Jump to content


  • Content Count

  • Joined

  • Last visited

  1. o.k. This is my first campaign in the CM2 series. I normally play games requiring minimum micromanagement, but I wanted to try this game and eventually found time to do it. I played all the missions of the first German campaign (Conrath's counterattack) and now I see a huge map for the last mission. Personally, I think that without a LOS fan to check the visibility conditions of each location (or unit) the game becomes unmanageable with big maps (and yes, I have tried also the mods with the gridded ground). Anyway, the CM2 engine is still impressive. One question: Before I spend my time
  2. Thank you for the link. Yes, I was aware of it and it is a useful source of information. Regarding the OR studies, their results regarding the effectiveness of airpower on ground targets naturally weren't welcomed in the air force. On the other hand, the last used OR to quantify results, like the effectiveness of AA fire and there are some very interesting studies in this area. They set the foundations for what was called "flak analysis" which was used by the bomber command to pick the best avenues of approach or the size and seperation between air formations to minimize losses.
  3. Right on target! This is exactly what I was looking for. I really appreciate that you took the time to browse the reports to find what I asked for. You are my Santa Clause, lol. Have a happy holidays!
  4. Perfect! Take your time. By the way, the worst thing was that I didn't let this book go. It was lost together with my suitcase in one of my trips. Now try to imagine that! :mad:
  5. Hello everybody, I came here cause I recall there were certain members who owned this magnificent book which unfortunately I don't have any more, so maybe somebody can help me trace a piece of information from inside the book. I recall there was a certain study inside examining the effects of artillery fire on wire communications. It was a case study of artillery bombardment on German positions and the authors calculated a rule of thumb about the intensity of fire necessary to disrupt wire communications after an hour of bombardment. If I recall correctly, they had the size of the ar
  6. This is an interesting link quantifying combat damage, bogging and mechanical breakdowns during the course of a few days of combat operations in difficult ground conditions http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_RTR/tech/reichswald/Reichswald%20Report.htm from the above link Tank Casualties, own troops By Enemy Action Mines 5 Bazzoka 3 HE 5 AP 2 Total 15 By other causes Turret segment 13 Mech failure 20 Clutches (total failure) 3 Bogged 32 Total 68 i.e. A total casualty for two regiments of – 83 At some point it states that at any time only 7% of tanks in the fo
  7. related to immobilizations. Tanks in mud and forest fighting (operation veritable). The link below is very interesting. It includes a detailed description of operations, terrain appreciation and casualties with detailed description of the causes. http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_RTR/tech/reichswald/Reichswald%20Report.htm from the above link Tank Casualties, own troops By Enemy Action Mines 5 Bazzoka 3 HE 5 AP 2 Total 15 By other causes Turret segment 13 Mech failure 20 Clutches
  8. somehow i think we got distracted I will post a link trying to steer the conversation to the original path http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew1.htm from the above link Then the authors give an example of how the French doctrine counting on WWI experience became irrelevant because of the interwar tech advancements. The above shows that doctrine is affected by technology and this is why i mentioned the radical different characteristics of Helos and TDs. This is why i said it is a stretch to argue both doctrines are the same. And i have to point something
  9. It is not the limitations themselves i pointed. Every system has limitations and yes you want to minimize them through combined arms. No argument here. I mentioned the totally different characteristics of the systems. They apply so different tactics, including basic ones-which is why i mentioned defense,because of their different limitations i find it a stress to argue they both come from the same TD doctrine. Ok, everybody wants to use superior speed and firepower to destroy the enemy. We find the same objective in many different "doctrines". This doesn't mean that all are the same. I guess
  10. first of all there is no black and white. Their primary purpose in theory was of course to actively seek and destroy. They did this by occupying first advantageous positions and by using this they certainly denied the enemy an advance. The AT helicopter can't stay too long in the battlefield to have similar effects. They will find the enemy, destroy some tanks and when they return back, the rest of the enemy force may still continue its advance. It depends on what portion of his force is intact. You can't do this against a ground force. I think this is obvious.
  11. and i would like to add something else. The vision of TD use didn't relate to combined arms operations. I am not sure why you mention it did, perhaps you read somewhere a proponent talking about "combined arms", but i prefer to let actions speak for people's intentions. Look for example the design of the TD platform. The M10 turret was topless. The board's official reason was that increased observation and reduced weight, both important in their vision to seek, find first enemy tanks and favorable firing positions, and use speed to occupy them, gain an advantage and defeat enemy armor.
  12. I guess it is a matter of what you mean by "basic doctrine". If we want to simplify the subjects, totally ignore different characteristics of the platforms and their different strengths, limitations and so on, we can find "basic" similarities among everything. You can find similarities at the most basic level between CAS and artillery doctrine too if you want. I think we have to see the whole picture, including tactics techniques and procedures used to exploit the "high maneuverability and speed" of AT platforms against enemy tanks. I can't ignore the fact that AT Helos are simply incapable
  13. There was a misunderstanding I talked about a tread (misspelled as thread ) which continued after wwii. We all know mechanization didn't start after wwii. But i think we agree that the level of mechanization continued to increase after wwii. And when all infantry in US army became mechanized, it was logical to see their supporting weapons - including AT assets to become fully mechanized too. The fact that we see AT assets on vehicles after wwii, is not a sign that the TD survived after wwii. It is just a result of the above tread. But all these assets continued to function in the same way
  14. ok, but i don't see them as descendants of TD doctrine. Even during WWII we had an attempt to use air assets to fight tanks and often we had dedicated tank busting units. These units and their tactics are not related to TD doctrine. The last is basically the product of a debate between more protection or more maneuverability-power. The application of airpower on the battlefield is not related to this dillema. But on a broader front, we still find a type of debate which is somewhat similar to the one we saw in the TD doctrine. Can airpower by itself confront and defeat enemy armor? or is
  • Create New...