How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

UKR TG channel Officer+ about operation in Kursk oblast:

"Kaif" warfare on the territory of Kursk oblast. Each of my brotehr-in-arms would like to be there. No firm contact line, everything didn't destroyed in junk, the enemy can't realize quantitative superiority, but with raids and maneuvers we can realize qualitative superiority over the enemy + separate command, which didn't put tasks of "space" level, opportunity to take initiative for each commander and perfect interaction of units. I do not reduce merits of "unknown formations of Kursk People Republic" /sarcastic name of UKR invasion groupmennt/, but I envy them in some extent, that they have good conditions for the warfare, as it may sound.

Just on the background of this Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar are hyperhell. Where just stick yor nose out - and a couple of enemy drones track you and want to kill you. And this is about both sides - this is specifics of this war. Here all dirt and complexity of this war, so remember and these guys, these directions, where it's hard for us, where on the shoulders of our soldiers keeps a front - this thin red line. And for "unknown formations" I wish a strenghth, inspiration and good soldier luck, because exactly they are our small beam of sun, giving big hope.       

Russians milblogegrs also pointed out new "ranger" tactic of UKR advance. 

 

 

[Grigb]

4 hours ago, panzermartin said:

Honestly, while I respect and often read your inside info and tactical analysis, you all have lost credibility here,

You had non to begin with.

4 hours ago, panzermartin said:

 especially since the UA summer offensive that fell so catastrophically short. The less enthusiastic estimate here was UA reaching Crimea and cutting the "soon to break apart" RU army in half.

What did I expect? Can you quote please?

Never mind that I already showed that UKR offensive was far from failure and completed the main strategic objective.

4 hours ago, panzermartin said:

Since then I log in sporadically here, but I still find the same people passionately claiming they know the whole truth and we are no expert enough to object that.

I log in sporadically but I still find you posting here the ridiculously ignorant posts. You literally just claimed that UKR advance is over extended and no AA umbrella is possible while UKR static positions are like from 10 km from the border (some times just 5 km). 

 You literally did not check the map before posting.  And now you complain that I am laughing at your level of expertise. 

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

PsyOp or actual DRG range

Psy Ops. There was a post in one Twitter account that will be enough of such content to confuse Russian intelligence, monitoring social networks. As Russian milbloggers told often Russian intelligence departments in HQs get real information much faster from social networks, than from reports of combat units. 

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

UKR TG channel Officer+ about operation in Kursk oblast:

"Kaif" warfare on the territory of Kursk oblast. Each of my brotehr-in-arms would like to be there. No firm contact line, everything didn't destroyed in junk, the enemy can't realize quantitative superiority, but with raids and maneuvers we can realize qualitative superiority over the enemy + separate command, which didn't put tasks of "space" level, opportunity to take initiative for each commander and perfect interaction of units. I do not reduce merits of "unknown formations of Kursk People Republic" /sarcastic name of UKR invasion groupmennt/, but I envy them in some extent, that they have good conditions for the warfare, as it may sound.

Just on the background of this Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar are hyperhell. Where just stick yor nose out - and a couple of enemy drones track you and want to kill you. And this is about both sides - this is specifics of this war. Here all dirt and complexity of this war, so remember and these guys, these directions, where it's hard for us, where on the shoulders of our soldiers keeps a front - this thin red line. And for "unknown formations" I wish a strenghth, inspiration and good soldier luck, because exactly they are our small beam of sun, giving big hope.       

Russians milblogegrs also pointed out new "ranger" tactic of UKR advance. 

 

 

This is good information and consistent with the little that we already know.  What I find interesting here is confirmation that the units on the ground were given general orders and not silly Soviet style timetable crap.  This is what a NATO force would be doing with its superior tactical training and communications. 

Steve

[Haiduk]

. /forum bug/

Edited August 9 by Haiduk

[Grigb]

Removed as it was written by my mistake.

Edited August 9 by Grigb

[Haiduk]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is good information and consistent with the little that we already know.  What I find interesting here is confirmation that the units on the ground were given general orders and not silly Soviet style timetable crap.  This is what a NATO force would be doing with its superior tactical training and communications. 

Steve

Interesting, that one Russian milblogger excited by this operation, writing "Syrskiy, graduee of Moscow Military Command Academy conducts it strictly by Soviet field manuals"  

[Grigb]

Just now, Haiduk said:

Interesting, that one Russian milblogger excited by this operation, writing "Syrskiy, graduee of Moscow Military Command Academy conducts it strictly by Soviet field manuals"  

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

We are all happy to see Ukraine achieve mobility of any sort, granted.  However, the circumstances by which it came about are quite specific to this particular offensive, therefore mobility (generally) has *NOT* been shown relevant again.

Ukrainians achieved mobility for the price of attacking in a remote part of the front, considered irrelevant by the Russians and therefore lightly defended. I don't think it is particularly controversial, that somewhere on the Russian border there would be remote areas neglected by the Russians where the conditions for a mechanised breakthrough like in Kharkiv in 2022 would still exist. I assumed that they could, but only in places where the Russians consciously decided to  economise on the defending forces, therefore being places which Russians thought unimportant.. On the other hand, the opinions abt. impossibility of mechanised assault at scale with bearable losses have been made in relation to parts of the front where Russians intended to seriously defend, and had artillery & drones to be concentrated on the attackers, as well as mines & ATGMS to block them. They still are valid IMHO, unless in the coming days we learn something about Ukrainian EW or demining capabilitites which can be transferred to the places like Zaporozhe or Doneck

The question is therefore whether the price is worth it & whether the Ukrainians have managed to change the attack into the nothingness of random RUS wood and village country into something meaningfully impacting the war. If yes, this is the stuff of which strategic victories are made of. 

[Haiduk]

Some words about terrain  of Kursk battlezone. You can see terrain denslely cut by narrow and wide ravins, often planted by bushes and trees. On the direction Sudzha - L'gov these ravins lie in multiple number along or across the road, creating in this way natural obstacles for heavy armor and large formations maneuvers. The same situations is NE and E from Sudzha and only in Korenevo direction is more integral terrain, but Korenevo defended on flanks by pounds and a forest.

Such terrain, I think, will complicate maneuvers of both UKR advance and Russian counter-attacks and main clashes can be expected along the roads   

Edited August 9 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

About preparation to Kursk invasion from the man from Sumy oblast, civil volunteer, whose workshop make camo nets for donates:

We almost a month have been making nets for Sumy direction, now it's clear why it was so large order. To surprise orcs it was a need properly mask a technic and personnel. I thank to all women of our project, which abandoned own market gardens and were executing military order.

Other thing, which can play as "covert operation" for troops in Sumy oblast are known statemets of Budanov, which on public warned about possible attempt of Russians to invade to Sumy oblast. Russians obviously spotted concentration of UKR troops, but probably can't figure out neither their purpose, nor their proper number

Also some prediction from this man:

I have read many experts so far, that our second push will be in Bachevsk area (Hlukhiv). Well, what I can say. Not a fact. Orcs in last time pulled artillery to our sector of the border (Bachevsk - Katerynivka), they pilled also from Glushkovka battered, but quite combat ready units. Will see - the border is buzzing

 

Edited August 9 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

The unknown variable is when Trump will call for the cease-fire

This is back to being an if, not when. The election is pretty much fifty fifty, to the limited extent that anybody can tell.

[MikeyD]

I recall reading of a debate within the Pentagon in the late 1970s. After abandonment of the 'tripwire' NATO nuclear defense but before 'Airland Battle' doctrine took off, a cadre of renegade Pentagon planners fought for the replacement of the then-current NATO doctrine (they derisively labeled 'don't lose') with a more aggressive, fluid, frontless warfighting strategy. They envisioned deep stabbing attacks from unexpected directions to spoil Russian battle plans and cause him to have to shift forces. That sounds roughly what Ukraine is up to, switching from a 'don't lose' warfighting strategy to a stabbing/punching strategy.

[panzermartin]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I will admit that you have been far more consistent than anybody here.  Specifically, wrong about just about everything all the time.

The summer offensive in 2023 was a disappointment, but the analysis here as it unfolded was high quality.  Analysis and being right are not the same thing.  Nobody can predict with certainty how something brand new to warfare will unfold.

 

You must be confusing this thread with something else you were reading.  Because I've been here every day since the thread began and what you just wrote is not even close to reality.

And so you continue your streak of consistently being wrong.

Steve

That's harsh, but yes I have been wrong  a few times Mainly at the early stages of the war victim of the "mighty russian bear" image . I must admit though they stayed in this war despite the horrendous early losses. 

I have learned to filter out the opinion/emotional part and the posts and data here has helped me shape a decent idea on what's going on. This thread is absolutely not for the recycle bin of course, I don't imply that 

That said, it's not a very balanced place for obvious reasons. 

The summer offensive was not just a disappointment. Losses of UA were very much hidden under the carpet here , the losses of the summer offensive alone are now documented to be shocking, if not war turning. Russia on the other hand gave a textbook lesson of layered defense and use of minefields in conjunction with tactical aviation use and artillery . All this was downplayed here and not credited enough. 

So, first underestimating RU, overestimating UA capabilities and then downplaying the results can lead to wrong analysis, pushing for wrong plans and I don't think I'm wrong all the time. 

 

 

 

 

[chris talpas]

7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This is back to being an if, not when. The election is pretty much fifty fifty, to the limited extent that anybody can tell.

Yes it has been a more hopeful and positive week on both continents 

 

[Tux]

I have to say there seems to be a lot of confirmation bias creeping into the last few pages.  I get that it’s always exciting when Ukraine advances but I really don’t think we know nearly enough about this move to be able to properly judge what it is, how well it’s gone, what made it possible or how it’s being sustained.

For now, a circa 15-20km poke through one of the quietest parts of the front over the course of a few days shouldn’t be held up as evidence that ‘manoeuvre warfare is back’.  It may get there but there’s a long way to go before it does. At the moment, if anything, this movement seems to clearly demonstrate the difference between what is possible against apparently minimal defence vs what is possible anywhere along the ‘real’ front line.

I hope I’m wrong and the Ukrainians have worked out how to get brigades of armour sweeping through enemy lines again but at the moment perhaps it’s best if we all remember to stick with “I don’t know” as a default position until real information from first hand sources is available.

[panzermartin]

58 minutes ago, Grigb said:

You had non to begin with.

What did I expect? Can you quote please?

Never mind that I already showed that UKR offensive was far from failure and completed the main strategic objective.

I log in sporadically but I still find you posting here the ridiculously ignorant posts. You literally just claimed that UKR advance is over extended and no AA umbrella is possible while UKR static positions are like from 10 km from the border (some times just 5 km). 

 You literally did not check the map before posting.  And now you complain that I am laughing at your level of expertise. 

I don't think is that close, the most forward elements are supposed to be deeper, 20km at least to 35km max. 

But in any case yourself said that they need to move the AA forward . That's crucial I think. This is one of the reasons I dint expect them to achieve anything in the major offensive. I actually predicted the first successful use of attack helicopters, from the disappointing till then Ruaf. 

And seriously, Tomkak was the minimum objective of summer 2023, what did UA achieved strategically, since they didn't meet even that? 

[Battlefront.com]

29 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

That said, it's not a very balanced place for obvious reasons.

I disagree.  Uninformed pessimism is not balancing any more than unwarranted optimism.  You have always come at the discussions from an biased negative position.  So from your perspective the middle is not balanced because it is already far from your thinking.

29 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

The summer offensive was not just a disappointment. Losses of UA were very much hidden under the carpet here , the losses of the summer offensive alone are now documented to be shocking, if not war turning. Russia on the other hand gave a textbook lesson of layered defense and use of minefields in conjunction with tactical aviation use and artillery . All this was downplayed here and not credited enough. 

So, first underestimating RU, overestimating UA capabilities and then downplaying the results can lead to wrong analysis, pushing for wrong plans and I don't think I'm wrong all the time.

Yeah, but you're wrong because you're biased and you don't seem willing to give up your bias.  Which makes you more prone to being wrong.

We have had many discussions about the summer offensive and I do not wish to do it again, but your analysis is (because you are biased) wrong.  The offensive did not go very well in terms of taking back territory and, since that was its primary goal, can correctly be seen as a failure.  Only hindsight shows that Ukraine would have been better off trying something else instead of what it had done.  The reason being that no modern army has tried to do with Ukraine did against what Russia had, so it's outcome wasn't obvious at the start.  It is obvious now and Ukraine has learned from that.

True to form, however, you only look at what you want to see.  What you do not see is that even with all its defensive and material advantages, Russia struggles hard to hold the line.  It is almost certain that they lost significantly more forces than Ukraine in order to contest every meter of territory as strongly as they did.  Those Russian losses were felt then and are definitely being felt now.  Ukraine's only clear path for defeating Russia is killing a lot of Russians cumulatively.  The summer 2023 offensive contributed positively towards that goal, even if it was costly.

So I agree, downplaying the results is not a good idea.  You should try harder to not do it.

Steve

 

[zinz]

53 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Ukrainians achieved mobility for the price of attacking in a remote part of the front, considered irrelevant by the Russians and therefore lightly defended. I don't think it is particularly controversial, that somewhere on the Russian border there would be remote areas neglected by the Russians where the conditions for a mechanised breakthrough like in Kharkiv in 2022 would still exist. I assumed that they could, but only in places where the Russians consciously decided to  economise on the defending forces, therefore being places which Russians thought unimportant.. On the other hand, the opinions abt. impossibility of mechanised assault at scale with bearable losses have been made in relation to parts of the front where Russians intended to seriously defend, and had artillery & drones to be concentrated on the attackers, as well as mines & ATGMS to block them. They still are valid IMHO, unless in the coming days we learn something about Ukrainian EW or demining capabilitites which can be transferred to the places like Zaporozhe or Doneck

The question is therefore whether the price is worth it & whether the Ukrainians have managed to change the attack into the nothingness of random RUS wood and village country into something meaningfully impacting the war. If yes, this is the stuff of which strategic victories are made of. 

I would strongly disagree about the irrelevant part of front. To put it mildly Russia was counting on Ukraine not attacking into sovereign Russian territory. That was proven as a miscalculation now. 

Well Russia is too big to hold any relevant area of it in this war. So for Ukraine it would always only be about holding any Russian terrain. So it doesn't really matter that it's some woods in the middle of nowhere. 

Also on the escalation front this attack is another step of removing red lines. Even if Ukraine withdraws tomorrow Russia can never have the luxury to leave the border with Ukraine undefended any more. 

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, Tux said:

I have to say there seems to be a lot of confirmation bias creeping into the last few pages.  I get that it’s always exciting when Ukraine advances but I really don’t think we know nearly enough about this move to be able to properly judge what it is, how well it’s gone, what made it possible or how it’s being sustained.

For now, a circa 15-20km poke through one of the quietest parts of the front over the course of a few days shouldn’t be held up as evidence that ‘manoeuvre warfare is back’.  It may get there but there’s a long way to go before it does. At the moment, if anything, this movement seems to clearly demonstrate the difference between what is possible against apparently minimal defence vs what is possible anywhere along the ‘real’ front line.

I hope I’m wrong and the Ukrainians have worked out how to get brigades of armour sweeping through enemy lines again but at the moment perhaps it’s best if we all remember to stick with “I don’t know” as a default position until real information from first hand sources is available.

Yes, exactly this.  From my perspective this is still a raid and, so far, very successful.  The conditions were carefully chosen to get a positive result that indirectly contributes to victory.  This is more akin to the bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnepr than the 2022 Kharkiv counter offensive.

We also don't know how this will end.  We assume (granted, with good reason) that it won't end badly for Ukraine, but that is not certain. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, zinz said:

I would strongly disagree about the irrelevant part of front. To put it mildly Russia was counting on Ukraine not attacking into sovereign Russian territory. That was proven as a miscalculation now. 

Well Russia is too big to hold any relevant area of it in this war. So for Ukraine it would always only be about holding any Russian terrain. So it doesn't really matter that it's some woods in the middle of nowhere. 

Also on the escalation front this attack is another step of removing red lines. Even if Ukraine withdraws tomorrow Russia can never have the luxury to leave the border with Ukraine undefended any more. 

I think you are both correct, depending on your definition of "relevance".  This sector of front is definitely irrelevant in terms of directly taking back Ukrainian territory.  If Ukraine had made a breakthrough like this in the Donbas somewhere, for example, there would be an ENTIRELY different discussion about it.  However, it is absolutely relevant in terms of the larger effort to defeat Russia.

People thinking "maneuver warfare is back!" definitely need to be reminded, as often as possible, that this not proven yet.  All we can see is that a carefully, and skillfully, executed plan against a decidedly weak sector of front can produce results not possible elsewhere.

I'll say this again... Ukraine's move in Kursk has more in common with Prigy's run on Moscow than it does to the war going on within Ukraine.  Maneuver warfare is so much easier when the defense is thin and the defender's ability to respond is poor.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Tux said:

I have to say there seems to be a lot of confirmation bias creeping into the last few pages.  I get that it’s always exciting when Ukraine advances but I really don’t think we know nearly enough about this move to be able to properly judge what it is, how well it’s gone, what made it possible or how it’s being sustained.

For now, a circa 15-20km poke through one of the quietest parts of the front over the course of a few days shouldn’t be held up as evidence that ‘manoeuvre warfare is back’.  It may get there but there’s a long way to go before it does. At the moment, if anything, this movement seems to clearly demonstrate the difference between what is possible against apparently minimal defence vs what is possible anywhere along the ‘real’ front line.

I hope I’m wrong and the Ukrainians have worked out how to get brigades of armour sweeping through enemy lines again but at the moment perhaps it’s best if we all remember to stick with “I don’t know” as a default position until real information from first hand sources is available.

So this will probably limit how far the Ukrainians can go. I think it also let them make it expensive for the Russians to take back any terrain they currently hold without committing to many forces. Doubly so if they are just trying to make it slow and expensive as opposed to holding the ground permanently.

Edited August 9 by dan/california

[FancyCat]

Russia has had twin goals of attriting Ukraine and illustrating to the West the uselessness of contesting Russia in Ukraine. It is essential for Russia to emphasize that one, the borders of a Russia are perceived red lines, two, Russia maintains a overwhelming advantage vs Ukraine, three, the war remains a “distant” war that won’t affect the home front. The invasion by Ukraine into Russian land breaks all 3 of these priorities, and if they are unable to restore them, there is a lot of potential loss here.

for example, a country on the brink of collapse should not be able to launch attacks across the border, the illustration of the Kharkiv attack was a effort to maintain that Russia holds the freedom of offense and illustrate the uselessness of Ukrainian resistance and western support. In contrast, the attack by Ukraine in Russia, illustrates continued Ukrainian ability to conduct offensive operation, this will be extremely useful for western advocates to promote western support of Ukraine. Also important for Ukrainian morale.

in the breaking of the illusion of the red line border, Russia loses a element of strength. How is Russia supposed to maintain that the advantages exist if the border is not only impenetrable, but quite porous. Not only that, Russia must actually garrison the rest of the border, must focus efforts to identify UKR mass to ensure a repeat cannot occur again, we know the Russian economy is stressed out, and manpower and esp are heavily taxed. 

we also must review critically the erosion of Russian soft power, their red lines, the facts of Russia that are used by advocates for abandoning Ukraine. If we run back to our perceptions of Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of the invasion, I think we would find few could believe Ukrainian forces would be attacking Russian territory and occupying it, few would believe Western vehicles and missiles and artillery would be killing Russians in Russia, and our fears of nuclear saber rattling to be quite high. 

We would find Russian hype about the risk of WW3 to be very potent, to generate ample fear in Western public opinion, the erosion of those fears, from a Germany worried about sending APCs and keen on touting helmets, to calmly be contented with Marders invading Russia to be bordering on absurd in 2022. 

and of course, Russia has been keen on keeping a lid on domestic problems, can Russian manpower cope with the broadening of the frontline? Can their budget? What will happen when Ukrainian drones start killing Russians in every border oblast? Does Russia move the Donbas units? Do they force their conscripts to the lines, and pay them the required bonuses and further inflate the economy or risk unmotivated personnel and their worried families generating a new solders mothers movement? 

of course, it’s very early into this, we still don’t know if it’s a raid or something more, so maybe it’s not a big deal…we shall see.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Some words about terrain  of Kursk battlezone. You can see terrain denslely cut by narrow and wide ravins, often planted by bushes and trees. On the direction Sudzha - L'gov these ravins lie in multiple number along or across the road, creating in this way natural obstacles for heavy armor and large formations maneuvers. The same situations is NE and E from Sudzha and only in Korenevo direction is more integral terrain, but Korenevo defended on flanks by pounds and a forest.

Such terrain, I think, will complicate maneuvers of both UKR advance and Russian counter-attacks and main clashes can be expected along the roads   

Yes! those balkas jumped right out at me on the maps so helpfully posted by @Grigb. 

...A nightmare for mechanised troops (both in WW2 and today), and a gift to infiltrators, or at least in the war we've been used to seeing (gaming) before Drones Changed Everything.

As @The_Capt noted several thousand pages back someplace, drones negate much of the 'LOS' advantage of physically commanding high ground. Curious about the extent to which they also tactically 'negate' gullies (excepting that they tend to be densely vegetated in the green season, relative to the adjacent fields or treelines).

...I recall that similar 'cut up' terrain is present in the central zone of Luhansk (Svatove area, Kupyansk-Kreminna N-S), along the Zherebets river. Could this be why there's been very little movement along that front since the UA 'blitzkrieg' of fall '22. In spite of great Russian desire to regain the Oskil line, for political reasons.

P.S. Were I doing a battalion scale (3km hex) wargame on Invasion Ukraine (if I only had the time, alas!), this would be its own terrain type, kind of a 'negative bocage'.

Edited August 9 by LongLeftFlank

[FancyCat]

Iran is about to ship hundreds of short range ballistic missiles to Russia. I hope the West responds accordingly with options to Ukraine for fighting them off. 

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-deliver-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-russia-soon-intel-sources-say-2024-08-09/