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Panzer V against any US tank


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Dude. The myth of the single Decisive Battle deciding a war died on the forward slopes at le Cateau and the Marne in 1914.

The Russians continued 'effective resistance' after Bialystock, Minsk, Smolensk, and Kiev. The Germans continued 'effective resistance' after Stalingrad, Cherkassy, and Tunis. Heck, even the Romans continued 'effective resistance' after Cannae.

This determination to redefine an overwhelming victory into a defeat is baffling. The German Army in France was spanked six ways from Sunday. The forces they lost in Cherbourg, Brest, Le Havre, Dunkirk, and the Channel Islands were the direct result of being out manoeuvred and surrounded at the operational level. The encirclements they suffered at la Baliene, Falaise, the Seine, Mons, and the Ruhr were likewise the direct result of being out manoeuvred and surrounded at the operational level.

They may not meet your idiosyncratic definitions, but that's just bad luck for you.

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Oh jeeze not this again. The burster charge on a German tank shell does not cause catastrophic damage. I think we have this debate previously but the thread got lost and I had no interest revisiting it at that point. Anyways you are referring to Jarrett's test in North Africa which is cited by Jentz. Here is the thing, neither Jarrett or Jentz knew a thing about penetration and APHE. Jarrett was an ordinance guy but his experience was in manufacturing and practical application, and not in penetration mechanics. His big contribution was capping British 75mm rounds so they could counter German FHA, something he could do because his specialty was int he manufacture of tank rounds. But his observations on the effectiveness of burster charges are flawed, especially his comment that partial penetrations would result in the destruction of a tank. Buster charges are not shaped charges, they are not directed through a small hole, they fracture like a Grenade so much of the blast would go outwards. Jentz citing Jarrett does not give credibility to the claim, it reflects Jentz lack of knowledge on the issue (Jentz knows a lot but not on this subject).

In comparison to Jarretts questionable observations we have British Operational Research reports which show Panther and Mark IVs burning up at similar rates to the Sherman despite the British using unfuzed rounds and the Germans using fuzed rounds. The British and US found Sherman burned at 60-80%, compared to the Panther rated in one report at 60% and the Mark IV at 80%. Hardly a testament to the superiority of buster charges, and far more extensive in examined hulks than Jarretts limited test.

Really? So examination of the high total losses of M3 and M4 in 1943 after burning out indicate similar levels of brew up to PIV and Panther's? That the experience of losing so many M4's and M3's as total losses after burning out resulting in a push to AP shells with bursters for the American tank arm. Or the very real fact that the Royal Navy never used solid shot as the after armor effects were considered negligible. Every other Major WWII tank force chose AP shells with burster charges (German/ Soviet) because of the greater after armor effect and that partial penetrations would be more lethal than a solid shot penetration. As Jentz, Jarret, and Gordon Rottman state the AP shell had greater after armor effect resulting in greater chance of total destruction of AFV

Jarret was a ordinance guy who tested to find out why shot was shattering and why British tanks burnt more often than German tanks

2 ORS Report 12 from 62% of Sherman's penetrated as Knocked out, damage being so great that they were unfit to repair a direct result of AP shells after armor effect.

ORS study from 6 June- 11 June that from 45 Sherman penetrated 37 of them brewed up/burnt. 8th and 29th Armored Brigade from 166 losses show 94 burnt out (2004 Buckley p127-128)

Please show me where similar brew up rates occur in German veh penetrated by AP shot.

Are you seriously undercutting Jarret for not being a penetration expert when his work led to the design and capping of rounds that led to reliable Pentration. He solved a pentration issue after his "amateur" testing.

Jentz is also citing 20% total destruction fire rates based on German records in 1941. He does not have to be an expert he's comparing the different records of brew ups between the two armies.

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Please show me where similar brew up rates occur in German veh penetrated by AP shot.

That'd be No.2 ORS, Report No.17, Analysis of German Tank Casualties in France, 6 June to 31 August 1944, unless I miss my mark.

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So we hear alot of about hitting a Panther on its sides because it is weak there. Sometimes I get a feel that it's a specialty tactic unique to the German tanks. By this I mean was the side armor on German tanks much much weaker to the front armor, in comparison to the Allied tanks front and side difference? For example, on a Sherman HVSS would you want to also try to maneuver for a flank shot on it. I can imagine the StuG III, PzIVG or Hetzers with the 75 L/43 might start having trouble with the fronts of some of the allied tanks later in the war. what would they try to do?

Oddly enough I remember in Barbarossa to Berlin, with early german tanks against the KV-1 and T-34, sometimes it didn't matter where you'd shoot from, it'd plink off them anyways.

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So what you really mean is "Show me an example where the Allied armies were able to perform the same massive envelopment operations in 1944 as the Germans did in 1941...

The Germans netted huge numbers of men in 1941 partly because there were huge numbers there to be netted. They had been ordered to hold their ground and not retreat, whereas at Falaise the German army was in full flight mode. Even with that, the German encirclements were not leakproof. At Kiev, the largest and most famous encirclement, thousands of Soviet troops were able to escape through the German lines in small groups. Hundreds, if not thousands more were able to go to ground and become part of a growing partisan movement behind German lines.

I think Sardaukar would be correct in claiming that Falaise was not a perfectly executed operation. His mistake is in assuming somehow that perfectly executed operations of envelopment and encirclement occurred with regularity elsewhere.

Michael

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Perhaps he should define the question better.

Maybe something like:

"Show me an example of where the Western Allies preformed a faultless double horizontal envelopment using primarily armoured units supported by a minimum of 5 artillery batteries of not less than Medium calibre and free of a terrain blocking feature that was completed in under 3 days, netted a minimum 3 to 1 combat loss/investment ratio with the wind blowing from the east starting on a Thursday just after Tea."

Just saying.....

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That'd be No.2 ORS, Report No.17, Analysis of German Tank Casualties in France, 6 June to 31 August 1944, unless I miss my mark.

That's the one dealing with the examination of Panzers in the Mortain area right? The ones on the road stretch contacted by US 2nd armoured division that used AP shells with burster charges?

If I remember it correctly it showed how about half of losses were due to crew's abandoning their veh and/or destroying them to prevent capture.

So 50% lost to their own crews after successful allied envelopment vurses circa 50% of British Sherman being total losses after penetrating hits.

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That's the one dealing with the examination of Panzers in the Mortain area right? The ones on the road stretch contacted by US 2nd armoured division that used AP shells with burster charges?

Nope, that'd be No.2 ORS, Report No.3 Investigation of an Air Attack on a German Column near La Baleine, or Report No.4 Air Attacks on Enemy Tanks and Motor Transport in the Mortain Area, August 1944

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Sardaukar,

I know what didn't happen, what you seem to be saying is that once the allies were out of Normandy and pursuing accross France and Belgium they should have been able to encircle the retreating remnants of the German army. If that is what you think then please tell me how you think this could have been achieved.

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So we hear alot of about hitting a Panther on its sides because it is weak there. Sometimes I get a feel that it's a specialty tactic unique to the German tanks. By this I mean was the side armor on German tanks much much weaker to the front armor, in comparison to the Allied tanks front and side difference? For example, on a Sherman HVSS would you want to also try to maneuver for a flank shot on it. I can imagine the StuG III, PzIVG or Hetzers with the 75 L/43 might start having trouble with the fronts of some of the allied tanks later in the war. what would they try to do?

Oddly enough I remember in Barbarossa to Berlin, with early german tanks against the KV-1 and T-34, sometimes it didn't matter where you'd shoot from, it'd plink off them anyways.

Effectively, the Panther glacis is bulletproof under normal circumstances vs the lighter Sherman guns and the Panther turret front is very tough*. The Panther side armour is vulnerable to the lighter Sherman guns.

By comparison, the ordinary Sherman is always vulnerable under normal circumstances vs the Panther's gun - though that's not to say that the Sherman's armour was weak - it was respectable - but that the Panther's gun was powerful. A Jumbo Sherman - not in game at present - would be more or less the same ratio as a Panther.

Tiger I had a more balanced distribution of armour between front and sides.

But yes, in general terms shooting at the side of any AFV is a better idea than shooting at the front - for this particular point in time, "shoot at the side of a Panther" is the most useful expression of that, but it's not unique.

*still don't wanna get shot! :)

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Sardaukar,

I know what didn't happen, what you seem to be saying is that once the allies were out of Normandy and pursuing accross France and Belgium they should have been able to encircle the retreating remnants of the German army. If that is what you think then please tell me how you think this could have been achieved.

I think failure to close Falaise pocket was critical to later battles in autumn. The later pursuit through France was done well...but I think (even more) all-out effort in Falaise might have been worth the loss of life, limb and equipment.

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I think Sardaukar would be correct in claiming that Falaise was not a perfectly executed operation. His mistake is in assuming somehow that perfectly executed operations of envelopment and encirclement occurred with regularity elsewhere.

Michael

You nailed my meaning well. I don't assume perfect operations, but I think it could have been done better and with even more aggression. This would of course run against Western idea of saving men's lives. Someone like Zhukov (or even worse example of skilled insensitive brute, Konev) would have tried it without batting an eye.

I don't intend that my view is anyway correct or even plausible..but for sake of discussion, it is interesting one. Got it from Max Hasting's book "Armageddon"...so it's not even original. :D While I don't always agree his views (and some sneer on his books because they are made easier to read, tho he documents his sources quite well), he raises some interesting questions.

Problem is, this could not be done under command of Eisenhower and Montgomery. On the other hand, I cannot see anyone else with required diplomatic skill to oversee the strategy within Anglo-American alliance starting to get way more abrasive..since it got into that even under him in Autumn 1944.

Bit of Catch-22.

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I think failure to close Falaise pocket was critical to later battles in autumn. The later pursuit through France was done well...but I think (even more) all-out effort in Falaise might have been worth the loss of life, limb and equipment.

Falaise was the final chapter in the battle for Normandy.

The German Army lost 450,000 out of 1 mill or so deployed, 50k or so escaped the pocket.

The failure to trap that comparatively small number, less than 10% of the total losses, cannot be seen as a failure, particularly since they escaped without their equipment and those that did escape were not the front line troops who were further attrited in keeping the pocket open.

There are numerous reasons given for the pocket not being closed, many of which point to other operations that actually set the allies up better for what followed.

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Falaise was the final chapter in the battle for Normandy.

The German Army lost 450,000 out of 1 mill or so deployed, 50k or so escaped the pocket.

The failure to trap that comparatively small number, less than 10% of the total losses, cannot be seen as a failure, particularly since they escaped without their equipment and those that did escape were not the front line troops who were further attrited in keeping the pocket open.

There are numerous reasons given for the pocket not being closed, many of which point to other operations that actually set the allies up better for what followed.

I think we have to agree to disagree, since IMHO those escaped troops were effectively used to rebuild decently effective combat units.

I do see your point too, but my meaning was that you don't give that sort of respite to enemy if you can avoid it.

To put it into US context, for example, it allowed Germans to rebuild many combat divisions around existing cadre, in sort of way USMC built couple of divisions around USMC Para & Raider battalions.

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The German Army lost 450,000 out of 1 mill or so deployed, 50k or so escaped the pocket.

The failure to trap that comparatively small number, less than 10% of the total losses, cannot be seen as a failure, particularly since they escaped without their equipment and those that did escape were not the front line troops who were further attrited in keeping the pocket open.

The sad news from the Allied perspective is that a lot of the escapees were from the leadership cadre. They were able to reform their old units or to raise new ones. Without those leaders, the German army would have been in an even worse bind for the rest of the war.

Michael

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The sad news from the Allied perspective is that a lot of the escapees were from the leadership cadre. They were able to reform their old units or to raise new ones. Without those leaders, the German army would have been in an even worse bind for the rest of the war.

Michael

Exactly as above. :)

There is massive difference between rebuilding unit from start and rebuilding it from cadre.

And what Michael E. says here is what I was "arguing" about. I don't know if I could have been done, but it had dire consequences later in 1944.

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I do see your point too, but my meaning was that you don't give that sort of respite to enemy if you can avoid it.

From my readings, it's hard for me to say what single act by one single commander could have changed anything. War is the province of chaos, and trying to manage an operation this big is like trying to balance a rubber hose on its tip. It speaks well of the managerial technique that it went as well as it did. The thing is, that to get it to run much better would require a lot of people at a lot of different levels of command to perform a lot better than they did. And SFAIK, most of them were already performing at or near the limits of their abilities. It's easy for us in our vantage point to say "So-and-so should have done this and that," but just how reasonable is it to assume that they actually could have. A lot of the time they were proceeding on at best educated guesswork where we enjoy relatively certain knowledge. Making decisions for us is easy because we have nothing riding on the outcome, which has been preordained anyway. But for those who are down in the pit, trying to sweat out some kind of plan and cut orders for the next day when you are already dog tired, it's not so easy.

Michael

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From my readings, it's hard for me to say what single act by one single commander could have changed anything. War is the province of chaos, and trying to manage an operation this big is like trying to balance a rubber hose on its tip. It speaks well of the managerial technique that it went as well as it did. The thing is, that to get it to run much better would require a lot of people at a lot of different levels of command to perform a lot better than they did. And SFAIK, most of them were already performing at or near the limits of their abilities. It's easy for us in our vantage point to say "So-and-so should have done this and that," but just how reasonable is it to assume that they actually could have. A lot of the time they were proceeding on at best educated guesswork where we enjoy relatively certain knowledge. Making decisions for us is easy because we have nothing riding on the outcome, which has been preordained anyway. But for those who are down in the pit, trying to sweat out some kind of plan and cut orders for the next day when you are already dog tired, it's not so easy.

Michael

I agree. It would have been expecting too much from commanders who were already performing, if not stellarly, still very well.

20/20 hindsight etc.

"It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by the dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions and spends himself in a worthy course; who at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who, at worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat."

Theodore Roosevelt (Paris Sorbonne,1910)

I have just done that, which (I hope) doesn't take away from deeds of people who did it, but for historical argument.

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I think failure to close Falaise pocket was critical to later battles in autumn. The later pursuit through France was done well...but I think (even more) all-out effort in Falaise might have been worth the loss of life, limb and equipment.

Good grief! All that fuss and sweat about how the allies had a "relatively slow rate of advance in the autumn of 1944", allowed too many to escape, never managed an encirclement etc. and the only thing you think they could have done that would have made any difference was charge harder at Falaise! Well, call me unimpressed.

I thought you might at least have something to back up your original statement. I had hoped you might have offered some learned insight. But no it comes down to the allies should have closed the Falaise pocket more completely.

Sheesh.

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Good grief! All that fuss and sweat about how the allies had a "relatively slow rate of advance in the autumn of 1944", allowed too many to escape, never managed an encirclement etc. and the only thing you think they could have done that would have made any difference was charge harder at Falaise! Well, call me unimpressed.

I thought you might at least have something to back up your original statement. I had hoped you might have offered some learned insight. But no it comes down to the allies should have closed the Falaise pocket more completely.

Sheesh.

No actually it comes down to "the Allies should have executed an operation planned on the fly on the basis of events that were in movement and without full intel perfectly in order to capure the last 10% of the enemy force."

One additional note to this discussion about the impact of capturing that other 90%. It contributed eventually to the decision to commit the armor Germany sent to the Western front in September to the Panzer brigades, effectively frittering away what could have been used far more effectively on either the Western or Eastern fronts.

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Geepers, 375 posts and counting. I'm surprised Steve hasn't locked us up and told us to start fresh. We have strayed rather far from the relative merits of Panther design. :) But on the topic of grand strategy, U.S. could've used its resources more constructively than going through the expensive process of reducing Brest as a 'show of resolve'. But what use would they have made of those redirected assets? They still had the west wall to their east and astondingly awful general Montgomery to their north. I don't know which impeded them more.

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