How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Carolus]

4 minutes ago, zinz said:

https://archive.is/97PT3

Brussels has told Hungary and Slovakia to wean themselves off Russian oil and seek alternative sources after they complained that Ukraine was blocking supplies from Russia. 

Well, that was the plan two years ago. They got a grace period of 2 years because they begged for it. Now it is 2024. 

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, Carolus said:

Well, that was the plan two years ago. They got a grace period of 2 years because they begged for it. Now it is 2024. 

Yup, and there really is no excuse as the rest of Europe has figured out how to handle cutting back/cutting off Russian gas.  Clearly they hoped the war would be resolved within 2 years and they could go back to business as usual.

Steve

[billbindc]

A pretty interesting list, including some internal adversaries that Putin thinks are quite dangerous (Kara-Muza prominently). Can be read multiple ways but I would highlight the possibility that Putin is both no longer confident that Trump will win and is now beginning to think about negotiating.

[Battlefront.com]

The timing of the exchange most likely has some meaning.  Russia has been holding onto the hostages (because that's what they were) for many years in some cases.  The US has been working for their release all this time and I am sure there were good proposals put forward which Russia rejected for strategic reasons. 

Put another way, Russia just decided to cash in something of value that they've not previously seen a reason to do so.  That means something has changed their calculations.  What that something is... no way to know, but I agree with Billbindc that hints at Russian weakness.  Specifically, they need something now(ish) and/or don't think they'll get a better deal in the near future.

Steve

[Kraft]

List of who's who.

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/01/world/who-are-detainees-russia-us-prisoner-swap-intl/index.html

I dont get why people are included that were bagged by russia because they came for tinder dates or family weddings to russia, after feb 2022. That kind of stupidity should not be traded for russian fsb contract killers linked to multiple political murders in europe, or sanction evasion procurement and bribe money laundering officers

Edited August 1 by Kraft

[FancyCat]

My only hope is that a Ukrainian GRU bullet finds their way to some of these returned from the West.

Still, it's good that the west opted to get Russians who are imprisoned on political matters out.

[Battlefront.com]

Short article on where things are currently at in terms of anticipating a Trump/Vance approach to Ukraine should they get elected.  For those of you who do not know, The Hill is a right leaning centrist publication that I have found has a consistently good take on domestic US politics, in particular those of the GOP.

https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4804488-republicans-alarmed-trump-war-ukraine/

The executive summary... not good for Ukraine (specifically) or the West (generally)

Steve

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Short article on where things are currently at in terms of anticipating a Trump/Vance approach to Ukraine should they get elected.  For those of you who do not know, The Hill is a right leaning centrist publication that I have found has a consistently good take on domestic US politics, in particular those of the GOP.

https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4804488-republicans-alarmed-trump-war-ukraine/

The executive summary... not good for Ukraine (specifically) or the West (generally)

Steve

An isolationist super-power?  Ya, I am pretty sure that won’t work.

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The timing of the exchange most likely has some meaning.  Russia has been holding onto the hostages (because that's what they were) for many years in some cases.  The US has been working for their release all this time and I am sure there were good proposals put forward which Russia rejected for strategic reasons. 

Put another way, Russia just decided to cash in something of value that they've not previously seen a reason to do so.  That means something has changed their calculations.  What that something is... no way to know, but I agree with Billbindc that hints at Russian weakness.  Specifically, they need something now(ish) and/or don't think they'll get a better deal in the near future.

Steve

 

Putin needs Trump's help to win in Ukraine and the very best way he could have helped him would have been to refuse to make a deal with anyone but Trump. Instead, he made one with the POTUS whose aid translated into the death of 500k Russian troops.

That's weakness. 

[Carolus]

11 minutes ago, billbindc said:

 

Putin needs Trump's help to win in Ukraine and the very best way he could have helped him would have been to refuse to make a deal with anyone but Trump. Instead, he made one with the POTUS whose aid translated into the death of 500k Russian troops.

That's weakness. 

And now we have a crack in the alliance because Iran is afraid of Trump's pro-Israel stance (acknowledging Golan height, acknowledging Jerusalem) and Iranian bots on social media are now fighting Russian bots over who should become president. 

It is quite amusing. 

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, Carolus said:

And now we have a crack in the alliance because Iran is afraid of Trump's pro-Israel stance (acknowledging Golan height, acknowledging Jerusalem) and Iranian bots on social media are now fighting Russian bots over who should become president.

Let’s not leave our Chinese brothers (or they back to being comrades?) out of this? Who do they like less? Trump or Biden policy 2.0?

[billbindc]

22 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Let’s not leave our Chinese brothers (or they back to being comrades?) out of this? Who do they like less? Trump or Biden policy 2.0?

I think they prefer a Harris administration because at least it is predictable. Below all of the rhetoric, I think China understands that the US has a much wider margin of error than it does. Trump will lurch about trying to impose tariffs and mucking things up in general which introduces a level of instability that has much higher tail risk than any short terms gains that the PRC might make while the US can and likely would recover its power to challenge it.

[Offshoot]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The timing of the exchange most likely has some meaning.  Russia has been holding onto the hostages (because that's what they were) for many years in some cases.  The US has been working for their release all this time and I am sure there were good proposals put forward which Russia rejected for strategic reasons. 

Put another way, Russia just decided to cash in something of value that they've not previously seen a reason to do so.  That means something has changed their calculations.  What that something is... no way to know, but I agree with Billbindc that hints at Russian weakness.  Specifically, they need something now(ish) and/or don't think they'll get a better deal in the near future.

It comes hot on the heels of dire economic news in Russia so could well be purely for domestic purposes to distract from that 18% interest rate - "Look at the deal we made. We got back Russian heroes in exchange for Russian traitors!"

Just a small snippet on the deal in an interview with one of the people involved in it giving an idea of timing (the rest is about her documentary work).

Quote

For almost a year from spring 2023, she was part of a small team of activists working on a swap involving Navalny. Crucial pieces were put in place by her group, she says: persuading the German government to release Russian hitman Vadim Krasikov; alerting the Biden administration; establishing a back channel to Moscow. “By February, there was a deal on the table,” she says.

‘I’m happy for everyone released, but there is also sadness’: film-maker Odessa Rae on today’s momentous prisoner swap

Edited August 1 by Offshoot

[Blazing 88's]

North Korean Bulsae-4 Anti-Tank Missile Vehicle Reportedly Spotted in Ukraine for First Time:
https://armyrecognition.com/news/arm...for-first-time

 

[NamEndedAllen]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The timing of the exchange most likely has some meaning.  Russia has been holding onto the hostages (because that's what they were) for many years in some cases.  The US has been working for their release all this time and I am sure there were good proposals put forward which Russia rejected for strategic reasons. 

Put another way, Russia just decided to cash in something of value that they've not previously seen a reason to do so.  That means something has changed their calculations.  What that something is... no way to know, but I agree with Billbindc that hints at Russian weakness.  Specifically, they need something now(ish) and/or don't think they'll get a better deal in the near future.

Steve

An interesting and quite recent event right before this exchange was announced: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-stopped-ukraine-s-alleged-covert-plot-against-russia-after-call-from-moscow-report/ar-BB1qMRTs

i have no knowledge that there is a connection, but contact between these two Defense Chiefs is exceedingly rare. One could imagine a degree of payback being involved, breaking the longstanding logjam - for stopping what seems to have been a serious attack on a sensitive Russian target. 

Edited August 2 by NamEndedAllen

[sburke]

5 hours ago, billbindc said:

I think they prefer a Harris administration because at least it is predictable. Below all of the rhetoric, I think China understands that the US has a much wider margin of error than it does. Trump will lurch about trying to impose tariffs and mucking things up in general which introduces a level of instability that has much higher tail risk than any short terms gains that the PRC might make while the US can and likely would recover its power to challenge it.

Let’s be honest, China’s economy is suffocating under President Xi (msn.com)

Prior to entering government, Foreign Secretary David Lammy said the Conservatives’ approach to China was excessively confrontational and inconsistent. He reportedly now wants to rebalance relations, focusing on closer cooperation and economic engagement. 

The government’s interest in boosting trade and investment with China makes sense in the context of their ‘mission’ to boost economic growth. It is also equally easy to see why this will offend those concerned about China’s threat to the liberal international system, the treatment of Hong Kongers and Uyghurs, and the risk of conflict with Taiwan.
But too few have bothered to ask whether China really is the country you want to bet on for growth. During the ‘golden era’ in UK-China relations under David Cameron, it seemed obvious that the populous and booming country was on an unstoppable trajectory. That’s much less the case today. 

It’s not that China’s economy has crashed, albeit the country’s property and debt bubbles still raise that risk. It’s more that the increased geostrategic tensions and shift under President Xi towards national security are doing damage.

China prospered over the first two decades of the 21st century after it decided to liberalise the economy, allow the development of a private sector and open up to global trade and investment. By contrast, President Xi has taken greater central control, harassed entrepreneurs and foreign companies, cracked down on internal critics, and subsidised domestic production. The behaviour has been justified under the ‘national security’ banner, but it is just as much about securing domestic control by a paranoid Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, it is much more difficult to maintain a monopolistic grip on power in a liberalised economy. 

Whatever the reason, the results are becoming clear. Foreign direct investment, once a torrent fueling China’s economic engine, has slowed to a trickle. The latest figures show that foreign direct investment has reached its lowest point since records began in 1998. This isn’t a blip – it’s a trend and one that’s accelerating.

Why the investor exodus? Look no further than Beijing’s increasingly harsh approach to foreign companies. In 2023 alone, we witnessed a string of high-profile crackdowns on foreign firms like Mintz Group and Bain & Company, including the arrest of employees. 

It’s not just foreign companies feeling the chill. In the latest edition of Economic Affairs, the IEA’s academic journal, China analyst Dr Kerry Liu develops a new security policy index using data from China’s largest search engine, Baidu. This is a proxy for official emphasis and public attention being paid to national security. 

The central finding is that as the focus on national security has grown, foreign investment, industrial growth, and the value of the biggest companies on China’s stock market have markedly reduced. In other words, the sectors that powered China’s economic miracle are now sputtering under the weight of excessive regulation and state interference.

Perhaps most notable is the impact on innovation. China’s tech giants, once the darlings of the global investment community, are facing difficulties from data localisation laws and restrictions on foreign collaboration that threaten to cut them off from the global knowledge economy. It’s a similar story for Fintech, after the state crackdown, and the focus on domestic production has pushed up costs and down quality.

Perhaps Western leaders can learn something from China’s emerging malaise. Strangling private enterprise and disconnecting from the interconnected global economy have real and negative consequences. Openness and dynamism were not only essential for China’s rise, but our own as well.

 

[Battlefront.com]

Looks like another attack on Crimea:

Steve

[zinz]

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-2-august-2024-airmissile

Tom Coopers air war update of the last couple of weeks 

Quote

Hello everybody!

As mentioned a few days ago, this month is characterised by a particularly intensive air- and missile warfare. Not only because of the arrival of the first four (ex-Dutch) F-16AMs in Ukraine: foremost because of high-intensity operations by attack-UAVs of both sides. Thus, have prepared a list of something like ‘most important reported operations’, with few links to additional information.

Before I go on to that let me offer you my ‘best guess-reconstruction’ regarding the look of these first few Ukrainian F-16s (and sorry for the ‘watermark’: have been plagiarised far too often by far too many over the years):

 

 

Essentially, the jets retained their standard camo pattern (‘in service’ already since the type is in operational service, back in 1979 or so) in three or four grey colours (from the lightest to the darkest: FS35375, FS36270, FS36320, and FS36118). My colour profile is showing an example armed with AIM-120Bs and AIM-9Ms.

Why that?

Was something like ‘standard, back in the late 1990s’. Gauging by what is the West usually delivering to Ukraine, it’s most likely that this is what it delivered for PSU’s F-16s, too.

Sure, that’s just another guess: it’s perfectly possible they’re actually armed with AIM-120C (‘very nice’ would be AIM-120C-7s), AIM-9X….perhaps even with IRIS-Ts. But, right now, there’s no evidence for this. Thus, we’ve got to wait and see…

Note: something like the ‘biggest question mark’ about the looks of Ukrainian F-16s is the position of the national marking (the ‘roundel’, apparently applied in the so-called ‘low-visibility’ style, in greys instead in yellow). Some say this is applied directly behind the cockpit (like, for example, on Danish F-16AMs), others as shown on my profile above (in same position like on the Dutch, US etc. F-16s). The longer they remain in Ukraine, the more likely is it that they’re going to start receiving ‘methods of quick (visual) identification’, too. See: drop tanks painted in yellow, for example…

This camo pattern might not look particularly ‘inspiring’, but:

a) NATO-instructors for PSU-pilots and -ground crews meant business, and thus there was no time for applying some kind of fancy camo patterns; and

b) these are standardised colours, and thus widely available (always important for maintenance purposes). Finally,

c) F-16AMs of different NATO air forces wearing this camo pattern have leading edges of their intakes, wings and fins painted in radar-absorbent colours. These are available in only one (grey) shade, and decreasing their radar cross section - and thus the range from which they can be detected by Russian radars (at least as seen from the front). I, strongly, doubt anybody in NATO or Ukraine might come to such a stupid idea like to ruin these colours by overpainting them.

***

Regarding air warfare… think, the ‘particularly interesting period’ began back on 12 July, and then developed something like follows:

12 July:
- Ukrainian ATACMS strike a VSRF S-300V-1 SAM-site at the Mariupol Airport.

18 July:
- Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Russian naval base in Donuzlav, in the Crimea.

19 July:
- PSU claimed to have shot down an Iskander-M ballistic missiles in the Odesa area.
- Ukrainians hit a dump in Luhansk and set it on fire (not sure what weapon was used).
- 110th Mech ZSU shot down a Su-25 using a Mistral SHORAD. Pilot ejected safely and was recovered (that’s the video showing two low-flying Su-25s, passing from right to left, and the second then gets hit).
- The Russians hit a base of the National Guard in the Kharkiv area by an Iskander-M...somebody there in the ZSU was super-clever and lined-up the troops just 35-40km behind the frontline: there were dozens of casualties…

 

 

20 July:
- Ukrainian UAV strike hit the Millerovo AB. The MOD in Moscow claimed 26 UAVs as shot down. Unofficial Russian sources reported that a maintenance hangar was destroyed and the POL-dump damaged.
- Ukrainians knocked out a Russian Buk SAM-system (probably by M142 HIMARS).

 

 

21 July:
- GUR sabotage group reportedly destroyed a Mi-28 and Ka-226 at 'an aviation construction enterprise in Moscow' (see: National Helicopter Centre Mil and Kamov' at Tomlino AB). Two other helicopters were damaged.
- Around 19.00hrs local time, Ukrainians hit the Morozovsk AB by 4-8 ATACMs: as first they hit the S-300/400 SAM-site, then the apron with parked aircraft, then a POL dump and then the runway.
- Another volley of Ukrainian UAVs hit an oil refinery in the Tuapse area. Caused a big fire.
- Russian Buk M2 destroyed by HIMARS-strike.

22 July:
- The Russians claimed an Ukrainian attack by 80 UAVs. Claim to have shot down 47 UAVs over the Rostov region, 5 over the Astrakhan Oblast, 1 each over the Belgorod, Voronezh, and Smolensk regions, 5 over Krasnodar, and 17 over the Azov Sea. 8 UAVs are known to have targeted the Morozovsk AB around 04.00hrs in the morning (yes, there was a follow-up strike): one hit the local ammo dump. Another hit a POL-dump in Tuapse.
- Heavy Russian strikes with UMPK glide bombs on Kharkiv.
- Russian 1K148 Yastreb AV radar knocked out by Ukrainian M142 HIMARS.
- Russian Tor M1 SAM-system knocked out by the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade, outside Olenivka.

23 July:
- PSU claimed 7 Shaheds as shot down.
- The last Russia-operated train-ferry Slavyanin was severely damaged (for third time in total), by Ukrainian missile strikes on the port of Kavkaz. According to the Russians, it was a 'low-flying missile from the Berdyansk area’ that hit the vessel. If so, then this was probably one of Ukrainian-made Neptune anti-ship missiles.
- 110th Mech shot down a Su-25 using a Mistral SHORAD. Pilot ejected safely and was recovered.
- Russian Buk M1 knocked out by HIMARS of the 15th Missile Brigade ZSU.

 

 

Fire aboard the train-ferry Slovyanin, after this was hit in the Port of Kavkaz, on 23 July. The vessel was hit already three times, but so far avoided destruction. Still, it’s the last of only three such ferries available, and unless the Russians can repair it, they’ve got to use the Kerch Bridge for their railway traffic to the occupied Crimea.

 

 

 

A UAV-look at the shoot-down of the VKS Su-25 on 23 July. Pilot’s parachute can be seen to the right, the fireball caused by the aircraft hitting the ground in the centre. The jet was felled by a French-made Mistral SHORAD: while the mass of Ukraine-operated MANPADS have an effective range of 2-4km, Mistrals have got a range of 8km, and thus can hit the Russians where they expect this the least.

24 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 17 Shaheds, 4 Zalas, 2 SuperCams, and 2 Orlan-10s.
- The Russians targeted the port of Izmail with Shaheds. At least three Shaheds flew 12km deep into the Romanian airspace: three crashed outside the village of Plauru, in Romania.
- GUR sabotage group reportedly destroyed a Mi-8 at Kryazh AB (Samara Oblast).
- Mi-28 involved in anti-UAV-operations in the Bryansk region crashed in the Kaluga region. The helo belonged to a recently-established anti-UAV unit. The crew of 2 was KIA.

25 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 25 out of 28 Shaheds during the night.
- Around 02.41hrs, a total of 13 powerful explosions were reported from the area of the Saki AB: Ukrainian UAVs reportedly hit multiple targets in the Okunevka area (Simferopol) on the Crimea. One weapon hit an ammunition depot at Saki AB, causing multiple explosions.
- 1 Pantsyr S1 knocked out by Ukrainian missiles or UAVs in the Kherson oblast; 2 of the crew WIA.
- 1 Pantsyr S1 knocked out by HIMARS-strike in the Donetsk area.

 

 

A Russian Pantsyr S1 SHORAD knocked out by Ukrainians on 25 July, southern Kherson.

 

 

This Pantsyr S1 was found and tracked by a Shark UAV somewhere in the Donetsk Oblast (Sharks are usually, but not exclusively, operated by the Ukrianian SSO).

26 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 20 out of 22 Shaheds during the night. Romanian air defences claim to have shot down several Shaheds as these were approaching the port of Izmail via the Romanian airspace.
- During the night, the Ukrainians have targeted the Saki AB by 8 ATACMs. Two ATACMs were shot down, one missed. Reportedly destroyed was one 9S19 Nebo radar (positioned outside the village of Shovkovychne), 3 9A84 launchers, 1 9A83 launcher, and one Su-30SM; another Su-30SM was reportedly damaged. The Russians should have lost 2 KIA and 4 WIA.
- Su-34 of the VKS crashed in the Volgograd region. The crew reportedly ejected safely.

27 July:
- PSU claims to have shot down 1 Kh-59 and 4 Shaheds during the night. One of Shaheds exploded in the Romanian territory. Additionally, the PSU claimed 4 SuperCam, 1 Forpost, 2 Lancets and one other UAV.
- Ukrainian UAVs hit the Ryazan area, including the Dyagilevo AB again. Reportedly, there were 10 explosions from that area.
- 1 Pantsyr S1 knocked out by Ukrainian missiles or UAVs in the Streletske area, Belgorod oblast.

28 July:
- Kyiv claims to have targeted multiple VKS air bases by drones, including:
- Saratov AB
- Dyaghilevo AB
- Olenya AB (1800km from Ukraine; was actually attacked in the afternoon of 25 July: SBU claims to have damaged Tu-22M-3s Borts 31 and 33; Ukrainians claim that one was confirmed as destroyed)
- Oil refinery in the Ryazan Oblast

29 July:
- PSU claims 1 Kh-59/69 and 9 Shaheds as shot down.
- Ukrainian UAVs truck multiple substations of the Russian electricity network in the Tomarovka area, Belgorod Oblast, and in the Glazunovka, Oryol Oblast.

30 July:
- Ukrainian UAVs hit the Kursk-Vostochny AB; POL depot was reportedly set afire.
- ZSU shot down a VKS Mi-8 using an FPV drone, about 50km behind the frontline, in the Donetsk Oblast (the Russians first claimed the helo as shot down by their own air defences).
- The MOD in Moscow claimed its Su-35S shot down a MiG-29 PSU over a range of 213km. As usually, no evidence or other details were released.
- Reports from the Russian and Italian social media are describing the VSRF creating an infantry unit consisting of VKS personnel. This should include at least one former fighter-pilot.
- PSU delivers a JDAM-strike on a 'company-command post & UAV operators'.

31 July:
- The PSU claims to have shot down 1 Kh-59 and all 89 Shaheds it detected during the night of 30-31 July.
- Ukrainian UAVs hit the Omsk refinery; reportedly, 600,000 tons of crude oil burned out and repairs are going to take 3-4 months.

***

Quote

What can be concluded on basis of all of this is (rather randomly) something like the following:

1.) Ukrainian SBU is continuing its attack-UAV-campaign against the Russian oil/gas-industry. Between others, this means: Kyiv is unimpressed with Hungarian and Slovak (for example) complaints about its decision to cut off the flow of the Russian oil/gas via the Ukrainian pipeline system to the West.

2.) The SBU has listened to related adavices and has expanded its list to the ‘frontline’ Russian air bases. Arguably, attack UAVs deployed for these purposes lack the terminal guidance system that would enable them to strike ‘targets of opportunity’ - like parked aircraft: therefore, they’re regularly deployed to hit depots for ‘petrol/oil/lubricants’ (POL) on such air bases, ‘instead’. Apparently, they’re also used to strike ammunition depots on VKS facilities, and - gauging by all the resulting detonations and fires - have been quite successful at that.

3.) The strike on the Olenya AB, on the Kola Peninsula, near Murmansk, and 1,800km away from Ukraine is a good idea. It should be repeated as often as possible to become seriously effective, though.

4.) So far, Ukrainian UAV-strikes on VKS’ air bases have not had effects in sense of decreasing the number of Russian air strikes by UMPK glide-bombs. But, this can still change: crucial for campaigns of this kind is to run such strikes regularly: to keep the VKS under pressure and thus disturb their operations. ‘One or two strikes on this or that air bases a month’ - are not enough.

5.) The Russians continue running air strikes by Shahed attack-UAVs almost every night. Most of operations are serving ‘mapping’ purposes: they’re trying to force PSU’s air defences to activate their radars, so they can track them down. Sure, the mass of Shaheds is shot down, but when they hit…

6.) NATO’s (non-)reaction to the Russians using the Romanian/NATO air space to strike the Ukrainian port of Izmail is only encouraging Pudding & Co KG GesmbH AG…

7.) The PSU seems to have no operational Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG air-launched missiles, right now. No idea if the donors run out of stocks or are holding them back. Instead, MiG-29s and Su-27s continued deploying JDAMs and HAMMERS against targets closer to the frontline.

8.) The integrated air defence system (IADS) of the VKS is overstretched. Due to combat losses and attacks on many different facilities over the months, the Russians are trying to do the only thing sensible, which is to concentrate their air defences for protection of particularly important areas. In turn, this is leaving a lot of their other facilities poorly-protected.

9.) Since around 20 July, the Ukrainian (and other) sources are reporting that the Russians have withdrawn their air defence systems from western and southern Crimea and re-organised all of them in the Kerch area (eastern Crimea). I doubt this was the case: the Russians would never leave all of their units and facilities on the ‘holy land’ completely unprotected from Ukrainian missile- and UAV-strikes. It’s more likely they’ve re-located their remaining S-300/400 SAM-sites to the Dzhankoi-Kerch area, while leaving facilities elsewhere protected by Buks, Tors, and Pantsyrs.

10.) The VKS crews of S-400, Buk, Tor, and Pantsyr systems seem to be getting better in intercepting ATACMs: meanwhile, they’re shooting down up to 30% of incoming missiles.

 

[Beleg85]

UAF liquidated Russian sabotagists/recon somewhere in Chernihov direction. Reportedly belonging to specnaz group "Sieniez" (graphic pictures). High-grade weapons and lot of electronic equipment visible.

https://x.com/PrzemekShura/status/1819060094383870260

Here more about it (beware it is rather propaganda account):

https://x.com/albafella1/status/1819029463104897460

 

Edited August 2 by Beleg85

[Grigb]

12 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

UAF liquidated Russian sabotagists/recon somewhere in Chernihov direction. Reportedly belonging to specnaz group "Sieniez" (graphic pictures). High-grade weapons and lot of electronic equipment visible.

https://x.com/PrzemekShura/status/1819060094383870260

Here more about it (beware it is rather propaganda account):

https://x.com/albafella1/status/1819029463104897460

 

As said in RU Lessons Learned - You do not send [human]groups behind enemy lines. 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

As said in RU Lessons Learned - You do not send [human]groups behind enemy lines. 

 

 

Absolutely. While we have no way to know how successful, overall, these sorts of infiltration missions are (and some have certainly been successful.  We've seen evidence), losing 5 officers from an elite unit is a big loss no matter what.

It's been a while since we talked about how unmanned systems can reasonably carry out a large number of traditionally special ops missions.  For example, booby trapping supply routes or ambushing supply vehicles.  Unmanned is doing that already.

Steve

[Probus]

On 8/1/2024 at 12:32 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Short article on where things are currently at in terms of anticipating a Trump/Vance approach to Ukraine should they get elected.  For those of you who do not know, The Hill is a right leaning centrist publication that I have found has a consistently good take on domestic US politics, in particular those of the GOP.

https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4804488-republicans-alarmed-trump-war-ukraine/

The executive summary... not good for Ukraine (specifically) or the West (generally)

Steve

Steve,

 If anything, I would say I am right leaning on most stuff (definitely not all), but this Republican stance on Russia is mind boggling to me.

I just don't get it.  (recent) History shows that when the USA becomes isolationist, a World War is on the horizon.  The USA has kept the 'peace' for almost 80 years. If we do become isolationist, we will be drug into a new world war within 20 years, prolly a lot sooner.

[acrashb]

1 hour ago, Probus said:

I just don't get it. 

I do get it, even though I don't agree with it.

The Republican Party's cautious stance on aid to Ukraine can be attributed to several factors. First, there is a growing isolationist sentiment within the party, with some members advocating for a focus on domestic issues and reducing foreign aid spending. This is reflected in the views of politicians like former President Donald Trump and Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, who have expressed skepticism about the U.S. role in the conflict.

Second, there is concern among Republicans about the potential for the conflict to escalate and draw the U.S. into a larger war with Russia. Some members of the party fear that providing more military aid to Ukraine could lead to a direct confrontation with Russia, which could have significant global consequences.

Third, there is a perception among some Republicans that Ukraine is a corrupt country, and that U.S. aid could be misused or wasted. This view is reinforced by Russian propaganda efforts to portray Ukraine as a corrupt and untrustworthy recipient of U.S. aid.

Finally, there is a political calculation at play. With the 2024 presidential election approaching, some Republicans may be wary of being seen as supporting a foreign conflict that could become unpopular with voters. This is particularly true given the mixed public opinion on the issue, with some polls showing a majority of Americans in favor of continuing aid to Ukraine, while others showing a growing number of Republicans opposed to it.

[kimbosbread]

Modern American isolationism is driven by 3 things, in my opinion:

• Globalization in a very real way has hurt a lot of lower or middle income American workers, and a lot of people are not fans after watching factories and jobs get offshored. The software generation is seeing this too: Consistent offshoring of junior or less skilled roles, especially in the remote work era.
• Most NATO members spend less than the mandated amount on security, and then come running for help to the US, and/or actively contribute to the problem (Germany with their Russia policy until very recently).
• There’s also the experience of the 20+ years in Afghanistan, and not wanting to repeat that ****show. I think Ukraine and Taiwan are different, but I understand the sentiment.

[sburke]

Before we paint the entire GOP as isolationist, keep in mind that the House GOP voted 102 out of 212 for Ukraine aid.  Some of the no vote is undoubtedly partly to just say no to anything the dems say yes to.  In the Senate 31 of 49 voted for Ukraine aid.  Part of the problem the GOP has is the rules in the house are so f'd up with the concession that was made to allow a single member to force a vote on the speaker.  Handing the whackiest members of the house a silver bullet for disruption has really hosed things up.

There is still a distinct split in the GOP when it comes to national security.