reasons given why Zaloga is clueless and wrong about his opinions and statements in his fine volume on tank destroyers.

Strange that I mentioned far more information on this subject and quotes from the Ft Leavenworth's US Army Combat Studies Institute on the overall failure of the whole TD concept ( it was disbanded as a force and concept after the war) and you zero in on a couple opinions from Zaloga.

You are certainly welcome to your opinion on tank destroyers and your opinion on TD's has merit but your continual rants about Zaloga as a historian are clearly not adding anything to the TD discussion. Perhaps you should start your own thread on Zaloga ?

Ok, back to this wonderful game.

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ok, but i don't see them as descendants of TD doctrine. Even during WWII we had an attempt to use air assets to fight tanks and often we had dedicated tank busting units. These units and their tactics are not related to TD doctrine.

The last is basically the product of a debate between more protection or more maneuverability-power. The application of airpower on the battlefield is not related to this dillema.

But on a broader front, we still find a type of debate which is somewhat similar to the one we saw in the TD doctrine.

Can airpower by itself confront and defeat enemy armor?

or

is it still necessary to confront enemy tanks with friendly armor?

I'm not talking of "airpower" (CAS, in this specific situation), which existed from 1920 on as is. I'm talking of AT assets under Army command, which follow, point by point, the tenets for TD doctrine as exposed: higher maneuverability and speed than tanks, capability of offensive concentration of AT assets against enemy tanks. This is done today by helicopters. The instrument is radically different, but the basic doctrine is the same.

It is meant to work as a combined arms system, as TDs were supposed to do, so, your final two questions lack sense in that context.

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Too bad there are no reasons given why Zaloga is clueless and wrong about his opinions and statements in his fine volume on tank destroyers. ... your continual rants about Zaloga as a historian

Hyperbole, much?

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I'm not talking of "airpower" (CAS, in this specific situation), which existed from 1920 on as is. I'm talking of AT assets under Army command, which follow, point by point, the tenets for TD doctrine as exposed: higher maneuverability and speed than tanks, capability of offensive concentration of AT assets against enemy tanks. This is done today by helicopters. The instrument is radically different, but the basic doctrine is the same.

It is meant to work as a combined arms system, as TDs were supposed to do, so, your final two questions lack sense in that context.

I guess it is a matter of what you mean by "basic doctrine". If we want to simplify the subjects, totally ignore different characteristics of the platforms and their different strengths, limitations and so on, we can find "basic" similarities among everything.

You can find similarities at the most basic level between CAS and artillery doctrine too if you want.

I think we have to see the whole picture, including tactics techniques and procedures used to exploit the "high maneuverability and speed" of AT platforms against enemy tanks.

I can't ignore the fact that AT Helos are simply incapable to defend a locality, due to their limitation of staying in the battlefield for a long time, or the fact that they have different threats against them.

Nor i can ignore the fact that even modern theory of AT helicopter use, doesn't believe that these assets can free firendly tanks from the need to defeat enemy armor, which was one of the pursued objectives of TD doctrine in the beginning.

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and i would like to add something else.

The vision of TD use didn't relate to combined arms operations. I am not sure why you mention it did, perhaps you read somewhere a proponent talking about "combined arms", but i prefer to let actions speak for people's intentions.

Look for example the design of the TD platform. The M10 turret was topless. The board's official reason was that increased observation and reduced weight, both important in their vision to seek, find first enemy tanks and favorable firing positions, and use speed to occupy them, gain an advantage and defeat enemy armor.

It seems to me they underestimated the threats from multiple sources in a combined arms enviroment. It still worked against a desperate enemy attacking carelessly with minimum artillery support- often as a result of poor observation conditions since he tried to avoid CAS, but NATO didn't expect Russians to employ armor the same way.

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Similarities between CAS and arty aren't the same than effective pursuit of similar goals and doctrine.

You may have CAS included in a preplanned artillery plan, but you, the Army commander, don't have command on those assets as part of your combined arms formation.

OTOH, you have command and control on the AT helicopters and they are part of your formation.

The TDs, as per the doctrine you stated, weren't meant to hold a locality. The ability of doing so is just a side effect of the characteristics of the machine. To the doctrinal effects that you specifically signaled: offensive operations against enemy armor (not holding terrain) wherever it is, the AT helicopters are the today's main instrument inside the Army force. Of course, you can eventually use tanks for that, risking a 1 to 1 odd (assuming equally capable opponents), instead of the near 10 to 1 you got with a AT helicopter.

It has nothing to do with "freeing" tanks from their "needs" or tasks. You stated that the stop in the developing of mechanized TDs was a result of bad doctrine. I say that there are now far better ways of doing which that doctrine establish than a mechanized TD, at least in some armies.

Others, like Austrian military industry, just keep coming with mechanized TDs, like the Kürassier, for those who can't afford enough AT helicopters, nor have the luxury on tank numbers as to use them as AT asset exclusively.

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The TDs, as per the doctrine you stated, weren't meant to hold a locality

first of all there is no black and white. Their primary purpose in theory was of course to actively seek and destroy. They did this by occupying first advantageous positions and by using this they certainly denied the enemy an advance. The AT helicopter can't stay too long in the battlefield to have similar effects. They will find the enemy, destroy some tanks and when they return back, the rest of the enemy force may still continue its advance. It depends on what portion of his force is intact. You can't do this against a ground force. I think this is obvious.

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and i would like to add something else.

The vision of TD use didn't relate to combined arms operations. I am not sure why you mention it did, perhaps you read somewhere a proponent talking about "combined arms", but i prefer to let actions speak for people's intentions.

Look for example the design of the TD platform. The M10 turret was topless. The board's official reason was that increased observation and reduced weight, both important in their vision to seek, find first enemy tanks and favorable firing positions, and use speed to occupy them, gain an advantage and defeat enemy armor.

It seems to me they underestimated the threats from multiple sources in a combined arms enviroment. It still worked against a desperate enemy attacking carelessly with minimum artillery support- often as a result of poor observation conditions since he tried to avoid CAS, but NATO didn't expect Russians to employ armor the same way.

I think you confuses many things.

I talked combined arms because it was you who made a few questions on limitations of AT helicopters (not M10s) in an operational vacuum, like if the only tool in the Army tool set was just the helo.

Then you go to point limitations on M-10 design which are more evident if used "against" TD doctrine (if you were seeking offensively for enemy armor, being open topped is not, theoretically, a limitation, because you are the one pacing the operations, and if speed is everything, there were very few chances that German or Soviet army could react with arty on time). That is, those limitations are quite evident when on defense, with the enemy's initiative and his arty falling down on your troops.

And even more convoluted, instead of keeping coherent your criticism to the core of the doctrine, we end with you criticizing the AT helos (and TDs) for being ineffective at something they weren't designed for: to hold (not defend, because any instrument could collaborate to defense) a location.

I personally think that the whole idea of TDs was stupid at WWII, as the instrument was too similar to a tank as to be meaningful to have other than a tank doing the task, plus taking out resources from them. But the doctrine itself evolved after WWII when instruments better fitted were developed, like the AT helicopter, or even, in some cases, light utilitarian vehicles with heavy AT punch.

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first of all there is no black and white. Their primary purpose in theory was of course to actively seek and destroy. They did this by occupying first advantageous positions and by using this they certainly denied the enemy an advance. The AT helicopter can't stay too long in the battlefield to have similar effects. They will find the enemy, destroy some tanks and when they return back, the rest of the enemy force may still continue its advance. It depends on what portion of his force is intact. You can't do this against a ground force. I think this is obvious.

Well, if you consider that an AT helicopter can have, in a good scenario, a 20 to 1 kill ratio against tanks, just having a few helos rotating at the chosen area could be far more effective than an equal force of tanks to stop a mechanized force.

A destroyed TD or tank is as ineffective as an helo to hold any ground.

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Similarities between CAS and arty aren't the same than effective pursuit of similar goals and doctrine.

You may have CAS included in a preplanned artillery plan, but you, the Army commander, don't have command on those assets as part of your combined arms formation.

OTOH, you have command and control on the AT helicopters and they are part of your formation.

The TDs, as per the doctrine you stated, weren't meant to hold a locality. The ability of doing so is just a side effect of the characteristics of the machine. To the doctrinal effects that you specifically signaled: offensive operations against enemy armor (not holding terrain) wherever it is, the AT helicopters are the today's main instrument inside the Army force. Of course, you can eventually use tanks for that, risking a 1 to 1 odd (assuming equally capable opponents), instead of the near 10 to 1 you got with a AT helicopter.

It has nothing to do with "freeing" tanks from their "needs" or tasks. You stated that the stop in the developing of mechanized TDs was a result of bad doctrine. I say that there are now far better ways of doing which that doctrine establish than a mechanized TD, at least in some armies.

Others, like Austrian military industry, just keep coming with mechanized TDs, like the Kürassier, for those who can't afford enough AT helicopters, nor have the luxury on tank numbers as to use them as AT asset exclusively.

Utter bollocks.

Anti Tank helicopters have a momentary presence over the battlefield and are not in any way shape or for anything more than a supporting asset.

8 guided missiles will never replace 50 120mm APFSDS for the antitank mission hovering behind a hill will never replace an MBT in a hull down position.

Armour cannot hold ground only infantry has the ability to do so.

Check the mission statements of the US Army for each of the arms and their role on the battlefield becomes apparent. Most armies have the same or similar statements.

"The Mission of Armor is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, manoeuvre, and shock effect."

"The Mission of Army Aviation is to find, fix, and destroy the enemy through fire and manoeuvre; and to provide combat, combat service and combat service support in coordinated operations as an integral member of the combined arms team."

"The Mission of Infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and manoeuvre in order to destroy, capture, or repel their assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack."

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I talked combined arms because it was you who made a few questions on limitations of AT helicopters (not M10s) in an operational vacuum

It is not the limitations themselves i pointed. Every system has limitations and yes you want to minimize them through combined arms. No argument here. I mentioned the totally different characteristics of the systems. They apply so different tactics, including basic ones-which is why i mentioned defense,because of their different limitations i find it a stress to argue they both come from the same TD doctrine.

Ok, everybody wants to use superior speed and firepower to destroy the enemy. We find the same objective in many different "doctrines". This doesn't mean that all are the same.

I guess in theory we can say there is an overall military doctrine which links all together, but this is a very weak assosiation.

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Utter bollocks.

Anti Tank helicopters have a momentary presence over the battlefield and are not in any way shape or for anything more than a supporting asset.

8 guided missiles will never replace 50 120mm APFSDS for the antitank mission hovering behind a hill will never replace an MBT in a hull down position.

Sorry, where I said otherwise?

I'm not comparing MBTs to helicopters, I'm comparing TD doctrine.

Armour cannot hold ground only infantry has the ability to do so.

Exactly part of my point when I mentioned "combined arms". Nor MBTs, nor TDs, nor helicopters' mission to hold ground.

"The Mission of Army Aviation is to find, fix, and destroy the enemy through fire and manoeuvre; and to provide combat, combat service and combat service support in coordinated operations as an integral member of the combined arms team."

Change "Army Aviation" for the more specific "AT helicopters", "enemy" for "enemy tanks" and it is pretty close to the mission of TDs as established by the doctrine being discussed, isn't?

No idea why you come after me, if you are virtually arguing the same that I am.

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Sorry I thought you were saying that the main antitank arm in modern armies are AT Helicopters which is not the case. They are able to harry and attrite an attacking armoured force but at the end the primary anti armour role is the MBT.

The Tank Destroyer Doctrine was a single purpose unit that was to be committed to battle in an essentially mobile defensive role with the expressed purpose to engage and destroy enemy tanks.

This is not the role of Aviation, Anti Armour or otherwise. Yes Aviation has a role to play in offensive and defensive operations involving enemy armour but it is not tasked to carry the burden of the anti armour effort as the TD battalions were supposed to.

There are elements in what you say that could be considered correct but it is a long bow to draw. One could just as easily argue that the Cavalry mission is the same as the TD or the Mech Infantry or artillery, particularly MLRS but they are not.

The TD concept was significantly different and the notion of tank destroyers died once the realisation was made that modern battle depends on combined arms, which is the exact opposite of what a Tank Destroyer battalion was.

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Well, AT helicopters aren't exactly suited for any other "role" than to kill tanks. They even tend to suck in almost any other CAS mission (though they are far, far better than nothing, of course).

I never talked on "aviation" in general.

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Well, AT helicopters aren't exactly suited for any other "role" than to kill tanks. They even tend to suck in almost any other CAS mission (though they are far, far better than nothing, of course).

I never talked on "aviation" in general.

Technically there is no such thing as a "pure" AT helicopter, yes the Apache is a stand out and one of the few helicopters that is highly adapted for the anti armour role but it is not a one trick pony. It carries a range of ordnance for a variety of roles.

Why do they suck at CAS ? They do not compare to a fixed wing but again fixed wing CAS is completely different to Rotary Wing CAS.

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Maybe "suck" was a bit strong.

I think that the helicopters, of all possible CAS missions, are the best suited for AT role, integrated with the maneuver of the unit they belong to.

In other CAS missions, from armed recon to close interdiction, they tend to lack in something (range, speed, loitering time, robustness, weapon load, etc.).

In AT role, with a bunch of ATGMs, firing from 4 to 10 kms, hovering over safe or at least not hostile territory, they really rock. As things come closer, like chasing infantry over enemy territory, they tend to become very vulnerable, even the best armored of them, as they are very complex machines, lacking the speed to compensate for it when they need to get out fast.

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Maybe "suck" was a bit strong.

I think that the helicopters, of all possible CAS missions, are the best suited for AT role, integrated with the maneuver of the unit they belong to.

In other CAS missions, from armed recon to close interdiction, they tend to lack in something (range, speed, loitering time, robustness, weapon load, etc.).

In AT role, with a bunch of ATGMs, firing from 4 to 10 kms, hovering over safe or at least not hostile territory, they really rock. As things come closer, like chasing infantry over enemy territory, they tend to become very vulnerable, even the best armored of them, as they are very complex machines, lacking the speed to compensate for it when they need to get out fast.

Using that logic the best AT aircraft is an F22 that can sit in the stratosphere and drop an LGB on a tank and shoot down anything that comes to challenge it. What an F22 can't do however is prosecute its own attacks on the battlefield, in a similar vein to artillery is is subject to direction of a 3rd party.

A helicopter on the other hand can conduct its own fight within the battle space in concert with other arms and they are the only vertical asset that can do that. This is it's forte that ability to provide rapid response firepower that is "self regulating"

Helicopters have a role to play well beyond being an airborne ATGM carrier and it ties in with the mission assigned to them by the mission statement I mentioned earlier.

CAS is like an artillery mission delivered by an aircraft. Success or failure in this is dependent on penetration of airspace, accurate delivery of a large volume of explosive and a safe exfil of the battle area. All things which "fast movers" excel at but are beyond a helicopter, which is why it is not in their mission.

Recon is not a CAS mission (is there such a thing as unarmed recon?) it is a Cavalry mission but can and is carried out by aviation. Nothing can match a helicopter's ability to closely examine terrain over a wide area and provide immediate intel to the commander.

I have no idea what close interdiction is but Interdiction is a role carried out again by fast movers, dropping big bombs on supply lines, it also isn't CAS.

There is a notion of battle field isolation and/or denial of mobility that helicopters can perform which involves tying down the enemy following support assets and second echelon forces, which does over lap into the artillery side of things.

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Well, you seems to be confusing my criteria with someone's else.

Today, CAS can be done with anything, from a F-22 to a B-52, because PGMs of the most varied kinds can be used effectively from any conceivable distance and attitude.

I pointed a few times that the helicopters works with other arms, inside the C2 of the parental formation, as you stated, and that makes it effective in its role. The role in which it is more effective is in the AT role.

You are referring to different "fast movers" than I am. You are assuming that I'm talking on zoom and boom jets, when I'm thinking on cheaper turboprops, which for a fraction of the cost of an helicopter, compensates for all its fails with better speed, more simplicity, more robustness and more range, keeping the ability of really low speed and low altitude fly, ideal for CAS missions.

Not taking in account the only two truly CAS jets in service, the A-10 and the Su-25 and derivatives (the Harrier could be added here, if you like).

On CAS missions, there are many more than the usual direct support (arty from the air). Air armed recon (you can have it unarmed), close range interdiction (the one you make to get a direct result in a local area, not the one you need a F-15E at top payload to work), local air superiority (especially, counter helicopter), offensive patrol (seek and destroy opportunity targets in the contact line), anti tank AND direct support for ground troops, all of it in close proximity of friendly forces, are all missions a CAS aircraft should be able to do, because all of it is supporting directly the troops in contact with the enemy.

As most armies only get helicopters, the only integrated asset to do all these they have is not suited for all kind of CAS missions, plus the Air Forces are unlikely, unless they have very specialized airplanes and trained crews, to risk their assets in things they feel aren't cost/effective for their own criteria (heck!, almost every 5 years the USAF is looking for excuses to ditch the A-10s! Then another war arose and the troops save them).

Then, most of the missions are neglected or given inadequate assets.

My favorite "what if" on the issue is, as USAF tends to generate doctrine that is spread all around the world, what could have happened if the idea of the 80s of using the Piper Enforcer as tank killer and low end CAS airplane, coupled with the A-7F for the high end of CAS has been realized. But I digress.

There was a very nice paper on the web, I think from Navy Proceedings, on CAS, called "CAS, a primer", which I think is no longer available, with all these points clearly exposed. But with a bit more patience you can find lots of articles from many sources on the web, not so well resumed, but on the issue. And if you read Spanish, I hope an article I wrote on CAS will be up soon (as soon as the webmaster has the time, in fact, so it could be never).

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Well, you seems to be confusing my criteria with someone's else.

Well if you are going to make up your own definitions perhaps you should provide a glossary. I am going off the standard military ones.

Today, CAS can be done with anything, from a F-22 to a B-52, because PGMs of the most varied kinds can be used effectively from any conceivable distance and attitude.

Only direct "eyes-on" PGMs can be used for CAS, anything other than that needs to be a pre-planned mission that goes outside the bounds of tactical support, so not really any conceivable distance or altitude.

I pointed a few times that the helicopters works with other arms, inside the C2 of the parental formation, as you stated, and that makes it effective in its role. The role in which it is more effective is in the AT role.

No, certain helicopters do well in the AT role, AH-64 for example, others do not B0-105, OH-58, UH-60. An AH-64 is just as effective against troops and other battlefield targets as it is against tanks, it is an Attack helicopter not an AntiTank Helicopter.

You are referring to different "fast movers" than I am. You are assuming that I'm talking on zoom and boom jets, when I'm thinking on cheaper turboprops, which for a fraction of the cost of an helicopter, compensates for all its fails with better speed, more simplicity, more robustness and more range, keeping the ability of really low speed and low altitude fly, ideal for CAS missions.

Turboprop aircraft will not survive on the modern mechanised battlefield. How many turboprops are in the US Army service in combat roles? None. Only a few Air Forces/Armies around the world do operate turboprop and then it is largely in a CoIn role for which they are well suited. As you no doubt are aware the Pucara did not fair well against the British in the Falklands who had minimal air cover.

Not taking in account the only two truly CAS jets in service, the A-10 and the Su-25 and derivatives (the Harrier could be added here, if you like.

On CAS missions, there are many more than the usual direct support (arty from the air).

Close Air Support are air operations that are directly integrated with ground ops. End of

Air armed recon (you can have it unarmed),

Recon is recon, whether you are armed or not is irrelevant, it isn't CAS

close range interdiction (the one you make to get a direct result in a local area, not the one you need a F-15E at top payload to work),

Interdiction is attacking enemy supply and follow on forces not CAS, sure it has an effect on the FEBA as everything does.

local air superiority (especially, counter helicopter),

Again not a CAS operation it is Air Superiority an entirely different mission.

offensive patrol (seek and destroy opportunity targets in the contact line),

This has no military definition, what you are talking about falls into other categories either interdiction of echelons or direct attack of forces near the FEBA which is CAS.

anti tank AND direct support for ground troops,

These can be CAS.

all of it in close proximity of friendly forces, are all missions a CAS aircraft should be able to do, because all of it is supporting directly the troops in contact with the enemy.

That is not the definition of CAS, which is more defined by how much interaction there is between the ground commander and the air asset, proximity of troops is not part of that definition. Destroying a bridge 50klm away to protect a flank at the order of a Divisional Commander is CAS, carpet bombing a highway 2klm from own troops to stop movement of supplies is Interdiction.

As most armies only get helicopters, the only integrated asset to do all these they have is not suited for all kind of CAS missions,plus the Air Forces are unlikely, unless they have very specialized airplanes and trained crews, to risk their assets in things they feel aren't cost/effective for their own criteria (heck!, almost every 5 years the USAF is looking for excuses to ditch the A-10s! Then another war arose and the troops save them).Then, most of the missions are neglected or given inadequate assets.My favorite "what if" on the issue is, as USAF tends to generate doctrine that is spread all around the world, what could have happened if the idea of the 80s of using the Piper Enforcer as tank killer and low end CAS airplane, coupled with the A-7F for the high end of CAS has been realized. But I digress.

A-10 are very expensive as they are a single mission aircraft where budgets stress multirole aircraft. What is saving the A10 at the moment is its maintenance record. It achieve a 97% readiness record in the Gulf and saved itself from replacement by the more capable but more demanding F16.

There was a very nice paper on the web, I think from Navy Proceedings, on CAS, called "CAS, a primer", which I think is no longer available, with all these points clearly exposed. But with a bit more patience you can find lots of articles from many sources on the web, not so well resumed, but on the issue. And if you read Spanish, I hope an article I wrote on CAS will be up soon (as soon as the webmaster has the time, in fact, so it could be never).

I'll stick with my Australian Army manuals thanks.

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Well, I came to the "CAS, a primer" following recommendation from a page on CAS of the Australian Air Force... hehehe.

Last time I've checked, the AAF page still pointed to that article, though it was removed from the original source.

You are working in a few misconception on what could effectively happens on what you correctly describe as "Close Air Support are air operations that are directly integrated with ground ops."

Why do you think that helos like the Tiger has added an AA role on top of the AT role? Self defense is one, but also because only helos are good for anti helo tasks (that is, local air superiority), except for light turboprops. So, local air superiority, in missions that otherwise aren't cost effective for multirol a/c, are done by purely CAS assets.

And a recon made by helos, giving intel "over the hill" directly to the troops beneath them, aren't "air operations that are directly integrated with ground ops".

And many more missions are and can be assigned inside the label of CAS, as far as they include a direct integration with the ground maneuver.

Helicopters are better suited for some, multirol aircrafts for others, beasts like the A-10 for almost all (but it fails in other aspects, related with logistic tail, front line operations, and the like: you need a great deal of effort to keep it running in the excellent level it reach).

I have to go. It's always a pleasure to discuss CAS with someone at least better informed in the issue than the average.

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