How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

29 minutes ago, Splinty said:

Til Valhalla!

Well, each section holds about 300 names,  and is say,  5m long,  pier to pier. 

Current RUS casualties are c75000, so /300 = 250 sections. 250 * 5m = 1250

So a wall 1. 25km long, and still growing....

Incidentally, the Kremlin complex is about 1.5km in circumference,  so pretty soon (eg Jan 2023) a wall like this could encircle that particular heart of darkness. 

And keep growing and growing, visually tightening a noose... 

But it's not like those cruel ****s inside will give a damn, of course. 

 

 

Edited November 8, 2022 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

27 minutes ago, womble said:

that elements equipped and trained to kill people and break things aren't the best tools for maintaining control of a civilian population.

Funny, isn't that exactly their approach to domestic Law & Order as it is

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Blazing 88's said:

In February, Russians attempted to cut off Ukrainian forces at Volnovakha in Donetsk Oblast but were stopped by Ukrainian tankmen. One of them, Vasyl, who has been fighting since 2015, tells his story.

Link: Veteran of the Tank Battle for Volnovakha describes how it was

Sorry if posted previously, didn't see it though.

 

Posted eons ago, so good to bring it back for this discussion.  It's an excellent video.  Reminds us how significant military actions can be tipped one way or the other by the actions of a tiny number of soldiers.

Steve

[Bulletpoint]

34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Respects to those who have fallen and to the nation that honors them.

Contrast this with Russia.  "Casualties?  What casualties?".  Imagine if Russia built a similar wall in Moscow.  I think they'd have to make it a lot taller to fit it within the confines of the city limits.

 

How about this one?

 

[chrisl]

40 minutes ago, akd said:

AFAIK, these are mostly (or exclusively?) losses from 2014-2021.

And there are about 2000 faces on the length of that wall.

[Haiduk]

Interesting hints for today:

- some RUMINT that front is moving in Zaporizhzhia area, but still no real info from there

- Taras Chmut, the head of Back-And-Alive foundation wrote in own twitter: "I wanted to write something, but better I will keep silence... Well, there will be many of "cotton" soon"

Somebody tied the latter words with this: Russian S-300PM1 launcher was spotted copmpletely destroyed near Ilyine on half way between Tokmak and Berdiansk. This is about 63-65 km to frontline. Launcher was hit on move, so this wasn't HARM or HIMARS

 

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, chrisl said:

And there are about 2000 faces on the length of that wall.

UKR Wiki article about ATO/JFO losses had last name on 23rd Feb under number 4552. But this number included all losses of all force structures (with police, volunteers and emergency service) in warzone i.e non-combat losses, which amount about 30 % of total according to 2017 year statistic.

[danfrodo]

11 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Interesting hints for today:

- some RUMINT that front is moving in Zaporizhzhia area, but still no real info from there

- Taras Chmut, the head of Back-And-Alive foundation wrote in own twitter: "I wanted to write something, but better I will keep silence... Well, there will be many of "cotton" soon"

Somebody tied the latter words with this: Russian S-300PM1 launcher was spotted copmpletely destroyed near Ilyine on half way between Tokmak and Berdiansk. This is about 63-65 km to frontline. Launcher was hit on move, so this wasn't HARM or HIMARS

 

 This is my dream!  Attack toward Melitopol maybe starting????

I wonder if UKR has some teams behind RU lines in this area?  It's an enormous area so it's not unrealistic.  The teams could watch roads waiting for sufficiently valuable targets to arrive.  This is very far behind the lines. 

[Huba]

The source of Rybar's news seems to be the gauleiter of Kherson:

 

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

 This is my dream!  Attack toward Melitopol maybe starting????

I doubt, because all best UKR troops involved in other directions. I even can't say who are on Zaporizhzhia front exept local TDBrs, elements of 17th TBr. In that time against UKR troops there concentrated almost all forces of 58th CAA and about half units of Eastern Miliatry District, involved in war.  

Edited November 8, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

The source of Rybar's news seems to be the gauleiter of Kherson:

 

There was info 2-3 days ago UKR arty of HIMARS has struck HQ of 205th brigade, and as if brigade commander and most of his officers where killed or wounded. But still no official confirmation

[Beleg85]

Russians started using SVBIED? Ok it's UR-77. But not used exactly the way is should...

 

[Haiduk]

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

Russians started using SVBIED? Ok it's UR-77. But not used exactly the way is should...

 

Reportedly again near Spirne NE from Bakhmut. Data unknown.

Edited November 8, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

Ok more sources claim that fights near Snihurivka may be not just local attack.

Ofc. still caution advised; it is not the first time such situation occurs. Polish and English mercenaries are omnipresent, so it may be serious action.

Edited November 8, 2022 by Beleg85

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Ok more sources claim that fights near Snihurivka may be not just local attack.

Ofc. still caution advised; it is not the first time such situation occurs. Polish and English mercenaries are omnipresent, so it may be serious action.

Fingers crossed for ZSU, this is THE MOMENT to inflict casualties on the russians

[Kinophile]

17 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Polish and English mercenaries are omnipresent, so it may be serious action.

?

Also how heavy are any of the foreign volunteer units?  My impression is they're more like MRBts,  with emphasis on local infantry combat rather than armor/mech breakthrough ops? 

If it's is mostly FVs there then tis could just be opportunistic(read,  short term) local development empowered by that judicious HIMARS decap on RUS command,  above. 

Edited November 8, 2022 by Kinophile

[danfrodo]

Kherson weather looks dry for the next week except for showers one day.  Maybe UKR was just waiting for things to dry up a bit

 

[Kinophile]

It seems RUS can just about handle/eventually fend off large UKR offensives, with highly variable levels of competence. 

I'm curious just how well they could handle an entire front-wide, multiple (supporting) axis UKR general offensive? 

It could require a level of HQ staff competence and polity al unity that simply doesn't exist in higher RUS command circles. Stress the system and it'll stall, argue a d eventually react. potentially fatally late. 

Currently RUS is able to shift forces to meet each offensive, eventually stall it and then rush off to fight the next fire. 

But a general offensive could be the punch that splits the RUS army in Ukraine into isolated, non-supporting fights. 

Naturally, that would require a lot from the ZSU, and allies,  but maybe not for as long as one might think. 

Once the splits happen it couod be very difficult for RUS to internally coordinate and cooperate to reform a cohesive,  single defense. 

Edited November 8, 2022 by Kinophile

[Beleg85]

4 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

?

In the words of Russian propaganda

4 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Also how heavy are any of the foreign volunteer units?  My impression is they're more like MRBts,  with emphasis on local infantry combat rather than armor/mech breakthrough ops?

Mostly platoon-sized units working independently of each other. Previous combat experience of many volunteers probably position them as elite light infantry or SF engaged in recon/assaults/QRF; at least 3 known volunteers from Poland serve in such role. But others may man the trenches, it seems a lot of it is dependant on necessicties.

Belarussians from Kostas Kalinousky reg. seem to be fighting as relatively coherent formation, various Georgian detachments as well (Didgori "brigade" or rather platoon seem to have heavy casualties two weeks ago, there were several orbituaries of them).

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

What I saw in 2014 and 2015 was a mixed bag from my perspective.  Indeed, I did not see Russia falling apart or being unable to fight.  However, what I saw was the same sorts of pros and cons of Russia's way of fighting that I've seen in previous conflicts.  I did not see overt superiority, I saw something that worked mostly because of mass.  I also saw hints that core problems that Russia has suffered from for 100+ years were still evident.  Even if anecdotally, which of course means I could have been wrong (though it wasn't).  More importantly, I saw how Ukraine's forces were able to thwart superior Russian forces enough that Russia scaled down its expectations for what it could achieve within the constraints of a limited military investment (precursor to the now famous Special Military Operation).

Well I think we are just going to have to agree to disagree and maybe things will become more clear when more data becomes available.  I am not seeing any corroborated evidence of above and would need to in order to follow a thread from 2014 to here.  In fact reviewing some of this stuff (again) in context of this war I come to the exact opposite conclusion - the Russians were victims of their own success from 2014.

We can nitpik tactical performance all day long but in the end the RA supported a proxy war and then rolled in pseudo conventional forces in new force structures and were observed crushing an opponent who had been succeeding against uncon separatist forces.  They pulled off two major operations that first pushed back the UA and then decisively defeated the in the field in early ‘15 forcing the Ukrainian government to the negotiations table. In the end Russia had taken the Crimea and about half the Donbas and avoided any real western reaction. I am sure there were observations of RA issues, no military in history has ever had a perfect war, but nothing I can see leads to a forecast of what happened in this war in prosecution or outcome.  To take the position of “well they didn’t take the whole Donbas = they suck” is a serious stretch given the context of the conflict.  Did they want the whole Donbas?  Could they do it without a full scale invasion which they were avoiding see: no western reaction?  

Hey maybe you were the lone prophet, the outlier who saw what everyone missed; however, using your own conclusions to prove your own theories is pretty risky and filled with pitfalls.  Further, I am not sure it sets up a theory that is resilient enough to stand up to scrutiny.  I think “Russia sucks” as a general theory is weak and overly-simplistic for explaining the phenomenon we have seen in this war and will continue to do my part to keep looking for other answers.

[Maquisard manqué]

Apologies if this has already been posted but the BBC have a documentary series on Russia and the experience of “surviving the fall of Communism and Democracy”. There are no talking heads. It’s basically archive footage with minimal text narration. I’ve found it quite insightful but I also realise BBC access isn’t available for all…

https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p0d3kjmp/russia-19851999-traumazone-series-1-1-part-one-1985-to-1989

[danfrodo]

11 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I'm curious just how well they could handle an entire front-wide, multiple (supporting) axis UKR general offensive? 

Do you mean like attacking all along Kherson front, for example?  Or attacking on multiple fronts, like Kherson + Melitopol + Svatove all at once?

[sburke]

Putin's Elite Tremble as Hardliners Call for ‘Stalinist’ Steps (msn.com)

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, dan/california said:

Can you elaborate on this a bit?  I am not quite sure what meant, but I am pretty sure it was significant.

Hmm, ok lemme try and keep it from getting too weird.  

War is a social exercise and as such social frameworks are very important to its prosecution - I am pretty sure everyone gets that.  It can be argued that society, since the Agricultural Revolution and creation of complex societies, is not a homogeneous mass.  There exist dimensions to society, libraries have been written on this stuff but very little on how these dimensions interface with warfare.

War is a macro-social exercise in almost all war theory.  Clausewitz had his trinity of macro social blocks, and many have used these to describe the fundamental theories of warfare.  By macro, I mean at a state or pseudo state level it is comprised of manufactured sectors of society - government, military etc - this in contrast to organic social structures. The relationship between macro and organic has been touched upon - “skeleton vs cellular” by Appadurai for example. Looking back a war before complex society anthropologist like Keeley write about how pre-historic warfare was tribal and below the “threshold of formation”.  Micro social structures are an ocean of humanity relationships and cultures that reside under the macro notions of a state or other large grouping.  They are your family, neighborhoods and friends - Harari refers to this as intimate communities vs imagined communities of macro structures.

Ok, so what?  Well if we accept that society is comprised of macro structures resting on top of organic micro-social structures then central to prosecution of warfare is the relationship between the two.  We can side step how that relationship affects Will and focus on warfare within these two dimensions itself.  The vast majority of military power is designed to fight within a macro-social context.  Militaries are designed, built and employed as an extension of macro-structures (mostly, but there have been exceptions).  These are designed to fight other macro-structures in a collision as has been described by many. 

Where things get weird is when macro structures attempt to deliver effects into micro-social constructs.  An infantry combat team is not designed to deliver effects within a micro context - beyond blunt approaches of wholesale elimination, which is a very narrow option set.  When thrust into a situation where a military is going to need to be able to deliver effects into this space they have developed specialists and special units.  SOF is most often employed in this space but there are others.  Police forces are another interesting example as they are purpose built to work in a micro-social context “walking a beat” but have to specialize to create formation and function on a macro level e.g, riot control.

”Ah Capt but what about the tactical level, is that not simply a micro-level of warfare”…no, but thanks for asking.  The framework of macro-micro in warfare is not about scale it is about orientation.  A single soldier in a platoon attack is still orientated towards macro constructs of warfare.  A deserter running away from the war is orientated towards micro-social constructs, the difference is not the soldier but which way they are facing and the impact of that on a wider scale is how entire armies fall apart.

Many of our failures over the last twenty years has been an inability to affect those micro social structures, in fact they have turned on us many times.  Sending conventional forces designed for macro warfare into a micro driven conflict is the epitome of insanity.  Clearly the Russias took this into account but then threw those specialized security forces into a conventional war and hilarity ensued.  

This is the tip of a very large iceberg because within those micro-social structures is an enormous amount of human energy.  We kick upstairs to the state but the majority of human energy never left the intimate relationship space.  That energy tend to be very localized and short range but when it boils over and start to emerge as a macro force, well that is when revolutions happen.  So there is a link to subversive warfare in all this as well.  

In the case of this war, the failure in Russian strategy is not only in regard to big red lines on the map, it was a failure to create sufficient effects within micro-social structures to avoid wide scale groundswell resistance, and they have shown no real plan to win these structures over post -conflict - I strongly suspect the level of partisan resistance in occupied has been under reported as has the wide scale oppression.  Finally that fire has a risk of spreading into Russia itself which is what all the talk of upheavals etc have been sitting upon.

Does that help a bit?

Edited November 9, 2022 by The_Capt

[kevinkin]

31 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Do you mean like attacking all along Kherson front, for example?  Or attacking on multiple fronts, like Kherson + Melitopol + Svatove all at once?

I think this might be called a broad front approach. Generally used to stretch your enemy thin while using alternating thrusts into the front threatening small scale envelopments. If the UA had all the time it needed they would be better off just killing the RA's poorly executed attacks. However, if Ukraine ever felt it needed to speed up the demise of Russia within its borders, then a ballsy strategy like a broad front would be considered. It's ballsy since you would not normally employ it against superior numbers. But the average UA soldier might be worth 10 RA conscripts, so numbers can be deceiving.