Too Many Strykers

[Moon]

panzermartin, they are... but (almost) hidden

Martin

[Homo ferricus]

"Note that all US Brigades will eventually be "digital" in the way that the Strykers are. The conversion process is well under way already. It's just that the Stryker Brigades were designed around this concept from the get go."

Its almost scary though, the more reliant war-fighting forces get on "digital" systems and technology in general, the worse it will be if they ever fail the soldiers *knock on wood*. As that one guy said about D-day, "it is the largest and most complicated amphibious invasion ever mounted, and as we all know, when things get complicated, things go wrong."

The chinese are already training military hackers to attack US government computer networks, i know a fella who works at a government facility that traced a hacker's IP back to a Chinese military base or sumfink. The point is that, in all seriousness, WWIII is going to start with all our defense networks failing.

but i digress, about the stryker vs. M113/Bradley/LAV. Its a pretty simple explanation, all these vehicles have their own advantages, what makes the stryker ideal for deep penetration operations is the fact that it does have these digital systems that enhance its logistics and communications abilities drastically. Think about it, try to imagine yourself as a commander of a fleet of Bradleys or what have you(and i mean on the brigade level) behind enemy lines, You need to get information double fast, because the biggest danger of being behind enemy lines is not knowing who is where and whats going on. If you are deep in enemy turf then you had better have your sh*t straight. The stryker, is really good for this. Now, i'd continue if i didn't just realize that i'm running late for something...

ciao!

[John Kettler]

civdiv,

Great thread!

Steve,

If the Stryker has centralized tire inflation installed, I don't see why going cross country would be that big a deal, unless it's some sort of hippo in a tutu situation resulting from all the additional weight and balance complications from the slat armor. I am curious about your 1/2 pickup. Is the division transverse or longitudinal? Also, which half you you drive and how?

Regards,

John Kettler

[civdiv]

To All,

Anyone that says the Stryker concept did not come about, due in large part, to COIN, simply doesn't know what they are talking about. The Stryker concept was an adaptation to what modern warfare looks like, and it is COIN and the 'three block' war.

Steve,

Sorry, IMHO, your points are off target and just plain flawed. Both the Bradley and the Stryker are equally protected against spork wielding insurgents. That doesn't make them equally protected. To argue that the Stryker is armored like the Bradley is laughable. The Bradley has composite armor that will shrug off some ATGMs and almost all RPGs, the Stryker doesn't. And this is not even taking bar or reactive armor into account.

And limiting the Stryker to a .50 cal or a Mk-19 means it can't deal with almost ANY armor it encounters. Sure, it has other varients but EVERY Bradley can kill anything in the Syrian TOE.

The Bradley is more manueverable than the Stryker due to its equal on road performance and its superior cross country mobility. Sure, the Stryker goes a little faster on a road, big deal. My G35 does 160 mph but anything over 90 isn't of much use to me.

Sound means nothing. The Abrams is equally quiet, doesn't mean hoot in a non-MOUT/COIN situation. Dust means a lot more than noise.

The army spent billions inventing something that already existed. So now you got an army of a bunch of semi-armored battle-taxis whose only target on a battlefield is a Suburu sedan.

And the Bradleys and Abrams have the same digital network system as the Strykers (Or have the ability to install them.). And Homo, the internet has nothing to do with tactical battlefield networks, you are talking apples and oranges here.

John,

Glad you liked it.

civdiv

[ March 10, 2007, 06:01 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

[Homo ferricus]

"Homo, the internet has nothing to do with tactical battlefield networks, you are talking apples and oranges here."

for the record, what i said about the Chinese had nothing to do with what i said about the Stryker. Like i said, the Stryker is a great piece of military gear AS LONG AS EVERYTHING WORKS LIKE IT SHOULD. I said that my greatest worry about it was the over-reliance on technology, meaning that if something fails, it could quite possibly complicate many things.

[civdiv]

Originally posted by Homo ferricus:

"Homo, the internet has nothing to do with tactical battlefield networks, you are talking apples and oranges here."

for the record, what i said about the Chinese had nothing to do with what i said about the Stryker. Like i said, the Stryker is a great piece of military gear AS LONG AS EVERYTHING WORKS LIKE IT SHOULD. I said that my greatest worry about it was the over-reliance on technology, meaning that if something fails, it could quite possibly complicate many things.

Sorry Homo, I misunderstood you.

civdiv

[Homo ferricus]

Originally posted by civdiv:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Homo ferricus:

"Homo, the internet has nothing to do with tactical battlefield networks, you are talking apples and oranges here."

for the record, what i said about the Chinese had nothing to do with what i said about the Stryker. Like i said, the Stryker is a great piece of military gear AS LONG AS EVERYTHING WORKS LIKE IT SHOULD. I said that my greatest worry about it was the over-reliance on technology, meaning that if something fails, it could quite possibly complicate many things.

Sorry Homo, I misunderstood you.

civdiv </font>

[JasonC]

As a point of information, in the first gulf war Bradleys using TOW actually outscored M-1 Abrams in terms of total Iraqi armor kills. The reason was the high accuracy at extreme range of the TOW let them plink at will, at distances (several km) and in conditions (night or otherwise limited visibility as a substitute for range e.g.) in which reply was impossible for the Iraqis. M-1s had comparable night vision advantages plus armor, but the accuracy of any kinetic round at extreme range was lower than the ATGMs achieved.

[civdiv]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As a point of information, in the first gulf war Bradleys using TOW actually outscored M-1 Abrams in terms of total Iraqi armor kills. The reason was the high accuracy at extreme range of the TOW let them plink at will, at distances (several km) and in conditions (night or otherwise limited visibility as a substitute for range e.g.) in which reply was impossible for the Iraqis. M-1s had comparable night vision advantages plus armor, but the accuracy of any kinetic round at extreme range was lower than the ATGMs achieved.

And from several sources I have seen suffered a total of 3 m-kills.

Jason, seen any totals on Bradley or Stryker kills in Iraq? Based on what I recall I have heard of four Bradley's getting KO-d in Iraq, and one was flipped over and the TC killed. In two of the Bradley KOs there were multiple KIAs. I have heard of at least 3 Strykers being KO-d, two w/ multiple KIAs.

Not really related, except that it deals with a KO-d Bradley. Read this;

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09122004_2004091207.html

and then watch this;

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3519855663545752103&q=iraq+journalism&hl=en

Start at about 33:00 but the whole video is well worth the view. Video of the same incident. And we wonder why they hate us.

civdiv

[ March 10, 2007, 06:11 PM: Message edited by: civdiv ]

[Battlefront.com]

Regarding NTC... the fact is it is a highly unrealistic setting. The "home team" has a huge advantage in that they know every rock on the field, the visitors do not. While a visiting team might get one or two chances to train there before losing people to rotations, the home team largely stays and fights again and again. The OPFOR (home team) is not simulating some 3rd world, barely trained, moderately well armed, force with massive strategic and operational restrictions. Instead they fight as a full up, worst case nightmare scenario. That's good in many ways, but it skews the results since that sort of opponent is not going to come around any time soon.

As for the poor showing of a Stryker unit at NTC, I've read some nice first hand accounts of mech heavy forces getting virtually wiped out as well. So no, I don't really see what relevance NTC has to actual battlefield expectations. It's a great humbling experience for the visitors, which has a lot vlaue.

Civdiv,

It is clear you have a chip on your shoulder about the Strykers. You are not looking at the other side of the argument at all. You only point out the Bradley's strengths and the Stryker's weaknesses, and when I flip it around you dodge it. You can't win an intellectual debate by presenting an obviously biased and lopsided argument. I'm sure you will say the same about me, but count up how many times I have agreed with your facts and how many time you've agreed with mine. I have seen you done the latter... (quick scan) not even once.

With that said, since this is like shooting fish in a barrel...

Anyone that says the Stryker concept did not come about, due in large part, to COIN, simply doesn't know what they are talking about.

I've been reading everything there is to read about Strykers since before they were called that. So if I don't know what I'm talking about, I've obviously been doing something wrong these past three years

Here is a quote from "From Transformation to Combat - The First Stryker Brigade at War:

The Strike Force [which became the SBCT concept] was to be the Army's newest step toward creating a rapidly deployable organization able to act decisively and successfully under any conceivable set of circumstances from peacekeeping to total war.

Obviously COIN ops is a part of what they are designed to handle, but to say that is what they were designed to handle is incorrect. Another quote:

In the field, early entry and stability operations would be the unit's primary functions, but its members would be trained and equipped both to conduct conventional offensive and defensive warfare and to coordinage support efforts such as humanitarian assistance. Intended to deploy from the continental United States to anywhere in the world with enough lethality to seize the battelfield initiative upon arrival, the unit would field a force of 3000-5000 troops tailored to achieve whatever goals it was set to accomplish.

The experiences that shaped this were Desert Shield, the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, and probably a dozen things we didn't get involved in. These operations were all problems for the existing US military force. Transformation seeks to make the rest of the military more flexible, but the SBCT is still the force that is designed to be the most flexible. The SBCT was grown to be a sort of Swiss Army knife, not a specialized single use tool.

Sorry, IMHO, your points are off target and just plain flawed. Both the Bradley and the Stryker are equally protected against spork wielding insurgents. That doesn't make them equally protected. To argue that the Stryker is armored like the Bradley is laughable. The Bradley has composite armor that will shrug off some ATGMs and almost all RPGs, the Stryker doesn't. And this is not even taking bar or reactive armor into account.

Right, so what part of my previous post are you disagreeing with? Seems to me you are in agreement. To repeat myself, except for a narrow range of threats (like you mentioned) the two vehicles are about just as vulnerable on the battlefield. An AT-14 is going to wipe out either one, an RPG-29 will wipe out either one, an RPG-7 HE round won't likely critically damage either, so on and so forth.

And limiting the Stryker to a .50 cal or a Mk-19 means it can't deal with almost ANY armor it encounters. Sure, it has other varients but EVERY Bradley can kill anything in the Syrian TOE.

It can't kill something if it is not even there in the fight or broken down. That's what the Stryker's advantages are, not a toe to toe fight with heavy armor. OK, but let's carry through your analogy here...

Anything short of a Bradley is a waste of space on the battlefield. Soldiers relying upon such inferior vehicles will not be able to perform difficult and taxing offensive operations. They will, instead, be vulnerable when not engaged and useless when engaged. Just like the Marines.

WHAT?!? JUST LIKE THE WHAT?!? Just trying to get your attention

The Marines use a tub of armor that is called the AAVP7A1. It is huge, slow, apparently God awful to ride in, and was designed for amphibious ops even though it rarely is used for them. Oh, and it is armed with a .50cal or Mk19. Since you are so hung up on the weaponry of the Strykers, and therefore the force's ability to conduct offensive ops, then you must also have the same low opinion of the Marines. Or does 25 Marines yelling OOORAAAAAH have the same effect as a TOW? As much respect as I have for Marines, I don't think so

The Bradley is more manueverable than the Stryker due to its equal on road performance and its superior cross country mobility.

Equal road performance? I have to say again... "you're kidding, right?". Soldiers that have ridden in both have said there is no comparison. The noise factor is also a huge issue in MOUT environments, which again the Bradley falls short on.

Sure, the Stryker goes a little faster on a road, big deal. My G35 does 160 mph but anything over 90 isn't of much use to me.

A LITTLE faster? You're kidding, right? Stykers regularly go 60mph in Iraq, which is 50% greater than a Bradley. And they can keep that up for hours without worry. No tracked vehicle can get even close to that. And when you have to redeploy 100 miles away, there is a big difference between sustained, uninterrupted 60mph vs. the Bradley's 40mph.

Sound means nothing. The Abrams is equally quiet, doesn't mean hoot in a non-MOUT/COIN situation. Dust means a lot more than noise.

Here we go again. I showed you a case where the Stryker is superior to the Bradley and you try to dodge it as if it isn't important. You find me a vehicle that is equally good in all situations, then you'll have something you can crow about. But when you take all the pros of one vehicle and say this outmatches all the cons of another vehicle, you had better be willing to honestly flip that comparison around. You obviously have zero intention of doing so.

The army spent billions inventing something that already existed.

The same accusation was leveled at the Bradley program. It was wrong and so is your blanket statement. As for the cost of the Stryker program, it was over budget and too much money for the end product just like every single vehicle the military has ever procured. So if your point is a better vehicle could have been designed for the same amount of money, or less, I am in agreement. But as I did in previous posts, I apply that same argument to the Bradley, Abrams, and everything else. So why single out the Stryker for government waste and contractor padding of contracts?

So now you got an army of a bunch of semi-armored battle-taxis whose only target on a battlefield is a Suburu sedan.

Sure if you dispense with all the positive things it brings to the fight. Oh yeah... I forgot, there isn't anything positive. My mistake

And the Bradleys and Abrams have the same digital network system as the Strykers (Or have the ability to install them.). And Homo, the internet has nothing to do with tactical battlefield networks, you are talking apples and oranges here.

It is true that the other forces are being Digitized, as I said in my last post. Eventually this will be a force wide capability. However, at the present time only the Stryker Brigades are still out in front in terms of this ability and experience.

Steve

[ March 10, 2007, 07:02 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Severin]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

I've been reading everything there is to read about Strykers since before they were called that. So if I don't know what I'm talking about, I've obviously been doing something wrong these past three years

Steve

This is really what it comes down to for me. I'm pretty much inclined to think someone is competent at their job unless they prove otherwise.

Civdiv, I think we can all say that old Mr. Grammont has proven that he knows what he's doing as far as his job (making wargames goes) goes.

As far the "Does the Stryker suck" argument that we've had sooo many times before my $0.02 is:

1) Pretty much all the guys using them I've heard think it doesn't suck

2) Most of the independent analysis I've heard (Steve including) think they don't suck

3) It doesn't f'in matter cause the Army will be using them for the foreseeable future no matter how much they may or may not suck

[John Kettler]

Homo ferricus,

I share your concern, as several of the early threads on Syrian military capabilities and potential military capabilities will attest, a concern grown larger now that I've seen an interview with a top U.S. expert on nonnuclear EMP weapons who said the Russians now had some as small as a beer can. The linked article is a serious warning of the kind of deadly pickle that what I deem to be our dangerous overreliance on fancy electronics could get us into.

http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/119160

Regards,

John Kettler

[Ryan Crierie]

They are kinda like FedEx... if it absolutely has to be there overnight, there is Stryker Brigade Nothing, and I mean nothing, can touch it.

You can't move Strykers by air in any meaningful amount unless you're committed to C-17 or C-5 support; and those rarely fly into direct combat zones to unload.

Each time the Strykers have deployed to Iraq or overseas, they've gone there in RO-RO ships; which begs the point, why not just send a Bradley instead if we're shipping by sea?

The Strykers yes are a big improvement over the M1114 Armored Humvee; and Iraq is pretty much the optimal place to test them; a nice dry flat country with decent enough roads leading everywhere; no real heavy weaponry except for IEDs.

What is so outrageous about the Stryker is it's outrageous cost; the Army could just have bought the USMC's LAV series and outfitted it with the digital equipment (FYI, the army did actually plan to buy LAVs in the 80s; they were assigned a M number, M1047, IIRC or something, but congress cancelled that order).

To pay for the Strykers, the army had to kill or cancel quite a lot of equipment not the least:

Restructured Programs

* M2000 Crusader SPH (later cancelled on the altar of Transformation) - TacAir and smart bombs aside, god forbid our artillery actually outrange the bad guy's

* Future Scout and Cavalry System (folded into the FCS as the Reconnaissance & Surveillance Vehicle IIRC)

Cancelled Programs

* M-4 C2V - M-577 replacement (IIRC, they actually pulled the prototypes out and issued them to 4thID during the invasion of Iraq)

* Grizzly Engineer Vehicle

* M104 Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge

Along with quite a lot of others.

I really don't have a problem with the idea of a wheeled armored vehicle; but the entire emphasis on a mythical C-130 transportation capability has severely crippled the Strkyer in a lot of areas.

The European nations on the other hand have wisely specified A-400M transportability instead of C-130, which allows a much more powerful vehicle to be designed and built; such as the Boxer and VBCI.

Yes, I know that the Stryker is supposed to be an interim armored vehicle, a step on the way towards the objective force, but it looks like it'll become the objective vehicle due to lack of funding or cancellation of the bigger meaner version.

[ March 11, 2007, 01:56 AM: Message edited by: Ryan Crierie ]

[flamingknives]

The Strykers would have cost about the same regardless of the platform. It's the bells and whistles that are the real cost. Without them, the Stryker is a LAV III.

[panzermartin]

Originally posted by Moon:

panzermartin, they are... but (almost) hidden

Martin

Now, that's a wise marketing choice

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Battlefront.com]

Ryan,

You can't move Strykers by air in any meaningful amount unless you're committed to C-17 or C-5 support; and those rarely fly into direct combat zones to unload.

Well, that's sorta true. In theory the Strykers can be moved in a meaningful way by C-130, and C-130s can go into places that the larger transports can not. What is true is that because of the need to protect against RPG rounds the "roll on, roll off" concept got nixed. However, it is likely that there is no vehicle capable of meeting such a spec no matter what, since the weight and/or bulk of such defenses precludes it from being flown in a C-130 in a completed state.

Each time the Strykers have deployed to Iraq or overseas, they've gone there in RO-RO ships; which begs the point, why not just send a Bradley instead if we're shipping by sea?

This is not the fault of the Stryker, rather the fault of the strategic air lift capability. RAND did a study of this back in, IIRC, 2002. I've got a printed copy of this report. It goes into great detail about what would be needed to move a Stryker Brigade by air alone. The amount of lift required for such a move is beyond what we have available. This same problem would exist no matter what the vehicle was since it is a numbers game. x number of vehicles requires y number of planes of x type to fly from A to B. Unless the vehicles become smaller or the air fleet larger, there is no way to satisfy this requirement. Military planners totally dropped the ball on this one.

Having said that, it is possible to deploy smaller portions of a Stryker Brigade by air, even C-130. It is just that currently our force requirements are massive and therefore the Stryker Brigades are not being used in a "rapid reaction force" mode. They are instead going to predetermined spots at predetermined times which are known well in advance. We have the sea lift capability for it and that is one reason why sea is used. Plus, sea lift is a LOT less expensive and logistically difficult, therefore sea lift is always the preferred method of deployment regardless.

The Strykers yes are a big improvement over the M1114 Armored Humvee; and Iraq is pretty much the optimal place to test them; a nice dry flat country with decent enough roads leading everywhere; no real heavy weaponry except for IEDs.

Correct. And this is one reason why we chose the Stryker Brigade as the center focus of CM:SF. At the time we decided to make the game the first Stryker Brigade hadn't even received it's full compliment of ICVs as I recall, not to mention the other variants. We thought "what might this force really be able to accomplish?". We heard all the doom and gloomers and wondered if they might be right. The first deployment of SBCT to Iraq proved the vast majority of legitimate criticism (besides the irrational treadhead arguments) to be either flat out wrong or addressable. What we still don't know is how the SBCT force structure would do in a "full up" conventional environment. So CM:SF's original vision to explore this is as relevant today as when we came up with it four years ago.

What is so outrageous about the Stryker is it's outrageous cost; the Army could just have bought the USMC's LAV series and outfitted it with the digital equipment (FYI, the army did actually plan to buy LAVs in the 80s; they were assigned a M number, M1047, IIRC or something, but congress cancelled that order).

Again, as Flamingknives mentioned, the LAV III was only part of the cost. The conversion of "bells and whistles" put a huge cost onto the vehicle. A cost that is also being expended on retrofitting Bradleys and Abrams too. Have you seen the refit costs for an Abrams to the new SA package (Situational Awareness) or the SEP upgrade? It's staggering.

On top of that the concept of SBCT called for vehicles that did not exist. Those had to be designed almost from the ground up.

To pay for the Strykers, the army had to kill or cancel quite a lot of equipment not the least:

That's not true. The cuts you mentioned were made for a variety of reasons, especially for the M2000 Crusader. The war in Iraq is responsible for more cuts to future equipment than anything else. And don't forget about FCS and Star Wars... two of the largest, bloated, useless programs that the US government has ever embarked on since the "Duck and Cover" propaganda campaign.

I really don't have a problem with the idea of a wheeled armored vehicle; but the entire emphasis on a mythical C-130 transportation capability has severely crippled the Strkyer in a lot of areas.

Which is why they have been moving away from that. The slat armor, for example, was put on regardless of what it did to the C-130 "roll on, roll off" requirement.

The European nations on the other hand have wisely specified A-400M transportability instead of C-130, which allows a much more powerful vehicle to be designed and built; such as the Boxer and VBCI.

And they have a similar, if not worse, problem with their strategic air lift capability. The USAF is the backbone of any NATO deployment with other nations, notably Russia, picking up the slack.

Yes, I know that the Stryker is supposed to be an interim armored vehicle, a step on the way towards the objective force, but it looks like it'll become the objective vehicle due to lack of funding or cancellation of the bigger meaner version.

The war in Iraq and the bloated FCS program are the two major reasons why there isn't money available for anything better, not the Stryker program. And the war is even eating into FCS, which just had to shed $1 Billion to help pay for Iraq. At $8 Billion a month, we could buy a lot of new toys instead of trying to keep people who hate each other from hating each other.

Adam,

If I don't understand, explain. We have access to all the maps we could want, we know what the forces consist of and we can guess at things like mobilization and assembly of infantry.

Right, so you just defeated your reason for the Stryker Brigade being useless for deep penetration (i.e. running into a Mech Corps or the like). But knowing about something and being in a position to do something about it are two different things. I might know you are going to move to a road intersection, but if I can't get there before you, then what real good is that information?

An invasion from the US either is going to come through Iraq in the north east or the Mediterranean through Lebanon (god knows) or Isreal via the Golan Heights. 200,000 men is not all that spread out when the central operations centres are around Damascus. There is a corps along either approach with another one behind it. The vulnerable area though is the north west, where their oil assets are. If these fell Syria would probably be willing to negotiate for them back. If the US attacks there, they meet reserves and spread out Syrians. But then there is still basically the entire Syrian army sitting in the west, and Syria mobilizing.

Syria will try to defend all its territory because it can not survive with just Damascus. And if it doesn't do anything to slow the invasion force down, and attritt it, then it will have completely ceded strategic and operational initiative to the enemy. That's a losing proposition for them. So like it or not, they will be spread out over the entire country. More so in some places than others.

Now you're planning this invasion - can you show me what you want your Stryker Brigade doing exactly? I thought you were trying to say they would do fine as something like an operational maneuver group. I think they're too weak to be even a forward detachment.

Right... uhm, so what was the 101st and 82nd divisions doing in the opening phases of OIF? Sitting around feeling sorry for themselves because they were a lightly armed, lightly equipped, largely unarmed force? These two divisional sized forces are even lighter than even the weakest of Infantry Divisions, which is what Stryker Brigades belong to. Brigade for brigade, they are lighter in arms and armor than a Stryker Brigade. So by your argument the 101st and 82nd shouldn't have even been moved out of Kuwait and Saudia Arabia until after Bush landed on the carrier to announce that the major fighting was over.

Also note that there are no HBCTs in Afghanistan. Not even when the Taliban was coherent (well, in relative terms ) and in possession of heavy armor.

I acknowledge they project a great amount of firepower, and their technology allows for assymetric exchange situations such as night operations. I know they aren't as vulnerable to RPGs as the hype goes, or machine gun rounds, or whatever. But they're still just a mechanized infantry brigade.

There is no hype about there ability to shrug off RPG rounds better than other wheeled vehicles and equal in some ways to the heavier tracked vehicles. This is a long established fact that should become part of your understanding of the way the world is.

Moving on from that, yeah... they are a mechanized infantry brigade. Mechanized infantry is designed to move quickly under its own power with the ability to defend itself and take on the enemy. So what's the problem here?

What do you see them doing specifically? What is a realistic mission? Expected enemy? How long can it operate on this mission?

Have you read anything about the SBCTs other than treadhead biased bunk that is not based on facts? If you had read something other than that, oh... like the first chapter or two of a SBCT field manual, you would know the answer to this. The short answer is... they are designed to do anything asked of them and do so for as long as it is asked of them.

In a Syrian setting they would be able to operate longer and with less logistical hassles than a Heavy BCT, but with a bit more hassles than an Infantry BCT (which is what they are calling light infantry these days). Since they were designed to be somewhere inbetween an HBCT and an IBCT, this makes sense.

I already said I think they can screen, particularly covering the flanks or rear of larger task forces. That is because they can use their mobility best within interior lines and open areas, and their vulnerability to direct fire is somewhat augmented if they can trade ground. Meanwhile I'd expect them to do pretty well for exchange ratios.

A screening force is an excellent use of a SBCT in a Syrian type setting. It is also a good force to commit to MOUT operations when they prove necessary. A "fire brigade" is also a good use for one, as well as a force capable of quickly exploiting unforeseen opportunities. As a raiding force, they would also be a good pick depending on the circumstances. Raiding the lines of communication of an armored division might be a good thing to do, it might not. Depends on the circumstances. Sweeping through an assembly area of a forming up reserve Mech unit would likely be an excellent use of an SBCT.

Remember, the Armored Cavalry has largely been abandoned. SBCT is considered to be the replacement for it, which irks a lot of people to no end Therefore, one should expect that SBCTs would operate in much the same way that Armored Cav used to.

Oh, and don't forget that SBCTs are designed to be combined with armor and Mech Infantry as the mission dictates. Since the parent divisions of SBCTs have such resources at their disposal, it is silly to think that they wouldn't be combined when it makes sense to do so.

None of this counts on air power to come to their rescue when attacked, or the enemy being a paper tiger. It also entertains no illusions about the mobility of light forces inside a hostile enemy country. Spearheads for serious operations are heavy and armored.

Spearheads for major ops against major conventional forces are indeed heavy and armored. But there is always a tip of a spearhead as well as the sharp edges. The US military has operated with a rich combined arms concept since it learned the hard way from the Germans in WWII that it needed to do this. To think there is no role for SBCTs or IBCTs in frontline combat, right up there with the lead elements, is to ignore 60 years of US military history and to in particular ignore the history of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Steve

[RevJack]

Very, very interesting thread....I, for one, am learning alot I didnt know. Wish I could contribute but I know little about todays modern army. This is one way to learn and one of the reasons I visit this forum....looking forward to the game and more informative posts from you guys.

[JasonC]

That really didn't even begin to address Adam's question.

Actual heavy forces, armor or full mech infantry, lead the way when there is actual enemy opposition beyond the light infantry or militia variety. The reason they lead the way is they have organic weapons that can reach out and demolish all enemy armor at multi-kilometer ranges and using advanced sensors, that make them effectively invulnerable to nearly all reply fire. And they can use those weapons on the move, offensively. When a seriously heavy mech division drives through a Warsaw Pact style armor formation, everything evaporated kilometers away before it can touch them.

Now one simply cannot accomplish this in MG main armament light armor. One cannot accomplish this with dismount ATGM teams with 2/3rds the range of the serious stuff in the heavy divisions. A fifth of the force in AT modes and the like can deal with a handful and provide all the fire brigade support a defensive stance based on dismounted Javelins and FOs might require, but they aren't intended for, or adequate for, charging through an enemy tank army and smoking it without loss. That is what heavy divisions are for, and reliably do.

So if I am invading Syria, I send a heavy divisions on "point" along every major axis of advance. I might grab undefended stuff with light forces, using their rapid deployment abilities. I might screen stuff taking with light mech. But I sure as heck would not put light mech on "point" against full Syrian armor divisons and upward - there is no point in doing so, it would be a combined arms "crime".

Yes light divisions were used in Iraq II. In case everybody forgot, 82 was used in the north because the Turks didn't let through the heavy division meant to lead on that axis. They stayed defensive and relied on air. They were basically there to protect the Kurds and tied down forces in the north, while the heavy stuff from the south took the country. This was a fall back from the planned heavy pronge through Turkey. In practice they were able to make modest advances by calling down mega air and ratcheting along as Iraqi formations lost morale and disbanded. That is all.

The 101, on the other hand, originally had a role of screening flanks of the heavies, and was then given an accelerated raid mission, trying to exploit Iraqi collapse. Most of the Apaches were sent on a single deep raid in a manner that would have been more fitting for the air force. It was a fiasco, in case everyone forget. They took so many rotor hits from light AA and small arms (23mm, 14.5mm, and lighter still) that the bulk of the Apache fleet was grounded inside 24 hours. Dust storms then further limited their ops.

Whereas in Desert Storm, Apaches operating at the edge of the front line scored heavily with minimal losses, the attempt to "go deep" with them independently was a clean operational failure, a waste of their demonstrated combat power in a less aggressive or more supporting fires role, and not something to be tried again.

The closest we came to using light armor so aggressively in gulf war II was the Marine task force. It was largely in AAA7s and LAVs. The LAVs were fairly heavily armed, at least as heavily as current typical Stryker forces (mostly because they have been around long enough to accumulate lots of the higher firepower variants, over the plain vanilla troop carrier - also because the Marines uses the AAA7s for the latter role). But they also had full tanks and used them. We still lost more men to RPGs hitting the AAA7s than to any other part of the combat force (rear echelon convoys and helo crashes were the other major causes of such loss as there was).

Pejoratives about "treadheads" and the like are simply silly. Heavy mech proved the most useful arm in the active phases of both gulf wars. It continued to show the same even in the urban combat against militia forces phase, when they were still confronting us openly in pitched battle ambushes and the like. The enemy got clobbered so bad by heavy mech trying that, they switched to IED tactics.

On later security ops, light mech has certainly proved useful and flexible and cheaper to run, and I've no doubt it can do the screen and patrol missions during active ones (as some Marine LAV units did in Gulf war II).

As for the deployability issues, the reason there is such rancor over it is the Bradley lost the initial competition in large part because of the C-130 weight requirement. The Stryker outperformed the Brad only on operating expense and that metric. Then in practice it failed to meet the requirements for actual C-130 deployment. The bitterness of Brad advocates comes from seeing the rule change after they got their bad grade, and the test then being downplayed afterwards.

As for the claim that no vehicle could really meet the C-130 test in deployable shape, it is clearly just wrong. The LAV and M113 varieties in the tests made the C-130 deployability criteria easily and still do. The Stryker promises more as a much larger vehicle than the LAV, which really doesn't have enough troop carrying capacity for an infantry rather than light mech scouting formation. But the LAV matches it in firepower and exceeds it in deployability, which is why Marines still use them.

At the time of the tests, Brad advocates thought the C-130 requirement unrealistic in other respects. They pointed out the billions we spent on C-17 airlift precisely to be able to get heavier equipment to theater rapidly. Then we turn around and pretend those don't exist for the deployment requirement, and spend billions more on a new fleet of vehicles. That then don't fit in the C-130 anyway. This cannot be described as the finest hour in Army - Air Force planning, in other words.

More important from my own point of view, it has turned out the very rapid wars, mobility is everything view that motivated the original shift toward light mech, has proven inaccurate in practice as an estimate of the kinds of wars we actually fight. We have months to prepare and Ro-Ros send the serious equipment, while the troops fly in to meet it.

Can we always count on this? No, and it is useful to have light stuff because of it. Also to reach landlocked areas e.g. Afghanistan. Although Marines were actually better at getting there than even the army lights, in practice. (Go figure. Organizational emphasis basically). But the basic mission of the bulk of the army has generally been quite protracted conflict against an enemy initially heavily equipped with armor, who dribbles off to light infantry militia through attrition success. This is not the maneuverist razzle dazzle win in 3 weeks picture initially used to sell the present doctrine.

I see no harm in admitting these things and actually learning from them. Lets leave siding with particular weapon systems to the friends of congressmen paid to do so, and instead watch what we actually do and what actually works.

[Battlefront.com]

JasonC,

That really didn't even begin to address Adam's question.

I never thought it would The question was extremely broad and people have written tomes on such subjects. Trying to condense an answer down to a few sentences is impossible.

Actual heavy forces, armor or full mech infantry, lead the way when there is actual enemy opposition beyond the light infantry or militia variety. The reason they lead the way is they have organic weapons that can reach out and demolish all enemy armor at multi-kilometer ranges and using advanced sensors, that make them effectively invulnerable to nearly all reply fire. And they can use those weapons on the move, offensively. When a seriously heavy mech division drives through a Warsaw Pact style armor formation, everything evaporated kilometers away before it can touch them.

Yup, no disputing this. The position I have been disputing is that SBCTs are basically COIN ops units and should be left at home while the HBCTs go out and do the real fighting. That's as much an unsupportable position as saying that SBCTs would lead the fight. What I have said is that, given certain circumstances, a SBCT would make an ideal deep penetration force. The key in that sentence is the circumstances. Like any type of unit, sometimes the opportunity is beyond the capability of a particular unit.

Now one simply cannot accomplish this in MG main armament light armor. One cannot accomplish this with dismount ATGM teams with 2/3rds the range of the serious stuff in the heavy divisions.

I dispute this only because you say this in absolutes. A Medium or Light force, properly deployed and backed up by air and artillery assets, could decimate a larger, heavier force of a type it is likely to encounter. It would not be wise to purposefully test this premise though, since the risks are of course a lot higher than if a Heavy force were in there instead.

A fifth of the force in AT modes and the like can deal with a handful and provide all the fire brigade support a defensive stance based on dismounted Javelins and FOs might require, but they aren't intended for, or adequate for, charging through an enemy tank army and smoking it without loss. That is what heavy divisions are for, and reliably do.

No disputing that. But in a moving battle of forces the SBCT could stop prior to "mixing it up" with the enemy Heavies and take them on in a defensive stance, then move on after. Or, as I said in my earlier posts, put up a screen and move around or withdraw.

So if I am invading Syria, I send a heavy divisions on "point" along every major axis of advance. I might grab undefended stuff with light forces, using their rapid deployment abilities. I might screen stuff taking with light mech. But I sure as heck would not put light mech on "point" against full Syrian armor divisons and upward - there is no point in doing so, it would be a combined arms "crime".

No argument there. However, remember that in OIF there was far more exploitation ops than head to head slugging it out, as there was in Desert Storm. So I would presume that after the initial assault that it would be a mad dash for key terrain as it was in OIF.

Yes light divisions were used in Iraq II. In case everybody forgot, 82 was used in the north because the Turks didn't let through the heavy division meant to lead on that axis. They stayed defensive and relied on air. They were basically there to protect the Kurds and tied down forces in the north, while the heavy stuff from the south took the country. This was a fall back from the planned heavy pronge through Turkey. In practice they were able to make modest advances by calling down mega air and ratcheting along as Iraqi formations lost morale and disbanded. That is all.

Right, but according to Adam they couldn't have even done that. And let's not forget, I only brought the Light forces to show the other extreme. A SBCT is not a Light force, it is a Medium force and therefore what the Light forces were/weren't able to do is not directly relevant.

The 101, on the other hand, originally had a role of screening flanks of the heavies, and was then given an accelerated raid mission, trying to exploit Iraqi collapse.

They were responsible for taking a lot of terrain and key features almost completely on their own and when there were still large amounts of Iraqi conventional forces in the the fight. The failure of the Apache assault is a different matter al together.

The closest we came to using light armor so aggressively in gulf war II was the Marine task force. It was largely in AAA7s and LAVs. The LAVs were fairly heavily armed, at least as heavily as current typical Stryker forces (mostly because they have been around long enough to accumulate lots of the higher firepower variants, over the plain vanilla troop carrier - also because the Marines uses the AAA7s for the latter role). But they also had full tanks and used them.

I'll dispute that the Marine LAVs are "at least as heavily" armed as a Stryker force is today. That's a matter of factual record that I don't see how it can be challenged. A Stryker Rifle Company has 3 Strykers armed with 105s and probably tasked with ATGM variants from the Battalion. But I would say they are similarly armed, which was the point I made above with CivDiv. The Marines performed a central role in the assault on Iraq and they did just fine with the forces they had.

We still lost more men to RPGs hitting the AAA7s than to any other part of the combat force (rear echelon convoys and helo crashes were the other major causes of such loss as there was).

And let's not forget A-10s

Pejoratives about "treadheads" and the like are simply silly.

Silly, yes, but it is an unfortunate facet of this debate. It's been there since the very beginning. There are also "wheelheads" (I guess you could call them!) who have an equal and opposite reaction to this debate. These are the people that managed to get rid of tanks in the Canadian inventory, albeit temporarily. The thing is OIF showed that Heavy forces still have a central role to play (which I for one never doubted for a second) and that has revived a lot of the "treadhead" thinking that left the US military without a Medium force for most of the Cold War. It is dangerous to forget that a Medium force is needed.

One reason why I have brought the "treadhead"issue up is because of how the debate has gone on so far. The Bradley is flawless, the Stryker is flawed. This is what I've seen and it is a bad way to discuss things. And it is very much rooted in the tracks vs. wheels debate since the sorts of heavy armament and defenses being put forward as the only way to go are only possible with tracks.

Heavy mech proved the most useful arm in the active phases of both gulf wars. It continued to show the same even in the urban combat against militia forces phase, when they were still confronting us openly in pitched battle ambushes and the like. The enemy got clobbered so bad by heavy mech trying that, they switched to IED tactics.

I was with you until the end. IED tactics are in place because they are effective against a well organized, well disciplined, vehicle based force. It has nothing to do with the weight of the force. IEDs have been most successful against lighter vehicles, which constitute a target rich environment. If there were no Bradleys or Abrams in Iraq there would still be IEDs. In fact, look at Afghanistan where IED attacks are growing by leaps and bounds and yet the forces there are driving around in uparmored Humvees and not Bradleys

On later security ops, light mech has certainly proved useful and flexible and cheaper to run, and I've no doubt it can do the screen and patrol missions during active ones (as some Marine LAV units did in Gulf war II).

Yup.

As for the deployability issues, the reason there is such rancor over it is the Bradley lost the initial competition in large part because of the C-130 weight requirement. The Stryker outperformed the Brad only on operating expense and that metric. Then in practice it failed to meet the requirements for actual C-130 deployment. The bitterness of Brad advocates comes from seeing the rule change after they got their bad grade, and the test then being downplayed afterwards.

Cost, maintenance, logistics support, unified chassis, larger troop carrying capacity, and other concerns were also major considerations and the LAV III beat the Bradley hands down. So while it is true the Army changed its requirements after the selection, I doubt that would have changed the decision.

As for the claim that no vehicle could really meet the C-130 test in deployable shape, it is clearly just wrong.

You did not read what I wrote correctly. The Stryker ICV is no longer C-130 "roll on, roll off" combat ready because of its anti-RPG defenses. If you uparmor another vehicle to have the same ability to shrug off RPG hits you will find that it too can not meet the C-130 requirements. Take the anti-RPG stuff off the Stryker and it does meet the C-130 test, as do other vehicles (including the LAV II and M113)

At the time of the tests, Brad advocates thought the C-130 requirement unrealistic in other respects. They pointed out the billions we spent on C-17 airlift precisely to be able to get heavier equipment to theater rapidly. Then we turn around and pretend those don't exist for the deployment requirement, and spend billions more on a new fleet of vehicles. That then don't fit in the C-130 anyway. This cannot be described as the finest hour in Army - Air Force planning, in other words.

Very true. The whole air lift logistics aspect was never realistic. I mentioned the RAND study above... very good, though dry, read.

More important from my own point of view, it has turned out the very rapid wars, mobility is everything view that motivated the original shift toward light mech, has proven inaccurate in practice as an estimate of the kinds of wars we actually fight. We have months to prepare and Ro-Ros send the serious equipment, while the troops fly in to meet it.

Well, I would disagree with you here. Right now we are so f'n bogged down in Iraq that we can't test this theory. We couldn't take on another major operation even with months of planning time without compromising Afghanistan and Iraq. In any case, wouldn't it be better to have the option to get a significant Medium force into action on short notice than to always be faced with a choice between quickly moving in Light and then waiting months to have significant Heavy forces in place? Based on what you wrote in your next paragraph I do see you agree with this.

I see no harm in admitting these things and actually learning from them. Lets leave siding with particular weapon systems to the friends of congressmen paid to do so, and instead watch what we actually do and what actually works.

Totally agree. As I've said all along, I am not pro-Stryker and anti-Bradley. I am instead interested in what each has to offer on the battlefield in reality. And the notion that the Strykers are useless is simply not something I can agree with, no more than I can agree that Bradleys are outdated Cold War relics. They both have their places on the modern battlefield. CM:SF will show this to be true.

Steve

[ March 11, 2007, 02:18 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Ryan Crierie]

Well, that's sorta true. In theory the Strykers can be moved in a meaningful way by C-130, and C-130s can go into places that the larger transports can not.

In theory, yes. But in order to do it practically, you need to do some pretty absurd things like deflating the tires to gain a few more inches of clearance with the conventional Stryker variants, and in the case of the MGS, you IIRC have to remove the turret completely.

However, it is likely that there is no vehicle capable of meeting such a spec no matter what, since the weight and/or bulk of such defenses precludes it from being flown in a C-130 in a completed state.

IIRC they've dropped that requirement for FCS.

Military planners totally dropped the ball on this one.

Or they were pressured into it by Shinkenski (more on this later), and once a big budget military program gets started, it's virtually impossible to cancel it. I'll try to elucidate more on the absurdity of the Army's "lightweight force" program later and how it was a total overreaction by Shinkenski due to the US Army's poor performance in 1999.

Having said that, it is possible to deploy smaller portions of a Stryker Brigade by air, even C-130.

The problem is, if we're deploying such small portions of a unit by C-17 (the only reasonable aircraft), why not simply upgrade the vehicle to Bradleys or Abrams to take more advantage of the C-17's massively increased payload capability over the C-130?

IIRC, in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; this did happen, once we had secured an airfield, the USAF flew in several C-17s and landed a small detachment of M1s for airfield defense.

Again, as Flamingknives mentioned, the LAV III was only part of the cost. The conversion of "bells and whistles" put a huge cost onto the vehicle.

Actually, one of the major reasons the LAV III series was selected as a baseline for the Interim Armored Vehicle was because it was already available and could be produced quickly and cheaply, with a minimum of development costs.

(FYI There were quite a few other contestants in the IAV contest, a good quick overview, even if it's just pictures of the contestants can be found in Richard Hunnicutt's Armored Car)

Then the Army insisted on something like 2000+ or so design changes to the LAV III design to make the Stryker instead of simply using the LAV III as is with the digital stuff; negating any savings from an off the shelf design.

A cost that is also being expended on retrofitting Bradleys and Abrams too. Have you seen the refit costs for an Abrams to the new SA package (Situational Awareness) or the SEP upgrade? It's staggering.

To be truthful, that stuff is going to be applied to the Bradleys and Abrams anyway through complete overhauls; we're putting some truly absurd mileages on our vehicles in Iraq; quite a lot of stuff is sitting over here in CONUS waiting for refurbishment after being driven until they broke.

On top of that the concept of SBCT called for vehicles that did not exist. Those had to be designed almost from the ground up

Technically, everything in the Stryker family did exist as variants of the LAV III; even the Stryker MGS had some prototype hardware at the time of the IAV competition, albeit on the LAV III chassis.

That's not true. The cuts you mentioned were made for a variety of reasons, especially for the M2000 Crusader.

The Crusader restructuring, M2A3 new production cancellation, M1A2 SEP new production cancellation, BAT Cancellation, ATACMS Block II, and Improved Stinger cancellation in 2002 (48 programs in all!!) were to pay for the Stryker program and FCS program, which both stemmed from a total overreaction by Eric Shinkenski and the Army brass from the Army's poor showing in Kosovo; Instead of asking for the USAF to buy more C-17s so the Army could move equipment and units overseas faster, they decided that the "Legacy Force", e.g. our existing heavy equipment like the Bradleys and Abrams was obsolete in the kind of peace keeping, rapid reaction environment that they thought would be the future states of conflict involving the US Army.

What killed the Crusader program was when they restructured it to be lighter rather than weighing nearly as much as an Abrams, a lot of the features, such as shoot on the move capability were terminated, leaving it essentially as a really expensive M109, so it was killed.

Ironically, the kind of "peacekeeping" we're encountering in Iraq is proving Shinkenski and his ilk completely wrong; the Army's buying up just about every heavy mine resistant wheeled vehicle that there is on the market; mainly because virtually every program for such vehicles has a backlog out to 2009, and so if we order 10 billion different vehicles, we'll get them faster than just orders for 2 main vehicles.

Ironically such vehicles are making the US Army heavier, much heavier than lighter; because these heavy wheeled vehicles weigh in at about 12-15 tons, versus only 7 tons or so for the M1114 Armored Humvee.

The war in Iraq is responsible for more cuts to future equipment than anything else.

Actually, the war in Iraq is pretty much weaning the Army off it's lighter is better fetish, and might actually result in FCS being worth a damn, since the weight limit has been raised from an absurd 19 tons to a bit more sane 24 tons, and might possibly end up being a much more reasonable 40 tons.

And don't forget about FCS and Star Wars... two of the largest, bloated, useless programs that the US government has ever embarked on since the "Duck and Cover" propaganda campaign.

Hey now, don't attack FCS....it has yet to absorb the entire DoD budget....yet.

Seriously, the sooner it's cancelled for a 40~ ton common chassis, the better.

As for Missile Defense, actually no, the program is proceeding quite well, and is worth it. Contrary to popular belief, it is not that hard to hit a ballistic missile. Why? Look at the word "Ballistic Missile". That means it cannot manuver at all.

Once you have painted the ICBM on radar a couple of times, you can use your computers to calculate where the missile will be at all points in it's trajectory. From there on, it's only a matter of placing something into it's path. You don't even need a homing warhead on your ABM system, you just need a rocket motor that will place the ABM in the same location at the same time as the incoming missile, and the sheer kinetic energy from both systems closing speeds will destroy both vehicles.

What about MIRVs or Decoys?

Well, MIRVs are a much overstated threat. See, the missile bus cannot release all of the MIRVs at once; because doing so will severely upset the stability and balance of the bus, due to all that mass being released at once, and hence will make the MIRVs miss their targets completely.

So the bus has to release the warheads in sequence and correct for the missing mass of each warhead before it can release the next warhead. This makes defeating them relatively easy; you just make the ABM even more longer ranged, so you can hit the missile buses in orbit before they've released their warheads.

Decoys, well, here's the problem; they simply don't work. Decoys simply don't behave like real warheads do, because they don't have the mass or sturdiness of the actual warheads themselves. A popular anti-balloon decoy method is to simply spray a cloud of ball bearings ahead of the interceptor, so that it shreds any balloons floating around.

And once the warheads and decoys start to enter the upper atmosphere, the much lighter mass of the decoys will cause them to fall far behind the much heavier actual warheads, making discrimination easy. For the kind of weight that decoys impose, you could just put actual warheads in.

The Russians FYI are updating their Moscow-based ABM system and changing over from nuclear armed interceptors to hit-to-kill ones, the same kind that we have deployed at Fort Greeley.

Sorry to sidetrack a Stryker discussion into one on Missile defense, lol.

At $8 Billion a month, we could buy a lot of new toys instead of trying to keep people who hate each other from hating each other.

At least it's providing us with a large live fire arena to prove/disprove military theories and concepts, and will heavily influence any future Humvee replacement, leading to US troops being the most heavily armored and protected troops in history by the time we leave.

Remember, the Armored Cavalry has largely been abandoned. SBCT is considered to be the replacement for it, which irks a lot of people to no end

That would be news to a friend of mine, who drives a M1A2 SEP v2 in the Brave Rifles.

To think there is no role for SBCTs or IBCTs in frontline combat, right up there with the lead elements, is to ignore 60 years of US military history and to in particular ignore the history of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The big problem with this is that the Stryker's (and the FCS's, to a large extent) boosters make claims that such units could stand up in a high intensity heavy mechanized environment due to better situational awareness and "transformational" technologies.

While I can see them standing up to a conventional mechanized force in a defensive formation taking advantage of the plentifulness of the brigade's Javelin missiles organic to their infantry, I have serious doubts about their capability of assaulting a mechanized force successfully without significant casualties, due to the lack of any organic heavy weapons capable of directing fire while on the move, other than the Stryker TOW (or is it Javelin) vehicles. I really don't think the MGS will actually see service, and will end up being cancelled due to intractible problems with the design.

[civdiv]

It is clear you have a chip on your shoulder about the Strykers. You are not looking at the other side of the argument at all. You only point out the Bradley's strengths and the Stryker's weaknesses, and when I flip it around you dodge it. You can't win an intellectual debate by presenting an obviously biased and lopsided argument. I'm sure you will say the same about me, but count up how many times I have agreed with your facts and how many time you've agreed with mine. I have seen you done the latter... (quick scan) not even once.

Steve,

I agree with you on the following points;

1. The Stryker is faster than the Bradley.

2. It is also quieter.

Now, while I agree with you I see the two factors as being almost irrelevent in a non-COIN/Three block war or certain MOUT situations.

3. I agree the Stryker is more fuel efficient.

4. I agree it is easier to supply (Because of the anemic firepower.).

5. I agree the ride is better and troops arrive 'fresher', if they do arrive.

6. The bigger carrying capacity do give them a much better infantry footprint.

With that said, since this is like shooting fish in a barrel...

Anyone that says the Stryker concept did not come about, due in large part, to COIN, simply doesn't know what they are talking about.

I've been reading everything there is to read about Strykers since before they were called that. So if I don't know what I'm talking about, I've obviously been doing something wrong these past three years [big Grin]

Here is a quote from "From Transformation to Combat - The First Stryker Brigade at War:

The Strike Force [which became the SBCT concept] was to be the Army's newest step toward creating a rapidly deployable organization able to act decisively and successfully under any conceivable set of circumstances from peacekeeping to total war.

Obviously COIN ops is a part of what they are designed to handle, but to say that is what they were designed to handle is incorrect. Another quote:

In the field, early entry and stability operations would be the unit's primary functions, but its members would be trained and equipped both to conduct conventional offensive and defensive warfare and to coordinage support efforts such as humanitarian assistance. Intended to deploy from the continental United States to anywhere in the world with enough lethality to seize the battelfield initiative upon arrival, the unit would field a force of 3000-5000 troops tailored to achieve whatever goals it was set to accomplish.

Partly balderdash, partly typical army PR, and part that agrees with my point. The Strykers are not designed for mech heavy fights. Neither were the Stryker's predecessors, the Light Divisions.

And, most of this 'transformation' is based on the understanding that economically the world is so intertwined we can't have a huge mech battle with, say, China, both our economies would tank.

And here's another quote from the same document you cited. So what caused the need for transformation?

The Army

believes that the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively

to (1) the growing number of peacekeeping operations and small-scale

contingencies and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such

as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

And why deployable? Because we don't fight the big mech battles anymore so we have to get combat power on deck quick.

And another factor is relevency and inter-service rivaly; needing the Marines to seize the initial ground in Afghanistan was a huge embarrassment to the army. They tried just about everything to come up with a plan that didn't focus on the Marines but try as they did, the army simply couldn't preform the mission.

The experiences that shaped this were Desert Shield, the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, and probably a dozen things we didn't get involved in. These operations were all problems for the existing US military force. Transformation seeks to make the rest of the military more flexible, but the SBCT is still the force that is designed to be the most flexible. The SBCT was grown to be a sort of Swiss Army knife, not a specialized single use tool.

Agreed, sort of, but I've got bigger fish to fry.

Sorry, IMHO, your points are off target and just plain flawed. Both the Bradley and the Stryker are equally protected against spork wielding insurgents. That doesn't make them equally protected. To argue that the Stryker is armored like the Bradley is laughable. The Bradley has composite armor that will shrug off some ATGMs and almost all RPGs, the Stryker doesn't. And this is not even taking bar or reactive armor into account.

Right, so what part of my previous post are you disagreeing with? Seems to me you are in agreement. To repeat myself, except for a narrow range of threats (like you mentioned) the two vehicles are about just as vulnerable on the battlefield. An AT-14 is going to wipe out either one, an RPG-29 will wipe out either one, an RPG-7 HE round won't likely critically damage either, so on and so forth.

I still wouldn't call them equally survivable. So do we agree the Bradley more survivable? And I would point out that one of the original design requirements was the Stryker withstanding 14.5 mm AP and to this day it doesn't, not w/o hanging another 5,000 lbs of armor on it.

And limiting the Stryker to a .50 cal or a Mk-19 means it can't deal with almost ANY armor it encounters. Sure, it has other varients but EVERY Bradley can kill anything in the Syrian TOE.

It can't kill something if it is not even there in the fight or broken down. That's what the Stryker's advantages are, not a toe to toe fight with heavy armor. OK, but let's carry through your analogy here...

Besides the army's own 'cooked numbers' I have seen no evidence that a Stryker is more reliable.

Anything short of a Bradley is a waste of space on the battlefield. Soldiers relying upon such inferior vehicles will not be able to perform difficult and taxing offensive operations. They will, instead, be vulnerable when not engaged and useless when engaged. Just like the Marines.

WHAT?!? JUST LIKE THE WHAT?!? Just trying to get your attention [big Grin]

[Battlefront.com]

Ryan,

In theory, yes. But in order to do it practically, you need to do some pretty absurd things like deflating the tires to gain a few more inches of clearance with the conventional Stryker variants, and in the case of the MGS, you IIRC have to remove the turret completely.

Deflating the tires isn't a big deal because the vehicle can self inflate them. So again... most of the C-130 transportable. Yup, the MGS is not and I am not sure the ATGM is either, but to say it is *not* air transportable by C-130 is factually incorrect. Whether this is of practical use is an entirely different question.

Or they were pressured into it by Shinkenski (more on this later), and once a big budget military program gets started, it's virtually impossible to cancel it.

Well, unfortunately that's how things work at the Pentagon. Recent cancellations of the XM-8 and renamed Future Warrior program show that it can happen, but unfortunately only after hundreds of millions have been spent and the eye taken off of more viable alternatives.

The problem is, if we're deploying such small portions of a unit by C-17 (the only reasonable aircraft), why not simply upgrade the vehicle to Bradleys or Abrams to take more advantage of the C-17's massively increased payload capability over the C-130?

Well, putting aside the fact that Bradleys and Abrams require a much larger logistics footprint than a Stryker unit of similar tactical size (check out the fuel usage stats cited earlier), the fact is that some Strykers can be put in by C-130. The theory is to fly C-17s to a place close enough to hop over in C-130s. Realistically this is possible, though how practical hasn't been tested yet.

IIRC, in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; this did happen, once we had secured an airfield, the USAF flew in several C-17s and landed a small detachment of M1s for airfield defense.

I had not heard that, but if true it really was a waste of lift capability. To defend a base you could have lifted a lot more practical things with a lot less effort.

Actually, one of the major reasons the LAV III series was selected as a baseline for the Interim Armored Vehicle was because it was already available and could be produced quickly and cheaply, with a minimum of development costs.

(FYI There were quite a few other contestants in the IAV contest, a good quick overview, even if it's just pictures of the contestants can be found in Richard Hunnicutt's Armored Car)

Then the Army insisted on something like 2000+ or so design changes to the LAV III design to make the Stryker instead of simply using the LAV III as is with the digital stuff; negating any savings from an off the shelf design.

There were still benefits from going with the LAV III even with the typical Pentagon mentality "if it isn't expensive, we don't want it" mentality. One was speed to implement. Starting from ground up would have likely cost more (though how much more is debatable) and would have taken several extra years to develop. So while it is true that the Pentagon screwed up many of the advantages of COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) procurement, this does not mean it would have been better to do a ground up design. Knowing how R&D goes for big budget items, I feel pretty confident that a ground up program was NOT the way to go.

To be truthful, that stuff is going to be applied to the Bradleys and Abrams anyway through complete overhauls; we're putting some truly absurd mileages on our vehicles in Iraq; quite a lot of stuff is sitting over here in CONUS waiting for refurbishment after being driven until they broke.

The cost to repair goes up with the weight of the vehicle. It's a pretty well established rule of thumb that has been true for centuries as far as I can see. And don't forget, there are different programs. There are "Reset" programs which simply fix and replace what was already on the vehicle. These programs do not do any upgrades. For that the vehicle has to be slated for one or more upgrade programs. For example, the M1A2 going through the AIM program did not become M1A2 SEP tanks at the end. They just became M1A2s that worked like new again.

The Crusader restructuring, M2A3 new production cancellation, M1A2 SEP new production cancellation, BAT Cancellation, ATACMS Block II, and Improved Stinger cancellation in 2002 (48 programs in all!!) were to pay for the Stryker program and FCS program, which both stemmed from a total overreaction by Eric Shinkenski and the Army brass from the Army's poor showing in Kosovo; Instead of asking for the USAF to buy more C-17s so the Army could move equipment and units overseas faster, they decided that the "Legacy Force", e.g. our existing heavy equipment like the Bradleys and Abrams was obsolete in the kind of peace keeping, rapid reaction environment that they thought would be the future states of conflict involving the US Army.

What killed the Crusader program was when they restructured it to be lighter rather than weighing nearly as much as an Abrams, a lot of the features, such as shoot on the move capability were terminated, leaving it essentially as a really expensive M109, so it was killed.

Ironically, the kind of "peacekeeping" we're encountering in Iraq is proving Shinkenski and his ilk completely wrong; the Army's buying up just about every heavy mine resistant wheeled vehicle that there is on the market; mainly because virtually every program for such vehicles has a backlog out to 2009, and so if we order 10 billion different vehicles, we'll get them faster than just orders for 2 main vehicles.

All true, though I still dispute that the Stryker program alone was the cause for cancellation of these other programs. FCS could have been scaled back, for example, and the funds made available.

Ironically such vehicles are making the US Army heavier, much heavier than lighter; because these heavy wheeled vehicles weigh in at about 12-15 tons, versus only 7 tons or so for the M1114 Armored Humvee.

Well, the problem here is comparing a force that was designed for the Cold War conventional fight and one that is in need of fighting in a COIN environment. The Stryker program was designed to fight small engagements, not 4 year monster quagmires against a vastly hostile and well armed population. None of the US military was set up for that, so everything is getting heavier. Heavy Brigades are now VERY Heavy Brigades In the defense of the Medium Brigade concept, this had better NOT be the norm for the US military. We can't afford it.

Actually, the war in Iraq is pretty much weaning the Army off it's lighter is better fetish, and might actually result in FCS being worth a damn, since the weight limit has been raised from an absurd 19 tons to a bit more sane 24 tons, and might possibly end up being a much more reasonable 40 tons.

Again, if this is the type of war the US sees itself fighting, it has a lot bigger fish to fry than what vehicles it uses.

Hey now, don't attack FCS....it has yet to absorb the entire DoD budget....yet.

Heh. Well, don't worry too much about it. Within a few years the DoD will have no budget at all since entitlements will consume every single penny the Federal Government takes in.

As for Missile Defense, actually no, the program is proceeding quite well, and is worth it. Contrary to popular belief, it is not that hard to hit a ballistic missile. Why? Look at the word "Ballistic Missile". That means it cannot manuver at all.

I still think it is a colossal waste of money. We could make this country far safer by using the same money in a hundred different ways. But that's just me

At least it's providing us with a large live fire arena to prove/disprove military theories and concepts, and will heavily influence any future Humvee replacement, leading to US troops being the most heavily armored and protected troops in history by the time we leave.

And yet I don't see how that is winning the war.

That would be news to a friend of mine, who drives a M1A2 SEP v2 in the Brave Rifles.

Hmmm... I thought Transformation was phasing out the independent ACRs and transforming them into HBCTs. I could be wrong about that.

The big problem with this is that the Stryker's (and the FCS's, to a large extent) boosters make claims that such units could stand up in a high intensity heavy mechanized environment due to better situational awareness and "transformational" technologies.

We don't know yet if that is true. They haven't been tested by that yet, however I for sure don't see them replacing Heavy forces.

While I can see them standing up to a conventional mechanized force in a defensive formation taking advantage of the plentifulness of the brigade's Javelin missiles organic to their infantry, I have serious doubts about their capability of assaulting a mechanized force successfully without significant casualties, due to the lack of any organic heavy weapons capable of directing fire while on the move, other than the Stryker TOW (or is it Javelin) vehicles. I really don't think the MGS will actually see service, and will end up being cancelled due to intractible problems with the design.

MGS is on the way to Iraq now (or is it there already? I can't remember) and has been approved for low rate production. They worked the kinks out of it, though it took a lot longer to do than they thought it would. They also had to give up on the C-130 lift requirement to do it too.

Steve

[aka_tom_w]

just an interesting web site where they make them near London Ontario:

Main Page Land systems web site

more video's and pics here, from this promotional site:

multimedia web page video's of a wide assortment of vechicles they sell

just for interest sake:

GDLS-Canada markets wheeled armor products internationally. The division also manufactures the highly successful LAV family of vehicles in a facility that combines state-of-the-art research and development with systems integration. Last, but not least, GDLS-Canada also supports the corporation's global presence through administrative leadership and strategic co-ordination for GDLS-Australia and collaborative initiatives with MOWAG.

[civdiv]

Originally posted by aka_tom_w:

just an interesting web site where they make them near London Ontario:

Main Page Land systems web site

more video's and pics here, from this promotional site:

multimedia web page video's of a wide assortment of vechicles they sell

just for interest sake:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> GDLS-Canada markets wheeled armor products internationally. The division also manufactures the highly successful LAV family of vehicles in a facility that combines state-of-the-art research and development with systems integration. Last, but not least, GDLS-Canada also supports the corporation's global presence through administrative leadership and strategic co-ordination for GDLS-Australia and collaborative initiatives with MOWAG.

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