How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

DPICM undoubtedly had/ has a major impact, both due to it being in plentiful supply (Especially when initially supplied) and for its effect on target, even if it was not being used at its 'full potential' with 8 or so rounds on target as US doctrine demanded. It still proves more than lethal even with just 2-3 rounds on a column. 

My observation here is that US doctrine was based on the presumption of massed conventional fire vs. DPICM.  They then said "how many DPICMs does it take to equal a crapload of HE?"

Ukraine, on the other hand, has been firing very small numbers of shells at any one target.  So for Ukraine the question is the other way around "how many HE rounds does it take to equal a single DPICM?".  The answer appears to be favorable to DPICMs.

The results, as far as I can see, show Ukraine using a 1-2 shots of DPICM to bust up a platoon sized concentration.  And it works pretty well.

Steve

[sburke]

Czechs will buy ammunition for Ukraine with income from frozen Russian assets (msn.com)

[sburke]

oops...

Putin’s pipeline project from Russia to China falls through (msn.com)

Mongolia, through which the 2,500-kilometer pipeline was supposed to pass, has not included Gazprom’s pipeline in its national development plan through 2028, The South China Morning Post reports.

According to the report, Russia offered Mongolia not only transit revenue but also the opportunity to receive gas from the pipeline with a projected capacity of 50 billion cubic meters per year. Moscow failed to reach an agreement with Beijing, said former Mongolian Security Council member Munkhnaar Bayarlkhaag.

“We are entering a long pause, as Moscow no longer believes it can get the deal it wants from Beijing, and the project is likely postponed until better times,” he said.
In 2022, Putin proposed to his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping to increase Russian gas purchases to 100 billion cubic meters per year to replace the European market lost by Gazprom. However, the Chinese leader did not give the green light for construction. The sticking point was the price of the gas: China demanded it be lowered to the domestic Russian level, around $60 per thousand cubic meters. This is four times cheaper than the Russian gas currently costs China: $260 per thousand cubic meters through the Power of Siberia-1 pipeline.

By late 2023, Russian authorities claimed that the Power of Siberia-2 project was in a high state of readiness and that project documentation would be approved in the first quarter of 2024. “After that, construction could begin,” said Victoria Abramchenko, who was then serving as deputy prime minister.

Mongolia had hoped for an influx of investments from the pipeline, estimated to cost between $8 billion and $15 billion. However, “Russia has no money, and China is in no hurry to build,” notes Li Lifang, an expert from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Additionally, Beijing may fear increased Russian influence in Mongolia, he suggests.

The new Chinese contract is desperately needed by Gazprom, which has lost two-thirds of its exports since the start of the war with Ukraine and last year sold the lowest volume of gas abroad since 1985.

This resulted in the first annual loss in a quarter-century, amounting to 629 billion rubles. Without the ability to sell gas, Gazprom was forced to cut production to its lowest level in history. In the first half of 2024, according to RAS reporting, the company’s gas business loss could amount to another 480.6 billion rubles.

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

It really does not take "a lot" and we have plenty of evidence of this worldwide. Post-Katrina in New Orleans showed just who fast things can fall apart in the richest nation on the planet.  Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Soviet Union, 90s Russia itself came damned close. Iraq is a masterclass in how to unravel a society held together by a single strong arm dictator node.

USSR- discussed before. Yugoslavia- similar + ethnic tensions of epic proportions underneath. Africa and Middle East- completelly different cultures of statehood on top of religious sectarianism, authentic tribalism and culture of honour. Iraq was not even a state before post-WWI, comparing such country to Russia is...well you get that. All beforementioned examples are too different from modern Russia to compare; most of them were articifial creations from the start. Current Russian polity, as much as crude it is, is not. There is real nation behind it; its political form is odd, but is real and has very old roots.

New Orlean is totally something else, as it was local, temporal effect of environmental catastrophy and had nothing to do with international politics; nobody stopped bein American because of it either. Btw. similar disasters happen on regular basis in Russia itself (particulary inland and even during this war) and state structures somehow remain intact.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/record-flood-waters-rise-russias-urals-forcing-thousands-evacuate-2024-04-07/

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Is this what they are teaching in liberal IR these days? 

No idea what  "liberal IR" is in this context. If you mean university, my views on Russia are certainly not  formed by it.

I am afraid that several advisors in White House are, though- which may actually be part of problem how to approach Russia. Not intent of beating poor Sullivan guy here, but I assure you Russian language sphere is full of personal conclusions of this kind, including from highest personas at Kremlin. They really not see this geopolitical contest in terms of numbers, red lines and mathematical probabilities, but ambitions of concrete people and tests of endurance. Like many other folks on this board from CEE and even Russia itself already bring attention to-  signalling strength and willingness to take risk is for Russians even more improtant than actual protracted actions. I can only imagine how many times Putin would need to change diapers if, for example,  NATO would actually seriously start flexing muscles around and blocking Kaliningrad (just an example).

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So you wanna tell us that Russia is not undergoing intense pressures in just about every one of these areas - some of which we are deliberately projecting upon them?  Strikes into Russia and a UA invasion sure sounds like "External Intervention" to me.

Who said they are not under pressure? Sorry Capt, you are twisting a little bit here. We are talking about scale of pressure and possible outcomes for Russia. Also strikes are made by AFU, not NATO troops. There are no "German", "American" or "Polish" tanks in Russia and nobody (apart from nuts and naturally Ukrainians) wants them there. Ukrainians are already hitting Russia deeper and deeper on their own, so ban on missiles is looking progressively weird and seriously improves muscovite morale as to the outcome of whole thing. Maybe it is rational line from WH standpoint, but we have right to openly ask questions if it still is reasonable as situation changes so dynamically. And update our answers accordingly; this will be very hot topic if Trump comes to power.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Factors used by the FFP (but are pretty well aligned with the OECD) are:

Security Apparatus
Factionalized Elites
Group Grievance
Economic Decline and Poverty
Uneven Economic Development
Human Flight and Brain Drain
State Legitimacy
Public Services
Human Rights and Rule of Law
Demographic Pressures
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
External Intervention

Ok, very good enumeration- you convinced me that Russia is in very bad shape. I would even throw several issues like widespread but largely hidden HIV disease or giant casualties of Covid. Quite frankly, these kind of global indexes (like Democracy Index and similar- I saw example of it in my country during PiS rule) tend to be too much on raw data side (check criticism of it in your links) and out of touch with actual sociopolitical reality, while not taking into account local perceptions; but let's pass on that. The crucial questions still remains- how does that translates into wars' end? Are we really doing enough to finish it?  Does being relatively poor and disconnected mean people in muscovy will start, out of a sudden, "f..k Russia" all across the country and demand independence? Why it didn't implode so far deep down in history, with such brutal history of repressions? Is WH calculus objective and rationale-driven, or dometic US concerns play big role here as well (not specialist here, so it is genuine question)?

(Will be back in 3 days so no immediate need to respond.)

Edited August 21 by Beleg85

[A Canadian Cat]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

USSR- discussed before. Yugoslavia- similar + ethnic tensions of epic proportions underneath. Africa and Middle East- completelly different cultures of statehood on top of religious sectarianism, authentic tribalism and culture of honour. Iraq was not even a state before post-WWI, comparing such country to Russia is...well you get that. All beforementioned examples are too different from modern Russia to compare; most of them were articifial creations from the start.

Yeah, I don't think so. You are mistaking time scale for unity. Just because the modern Russian state was a construction by an imperial monarchy hundreds of years ago instead of something created after WW1 or WW2 does not mean there is magically unity instead of significant grievances driven by cultural differences and inequality of treatment.

[The_Capt]

16 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Ok, very good enumeration- you convinced me that Russia is in very bad shape. I would even throw several issues like widespread but largely hidden HIV disease or giant casualties of Covid. Quite frankly, these kind of global indexes (like Democracy Index and similar- I saw example of it in my country during PiS rule) tend to be too much on raw data side (check criticism of it in your links) and out of touch with actual sociopolitical reality, while not taking into account local perceptions; but let's pass on that. The crucial questions still remains- how does that translates into wars' end? Are we really doing enough to finish it?  Does being relatively poor and disconnected mean people in muscovy will start, out of a sudden, "f..k Russia" all across the country and demand independence? Why it didn't implode so far deep down in history, with such brutal history of repressions? Is WH calculus objective and rationale-driven, or dometic US concerns play big role here as well (not specialist here, so it is genuine question)?

Well I am glad you approve - no index is perfect, but if you have a better one, other than your own personal opinion, let's hear it.

Russia did implode...twice.  1917 was the big one.  Hand waving on the Soviet Union in the 90s, is disingenuous. We have a Russian-centric macro-social construct that failed...again...in less than 100 years.  Hand waving and whataboutism on other examples is reaching (and twisting a little bit). Russia has many of the same socio-economic issues that any of those failed state examples had before they failed - that was the point of the entire index thingy.

I could give two figs what the "WH calculus" is on the subject...I have an internet account and can read - Russia was not in fantastic shape before all this, centralized fake democracy held together by elite oligarchs and a strongman.  It economy outside Moscow was flat or sliding (all the talk of no toilets), rampant social issues such as alcoholism and crime.  Its economy was built on a single commodity - energy, which is risky in itself.  Take into account a pretty diverse social structure - 25 official languages! ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_Russia) and I do not need a WH briefing to tell me the place has got issues in its tissues. Russia's fragility index is next door to winners like Iran and North Korea (go look it up).

Now add to this a very high cost losing war and it does not take a freakin genius to see how that can go sideways pretty quickly.  There is no domestic-US-plot here (the cry of every European...ever) and you are talking to a Canadian who has to duck every time the US twitches. Russia was a brittle state before this war. Putin was holding it together with bribes, threats and populism. The whole thing would be schadenfreude laughable if not for the fact that the dump has nukes.

 

[Tux]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

My observation here is that US doctrine was based on the presumption of massed conventional fire vs. DPICM.  They then said "how many DPICMs does it take to equal a crapload of HE?"

Ukraine, on the other hand, has been firing very small numbers of shells at any one target.  So for Ukraine the question is the other way around "how many HE rounds does it take to equal a single DPICM?".  The answer appears to be favorable to DPICMs.

The results, as far as I can see, show Ukraine using a 1-2 shots of DPICM to bust up a platoon sized concentration.  And it works pretty well.

Steve

Thanks for the responses, all.  I suppose it's hard to tell (until we see the post-war wash-up in a few decades' time) whether a given DPICM strike would have been more effective if made with plain HE, or not.  It definitely sounds as if the circumstances in which DPICM make a real difference vs HE are relatively rare in this war, though.

Thinking ahead, as modern ISR-supported precision strike capabilities develop I have to say I doubt whether armies will be that bothered about maintaining DPICM stocks on the off-chance they are able to fire a barrage of them at a dense enemy concentration once or twice per operation...

[Degsy]

A Russian propagandist on the Solovev programme, taking his life in his hands:- "Our authorities were given a colossal credit of people's trust in the spring...but it would be a very great mistake to think that this credit or trust will not be exhausted..we will face very big political problems..."

"our authorities were given..."

[mosuri]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

Russia did implode...twice.  1917 was the big one. 

 

And it was cracking badly at the seams in 1905, after that humiliating defeat to a nation that wasn't supposed to be able to win (although Japan was stretched to the limit by the war, if my limited understanding is correct, they still prevailed)

[FancyCat]

Quote

Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Tobias Billström: "We have never put any restrictions on the weapons that we have delivered to Ukraine, and we do not intend to do it now. Ukraine has already put those weapons to good use"

 

[Endyamon]

Russian tanks are evolving really well...

[FancyCat]

 

Quote

More than a thousand miles from the Ukrainian border, a Ukrainian drone made it all the way to Russia’s Murmansk region in an attempted attack on the Olenya air base, home to strategic bombers used in missions against Ukraine. (The UAV didn’t make it.) https://t.me/VGrudina/2794

Quote

Olenya/Olenegorsk air base is one of four primary strategic air bases that potentially forward-deploy nuclear-armed cruise missiles (Kh-55, Kh-55SM, Kh-102). The other three include Engels air base, which has been struck in the past, as well as Belaya and Ukrainka.

[Lethaface]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

A nation state that has had two revolutions in less than a century, and came dangerously close to a coup last year.

The an answer to your “what would it take?” question is very simple…for the lights to go out.  An economic collapse leading to infrastructure failure and shortages is about all 150 million slightly evolved primates need to go feral.  Macro-social structures are an illusion - “imagined community” Hararri called them. That illusion fractures and micro-social reality takes over.  We have seen this in enough places to understand it does not take much.  Russia can barely hold itself together on a good day - those eagles are pointing two heads in opposite directions for a reason.  Under the pressure of war, economic creaking and a tightly gripping autocracy we have all the factors of a brittle state.

My question is not “how could Russia ever fail?”  It is “how has it held it together so far?”

What exactly is holding together? In how far can we even speak of the Russian Federation as a nation state which acts in the same way and according to the same rules as other instances of the concept nation state do?

Why do we expect it to behave like other nation states when it is quite clear that it doesn't?

I mean, if we don't know how it has held together so far it is fair to say we don't know very much; I guess not everything is observable from space

 

[Lethaface]

I think both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz would be clear about how unwise it is to be engaged with an enemy of which you don't really know his form and how the political structure / architecture holds, even or especially in a proxy war.

At the same time I feel that in NATO as a whole, besides other countries/groups not in the 'pro Russia' camp, there is more understanding of the ways of Russia works. The countries bordering Russia would be a prudent place to look for insights into insights.

[A Canadian Cat]

14 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

What exactly is holding together?

Force. FSB, police all working to hold decent in check at the behest of the dear leader.

 

14 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

In how far can we even speak of the Russian Federation as a nation state which acts in the same way and according to the same rules as other instances of the concept nation state do?

Russia is not unique in that regard. Nothing special here. Powerful elites pulling the economic strings with a strong police state keeping disagreements and descent in check.

 

14 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Why do we expect it to behave like other nation states when it is quite clear that it doesn't?

That's the external policies taken up by the governments. It's Putin's choice that they act belligerent towards its neighbours. His choice to not behave the same way other nations do. 

That has little to do with what holds the nation together. I mean it's not totally separate either - the whole everyone is against us and only I can protect you is useful for something but it really sucks for making friends on an international stage.

All of these strains are things that every nation has some of (see @The_Capt's link to the Fragile nations) how they deal with those strains can vary and honestly those choices cause additional strains. Case in point putting down descent by force causes strain just like the differences in equality do to drive the descent. If you create productive or at least non destructive outlet for the descent then you reduce the strain. Easier said than done I know.

Putin's choices for governance have contributed to the fragility. I realize he thinks he made those choices to hold things together. 

As with all dictators everything seems fine until one day it's not. Figuring out when "one day" is just isn't something we can do very well. We can flag the issues that lead to "one day" but predicting when it will be is something we can do afterwards  

[danfrodo]

14 minutes ago, A Canadian Cat said:

Force. FSB, police all working to hold decent in check at the behest of the dear leader.

So true, so very true.  And this will continue to be the case until it suddenly aint.  Maybe Putin will ride power until a natural death.  But just as likely that someone lights a spark and it turns into a great big fire.  Just look at how most everyone stood aside during Prig's march toward moscow.  

[kimbosbread]

Arab Spring and various revolutions could count on favorable demographics. Lots of angry young men is never a good situation for a government.

How does this work if there simply aren’t that many young men around who have nothing to lose? Are a bunch of middle aged men going to overthrow a government?

[A Canadian Cat]

2 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

But just as likely that someone lights a spark and it turns into a great big fire.

There are a number of ways things can go. All the way from nearly a nothing burger - some other person takes over and manages to keep everyone in line and doesn't change much to chaos at the top that result in chaos at many levels and leads to small areas breaking away first unofficially and then officially until there is a shattered mess and the whole place looks more like war lord fiefdoms form Afghanistan.

[A Canadian Cat]

1 minute ago, kimbosbread said:

Are a bunch of middle aged men going to overthrow a government?

Yeah those middle aged men are more likely to stab a leader in the back (or push him out a window) and take over with their buddies hoping they have enough friends to not get taken out too soon by a rival.

[Lethaface]

35 minutes ago, A Canadian Cat said:

Force. FSB, police all working to hold decent in check at the behest of the dear leader.

 

Russia is not unique in that regard. Nothing special here. Powerful elites pulling the economic strings with a strong police state keeping disagreements and descent in check.

 

That's the external policies taken up by the governments. It's Putin's choice that they act belligerent towards its neighbours. His choice to not behave the same way other nations do. 

That has little to do with what holds the nation together. I mean it's not totally separate either - the whole everyone is against us and only I can protect you is useful for something but it really sucks for making friends on an international stage.

All of these strains are things that every nation has some of (see @The_Capt's link to the Fragile nations) how they deal with those strains can vary and honestly those choices cause additional strains. Case in point putting down descent by force causes strain just like the differences in equality do to drive the descent. If you create productive or at least non destructive outlet for the descent then you reduce the strain. Easier said than done I know.

Putin's choices for governance have contributed to the fragility. I realize he thinks he made those choices to hold things together. 

As with all dictators everything seems fine until one day it's not. Figuring out when "one day" is just isn't something we can do very well. We can flag the issues that lead to "one day" but predicting when it will be is something we can do afterwards  

To be transparent I was trying to entice a bit of a dialectic on this subject.

I think there are different schools of thought, to keep it simple for now on this subject and inside the NATO alliance alone:

* Anglo-Saxon model
* Rhineland model
* Eastern Europe/Slavic
* Nordic

Granted I don't know much about the latter two (insofar whether you can even speak of a model, but hey have plenty of theory in writing which differs from the former two), but I do know that they are more similar to the Rhineland model compared to Anglo-Saxon model. Now that's all very abstract, but you and others here will grasp it fine and I don't feel like going into more detail here.

@Beleg85 wrote an (imo) interesting post about how 'we' may attribute or project some kind of stuff on Russia, which might be just our projections. My interpretation. 
And yes Russians are just people like us, but are 'our' rational / behavioral models and risk theories applicable to the Russian Federation? I thought @The_Capt answer was interesting, not only because of it's conclusion. But if his conclusion would be representational to NATO, that's a nice subject for someone to do a study/military phd whatever on.

Edit:
I forgot to mention 

* France 
* South European

I did read quite some France literature on various subjects (although much less compared to Anglo-saxon/Rhinelandic).
 

 

Edited August 21 by Lethaface

[Eug85]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Russia did implode...twice.  1917 was the big one.  Hand waving on the Soviet Union in the 90s, is disingenuous.

In both cases you mentioned, the reason for the collapse of Russia was a crisis of power against the backdrop of a difficult economic situation.

In the first case, it was Nicholas II, or as Russian Nazis call him today, "the rag tsar." He was a rather melancholic and vulnerable person, and in a difficult time for the state, instead of drowning in blood any attempts to change the state system, he decided to play at democracy and allow the Russians themselves to make their choice. This led to chaos and the collapse of the Russian Empire.

In the second case, it was the kind and fair General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The situation is the same. Granting Russians a number of freedoms such as perestroika and glasnost. Feeling the weakness of the government, Soviet citizens began to demand changes in the state structure. Gorbachev did not drown the demonstrations in blood in 1991. For this, Russian fascists hate him today.

As we see, the Russian state is based on fear. As soon as Russians stop being afraid of their ruler, they begin to rebel. Today, Russia is ruled by a very cunning and cruel man who will cling to power with all his might. He will shed any amount of blood if anyone dares to encroach on his power and the Russians understand this perfectly well.

So you can sleep peacefully. There is no threat to Russia's integrity now.

Edited August 21 by Eug85

[Eug85]

Russia cannot exist within its current borders as a free, democratic state. In the early nineties, there was an attempt to make Russia a free state. Without a strong government built on violence, Russia began to literally disintegrate. Chechnya was the first to break away, then problems with Dagestan began. Independence movements began to gain popularity in a number of Asian regions of Russia. The Russians were afraid of this and elected as president a despot who drowned Chechnya in blood. Naturally, after the rest saw what fate befell Chechnya, any talk of leaving Russia was stopped.

[FancyCat]

18 minutes ago, Eug85 said:

In the first case, it was Nicholas II, or as Russian Nazis call him today, "the rag tsar." He was a rather melancholic and vulnerable person, and in a difficult time for the state, instead of drowning in blood any attempts to change the state system, he decided to play at democracy and allow the Russians themselves to make their choice. This led to chaos and the collapse of the Russian Empire.

Unless your reference to "drowning in blood" include dropping out of WWI and making a separate peace with Germany, you should explain how you think Nicholas II could have possibly held his throne by "drowning in blood" anyone. 

[Fenris]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

 

I've wondered for a while if taking a freighter into northern waters and launching a large drone strike at those airfields would work.  With the range the drones can achieve I'd have thought the ship could stay a long way away from the target.

 

[Beleg85]

3 hours ago, A Canadian Cat said:

Force. FSB, police all working to hold decent in check at the behest of the dear leader.

And they somehow survived 500 years of basically uninterrupted statehood in this way (minus several years in XVIIth and XXth century). As much as repulsing their polity is, don't you folks think there must be something more beneath it than pure coercion and yeasts of imperialism?

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well I am glad you approve - no index is perfect, but if you have a better one, other than your own personal opinion, let's hear it.

I think we are talking about two different things here. You try to prove (effecively) that Russia is in bad shape economically and partly politically, which make it vulnerable to political turmoil. I talk about identities, sense of nationhood and continuity of state builded around it...in longue duree  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longue_durée  (sorry for snobbish term). It is by definition harder to find valuable data on soft issues in country like that. There is entire, relatively new  literature in english alone on the subject of "who is Russian" if you like to look for it:

https://academic.oup.com/book/12447

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/two-books-modern-russian-identity

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/national-identity-in-russian-culture/DB6E1D4E93213ECFDA2B6FB06067F005

https://www.amazon.com/Identity-Formation-Russian-Speaking-Populations-Politics/dp/0801484952

+ curiosity:

https://www.levada.ru/en/2024/06/21/emigration-sentiments-and-attitudes-towards-people-who-left-russia-march-2024/

None of these books seriously consider that state may suddenly stop to function and therefore people stop being Russians,  turning country into Mad Max. And that is how I read all those, very popular in anglosphere and partially also here, visions of "Fall", "Collapse" or "Implosion" of muscovy. People all too often imagine this potential catastrophy literally, expecting endgame like in Syria, Libya or other failed states- that means, that Russian polity stop to be one.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Hand waving and whataboutism on other examples is reaching (and twisting a little bit).

I gave you reasons why they were different, where is whataboutism here? Comparing Iraq to Russia is, sorry to say, not very reasonable given massive cultural differences alone. Also I don't see what revolution was in Russia in '89-91, when literally three older gentlemen (Jelcyn, Shuchkievich and Kravczuk) decided to dissolve Soyuz during their winter holidays after external, non-Russian Republics and satellites started to secede. Poland, Ukraine, Baltics, Belarus, Romania...non of these (except unfortunate Belarus) are now within their borders or under Russia influence to help it implode.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belovezha_Accords

Issue of ethinc diversity we disucussed before many times. Russia may have even 50 languages, doesn't matter that much as long as they are all Russkije. Btw.: do you know any serious independence national organizations there? Who is Russian candidate for Catalonia? Any ETA/IRA type sentiments for country of Mari El or Republic of Komi? Except for those two small Caucasian republics we talked about many times. For me it looks like pretty self- concious and coherent nation overall; even too much:

https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/levada-poll-12-russians-support-idea-russia-russians-about-15-would-not-let-chinese-ukrainians

3 hours ago, Lethaface said:

@Beleg85 wrote an (imo) interesting post about how 'we' may attribute or project some kind of stuff on Russia, which might be just our projections. My interpretation. 
And yes Russians are just people like us, but are 'our' rational / behavioral models and risk theories applicable to the Russian Federation? I thought @The_Capt answer was interesting, not only because of it's conclusion. But if his conclusion would be representational to NATO, that's a nice subject for someone to do a study/military phd whatever on.

This is probably correct observation, though I am not sure if different national schools exists. Rather different levels of experiencing Russia, if you know what I mean (there are fantastic Russia experts in the West too, nobody denies that).

Whatever the case, I still think we have all right to ask questions about rationale behind this or that White House decision making. Especially that, in case Orange Guy wins, we have maybe 2-3 months of relatively rational discussions about it left.

Edited August 21 by Beleg85