How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Huba]

18 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

I don't think they are that crazy; it would have been extremely controversial and costly decision even for oil sheikhs from the Gulf, so it is probably well grounded. There must a method in this shopping spree, probably agreed on highest levels between USA and PL and connected to long-term strategic goals.

I'd love that to be true, but given our track record thus far I remain skeptical. Keep in mind that the approved sale is for "up to 500" - perfect for grandioze statements, but can easily be cut down to a reasonable number, say after the elections. 

[Beleg85]

5 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'd love that to be true, but given our track record thus far I remain skeptical. Keep in mind that the approved sale is for "up to 500" - perfect for grandioze statements, but can easily be cut down to a reasonable number, say after the elections. 

Could be true. However these magicly high numbers do not necessarly provide any public support; to the contrary, they could be damaging internally as we already have massive problems with debt, inflation etc. If they only needed "PL army strong" narration for elections, they could order 3 times less as well and sound their trumpets. Something here stinks on many levels.

 

25 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is my interpretation of it as well.  There is no incentive for Gazprom to raise a private army and use it for things other than protecting Gazprom interests.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely it will be used like Wagner.

I posted more detailed speculation on this a few pages ago.

Steve

Sorry, just started to make up last several pages like Russian mobik who fall from the tank and try to catch it up . RL duties calls and topic is progressing very fast last days.

[riptides]

20 hours ago, Kinophile said:

.....

In the US,  the capital is protected by the Capitol police,  who are straight police, non paramilitary (nothing heavier than a few MRAPs). Perhaps our US friends can explain why it's a Capitol and not Capital...!  The Government in person is protected by the Secret Service,  who would be Praetorian (to me). I don't think there's a special  military unit designated as a "Palace"  protector. It's why on Jan 6 the DC Police asked for the National Guard, from Maryland,  essentially inviting the armed forces into the seat of government.

....

 

 

The police are charged with protecting the building, the Capitol Building. Not the seat of Government itself, the Capital of the District of Columbia. Which also serves as the Capital of the US of A.

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Sorry, just started to make up last several pages like Russian mobik who fall from the tank and try to catch it up . RL duties calls and topic is progressing very fast last days.

Ah!  I didn't mean that comment to be like "RTF"   I was just too lazy to type more.  It is hard to keep up with this thread if you take even a half day off!

Plus, with all the talk of balloons and tanks it is easy to miss something else!

Steve

[kevinkin]

UA soldier quote from the WSJ today from article on the brutal fighting:

“I need men. Good men. Spirited men,” he said. “Experience isn’t the most important thing. Here, the most experienced person can live for one day, and the least experienced person for months. It’s roulette.”

Just one observation, but that is really is a major part of attrition warfare. That is, experience does not matter. So why train men and just feed them to the mill?  I think NATO is putting together a force structure that will break that mold. The one thing the UA has over the RA as a constant is the spirit on their soldiers. And that has to be natured and retained very carefully.

 

 

Edited February 8, 2023 by kevinkin

[cesmonkey]

Russian news sites are enjoying talking about this:

https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream
How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline
The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now
Seymour Hersh

Quote

Last June, the Navy divers, operating under the cover of a widely publicized mid-summer NATO exercise known as BALTOPS 22, planted the remotely triggered explosives that, three months later, destroyed three of the four Nord Stream pipelines, according to a source with direct knowledge of the operational planning.

 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think we have enough evidence, direct and implied, to conclude that Russia's goals for sometime now have been fairly consistent:

1. generally cause Ukraine as much pain and suffering as possible to soften them up for negotiations
2. take all the terrain of Luhansk and Donetsk as designated by prewar maps
3. declare victory
4. dig in and freeze the conflict
5. rebuild the military for future operations (not just in Ukraine)

Not surprisingly, it seems you have come to similar conclusions.

This is a logical way for Putin to end the war with something resembling a win.  Obviously it isn't a win, but being able to say that is what controlling the media and people's ability to express themselves is for

Regarding the 'winning', I call it 'loss aversion': losing less bad can feel like a win and indeed most important can be sold as one. 
And while Russia might be able to continue the war for a 'long' time, that's definitely not a goal in and of itself - even for Russia. Keeping the grind on does cost Russia heavily, in various ways, and indeed also comes with opportunity costs regarding endeavors outside Ukraine. So they are poised to achieve some results QUICKLY and like others have posted, that's probably a big reason while they keep failing as big as they did until now.

Who is there to appoint after Gerasimov? Putin taking direct control of all military matters?

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, that's the sort of stuff I'm asking about.  If the above is Russia's only play, and they're too weak to pull it off, then what will the consequences be?  Because there are always consequences.

Since the beginning of the war I've only put out very loose and vague concepts of what failure will mean to the Putin regime.  Now that it appears we're finally getting to the endgame, I'm wondering if we're any closer to figuring out what the most likely outcome of failure is.

Based on what we're seeing I think the most plausible chain of events for 2023:

1. this winter offensive fails to achieve anything even close to what Russia feels it needs
2. Russia will not surrender, but instead continue to fight defensively
3. Ukraine will have some successes in the coming months, perhaps not spectacular like the Kharkiv or Kherson operations, but still obvious and damaging (see separate point below)
4. whatever negative things are going on within Russia that Putin is worried about will get worse.  Especially if losses are so bad that a large desperation mobilization is once again required to keep the front from collapsing
5. someone will make a move to take power away from Putin.  This need not be an outright coup.  It could be something negotiated, as I've just speculated about Gazprom's entrance into the PMC arena
6. Russia's maximalist demands for a peace deal will soften, at first only superficially, but as things get worse there will be meaningful concessions
7. Ukraine may reject negotiations, but it might also decide a pause has more advantages than disadvantages
8. whether the war ends this year or extends into next year depends on Putin's continued ability to wage war, both politically and militarily

This is broadly how I see things going this year.  However, there is one MASSIVE wild card in the deck... Russian military collapse.  We've discussed this hundreds of times and it is still an extremely real possibility that Putin has managed to (barely) avoid at least 3 or 4 times so far.  There's only so many times one can dodge a bullet.

One scenario is that the costly failure we expect this winter offensive to be will sap so much strength away from Russia's ability to defend itself that when Ukraine goes on the offensive some sector of front, large or small, will be torn open.  Unlike Russia, Ukraine has shown an ability to exploit such a situation to a meaningful extent.

What happens then?  When a similar situation happened in 2022 Putin had to not only do a hasty partial mobilization, throwing tens of thousands of lives away, but he also had to withdraw forces from Kherson.  And all that did was stabilize the situation.  Is it viable for Putin to do this again?  I'm not so sure that it is for a host of practical and political reasons.

So if throwing bodies at the problem was the only solution he came up with in 2022 when Ukraine tore into his frontlines, and bodies aren't available in the quantity he needs to stop another offensive in 2023, then what?  Collapse seems quite plausible.

Steve

In the scenario where his offensive fails, I guess he will look at ways or explanations to keep control of the narrative and repress or eliminate any threats to him (this wasn't the big offensive, we need to rebuild our forces because evil NATO tanks, there are traitors in our midst, etc; another of the usual window dressings). 
I find it difficult to predict how long he can succeed in staying afloat that way, but even cats only have 7 lives. How many does he have left? And indeed the regime probably doesn't want to go down with him necessarily, another setback could be just the thing someone/some powergroup needs to instigate a 'change'. Probably knives have been sharpened several times already.

A (limited) military collapse seems to me one of the best case scenario's for Ukraine. If Ukraine can force upon Russia another pair of unexpected operational/strategic blows in 2023, I'd say indeed some form of military collapse seems plausible enough.
If enough % of soldiers on the frontline realize that the special operation is a doomed case and rather take their chances advancing backwards rather then forwards, that's enough of a collapse imo. The average Russian is quite pragmatic in my experience so I don't see them all fighting till the last man for the special operation, if they believe it's a doomed cause anyway. 

But I personally prefer/try to always keep my expectations at a minimum . First the next RU offensive needs to fail (if it actually comes) and then Ukraine needs to achieve results. 

On your list I fully expect 1 to happen, and 2. Good hopes for 3, they've done it before and while that's no guarantee it's sure an indication they can do it again. 

When we get to number 4. in your list I'd say we're (or rather Ukraine is) already in 'good' territory and I feel it's 'safe' to raise expectations for an endgame being on the horizon. For the endgame in Russia my money would be on Putin 'dying from medical conditions after being ill for a long time' and the new leadership wanting to at least clean up the mess for a moment. Continuing a disastrous war wouldn't be high up anyones list after they've just ascended the throne. Whether they are any better in the long run will remain to be seen. Probably not. 

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

UA soldier quote from the WSJ today from article on the brutal fighting:

“I need men. Good men. Spirited men,” he said. “Experience isn’t the most important thing. Here, the most experienced person can live for one day, and the least experienced person for months. It’s roulette.”

Just one observation, but that is really is a major part of attrition warfare. That is, experience does not matter. So why train men and just feed them to the mill?  I think NATO is putting together a force structure that will break that mold. The one thing the UA has over the RA as a constant is the spirit on their soldiers. And that has to be natured and retained very carefully.

 

 

Actually our entire western doctrine is built around the exact opposite of this; however, we are also not really built for attrition warfare.  I am also not sure of the veracity of the statement itself.  In the large world wars the more experienced a solider survived to be, the better their chances of survival is the prevailing wisdom - not sure if that is myth or backed up by serious study.  Further one thing that is backed up by history is that experienced troops fight better and smarter.  In experienced soldiers panic and run, largely because they are more likely to suffer dislocating psychological shock.

The narrative here sounds a lot like "Fighting Spirit and the end of bayonet, for King and Country!"  Which is not a bad thing or untrue, but is more in line with strategic messaging than actual performance on the battlefield.  

[The_Capt]

40 minutes ago, mosuri said:

Russia's revenues down, spending up:

Russia's Jan budget deficit widens as energy revenues slump

There's always the piggy bank to break into:

Russia rainy day fund shrinks by $38 bln as government plugs deficit

And business profits can be mobilized:

Authorities may increase taxes on businesses for the first time since the start of the war (Google Translated)

So nice to have plenty of good news

What I don't get is that if this was a domestic report (e.g. US) a lot of people in some political camps would be losing their minds.  Yet some of those same people completely dismiss these reports when it concerns Russia.  Did we not just have a heated debate that the Russian economy is pretty much bulletproof?

I am not an economics guy, it really remains a bit of a dark art to me.  And some stuff is totally inverse in logic, e.g. "rising ruble value is bad".  But news like this, along with other indicators kind of back up a lot of the analysis that pointed to the damage to the Russian economy will be under the waterline until it is not.

 

[Twisk]

I think we shouldn't read too much into this UA soldier's comment. It sounds like something you will read in any soldier's memoir from any modern peer war. A fatalistic sense that you can do everything right and be the best soldier but if your tickets up... its up.

You can even read this in some experiences of Coalition soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan where they will speak about a particularly skilled and beloved person in their unit being killed by an IED or ambush. A sense that the randomness of war cannot be escaped.

So i would not read into this too much on how experience impacts survival. It is instead the mentality of fatalism that develops after being in combat for long periods of time and seeing much death. But that is just my opinion of course.

 

24 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

UA soldier quote from the WSJ today from article on the brutal fighting:

“I need men. Good men. Spirited men,” he said. “Experience isn’t the most important thing. Here, the most experienced person can live for one day, and the least experienced person for months. It’s roulette.”

Just one observation, but that is really is a major part of attrition warfare. That is, experience does not matter. So why train men and just feed them to the mill?  I think NATO is putting together a force structure that will break that mold. The one thing the UA has over the RA as a constant is the spirit on their soldiers. And that has to be natured and retained very carefully.

 

 

I also think its useful to remember too that a lot of reports form individual UA soldiers are going to be tinged with their local experience (not just rational viewing but emotional exhaustion and so on). I have seen some people claim that UA is on its last legs from soldier reports but that soldier is probably in the worst experience of his life so it must be taken with large grains of salt since it doesn't represent the overall situation.

Edited February 8, 2023 by Twisk

[Lethaface]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

What I don't get is that if this was a domestic report (e.g. US) a lot of people in some political camps would be losing their minds.  Yet some of those same people completely dismiss these reports when it concerns Russia.  Did we not just have a heated debate that the Russian economy is pretty much bulletproof?

I am not an economics guy, it really remains a bit of a dark art to me.  And some stuff is totally inverse in logic, e.g. "rising ruble value is bad".  But news like this, along with other indicators kind of back up a lot of the analysis that pointed to the damage to the Russian economy will be under the waterline until it is not.

 

One thing about the economic situation is that because of the sanctions 'we' don't get much numbers anymore about the Russian economy. And the numbers that get communicated should probably sprinkled with some extra salt.

So I think it's safe to say that the sanctions hurt. How much probably nobody knows, even those in the know of the numbers today in Russia might find it hard to predict what will happen.

The thing about economics is that there are a lot of different models, but they usually assume the decision makers act rational at the lowest level (for example that a human will always seek to gain an advantage of $1 as much as he will seek to not lose $1. However we humans aren't rational decision makers on that level). So various models are perhaps good for understanding stuff but less good for predicting stuff. And other models work good for predicting stuff, assuming that the world will continue to operate more or less the same. Things didn't continue more or less the same so there's that. 

Russia had quite a bit of a warchest prepared and had some preparations to protect against more sanctions. Other countries seeking opportunity. All will alleviate some impact of the sanctions, be it temporary.

The relevant part about the sanctions is imo that there was a reason for the sanctions and a purpose. We won't exactly know how effective they are for a while probably, but the reason and purpose for the sanctions are still there. We can rather safely say that Russia would be doing better without sanctions. So as long as we can keep them up they should be kept up, or intensified.

[The_Capt]

8 minutes ago, Twisk said:

I think we shouldn't read too much into this UA soldier's comment. It sounds like something you will read in any soldier's memoir from any modern peer war. A fatalistic sense that you can do everything right and be the best soldier but if your tickets up... its up.

You can even read this in some experiences of Coalition soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan where they will speak about a particularly skilled and beloved person in their unit being killed by an IED or ambush. A sense that the randomness of war cannot be escaped.

So i would not read into this too much on how experience impacts survival. It is instead the mentality of fatalism that develops after being in combat for long periods of time and seeing much death. But that is just my opinion of course.

 

I also think its useful to remember too that a lot of reports form individual UA soldiers are going to be tinged with their local experience (not just rational viewing but emotional exhaustion and so on). I have seen some people claim that UA is on its last legs from soldier reports but that soldier is probably in the worst experience of his life so it must be taken with large grains of salt since it doesn't represent the overall situation.

The heartless randomness of the whole thing is absolutely true but these are micro-observations that when upscaled run into other factors.  For example an experienced outfit knows to disperse, dig in and camouflage itself as best as it can.  It has noise and light discipline and sticks to the basics on all around defence and STANO.  When the shells land they stay their holes and stay as safe as they can.

A highly spirited crew with no experience builds a camp fire and sings stirring war songs.  You can see how that will (and has) unfold(ed) and who has the better chance of surviving the night.

[Eddy]

Not sure whether this has been posted yet but here's another upbeat, happy-clappy report from the ever cheerful Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service!!!

[JonS]

37 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Actually our entire western doctrine is built around the exact opposite of this; however, we are also not really built for attrition warfare.  I am also not sure of the veracity of the statement itself.  In the large world wars the more experienced a solider survived to be, the better their chances of survival is the prevailing wisdom - not sure if that is myth or backed up by serious study. 

FWIW I made some comments on this a while ago

 

[Battlefront.com]

41 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

I find it difficult to predict how long he can succeed in staying afloat that way, but even cats only have 7 lives.

Here in America even our cats have more than the rest of the world.  Ours have 9

41 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

How many does he have left?

This is the problem with Putin's war since the start.  It's all about managing crisis with gimmicks.  Gimmicks are gimmicks because they can only be used a few times before they become ineffective.  Putin's regime has done remarkably well at coming up with yet another gimmick to keep them going, but without underlying change eventually there won't be any options left.

41 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

\If enough % of soldiers on the frontline realize that the special operation is a doomed case and rather take their chances advancing backwards rather then forwards, that's enough of a collapse imo. The average Russian is quite pragmatic in my experience so I don't see them all fighting till the last man for the special operation, if they believe it's a doomed cause anyway.

We've seen this to some degree already in isolated instances and would have seen it even more if units hadn't been ordered to retreat.  As with gimmicks, there's only so many times you can suffer military disasters and have soldiers keep soldering.  Eventually the regime will either miscalculate the timing of a retreat or lose control of rebelling units.  It's bound to happen.

Steve

[Lethaface]

Just now, Battlefront.com said:

Here in America even our cats have more than the rest of the world.  Ours have 9

 I guess we are less friendly to our cats or I just made an oopsie. 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

 I guess we are less friendly to our cats or I just made an oopsie. 

No worries.  Your cats probably have better health care options, so they probably live as long as ours do

Steve

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, JonS said:

FWIW I made some comments on this a while ago

 

Good detailed post there.  A couple things to add:

I would argue from personal experience that “fighting spirit” and “experience” are inversely proportional.  A lot of times inexperienced troops are all pee and vinegar, ready to win the war single handed.  While the troops who been in it for awhile are basically trying to do their job and survive.  This could be where some of the OP narrative is coming from.

Collective or corporate knowledge is a thing.  Every unit/sub-unit has a body of experience and knowledge that kind of floats overtop of it like a cloud.  People come in and out but that experience and knowledge survives - it normally get labelled as “how we do things here”.  In combat this is no different with the exception of complete wipe-out.  Even if a unit gets 50% attrition, the surviving half will pass the knowledge onto the replacements.  The longer a unit as a collective is in combat the better it learns and gains experience - “we used to do that but it is now a bad idea”.

Leadership both formal and informal gets rolled into this soup, so you can see how it is a pretty complex arena.  In the end units that can keep attrition to manageable rates seem to have a better chance of survival.  This is one of the debates against whole unit rotations as a lot of corporate knowledge is lost.  We hybridize it by doing unit rotations but formation offsets and all sorts of tricks but I don’t think anyone has a perfect solution.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

46 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Actually our entire western doctrine is built around the exact opposite of this; however, we are also not really built for attrition warfare.  I am also not sure of the veracity of the statement itself.  In the large world wars the more experienced a solider survived to be, the better their chances of survival is the prevailing wisdom - not sure if that is myth or backed up by serious study. 

I guess he speaks of the static warfare - think WW I. There must be a huge difference between a green soldier and a somewhat experienced one, but between an experienced one and very experienced one - not so much. Once a solider gets the habit of instinctively not sticking out his head from the trench and learns not to panic under bombardment, there is not much he can do to improve his chances of survival which become mostly statistical at that point. There is a very good reason why the Germans withdrew stormtroopers out of the trenches ASAP after attack.

[MSBoxer]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ah!  I didn't mean that comment to be like "RTF"   I was just too lazy to type more.  It is hard to keep up with this thread if you take even a half day off!

Plus, with all the talk of balloons and tanks it is easy to miss something else!

Steve

Friday I travel to Orlando for our annual trade show.  I am dreading the catchup I will have to slog through a week later!  It will be worth it but long. 

Unless, and this is just a suggestion.  Could any of you arrange to have this whole mess cleared up by early Friday morning?  That would be great!  Thanks in advance.

[JM Stuff]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'd probably be doing this anyway as the historian in me is fascinated by it.  I spent considerable time following the 2014/2015 war day to day as well.  However, you are correct that there is a professional simulation interest being served by all of this time spent.  Simulating things you have a deep understanding of tends to result in a better product

Steve

Just be curious the way that you will follow, but what ever you do this will be a good addons...

Cheers

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I guess he speaks of the static warfare - think WW I. There must be a huge difference between a green soldier and a somewhat experienced one, but between an experienced one and very experienced one - not so much. Once a solider gets the habit of instinctively not sticking out his head from the trench and learns not to panic under bombardment, there is not much he can do to improve his chances of survival which become mostly statistical at that point. There is a very good reason why the Germans withdrew stormtroopers out of the trenches ASAP after attack.

Ah yes, this would be the line between Veterans - who are normally kept in combat until they die/wounded, got promoted out, or pulled back to train incoming troops, and Elite forces, who are specifically selected (normally but not always Veterans), equipped and trained for a more specific set of jobs that normally occur at critical choke points on decision trees.

[Eddy]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Could also be general tactical training.  One of the weakest areas of Soviet based airforces is their lack of training and coordination with other assets

Yep, this from a retired Air Marshal, Edward Stringer 

On Sky News he'd stated previously that just giving F16s without all the Awacs, EW, refuelling etc. (i.e. the whole package) wouldn't be much more of an improvement on what they've got now. 

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

FWIW I made some comments on this a while ago

 

This little master class in scenario design needs to be in the game manual, in full.

55 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Good detailed post there.  A couple things to add:

I would argue from personal experience that “fighting spirit” and “experience” are inversely proportional.  A lot of times inexperienced troops are all pee and vinegar, ready to win the war single handed.  While the troops who been in it for awhile are basically trying to do their job and survive.  This could be where some of the OP narrative is coming from.

Collective or corporate knowledge is a thing.  Every unit/sub-unit has a body of experience and knowledge that kind of floats overtop of it like a cloud.  People come in and out but that experience and knowledge survives - it normally get labelled as “how we do things here”.  In combat this is no different with the exception of complete wipe-out.  Even if a unit gets 50% attrition, the surviving half will pass the knowledge onto the replacements.  The longer a unit as a collective is in combat the better it learns and gains experience - “we used to do that but it is now a bad idea”.

Leadership both formal and informal gets rolled into this soup, so you can see how it is a pretty complex arena.  In the end units that can keep attrition to manageable rates seem to have a better chance of survival.  This is one of the debates against whole unit rotations as a lot of corporate knowledge is lost.  We hybridize it by doing unit rotations but formation offsets and all sorts of tricks but I don’t think anyone has a perfect solution.

Outstanding information as always. Two observations related to the current war. The Russians, with few exceptions seem put a unit forward, and leave there until it is just shattered. This must greatly limit the accumulation corporate knowledge The_Capt is referring to. The Ukrainians on the other hand seem very aware that units needs to rotated before combat exhaustion set in, even if their casualties have only been moderate. The minus side of the Ukrainian approach is that I can site at least two significant instances where a less experienced unit that was just put in to relive another unit had a very bad day that led to a lot of OTHER units having a very bad day. So as the The_Capt says, no approach is perfect. Higher level staff should remain conscious of the down sides of whatever approach the are using.

FWIW I think the Russians are making a big mistake pushing there few remaining pre war elite formations to total failure, instead of pulling virtually all of them back to use as trainers and cadre for new units.