Too Many Strykers

[Wisbech_lad]

Good thread. I for one welcome BFC approach of focusing on Strykers - because they are controversial. I fully expect to see "naysayers" happily making "oh sh!t" scenarios of a Stryker company running into hornets' nests.

AFAIK, they will also have M1, M2, M3, Hummvee in the game. So, if you don't like Strykers, you can happily create scenarios for HBCT, though maybe with some compromises on TOE.

[Battlefront.com]

CivDiv,

I agree with you on the following points;

1. The Stryker is faster than the Bradley.

2. It is also quieter.

Great! Now we're starting to see some balance.

Now, while I agree with you I see the two factors as being almost irrelevent in a non-COIN/Three block war or certain MOUT situations.

The quieter a force is the less chance of detection. I'm thinking about WWII now where it was nearly impossible to move a tracked force around behind the lines without the enemy knowing about it, unless certain conditions were favorable. In a tactical environment there are certain situations where this could be relevant too, especially when LOS is restricted and there are few known avenues of approach. I mean, a large truck coming up my street gives me about 2 minutes of warning time, a small car about 10 seconds. I'm not saying sound is a very big bonus for a Stryker in a conventional war, but I would hardly call it almost irrelevant.

As for speed, the sustained high speed redeployment of a force is always an asset. It might never be used, but it is an asset none-the-less. Here is a quote from (now) LTC Chuck Hodges, whom I had the pleasure of speaking with on the phone last year:

In early August, a battalion in the Army's 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division operating in northern Iraq received orders to pack up and move 500 kilometers south to participate in a key combat operation. The battalion arrived at its new location within 24 hours. To civilians, that might not sound very impressive. To most soldiers, it was revolutionary.

"That's unheard of in my Army experience," said Maj. Chuck Hodges, the brigade operations officer, in a telephone interview from Iraq. "[in another unit] it would take a couple of days at best - about three - to get everything geared up and ready to go." The 3rd Brigade is the only one in Iraq equipped with the Army's new medium-weight combat vehicle called the Stryker. By battlefield standards, Strykers are fast, traveling 55 to 60 miles per hour, and they get better mileage than many civilian sport utility vehicles, which cuts down on the logistics train needed to support them. In the 10 months the 3rd Brigade has been deployed to Iraq, the vehicles have shown themselves to be exceptionally capable and reliable, says Hodges.

This was from this article from 2004:

http://www.govexec.com/features/0904-15/0904-15newsanalysis5.htm

3. I agree the Stryker is more fuel efficient.

4. I agree it is easier to supply (Because of the anemic firepower.).

5. I agree the ride is better and troops arrive 'fresher', if they do arrive.

6. The bigger carrying capacity do give them a much better infantry footprint.

They are easier to supply because they use less fuel, consume less moving parts, are less likely to blow something in the power train, tires are a lot easier to stockpile than tracks, etc. The anemic firepower, as you put it, is also a plus from a logistics standpoint, true enough.

And "if they do arrive" is dig that is unwarranted. As I've laid out, the survivability of either a Stryker or a Bradley is practically very close together. In a vacuum I'd rather risk an "if" with a larger and fresher force arriving faster and with less effort as the payoff than a smaller force arriving spent and possibly not at all due to logistics problems.

Partly balderdash, partly typical army PR, and part that agrees with my point. The Strykers are not designed for mech heavy fights. Neither were the Stryker's predecessors, the Light Divisions.

Yeah... but who on Earth has said they were designed for mech heavy fights as their optimal role, any more than a Heavy force is good for mountain operations at 9000 ft? This is the ridiculousness of your argument. You're saying that a screwdriver is not the best tool to pound in a nail. No kidding. A hammer is. But try to put a screw into a tight spot with a 3 lb hammer and tell me that is the optimal solution.

And, most of this 'transformation' is based on the understanding that economically the world is so intertwined we can't have a huge mech battle with, say, China, both our economies would tank.

We can't. Not without expending probably double the % of GDP we currently expend and go back to the draft. Heck, we couldn't even handle Syria right now if we wanted to, conventional fight or not.

And here's another quote from the same document you cited. So what caused the need for transformation?

The Army

believes that the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively

to (1) the growing number of peacekeeping operations and small-scale

contingencies and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such

as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

And why deployable? Because we don't fight the big mech battles anymore so we have to get combat power on deck quick.

Yup, so what's your point? One of the wakeup calls was long before anybody was talking about terrorism as a national priority. The Kosovo conflict was a huge embarrassment for the mech heavy Army. It couldn't deploy a credible Task Force sized threat to Albania because of the logistics and the terrain.

And another factor is relevency and inter-service rivaly; needing the Marines to seize the initial ground in Afghanistan was a huge embarrassment to the army. They tried just about everything to come up with a plan that didn't focus on the Marines but try as they did, the army simply couldn't preform the mission.

Yup. It would have been interesting to see what would have happened if Stryker Brigades were online at that time.

I still wouldn't call them equally survivable. When you talk about most CE hits to the front aspect of a Bradley, and ANY KE hits, the Bradley is more survivable by factors rather than percentage points. And I would point out that one of the original design requirements was the Stryker withstanding 14.5 mm AP and to this day it doesn't, not w/o hanging another 5,000 lbs of armor on it.

Er... they fixed the 14.5mm requirement. Double check me if you don't believe it. The initial subcontractor provided substandard ceramic armor, which was fixed prior to deployment in Iraq.

As for KE hits... sure, the Bradley has more mass and more armor, so it can absorb more hits more easily. But how likely is it that a Stryker or a Bradley is going to be hit by rounds in excess of 14.5mm but under 30mm (which is all the Bradley is capable of taking)? Not very likely.

Besides the army's own 'cooked numbers' I have seen no evidence that a Stryker is more reliable.

Rule of thumb... wheeled vehicles are easier to maintain than tracked, lighter vehicles easier to maintain than heavy. I remember some gripping footage of the sandstorm during the first few weeks of OIF where a maintenance crew had to do a full up power unit replacement on a Bradley, which promptly broke down afterwards. I know plenty of guys who own armored vehicles and they'll tell you the same thing. Now, that doesn't mean that the Army isn't capable of keeping them running, it means that when the stuff hits the fan the heavier units have less margin for error.

Yeah, that was a rather garbled paragraph (Grin).

We all have those from time to time

I meant something along the lines of; that using limited tranportation (into theater) space WHEN preparing for a mech fight. And with the Stryker you have a bunch of soldiers sitting in a vulnerable vehicle when moving, and when engaged the get nothing from their vehicle.

All vehicles are vulnerable all the time. A Stryker going 60mph is sure going to be hard to hit, though. As for the uselessness of the ICV when engaged, it depends on the scenario. They have been in some very heavy fighting in Iraq and performed well. Of course their biggest threat was RPGs (and they've been hit lots of times). A Bradley is, of course, capable of a lot more. I will say, though, that I have heard criticism about the Bradley's firepower not being ideally suited for MOUT warfare. Something about the rounds going straight through or something like that.

The AAV was not designed to be an APC, or maybe saying IFV would be better. They are designed for amphibious operations and they did those all the time. I don't know what the AAV footprint in Iraq is but I haven't seen a picture of one since Fallujah. So we are talking apples and oranges here. And the AAVs have a dual weapon system w/ both .50 cal and Mk19 weapons, fired either exposed or remotely. Probably not as accurate as the Styrker gun system but a whole lot more effective. Plus the AAAV is almost done with development and it has an autocannon and it is fast.

I was simply pointing out that even with this vehicle the Marines were able to do amazing things, yet the argument you used against the Stryker would contradict that. The ability to reload under cover is also circumstantial. If I have an enemy in my sights and squeeze off 10 rounds, it doesn't matter if I have to get out and reload or it is done under cover. Ten rounds fired is ten rounds fired. The Stryker's gun system is a lot more useful at night and in limited light situations.

Road performance to me means ability to move on a road, not whether it is air conditioned. Yes, the Stryker gives a better ride to its occupants. But what utility is that when your ride gets killed by the first T55 that sees it?

A Bradley would be equally dead if it got fired at by a T-55. That's been my point all along. However, a Stryker would probably stand a better chance of not getting hit due to its speed. The tracking ability of T-55s would likely be stretched to the max to hit a Stryker driving as fast as it could vs. a Bradley driving as fast as it could. On the flip side, if the Bradley stuck around to shoot back at the T-55 it would of course have an advantage. But doing that with a mounted element in back is rather risky, so the mounted element would probably be wise to get out. And if that were the case with a Stryker, you have Javelin right there looking forward to scattering the tank.

But again... in a mech heavy enemy environment, you would certainly want to have the Bradley over the Stryker. But that's just because your chances of survival in such an environment go down, so you want as many advantages as you can get.

Strykers do not regularly go 60mph in Iraq. They may go that speed if they are moving in civilian traffic and that is the pace of traffic. I can't see that being the case in Syria. So if you have a nice 6 lane paved highway and the tactical situation allows you can go 60 mph. The Marine LAVs can do almost a 100 but that doesn't mean they go that fast, ever.

Strykers do go that fast when there is a need (see quote from LTC Hodges above). A Bradley can't, need or not. That's the only point I was making.

As good as the Stryker? The LAV maybe? There is an LAV version that carries 8 troops.

A stock Stryker ICV is superior, though there is not a big difference.

The Bradley was an revolutionary design. I would be scared to even characterize the Stryker as evolutionary. Yes, badly managed program carried out badly and spending billions to try and shoe-horn equipment to meet a spec that to this day on numerous fronts, it does not meet.

Unsubstantiated claims to bolster your bias. What you should have said is a badly managed war carried out badly and spending billions to try and shoe-horn a force structure to meet a spec that to this day on numerous fronts, it isn't able to meet. That would be a far more accurate and relevant thing to say. The Army, and Marines, are being ground into the sand because its force structure is not capable of handling the mission it has been given by people that probably couldn't find their way out of an unlocked closet with someone pointing to the doorknob and saying "you have to turn this if you want the door to open".

And this digital stuff is of marginal value in a unconventional fight.

Actually, some would argue it is more valuable in a COIN environment because it allows for larger operational areas with fewer forces. I talked with a Battalion commander of the 101st who said he spent most of his time flying around in a helo so he could figure out what his units were up to since their radios couldn't reach each other. No such problem with a digitized force. Coordination between ground and support assets is a lot better too. But yes, digitized forces shine best when they are all out on the hunt against a conventional foe.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Wisbech_lad,

This discussion reminds me a lot of the sorts of epic threads from CMBO and CMBB days. Especially the Panther vs. Sherman debate. The Sherman sure did have its faults compared to the Panther, but overall the Sherman was a better vehicle IMHO when all factors are considered. Still, the Sherman could have had all its advantages over the Panther and not have sucked so bad earlier on. But we can get back into that one when CMx2 moves back to Normandy

Steve

[Tarquelne]

Running and footprints. I've got lots of questions.

Trying to cull some of the essential operational figures from the thread... Is 60 mph a sustainable speed for a Stryker group? (Assuming "fair" roads.)

How about about a similarly sized heavy mech group? Not just the sprinting speed, but something it could sustain for at least 3 days, maybe a week. I don't even have a guess.

What's the logistics like? How long can a Stryker group operate without significant resupply (Like, via truck.) vs. the heavy mech force? Or is weight a better way to look at it? How many kilos of supplies, or how much transport, does it take to supply the two forces (Stryker and heavy mech) for a week of moving. Fighting?

[hoolaman]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

But again... in a mech heavy enemy environment, you would certainly want to have the Bradley over the Stryker. But that's just because your chances of survival in such an environment go down, so you want as many advantages as you can get.

I'm not disagreeing with the substance of the argument, but I'm pretty sure this is the point civdiv was originally making.

By design CMSF puts Strykers in an unlikely scenario against a reasonably capable, mostly conventional opponent. And I think the argument is that unless you need Syria invaded by next Tuesday, Strykers would not be in this role.

While the design brief of the Stryker might not have specifically had Iraq/COIN in mind, today's Stryker heavy army might be more evidence of their success in that role than evidence of suitability in its other roles. As some here have stated the spearhead of a large scale invasion of a well defended sovereign nation seems to be one of the few things it was not designed for.

The quick deployment to hotspots around the world angle was, as I understand it, for the type of conflicts the Pentagon expected to see more of in the 21st century. Examples cited earlier were The Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, UN style Humanitarian and Peacekeeping missions (back when backing the UN suited US interests).

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Ryan Crierie:

The European nations on the other hand have wisely specified A-400M transportability instead of C-130, which allows a much more powerful vehicle to be designed and built; such as the Boxer and VBCI.

I would like to hear the cries and shouts of those having issues with the Stryker should the US Army specify A400M transportability for the successor vehicle.

Or to put it differently, the Euros wisely specified transportability for a plane they have procured. The US wisely did not specify transportability for a plane it has not, nor will ever procure, and which was a gleam in Airbus' eye at best when Stryker was defined.

All the best

Andreas

[Cpl Steiner]

I don't really see what all the fuss is about, as CM:SF will have M2 Bradley/M3 Cav vehicles in it from the start. As long as BFC makes it possible to swap in M2/M3s for Strykers in any scenario (including those in the solo campaign), everyone should be happy.

BFC, will this be possible?

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[panzermartin]

In game, as long as the syrians get ZU-23 AAs, Strykers should be smoked right? Can they withstand spraying 23mm APs?

[Andreas]

I wouldn't get hung up on individual weapon systems. If you encounter a Syrian force with ZSU-23s, it is likely they have other kit as well, such as advanced ATGMs, or maybe the odd tank. In which case Bradleys are also in for trouble. Neither of the Syrian large kitm would be around for long though once fixed - i.e. once they have opened fire.

All the best

Andreas

[aka_tom_w]

Originally posted by Cpl Steiner:

I don't really see what all the fuss is about, as CM:SF will have M2 Bradley/M3 Cav vehicles in it from the start. As long as BFC makes it possible to swap in M2/M3s for Strykers in any scenario (including those in the solo campaign), everyone should be happy.

BFC, will this be possible?

the M2 and M3 are in, here is the "planned vehicle" list from the web site:

web page from CM:SF promo web site

[MikeyD]

It sounds like we're all poised to throw our hard-won CMx1 tactical experience out the window with CMSF. We should probably not be using our Strykers very much more aggressively than CMAK half-tracks! They're troop transport, they're indirect and direct fire support platforms. But its going to be the infantry, artilley, and tank fire that are going to be doing most of the killing in the game. Stryker's already done most of what it was designed for just transporting the troops to within combat range. If you've driven your Stryker - or your Bradley - smack into the middle of a hot melee engagement its not the fault of the vehicle if it gets KO'd, its the fault of the General.

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[Andreas]

I don't think that heavy armour will have a good time going through dense infantry anti-tank belts either.

Or maybe I just imagined what happened to the Israelis on the last day of their recent war.

All the best

Andreas

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[Andreas]

So, heavy armour will get blown into pieces, and that's why they are better to use in such a situation than a medium force, who would get blown into pieces.

Somewhere the logic of that conclusion appears defunct to me.

All the best

Andreas

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[Battlefront.com]

Adam,

I don't know how else to put it. You have set up a scenario that I simply disagree with. And that is the Syrians will have a nice, choesive, set of defenses, in depth, with capable heavy units all over the place. In such a scenario thrusting forward a Stryker Brigade would be rather foolish since it will tackle the very sort of enemy force it is least well suited to taking on.

But what you outline is simply not realistic in a Syrian type setting. I have already attempted to show why, you have not seemed responsive. But the gist of it is, there is a LOT of country to cover with very few capable forces. They would concentrate their best forces around a few key points and would have their garbage units defending the rest. This is how it happened in Iraq and I see zero reasonable arguments that would suggest Syria would be significantly different.

In such a setting as I have outlined, a Stryker Brigade could cause a great amount of disruption of the enemy's plans. Syria has a decent, but very limited, road network. In particular sections of Syria (check out a map sometime) a force (any force) getting in deep enough could effectively cut off all supply and reinforcement via road to a rather large section of territory. It would also be possible to destabilize attempts to come up with new lines of defense. This is maneuver warfare 101, so I'm unsure why you're having such a problem with this.

A Stryker Brigade is a powerful MEDIUM weight force. It totally outclasses a Syrian Mechanized Rifle Regiment, which is the most likely opposition it would come upon.

The force it is most vulnerable to, a tank heavy force, is also the easiest force to interdict by air. Either before it comes into contact with a friendly forces or after (especially after). It is also the easiest force to avoid contact with, at least for US forces. A Stryker Brigade also has organic recon elements that offer it a lot of warning even if higher ups drop the ball. And if an enemy tank heavy force is coming down on them, and somehow air and artillery are not able to lend significant aid, the Stryker Brigade can easily outrun it.

In short, you are fixated on a specific type of matchup that is simply would not be the norm. You are applying this unlikely matchup as a rule and therefore dismissing what would likely be quite possible as very impossible.

Steve

[Andreas]

Edit: cross-post with Steve, sorry for the repetition.

Adam

In your examples you are blissfully mingling tactical examples to elaborate on an operational/strategic problem. I was responding to your tactical example, nothing more. So, let's accept that Steve is right, and that in a tactical situation like the one you describe it does not really make a big difference whether it is an M1 or a Stryker that gets blown into pieces by a Styrian Kornet.

Your operational/strategic question has merit, but I think the answer depends on BFC's background story. But let's take the 'It absolutely has to be there on Tuesday' approach. For whatever reason US forces are needed to go into Styria, and sort things out. This has to be done now, and on the double, for political reasons. This would tell me the following:

a) you are unlikely to hit a continuous line of defense

key elements of the most capable enemy force may not be in your way in numbers

c) your fast medium force element is going to be out on a limb compared to your heavy elements; but that does not mean the latter will never arrive, just that they will be there later.

So, I think of this as a large forward detachment action, where combat power is traded for mobility. The Germans called these Vorausabteilungen, and every infantry division had one in France and early Russia, consisting of their motorised elements. The aim was clear for these guys - stay as close as possible to the enemy, keeping him from taking the time to turn around and defend again. If you hit real resistance, move around it and continue, or screen it until the infantry regiments have walked up. Arrive in potentially defensible locations such as the Stalin line at the same time as the retreating enemy. Establish bridgeheads before you are expected to be even near the river. All this only works if you are dealing with a disorganised enemy, and there is the reason they did not do it at Kursk.

The German VA was a motorised infantry force, supported by lots of light AT and a battalion of 15cm guns. They went up against Soviet forces that on paper were numerically vastly superior, had access to KV-1s, T-34s, and lots of artillery, and got away with it. The reason for that was that one side had functioning C&C and a plan, while the other was shaken to its core and had lost control.

Stryker Brigade can do the same against Styrian forces, regardless of what they have as weapons on paper, as long as they keep them off balance. But that is the extent of it. In order to properly kill the Styrians however, and thereby turning the fleeting success into a permanent one, they will still need HBCT forces coming up behind them, who will deal with the main enemy force element should the Styrians decide to make a stand.

Stryker Brigade can create the opportunity to dismember Styrian forces, but it can not achieve this, it will need other forces to do it. Have a look at the Uman encirclement - Lots of relatively light forces coming from the west and south using weak forward detachments to control the roads and create the encirclement, but it needed most of a Panzergruppe coming from the north to go around the Soviets in the east, and some fairly heavy stuff to convince the guys inside the pocket that their number was up.

If Stryker Brigade runs into well-armed and motivated Styrians whose commanders are not razzle-dazzled, it is toast. My guess is the Background story will explain why that is unlikely.

I hope that gives you some idea. Let's stick to one layer of debate, and not use CMx1 examples or think about how the ZSU-23 will affect Strykers, as opposed to Bradleys, because it really won't make a difference on the operational level.

All the best

Andreas

[Battlefront.com]

Tarquelne,

Trying to cull some of the essential operational figures from the thread... Is 60 mph a sustainable speed for a Stryker group? (Assuming "fair" roads.)

Yes. Unlike a Heavy force all vehicles within a Stryker Brigade are capable of sustained 60+ mph speeds. Check above for my quote from LTC Hodges.

How about about a similarly sized heavy mech group? Not just the sprinting speed, but something it could sustain for at least 3 days, maybe a week. I don't even have a guess.

LTC Hodges's estimate is that it would take about 3 times longer to achieve the same distance when that distance is quite larger (500km in his example). The reason is not only because of the slower speed of the force, but because of the more frequent need for rest, refueling, and maintainence.

What's the logistics like? How long can a Stryker group operate without significant resupply (Like, via truck.) vs. the heavy mech force? Or is weight a better way to look at it? How many kilos of supplies, or how much transport, does it take to supply the two forces (Stryker and heavy mech) for a week of moving. Fighting?

I gave some stats on page one. It boils down to roughly this:

Stryker Brigade - 48 hours

Heavy Brigade - 12 hours

Fuel consumption is 10 times more for a tank unit than a Stryker unit, 4 times more for a Bradley unit than a Stryker unit.

Worse, most Abrams do not have the ability to remain tactically operationaly without their engines on. An Abrams consumes about 12 gallons of fuel an hour sitting at inactive idle. A Stryker could drive 70 miles on a road using that same volume of fuel in roughly the same amount of time. An hour of inactive idel of an Abrams reduces its operational range by about 50 miles.

It should also be noted that the Abrams uses a special fuel that is unique to it. A Stryker Brigade uses, pretty much, the same fuel (there might be some minor gas/diesel differences). This makes logistics easier and far more flexible when things start getting tight.

One thing though... a Stryker Brigade is supposed to be able to sustain itself for 72 hours. This is true only if the force is conducting normal ops mostly on roads. 48 hours is the practical sustainment time. I have read criticism about the Stryker Brigades rather slim BSB (Brigade Support Battalion) as being the main problem. Obviously a BSB can be augmented easily, which is the official answer to the problem.

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

A Stryker Brigade uses, pretty much, the same fuel (there might be some minor gas/diesel differences).

Is that anything like a "minor drinking water/antifreeze" difference?

Maybe I'm being too literal, but what I read here is that some vehicles may be gasoline and others diesel? Or are you simply saying that whatever of the two types of fuel the brigade uses, there are minor differences of that type?

Cuz the difference between gas and diesel seems fairly major to me...

[Tarquelne]

Gar, dbl pst.

[Tarquelne]

Thanks for putting all that in one place for me, Steve.

The reason is not only because of the slower speed of the force, but because of the more frequent need for rest, refueling, and maintainence.

Important and not covered by a straight-up speed comparison (which isn't simple anyway).

By your figures the Strykers move 3 times faster, and can go 4 times as long without resupply, with a few caveats.

Hmm... Given those speeds a Stryker force could be 100 miles away from Syria at 3 am, and in the center of the country (from N or E) by breakfast at 8 or 9. (7 if they make all the lights - ie, no opposition, 0 hitches.) Or they could be digging in near Aleppo or Dayr az Zawr at 5 or 6.

A mech force starting in the same place and time wouldn't be to the Syrian border till 8. (Top-speed travel gets it to the border about an hour after the Stryker force, but at what state of readiness?)

A light force could get there just as fast, but with less firepower and even less ability to handle opposition on the way.

That seems like a significant difference to me. The Stryker force won't be able to obliterate anything that may come against it like a heavy mech force might (airpower might do a LOT, though), but with that sort of mobility it should be able to pick and chose most of it's fights. Assuming everything goes according to plan. It wouldn't, but IMO that makes CMSF all the more interesting.

Come to think of it, that's what originally sold me on the game's concept. I'm a WWII junky, but as I understand it the Stryker's advantages are primarily operational. At the game's level we don't really experience that. Instead, we have to cope with the trade-offs.

[Battlefront.com]

Andreas,

For whatever reason US forces are needed to go into Styria, and sort things out.

Sure, with Global Warming and Spring coming up on us soon, speed is critical in getting in some skiing before the thaw sets in. Or were you talkinb about SYRIA? No good skiing there at all.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Dorosh,

Maybe I'm being too literal, but what I read here is that some vehicles may be gasoline and others diesel? Or are you simply saying that whatever of the two types of fuel the brigade uses, there are minor differences of that type?

Heh... I thought what I wrote wasn't clear. Thanks for confirming that

What I mean is not all vehicles in a Stryker Brigade are gasoline powered, not all are diesel powered. But the bulk of the fighting force (if not all) is all diesel. A HBCT has a mix of three fuels even for its fighting force. One of these fuels, for the Abrams, is unique and can not be "borrowed" from a neighboring unit unless it happens to be one outfitted to resupply Abrams.

Note that logistics only matter when they aren't available, not when they are. So when everything goes smoothly and as planned, there is no negative impact on operations. However, when things don't go as planned, the unit with the less complex logistical requirements will be at an advantage. Fortunately, US logistics are very good and the enemy's ability to disrupt them in any serious way very limited.

Steve