How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

 

[Los]

The Ukrainians will deploy this capability faster than anyone expects because the fate of their  nation depends upon it. Just like everything else they have done.

Edited January 26, 2023 by Los

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

That's always a consideration in general when fielding armies throughout history. When is to much technology to much for the task at hand? In the present situation, Ukraine is moving over to western systems. Other than tactical rifles, mortars and alike, the west does not have really simple systems. They are engineered for lethality and survivability which is the traditional approach when arming a force having inferior numbers. In WW2, they called it "bullets not bodies". Closing with the enemy is very deadly and the west wants that process to be almost a done deal before bayonets are fixed. So, I don't think the west has a lot of simple equipment to give to the UA. Longer range missiles and GPS shells fit that requirement. But most new AFVs are going to need re-training. We can table F-16s. One good thing is that training can accelerate as classes move through schools. They used to be called training outfits. Once Ukraine has those in place things will speed up. 

If you look at how most of this war is going, more precision tech is better.  Although we're certainly seeing a few firefights on the videos, most of the killing is done with action at a distance, whether it's tube artillery, missiles, or little bombs from drones.  Even when it's scared squishy guys with guns, they've sometimes even got someone else with a drone telling them how far to toss the grenade.  

Even modern MBTs are going to be about action at a distance - modern western MBTs have a longer effective range so they can eliminate older Russian tanks before they're even in range to get a shot off.  The risk with modern MBTs is that they're still LOS weapons and are vulnerable to modern ATGMS.  Fortunately for Ukraine, Russia doesn't have the kind of availability of modern ATGMs that have been pouring into the UA.

So I'd be quietly pouring more longer range precision weapons and supporting ISR to destroy RU supply depots and assembly points at progressively longer longer ranges behind the the lines while arguing publicly about what big hunks of steel will be sent in to clean up afterward. And would be training UA pilots to operate western EW and multi-role combat aircraft so that when RU is expecting tanks to roll in, the EA-18 squadron and a bunch of fighter/bombers show up instead.

[Harmon Rabb]

15 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

 

I'm interested if they are ethnic Germans or ethnic Russians with German citizenship.

From what I understand Germany has a sizable ethnic Russian community.

Russians in Germany (Wikipedia)

Edited January 26, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Lethaface]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

However I can think of one nation that is heading in this direction, and it literally wrote the rules on on some of this over two thousand years ago.

Perhaps the blessing is that upfront bottom-up critical thinking doesn't go that well if you're planning to make a career in that nation at this moment.

[cesmonkey]

33 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

Good thread about the US decision to sent Abrams to Ukraine:

Politico has a story on this also:
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/25/inside-washingtons-about-face-on-sending-tanks-to-ukraine-00079560

Quote

Biden “knew the only way Germany would do Leopards is if we did Abrams and allied unity is the most important thing to him. So Secretary Austin sent a proposal on how to make it happen,” one U.S. official said.

 

[Lethaface]

3 hours ago, IanL said:

It sure did! As soon as I started scrolling after reading a post on the page I heard the tell tail audio of a video I was not watching and had to scroll further down to find it and shut it off. Sorry Reddit did not fix / change it.

Edited to add Win 10 Firefox

I can recommend duckduckgo privacy essentials browser extension. I have it on chrome.
Their search isn't on same level as google but you can always go to google.com still, or change default search engine. 

[Rokko]

13 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I'm interested if they are ethnic Germans or ethnic Russians with German citizenship.

From what I understand Germany has a sizable ethnic Russian community.

Russians in Germany (Wikipedia)

I've read an article conveying details, allegedly sourcing a German volunteer involved in translating during the interrogation of the two prisoners. One is supposedly a Russian-German with dual-citizenship, the other a formerly unemployed guy from Berlin with no prior military experience. Monthly pay is apparently around 7000 Euro, so quite expensive cannon fodder. I wonder, do recruited convicts paid as well or is amnesty after surviving 6 months the only incentive?

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, Los said:

The Ukrainians will deploy this capability faster than anyone expects because the fate of their  nation depends upon it. Just like everything else they have done.

Yup, I think that's why some of us are thinking 8 months rather than 12 or 24.

6 months is long enough to get most of the pieces into play, though with significant limitations.  Could be good enough though.  Anything less than 6 months seems to be unreasonably short and something significant will bite the whole project in the arse sooner rather than later.

Steve

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Perhaps the blessing is that upfront bottom-up critical thinking doesn't go that well if you're planning to make a career in that nation at this moment.

Ah, now we are talking about our competitive advantage.  Bottom up democracy is much more resilient and agile, but does trade efficiency.  In the warfare that a certain nation considers theirs, they have always been hobbled by their own addiction to centralized authority and structure.  If one is going to do systems-based non-linear warfare - less structure, more agency and meritocracy are the better qualities to leverage.  It is nuts but we need to re-wire approach, they would need to rewire their entire society - we can crush this competition but we need to wake up first.  

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Twisk said:

At a basic level any sort of guess for how long it will take for Ukraine to get tanks fighting fit is going to be a huge estimate I think. We actually don't even know when the Ukrainians began training on these vehicles. For all we know they've had crews cycling into these vehicles for months. We also don't know Ukraine's training goals and how much of the training can be cut during an actual war.

What we can discuss is the weather and  it seems the weather is not cooperating with the capability of mechanized attacks. Its apparently too wet across too much of the front so that even if Ukraine had Abrams today they couldn't do anything particularly useful with them. Rasputitsa is going to hit in like ~2 months? and that will last for about a month or two if I am correct? So barring anything else it looks like the capability for Ukraine to launch a major attack is going to be weather limited to sometime 5-6 months from now. Is there any reason to disbelieve this? Maybe things freeze solid in a month but is that enough time for Ukraine to launch a major attack?


So reasonably Ukraine could probably launch an attack sometime over the summer and at that time they could reasonably have western IFVs and tanks integrated into some sort of combat capable formation? What will Russian forces look like at this point?


 

So people should stop worrying about when and just get on with the job, it will be ready when it is ready :). When things are close to ready those involved will know it and others can start planning around with the new assets. Wise would it be to not plan the most difficult/complex task as the first in the queue. 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

The US is usually pretty good at getting tanks to where they are needed though.

Here's another version of the analogy:

 

You own a dirt track, but you want to get into Formula 1 racing.

You have an experienced dirt track driver, but he hasn't driven F1. He's very motivated and quick to learn.

You happen to have a friend who has:

-about 8000 Formula 1 race cars in storage

-Lots of experienced F1 mechanics

-Many highly trained F1 pit crew

-a large number of other drivers

-contracts w/ engine/tire companies

-a number of 18 wheelers to get to races

-a completely legal money printer

This friend(s) also have a lot of interests of his/their own.

[Lethaface]

35 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ah, now we are talking about our competitive advantage.  Bottom up democracy is much more resilient and agile, but does trade efficiency.  In the warfare that a certain nation considers theirs, they have always been hobbled by their own addiction to centralized authority and structure.  If one is going to do systems-based non-linear warfare - less structure, more agency and meritocracy are the better qualities to leverage.  It is nuts but we need to re-wire approach, they would need to rewire their entire society - we can crush this competition but we need to wake up first.  

One could hope current events are some sort of an alarm clock, but the snooze danger is still there I guess ;-). 
At the same time the cultural difference that history has 'provided', might give us some extra snooze time and be late for work but still get the job done. As long as we don't fall to too much into the 'corporate culture' trap, imo.

[Lethaface]

11 hours ago, Shady_Side said:

It just seems logical to me that operating tanks would have more similar things then they would have things that are wildly different. For an overly simple example my old Ford Escort I learned to drive in has a lot of basic things in common with supped up Dodge Charger. I would need some time to learn how to get the most out of that Charger but I dont need to learn to drive all over again do I?  

Another difference with regards to the car analogy is that if you change from manual to automatic gear vehicle, it doesn't eat your arm if you hold it at the knob too long. A minor but not unimportant detail I guess 

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Well I am not sure if we can even clearly define what we mean by "attack" at this point.  I expect that the UA will continue to conduct a series of deep strike and attritional campaigns, continually eroding the RA at its critical points.  Then once the corrosive phase of warfare is over, they will kick the door in (insert western tank shots).  My money is on a diversionary push in the east, and then a main effort punch to cut that strategic corridor.  Once they do that, they can go to work on Crimea and compress the RA back into the box where it started in the Donbas. 

They get to that point and we are basically at the "ok, so where do we draw the line?" arguments.  Ukraine, obviously will want to push all the way back to pre-2014; however, the west might not be all onboard for this war to drag all the way into 2024 (and maybe beyond). That is a lot of money and hardware to finish that job and commitment may wane.  But as I always say, let's walk to midnight one second at a time.

Is there any idea of what the Russian force density (in terms of infantry/kilometer) is on the fighting line this moment? 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Finally someone puting this in nice short writing. TLDR modern Abrams is not that different from Leopard in terms of logistics and sustainment:

 

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Is there any idea of what the Russian force density (in terms of infantry/kilometer) is on the fighting line this moment? 

I've been wondering that as well.  Clearly it has improved significantly since the Fall.  It seems adequate enough overall to discourage Ukrainian mini-offensives.

Steve

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

My money is on a diversionary push in the east, and then a main effort punch to cut that strategic corridor.

This is my theory 1A also.  Which is why UKR will probably have multiple feints or optional paths based on RU reserve movement.  Gonna be interesting though I am starting to think it's not until May.

[cesmonkey]

24 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

TLDR modern Abrams is not that different from Leopard in terms of logistics and sustainment:

On the English version of the Leopard 2 Wikipedia page, there is this unexpected finding:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopard_2#Failed_exports

Quote

The Australian Army evaluated ex-Swiss Army Leopard 2s as a replacement for its Leopard 1AS tanks in 2003, but selected the M1A1 AIM instead due to easier logistics. More modern versions of the Leopard 2 or M1 Abrams, such as the Leopard 2A6, were not considered due to their higher price.[73]

 

[poesel]

I feel a bit neglected: now that we deliver the tanks, nobody is interested in Germany anymore!

FYI, this is the aftermath of the 'Panzerdeal' here in Germany.

Very unsurprisingly, all the pro-tank parties (Greens, FDP, half of SPD, CDU) are happy while the anti-tank parties are not (Left, AfD, other half of SPD). Of course, there's some grumbling from the opposition (and from some in the coalition, too) that that was too slow.
But the main point of criticism from nearly everyone was, that the chancellor failed to explain his reasoning while he was doing it.

Judging Scholz just by the results, most pundits (and I) have to grudgingly admit, that he did quite well.
From an inner politic view, he was not too early and didn't rush it. He was also not too late, to create enough turmoil in the coalition for any lasting damage. Thus, he has appeased the reluctant half of the population, while also (finally) pleasing those who wanted to have sent tanks long ago.
In the foreign politics field, he managed to create a broad coalition of nations who will send heavy tanks. Not only in Europe, but the US, too. Getting the US to commit Abrams is a success - no one knows who will be next in the Oval Office.

OTOH he did aggravate a lot of people, especially in the EEC. Weighing this with the effects inside Germany, that is still a win for him. So he put the German interests before foreign ones - that kind of behavior is quite common for many nations, but not from Germany (in the past).
I guess this will be some kind of 'new normal' that others have to get used to.

So from a German perspective, Scholz couldn't have done it better (that is a strange sentence). Everyone is a bit upset, but the issue has been resolved.
However, since he didn't explain himself (see above), we don't know if this is the intended outcome or just luck. And I guess we never will...

[The_Capt]

53 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Is there any idea of what the Russian force density (in terms of infantry/kilometer) is on the fighting line this moment? 

I crunched the numbers on this but it bears re-calcs:

So Russian forces - with paramilitary from DNR/LPR and Wagner, after mobilization are around 350k in country right now?  (They had 200k in initial invasion, which they have debatably sustained and the mobilized 300k, of which half were supposed to actually go in-country).

The "Line" is about 700km long from tip to tip.  This gives a force density of about 500 troops per km, but this is not how things really work.  First off this number has to include support troops so maybe 2/3rds are actually able to be "on the line", so say 340 ish per km.  And then you need depth, reserves and rotations, which will take up nearly half in a normal military, but the RA is probably packing them in and leaving them there, so I would go 2/3rds again.  So we are at around 225 troops per km, which is a healthy company group but of course this is uniform and does not account for concentrations for attacks, which are going to leave other areas pretty thin. 

I think I calculated a troop density of around 1000-1500 per km during WW1, but they did not have the ISR and range of manoeuvre, but even with that nowhere near that level.  Russia would need to put nearly 1.5 million troops in country to create that level of sustainable troop density. 

My bet is that the UA is more than happy for the RA to pull in and grind itself as the rest of their line gets thinner and thinner.  Eventually something has got to give.  As the RA gets blinder and less mobile due to vehicle attrition all they will have is human capital, and not enough, to cover the frontage.  UA is going the other way. 

Edited January 26, 2023 by The_Capt

[JonS]

25 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

this unexpected finding:

There's a broader context that's informing that, beyond which vehicle is easier to sustain.

The Aus Army is pretty small. They aren't going to invade anyone or go anywhere without friends, unless they can do it purely with light infantry (eg East Timor, Solomons). In particular, in any large conventional fight that friend is going to be the US. And wherever the US goes, they build an astonishing logistics infrastructure, which means that parts and base support for M1s will be right there.

The Germans might be there too, but they will not provide the same shared logistic support.

Therefore, on Operations, the Abrams will have easier logistics than the Leo.

Edited January 26, 2023 by JonS

[Butschi]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I wanted to come back to this in more detail to demonstrate how easy it is to dismiss historical comparisons based on flawed thinking.  Let's take Afghanistan and Iraq for example.

It is absolutely true that the overall US/NATO way of fighting conventional warfare did NOT work against a determined insurgent based domestic fighting force.  This wasn't just the fault of the military but of the political leadership surrounding it.  Therefore, if you want to evaluate US/NATO's strategic chances of winning such a war (winning defined as establishing a stable and self sustaining country) you'd be quite correct to doubt it would go well.  I share in that opinion.

However, that's not the sort of war we are talking about in Ukraine.  We're talking about a conventional war of equipment and doctrine based on national resources dedicated to making war.  To put it crudely, it is a war of equipment first and foremost because BOTH sides have built their capabilities around equipment.  The various insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan did not.  ISIS is another example which is somewhere between and that actually did turn out well for the US/NATO system (but that is another discussion).

What did we learn from Iraq and Afghanistan?  That the US/NATO had a wide range of ways to kill anything it decided needed killing.  Not just maybe kill, but definitely kill.  This required complex and expensive equipment, doctrine, training, and industrial capacity.  It worked extremely well.  It is proven fact, not theory.

OK, so what are the variables that Russia throws into the mix that the likes of the Taliban did not?  Counter equipment.  Well, we have seen that sort of equipment in use elsewhere (I already listed some) and the US/NATO combined arms concept crushed them.  The S-400 and EW capabilities that Russia has developed more recently have been tested out by Ukraine in various ways and have been found to be an incremental improvement at best.  Which is not surprising because many experts pointed this out years ago. 

Therefore, from an equipment standpoint it isn't likely that the Russian posses much that would change the outcome in a favorable way.  It might be a bit more of a challenge for the US to gain air supremacy than in Iraq, but I don't think by much.  Especially at this point in the war.  Some US/NATO doctrine and capabilities might be more limited than is desired, for example use of rotary aircraft close up to the front, but then again maybe not when we look at Ukrainian Mi-8 rushing around right under Russian noses.

OK, so what about training and doctrine?  I could go on and on about what we've seen in this war so far, but it is safe to say that Russia Sucks At War™ sums it up well enough.

Add this together and the Russian side of a match up with US/NATO would be fairly similar to Desert Storm in nature, but in effect easier because Ukraine has already ground down Russia's forces pretty severely.

Steve

Thanks for these two very long and detailed answers. I am not going to argue your points - they are firmly in your area of competence - because I am actually thinking more in epistemological terms here. Instead, let's move away from your 30+ years of expertise (which I don't want to belittle in any way) to view things from a different angle, based on my 20+ years of experience in science and engineering:

I'll give you an analogy - I think it isn't too flawed - from what I do for a living. Let's say I show you a self-driving car for which I developed the AI. It is based on data recorded in the busy quarters of Mumbai, an Italian mountain pass road, German Autobahn and... yeah, French villages with lots of roundabouts would fit nicely. I also have a nice simulation, let's call it Car Motion (CM for short). It is well regarded and does a decent job although it doesn't cover all the aspects of driving. My vehicle is equipped with all the latest toys, cameras, Lidar, Radar, Ultrasonic and the biggest and meanest computer that money can buy and still fits into a car. The data I recorded has all the ingredients of traffic: different types of roads, traffic signs, traffic lights, lots of different cars, pedestrians, different landscapes. My AI looks very good in CM and I applied what I learned from simulation and data and used it to drive a country road through the Black Forest without accident.

Now I don't know, maybe you are brave enough and would want to try it, say, during rush hour in downtown Atlanta. Well, I wouldn't let you. Not because I don't trust in my own skills. Based on my knowledge and experience I'd say chances are quite good it would work. But while I have a good feeling, I don't have enough evidence. I have tested my self-driving car in one subset of possible situation. I know my data and - although all the ingredients are there - it doesn't cover all situations and there is always something that isn't in the data. My simulation, while great, is an abstraction and I know it falls short in some aspects. And so, before I have tested it in a much greater variety of situations I cannot actually make a robust prediction. And the different authorities responsible for clearing my car for real-life traffic pretty much share my view of things.

Well, we are coming from a quite different background and since wars don't happen all that often and it is morally questionable to stage them in real life, I guess your approach is as good as it gets. But maybe you understand why it gives me headaches.

 

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

 

[Butschi]

50 minutes ago, poesel said:

However, since he didn't explain himself (see above), we don't know if this is the intended outcome or just luck. And I guess we never will...

And again, a perfect Merkel copy...