How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

Quote

Russian milbloggers report that Ukrainian forces from the 95th Airborne Brigade managed to encircle parts of the Russian 18th MRD in Malaya Loknya, Kursk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces reportedly flanked the town and cut off the main access road.

https://t.me/yurasumy/17314

 

[FancyCat]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

The "US leaks all the plans!" folks having a tough morning today. 

Oh yes the General who planned the Kharkiv and Kursk offensives was very careless.

Quote

Those dots are mines the icons above the unit are I which is the company level echelon

There is a few platoon level echelons on the map but almost everything is company

 

[Centurian52]

I have read Clausewitz. On War is not an easy book to get through*, and I can't recommend it unless you are really interested in the state of military thinking in the middle of the 19th century (which I am). I nonetheless found it very interesting. He's writing in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. And he makes a very detailed analysis of lessons learned from those wars and from preceding wars (obviously he was far too dead to draw any meaningful lessons from later wars). So I have no doubt whatsoever that his conclusions are pretty much correct for warfare in the first half of the 19th century. But that does not mean it's wise to trust his conclusions when it comes to modern warfare. Some of what he says is still relevant to modern warfare (for all the things that have changed, there are always a few things that haven't changed (yet))**. But he also says a lot of things that make it very clear that he is talking about Napoleonic warfare, not modern warfare*** (as we understand it today (obviously from his point of view the Napoleonic Wars were modern)). 

The bit about war being a continuation of politics by other means is likely his most commonly referenced point by a very wide margin. While it's pretty self evidently true (governments don't start wars unless they hope to achieve something with them) it isn't really a point that he spends a great deal of time on. In fact he points out that, while a war will always have some sort of political objective, once the war starts it tends to take on a life of its own. Regardless of what the political objective of a specific war is, it is always possible to describe the generic goal in any war as the destruction of the enemy's military power (the idea that the goal is the destruction of the enemy's military power is a point that he spends a great deal more time on). Whatever the political objective is, the thing standing in the way of you achieving that objective is the enemy's military (if the enemy's military wasn't standing in the way of achieving your political objective, there wouldn't be a war). The political objective is the specific end that you hope to achieve with the war. But the means to achieving that end will usually be to remove the obstacle (the enemy's military) that is preventing you from achieving it.

*Which is not really Clausewitz's fault. On War is less a book and more a collection of Clausewitz's notes made throughout his life that his poor wife did her absolute best to organize for publication after his death. So perhaps it's not surprising that the book doesn't exactly flow very well from one chapter to the next.

**I particularly like his definitions of attack and defense, which seem to be just about universally applicable to any period of warfare. He defines the attack as the weaker form of war with the positive object (positive because there is a goal that you are actively trying to achieve). And he defines the defense as the stronger form of war with the negative object (negative because your goal is to negate the enemy's objective). A positive object might be something like capturing a bit of territory or destroying the enemy's army. A negative object might be something like not losing a bit of territory, or not being destroyed. A lot of people seem to be under the impression that Clausewitz advocated always attacking. But if he did, then I missed it (I've read On War twice now, but it's such a dense book that it's still easy to miss things even on a second reading). Really he did nothing more or less than describe what attack and defense are and what their relative advantages are. If you have a positive object (a goal that you actually want to achieve) then there is no way to attain it except by attacking. But by attacking you always make your army weaker than it would be if it were on the defense. So you only attack if you have a positive object and are stronger than the enemy by enough that you can win despite conducting the weaker form of warfare. If you have a positive object then you should always be looking for a chance to attack, because there is no other way to achieve your object. But that you should always be looking for a chance to attack does not mean that you should always be attacking (because attacking makes you weaker, so you shouldn't attack if you aren't strong enough to compensate for the inherent weakness of being the attacker, even if you have a positive object).

***He is dismissive of the value of defensive lines (as in lines formed in defense of an entire theater), arguing that any line must either be short (so easily outflanked) or thin (so easily broken). He was unable to conceive of a day in which armies would be so large, and armed with so much firepower, that it would be possible to form a strong line across the length of an entire theater of operations. Possibly one of the most visible differences between warfare before WW1 and warfare after WW1 is that before WW1 the location of an army would be marked on a map as a point (where was Wellington's army in 1815? At Waterloo). While after WW1 the location of an army would be marked on a map as a line (where is the Ukrainian army in 2024? On a line running roughly from Kupiansk, to Siversk, to Vuhledar, to Kamianske, to Kherson (had to cut a few corners here)).

Edited August 20 by Centurian52

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

A society where a centralized government with a monopoly on military power does not exist or function.  Putin is a complete @sshat, but he holds onto the reigns of power.  Destabilization is a bunch of different power nodes doing what they wish...but now with spicy nukes.

That is just the military and violence end of things.  There are economic, social and a bunch of other bad seucirty things that can happen.

A stable Russia can still be a complete and utter pain but it is still in control of being that utter pain.  Coming back to our reality, all war is negotiation.  In a destabilized Russia, we are not negotiating with a single macro-social entity but a bunch of smaller, far more relatively rational ones.

Destabilization of Russia in this war is basically like trying to put out a fire by kicking it.

Adding to this, a fully destabilized Russia (i.e. far worse than the early 1990s) would mean a flood of refugees into the EU and Ukraine.  That has it's own repercussions, both for Russia and the countries dealing with the refugees.

Then we have the issue of Russian criminal organizations.  They won't be content with thriving off of the chaos within Russia.  They most certainly would relocate a lot of their operations abroad and work from there.  Yes, that already happens on a large scale, but it can get worse.

It is also probable that there will be a lot of bloodshed within Russia.  Some portion of that will wind up biting the rest of the world in the arse in some way at some point that can't be predicted.

Lastly, Russians will blame the West for all of this.  They have already invented a ton of reasons to be hostile and resentful towards the West and look how well that's turned out for everybody.  It will be worse, which could mean a supercharged hostile government eventually replacing Putin's regime.

Notice I haven't even touched upon the Humanity angle.  People will suffer a lot.  Many will die horrible deaths.  The kind side of me would rather that not happen.

Steve

[Lethaface]

On 8/19/2024 at 8:02 PM, Tenses said:

Some of the most advanced countries in the World still use even weirder habits from the past. Like foot(God knows how old) for measurement of distance and pund(also ancient Roman) for weight. It doesn't matter that we have metric system based on some physical properties of surrounding universe, when one guy 10000BC has used his foot to measure some mammoths hide and it all started...

So its not like it is something out of the blue to use roman numbers for centuries. I personally like it as it is always clear what someone has in mind(think: "When has this happened? In 17th. OR In XVII).

The first time an English friend asked me how much stone I weighed, I thought he was taking the piss. Perfidious barbaric cavemen Islanders ;-).

[mosuri]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Adding to this, a fully destabilized Russia (i.e. far worse than the early 1990s) would mean a flood of refugees into the EU and Ukraine.  That has it's own repercussions, both for Russia and the countries dealing with the refugees.

Then we have the issue of Russian criminal organizations.  They won't be content with thriving off of the chaos within Russia.  They most certainly would relocate a lot of their operations abroad and work from there.  Yes, that already happens on a large scale, but it can get worse.

It is also probable that there will be a lot of bloodshed within Russia.  Some portion of that will wind up biting the rest of the world in the arse in some way at some point that can't be predicted.

Lastly, Russians will blame the West for all of this.  They have already invented a ton of reasons to be hostile and resentful towards the West and look how well that's turned out for everybody.  It will be worse, which could mean a supercharged hostile government eventually replacing Putin's regime.

Notice I haven't even touched upon the Humanity angle.  People will suffer a lot.  Many will die horrible deaths.  The kind side of me would rather that not happen.

Steve

Yeah, living next door to mordor the potential refugee crisis following a complete russian collapse is something I avoid thinking too close to bedtime. Instead of a sudden collapse, an unstoppable but just slow enough slide into irrelevance would be by far the preferable outcome from my perspective as well.

I don't much care if they suffer or marinate in their resentment of the West, as long as they stay in russia. We tried being nice after soviet union fell -- e.g., Finland even funded waste water treatment plants in petersburg at one time, as they couldn't be bothered taking care of their own excrement but just flooded it out to sea -- and look where we are now.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Centurian52 said:

I have read Clausewitz. On War is not an easy book to get through

Understatement. We basically are still living within the Clausewitzian school in the western world - it is the foundation of military thinking within that sphere.  China has a different school beyond that. As do Russia and Iran.

Clausewitz was really writing a counter-point to the Jomini school of deterministic military thought, that basically tried to pull it all down into math - we went through another machination of this during the Vietnam era.  He re-inserted human dimensions and chaos (e.g. Friction). His papers on Small Wars are better in some ways as he wrestles with his own definitions in the face of micro-social realities. The guy was a Prussian aristocrat, his view of society was somewhat rigid.

The Makers of Modern Strategy (there is a new edition) and Azar Gat's A History of Military Thought do a very good job of laying down how we got to this point.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, akd said:

Well, they finally did it…(maybe)

 

I'll believe it when I see it, but it is interesting that they're still pushing ahead with it despite the obvious limitations.  The video covered the two big ones... top attack and FPV.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

3 hours ago, akd said:

Well, they finally did it…(maybe)

 

I would take this with a severe pinch of salt. Its tradition at this point that the Russians display all sorts of fancy tech at their exhibitions, but in reality very little of it actually reaches the frontlines or is actually put in service. Considering we have not seen even testing of Arena in Ukraine, I doubt we will see it. I still suspect it has severe issues that have not been solved. 

[Tenses]

23 minutes ago, mosuri said:

Yeah, living next door to mordor the potential refugee crisis following a complete russian collapse is something I avoid thinking too close to bedtime. Instead of a sudden collapse, an unstoppable but just slow enough slide into irrelevance would be by far the preferable outcome from my perspective as well.

I don't much care if they suffer or marinate in their resentment of the West, as long as they stay in russia. We tried being nice after soviet union fell -- e.g., Finland even funded waste water treatment plants in petersburg at one time, as they couldn't be bothered taking care of their own excrement but just flooded it out to sea -- and look where we are now.

I consider "the West" to widely underestimate how Russia is already in China's grip and what true consequences would its fall have. In short - almost none from the western standpoint. China will bailout russian state economically AND politically. In best case scenario for Russinas it will effect in change of the Moscov regime for chinese puppet, something resembling current Lukashenko for Russia. This is quite obvious how Russian people would be terrified about that and how many protests against foreign influence in Great Russia this official vassalization would ignite - exactly zero. Russians brain cancer is a double edged sword and it is clearly visible with current incursion to Kursk. The only thing that you can surely expect from Russian is that he don't care. At least to the moment he will get hit in the head instead of his neighbor. He will be then very suprised and shocked how is that even possible.

Going from best case there are many worse ones like true annexation of Siberia or actual occupation with chinese security forces at least part of the country. Of course not "hostile" occupation, just "support and relief". For far east this will be probably smooth but for western parts of Russia, I don't think that confrontation of chinese and russian culture will work in the long run. Strict and responsible chinese will never accept russian drunks. This would be new slave era, where Russians would be treated like inferior race or even animals by their chinese masters despising their chaotic, illogical nature. In the end, republics like Chechenya and Dagestan along with western districts would probably revolt in some way, but China is quite experienced in dealing with that(Tibet, Ujgur).

Whatever happens in this war, one thing is quite clear to me - Russia lost it on the day Putin pushed this country over the edge. Russians will come back to good old habit of being vassalized by far east masters. For Ukraine this is a win in any case as it will be on the better side of influence area. Actually, only recently we could see first joint exercises of China and Belarus and this might be first step to try secure also Belarus as a future vassal. Russia will come in one packet, at least initially ,but any current or former states dependant on it will have to be pulled into chinese world separately.

[ArmouredTopHat]

I imagine the AFU have got plenty of drones watching these pontoons. 

[billbindc]

19 hours ago, billbindc said:

Color me somewhat skeptical about all of this for a few reasons: 

1. Are we really buying that the US is leaking plans while an often badly penetrated Ukraine is not as much or more? 

2. Do we really think that the targeting and ISR analytics available to the Pentagon didn't pick up preparations? 

Let me suggest that perhaps there are some powerful reasons for Ukraine's government to justify earlier failures.  That there are powerful reasons for the US to be able to deny responsibility for actions Ukraine takes. That this is much as or even more a political offensive than a military one with goals both domestic, towards Moscow and internationally.

Credibly being reported that HUR and Yermak were not told until the last moment and the units used in the initial attack only found out about 24 hours they were sent in. That doesn't sound much like Syrski was worried about *American* leaks.

[Vanir Ausf B]

18 minutes ago, billbindc said:

That doesn't sound much like Syrski was worried about *American* leaks.

I am consistently hearing that we really didn't know, although why they chose not to tell us is debatable.

 

[Fenris]

Posted a couple of hours ago

Quote

According to Romanov and other Russian sources, Ukrainian forces have started offensive operations and became more active in Zaporizhzia near Polohy. Waiting for further confirmation. 

 

[Fenris]

Interesting. Browsing this twitter account today and there's three clips of UKR airstrikes.  There's been a noticeable uptick in these over the past couple of weeks. (note the obligatory metal backing track is loud on this one).

Here's another one, claims to be an command bunker

 

Edited August 20 by Fenris

[Beleg85]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Adding to this, a fully destabilized Russia (i.e. far worse than the early 1990s) would mean a flood of refugees into the EU and Ukraine.  That has it's own repercussions, both for Russia and the countries dealing with the refugees.

Then we have the issue of Russian criminal organizations.  They won't be content with thriving off of the chaos within Russia.  They most certainly would relocate a lot of their operations abroad and work from there.  Yes, that already happens on a large scale, but it can get worse.

It is also probable that there will be a lot of bloodshed within Russia.  Some portion of that will wind up biting the rest of the world in the arse in some way at some point that can't be predicted.

Lastly, Russians will blame the West for all of this.  They have already invented a ton of reasons to be hostile and resentful towards the West and look how well that's turned out for everybody.  It will be worse, which could mean a supercharged hostile government eventually replacing Putin's regime.

Notice I haven't even touched upon the Humanity angle.  People will suffer a lot.  Many will die horrible deaths.  The kind side of me would rather that not happen.

Steve

Tbh. I think we are hiting from wall to wall regarding this... look folks, while part of this scenario is remotely possible, truth is modern Russia is not a Mordor from the past where tribes only wait to eat each other once Tsar is dead. It is relatively coherent nation-state with institutions, division of competences, developed security culture and 10+ mln megalopollies. Such interconnectivitty will not simply vanish into pieces because 2-3 folks at the top will potentially struggle a little in power vacuum after Putin. It's not Somalia.

Knowing a one or two things about this country (still very amateurish level) I must admitt it is difficult to me to imagine how this mythical 'fall of Russia' that people at Washington are so afraid of could look like in reality. No trully moving ideologies, population that is almost fully blaise about who rule them and why, no ambitious politicians with charisma and vision...I just don't see potentiall for apocalyptic chaos people sometimes imagine. And historical analogies can only carry us this far...times are changing, even in muscovy.

On other side we have nuclear equation that is very serious matter indeed. The problem with judging US reaction here is that we know very little how both sides limited this geopolitical contest- I have zero doubts they have a hotline, probably several, in different forms (also diplomatic) to negotiate and talk relatively candidly. I completelly get that, Russia cannot be turned into complete pariah and am not joining "just hit Russia" crowd. But on other side, it is difficult to not see that there are serious doubts how to approach Russia in USA itself, driven by various intrernal issues that in the end directly influence number of casualties in this war. I doubt there is one, completelly objective calculus somewhere near Biden created by super-smart asses who knows everything about their adversary, that is dynamically changing depending on situation on the ground. I see more and more fossiliziation of ideas frankly, like sticking to the script that is getting older by months. Biden's crew started and conducted it very well from the start, but It looks like they got risk awerse and run out of serious ideas over time, especially after failed UA offenisve in 2023. There will be a tipping point somewhere in time, like it or not, where golem that is Russian military effort will start to crack in uncomfortable ways and some risk regarding Putin regime must be taken anyway - even if only in the form of ATACMS and similar initiatives. Otherwise we end in forever war, backing muscovy regime from verge of dead n-time and with potentiall catastrophy in form of crazy Trump presidency looming over horizon. Hope that muscovia will simply bugger off from Ukriane one day because it will be tired looks frankly even less realistic.

What I am sure is that Putin knows this perfectly well and is purposufully creating smoke and mirros cabinet for (in his mind- clueless) Yanks, where he inflates dangers of him getting topped by some coup amd perfectly plays on Western fears and stereotypes. Perhaps even such vital, internal issue as lack of marked successor for the throne is conditioned by this plan; he desperatelly want to convince everyone important in the West (just as he did for his people) that he is only person standing between order and chaos. The question is, is it really true?

Edited August 20 by Beleg85

[cyrano01]

6 hours ago, Lethaface said:

The first time an English friend asked me how much stone I weighed, I thought he was taking the piss. Perfidious barbaric cavemen Islanders ;-).

Being Island Monkeys we struggle with these sophisticated continental measures. Now, if you'll excuse me, I just need to go and measure out my vegetable patch in rods, chains and furlongs. A bit modern I know but I've recently moved on from hides or carucates and I'm keen to keep up with the times.

Edited August 21 by cyrano01

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Fenris said:

Here's another one, claims to be an command bunker

 

Whatever it was, it was underground and is burning nicely.  That's gotta make some Russians nervous.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Knowing a one or two things about this country (still very amateurish level) I must admitt it is difficult to me to imagine how this mythical 'fall of Russia' that people at Washington are so afraid of could look like in reality.

We've been over the various scenarios quite a few times.  There's a wide range of possibilites, but agreed the most likely "collapse" scenario (at present) is another authoritarian regime taking over, fairly quickly, and everybody falling in line because they deem it better than trying to make things better for themselves.  Whatever comes after Putin could be worse, so a rapid stabilization might not be a good outcome.

The other scenario is a catastrophic collapse where the center of power, Moscow, can no longer meet its most basic social contract obligations.  Putin is ousted, or at least a challenger emerges, and there is no straight forward transition of power.  Or maybe a short lived one.  Let's not forget that after the Soviet Union dissolved there was a challenge to Yeltsin that involved tanks blowing holes in things.  It was ended quickly because there was no serious armed support for the opposition.  That is not assured if there's another challenge.

Taking a step back, the most likely reason for a collapse isn't because of HIMARS being taken off their leash.  It isn't even likely due to anything specific Ukraine does or doesn't do.  I'd even rank a military mutiny as a fairly low possibility  Instead, the most likely reason Russia would collapse is because it can't even manage a mirage of living up to its social contract with the people.  Privation leads to unrest, unrest leads to opposition, opposition leads to brutality, and brutality often results in revolution. 

Let's also keep in mind that while the Putin regime's "power vertical" structure functions well, inherently Russian society is geographically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously horribly fragmented.  It should not assumed that if the central authority breaks down that all of Russia, as we know it today, will remain intact.  A fractured Russia might wind up being a good thing for everybody, as it was after the Soviet Union broke up.  Or it could go the route of 1917 and be a very long and bloody breakup.  No way to know and so it's good to not try and find out.

Steve

[MikeyD]

Putin's ego is so deeply wrapped up in Ukraine that I can't imagine a successor caring half as much. Isn't that why Russia got out of Afghanistan? Gorbachev got into power and just didn't see the point of continuing to prosecute Brezhnef's war.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Let's not forget that after the Soviet Union dissolved there was a challenge to Yeltsin that involved tanks blowing holes in things. 

 

Yup, I remember watching that mess live on CNN.

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, LongLeftFlank said:

Yup, I remember watching that mess live on CNN.

I can do you one better... I recorded that mess on VHS  Due to the time differences and me having a 9-5 job at the time I had to record the live footage so I could watch it later.  That tape kicked around gathering dust until... I dunno, 10 years or so ago?  It had somehow escaped previous purges but it finally found its way to a landfill.

Steve

[Offshoot]

41 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yup, I remember watching that mess live on CNN.

I arrived to Moscow a couple of days after the main event finished. Apart from the scorched White House and the occasional rucked up road from tanks, you wouldn't have known it had happened walking around the streets and seeing people. I don't know if ordinary Russians were as passive then, but it was a hard time for many and most had to spend their time on getting by, making money, finding food and queueing for it.

Interestingly, the ringleaders were amnestied not long after and some even continued in political life. No windows, no bombs, no polonium years later.

Edited August 21 by Offshoot

[billbindc]

6 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I am consistently hearing that we really didn't know, although why they chose not to tell us is debatable.

 

My larger point is that Syrsky keeping it from his own chain of command puts paid to the idea that hiding it from the US was an important element to the success of the operation and that hiding it from the Pentagon was probably not really an option given Ukraine's dependence on American systems. 

[Fenris]

Sorry if this is waaay OT but I think he's serious and it made me laugh