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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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2 hours ago, Taranis said:

• Potentially extremely significant - but only if Russia overcomes barriers & Ukraine stagnates

I really like Perun but he is a civilian that appears to work deeply on the corporate side of things.  Sometimes when he wanders into military operations he gets a little off-menu - he has stated this multiple times.

So in order for the Russia mobilization to become “extremely significant” the Russian military needs to overcome much more than it mobilization challenges - it would have to rebuild a better military than it had on 23 Feb.  The RA is demonstrating it lags significantly in the stuff that really matters at this level of warfare - C4ISR, logistics and joint capabilities.  I have watched the RA repeatedly conduct unsynchronized and uncoordinated operations, while the UA does the opposite.  The Russian missile campaign should have been able to cut up Ukrainian infrastructure, both physical and information, if it was coordinated and armed with comparable ISR - they have not done this, instead leaning on terror strikes like this was 1940.  The closest we have seen was the strikes on those dam-locks but I am still not sure of the military value of that action.

If the UA managed to pull off two river crossings it is also a sign that the RA is lagging.  As we saw last spring, a major river obstacle crossing in an environment where ISR is everywhere should be next to impossible, yet the UA appears to have done it. So what? The RA can’t see them, or if they can, they can not act on it.

It will not matter if Russia can get 1 million men in uniform with rusty AKs on the line, if they cannot command, support and coordination those troops they are just going to die - pretty efficiently based on what we have seen from the UA.

I suspect that this war will go down as “the last war of the 20th century versus one of the first of the 21st”.  We have had the preludes in Iraq, Ukraine in 2014 - where the symmetry was reversed, Ukraine fighting like it was 1989 and the Russians fighting like it was 2005, and Armenia.

If the RA suddenly started to demonstrate a 21st century C4ISR architecture, I would be shocked and frankly we would have to rethink this war.  However, despite attempts (see Iranian drones), this is not about sensors, it is about boring things like All Source Intel Fusion and communications. - that takes years to build, years that Russia does not have.

Finally the fact that Russia thinks that mobilization of mass is a solution demonstrates that amateurs on the Russian side are running their war.

Edited by The_Capt
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2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I really like Perun but he is a civilian that appears to work deeply on the corporate side of things.  Sometimes when he wanders into military operations he get a little off-menu - he has stated this multiple times.

So in order for the Russia mobilization to become “extremely significant” the Russian military needs to overcome much more than it mobilization challenges - it would have to rebuild a better military than it had on 23 Feb.  The RA is demonstrating repeatedly it lags significantly in the stuff that really matters at this level of warfare - C4ISR, logistics and joint capabilities.  I have watched the RA repeatedly conduct UN synchronized and uncoordinated operations, while the UA does the opposite.  The Russian missile campaign should have been able to cut Ukrainian infrastructure, both physical and information if it was coordinated and armed with comparable ISR - they have not done this, instead leaning on terror strikes like this was 1940.  The closest we have seen was the strikes on those dam-locks but I am still not sure of the military value of that action.

If the UA managed to pull off two river crossings it is also a sign that the RA is lagging.  As we saw last spring, a major river obstacle crossing in an environment where ISR is everywhere should be next to impossible, yet the UA appears to have done it. So what? The RA can’t see them, or if they can, they can not act on it.

It will not matter if Russia can get 1 million men in uniform with rusty AKs on the line, if they cannot command, support and coordination those troops they are just going to die - pretty efficiently based on what we have seen from the UA.

I suspect that this war will go down as “the last war of the 20th century versus one of the first of the 21st”.  We have had the preludes in Iraq, Ukraine in 2014 - where the symmetry was reversed, Ukraine fighting like it was 1989 and the Russians fighting like it was 2005, and Armenia.

If the RA suddenly started to demonstrate a 21st century C4ISR architecture, I would be shocked and frankly we would have to rethink this war.  However, despite attempts (see Iranian drones), this is not about sensors, it is about boring things like All Source Intel Fusion and communications. - that takes years to build, years that Russia does not have.

Finally the fact that Russia thinks that mobilization of mass is a solution demonstrates that amateurs on the Russian side are running their war.


Yes, they are waging a terrorist war like in 1940. I watched an episode of the WW2 channel a few days ago where the Soviet Union established referendums in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to annex them after occupiyng them. Guess the results... Déjà vu ? 🤔
The channel also demonstrates well the futility of direct terror bombardment of civilians, as morale never plummeted. Morale held up just as well in Great Britain, as in Finland and Germany...

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There is an interesting RU report that says L-PR continue to control Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (top of the map)

aIjFl7.jpg

This is where RU was trying to build new defense after retreat across the Oskil. Most likely it is a new RU frontier for now. We should expect them to withdraw everybody back to this line.

A reminder of what retreat to these settlements means for Svatove

LnyaQe.jpg

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Freedman extremely on point this morning: 
 

“Even by his own standards Vladimir Putin’s speech on 30 September in the Kremlin’s St George’s Hall was unhinged. For those who can face reading it, it can be found here. As he ranted about the west, denouncing it in lurid terms for a range of evils, from imperialism to satanism, it seemed, as Mark Galeotti observed, that he was trying to convince himself as much the outside world about this grand civilisational struggle with the West. The rant had a purpose, which was to demonstrate the irrelevance of legality. The annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, now to join Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, goes directly against the Charter of the United Nations. Instead of this being acknowledged as a foundational document of international law, it was wrapped up in a denunication of the West’s claims about a ‘rules-based international order’, which only reflected their selfish and malevolent interests. Russia was under no obligation to follow those rules. If it wanted to expand its borders, it was fully entitled to do so. 

Ever since the Kosovo War in 1999, and NATO’s use of the principle of self-determination and reports of atrocities to justify their support of the Kosovar Albanians, he has employed this same combination of claims to rationalise his violations of the sovereignty of neighbouring countries. Hence the contrived processes of sham referendums and fake claims of Ukrainian terror. 

Implications for Diplomacy

Although it is always disturbing listening to these rants, the conclusion was not surprising. He explained that this was an irreversible move. This was his political offer:

‘I want the Kyiv authorities and their real masters in the West to hear me, so that everyone remembers this: people living in Luhansk and Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia become our citizens forever. (Applause.)’

‘We call on the Kyiv regime to immediately cease fire, all hostilities, the war that it unleashed back in 2014, and return to the negotiating table. We are ready for this, it has been said more than once. But we will not discuss the choice of the people in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson, it has been made, Russia will not betray it. (Applause.) And today's Kyiv authorities should treat this free will of the people with respect, and nothing else. This is the only way to peace.’

Should Kyiv do as he asked and accept the permanent transfer of these provinces, it is not clear what they would be getting in return: Putin presumably would be looking for Ukrainian neutrality and the ending of sanctions. If he was negotiating from a position of strength then these demands might have some credibility. But his position is weak. Ukraine’s only interest is total Russian withdrawal which Putin now says in constitutionally impossible.

Even those in the West most keen to push for a negotiation around the current territorial holdings should appreciate that however difficult it is to get Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, they are not going to convince Ukraine to withdraw from Ukraine. In addition, while Crimea had a separate status of all its own, because of its annexation back in 2014, it was possible to imagine how it might be dealt with in negotiations by special measures. Now it is just one of five illegally annexed provinces whose fate is tied together.

Putin has boxed himself in with these moves. Before it was possible to imagine, if always unlikely, that there could be some diplomatic means to bring the bloodshed to an end, for example by discussing forms of shared citizenship for those who wished to be attached to Russia or new forms of security arrangements. That path has now been blocked. The Ukrainian government’s response to the speech was to insist that that they could not negotiate with Russia so long as Putin remains in power. The war is now destined to carry on to its own bitter end. It also means that even should the fighting end it is not clear how issues such as war crimes, reparations and the unwinding of the sanctions’ regime will be handled.

Implications for Nuclear Use

Nuclear threats were not as prominent in this speech as they had been in the mobilisation announcement of 21 September. There was a strong implicit reference when he spoke ofRussia’s willingness to use ‘all available means’ to keep safe Russian territory, in its new expanded definition. There was also an explicit hint, when he referred to the US as ‘the only country in the world that twice used nuclear weapons, destroying the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.’ He then added, ‘Incidentally, they created a precedent.’ In the years since 1945 enormous international efforts, many involving the first the Soviet Union and then Russia, went into ensuring – successfully - that this precedent was not followed. But at least Putin did not follow this up with any overt nuclear threats. Conveying a sense of of nuclear menace is part of his strategy, but that is not the same as identifying ways of employing these weapons to help turn the tide of this war without making everything a whole lot worse. 

The nuclear issue does come into play with Zelensky’s response to Putin’s statement. He announced that he would seek to fast track the country’s accession to NATO. Holding back on that aspiration was the one big concession that Zelensky was keeping available as something that might be put on the table in a serious negotiation. But the Biden Administration quickly dismissed the idea that this could be addressed at speed. Once Ukraine joined NATO it would benefit from the alliance’s Article V and expect active engagement in Ukraine’s defence. This is exactly the development that Putin has been using his nuclear forces to seek to deter. But the application can stay on the table, a reminder to Russia that once nuclear weapons were used in any form they would no longer be serving a deterrent purpose. 

Biden’s main response, as he dismissed the legitimacy of Putin’s move, will affect the course of the war. He announced that he was pushing forward with the next $12 billion assistance package to Ukraine and imposing more sanctions on Russia and members of the elite responsible for the prosecution of this war.

The Implications of Lyman

Meanwhile as this elite gathered to listen to Putin’s speech news was coming in from eastern Ukraine of the effective encirclement of the town of Lyman, a key logistical hub for the eastern Donbas, as anticipated in my previous post. I pointed there to the tension between a political strategy that must have the Russian flag in as many places as possible and a military strategy that should conserve scarce resources, and so trading space for time, abandon vulerable positions to establish stronger defensive lines that might be held until the newly mobilised forces can fill out the front lines. The political strategy has won. Putin’s fixation with taking and holding pieces of territory at whatever cost has made a full defeat more likely. 

There were believed to be some 2,500 troops in Lyman along with a similar number already pushed out by Ukrainian forces from surrounding villages. Cut off from logistical support, the Russians do not appear to be settling down for a long drawn out defence of their position but instead are trying to get out in some shape or form. There are reports from Ukrainian sources that the Russian troops asked for permission to evacuate but this was denied. Now their position is even wose than shown in the above map. They are trapped, without supplies or reinforcements, and must either surrender or try to find their own way out in the face of heavy Ukrainian artillery fire. Ukrainian forces do not need to storm Russian positions. Instead they can use available forces to press on, making a point of crossing the border into Luhansk. The absence of the forces caught in Lyman, and growing logistical difficulties, means that Russian forces will continue to be pushed back. Ukrainian forces are reported to be pressing Kreminna and may soon threaten the Russian positions in Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, taken in June after a long and costly (for both sides) struggle.

All this mocks Putin’s announcement, demonstrating that he can’t hold what he has just annexed. The qustion now is how long the Russian people and, most importantly, the members of the power elite, put up with this recklessness. Polling suggests that support for the war has fallen sharply. The latest shows that from 48% of Russians wanting the war to continue in August now only 29% are detrmined about pressing on. Another 15% are lukewarm and 48% want peace. Putin offers no way to fight or negotiate a way to victory. More men may so far have fled the country than joined the army. The audience at St George’s Hall look more perplexed than inspired, watching a man who has lost his swagger, caught up in a deluded world of his own construction, but out of which he has inflicted a real-world catastrophe.”

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3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

The road in vicinity of Lyman, as said cameraman. Destroyed Russian convoy of cars and minibus, corpses on the road. Likely some volunteer like BARS or LPR mobiks unit. In comments somebody noted this can be minor road between Lyman and Stavky village

 

Looks like their looting columns didn´t make it out in time. Too many washers inside I´d guess. 😅 Some russian wifes must be very sad not getting their christmas presents this year.

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Puck me! Maskovets says according to few sources UKR are making move at North. Most important part and map.

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And, apparently, the Russian command simply does not have enough combat-ready forces and means, or to cover the area northwest of Svatove... At least, the expansion of the Kupyansky bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in recent days clearly indicates that the 1st Guards "is not coping with the Glorious mission assigned to it... According to certain information, the AFU is allegedly alread y at Arapivka and is advancing to Verkhnyaya Duvanka.

tJGjFM.jpg

 

Full post is below

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I cannot say that the decision, Russian command has found, regarding the Svatove direction looks optimal [even] for them, but the fact is it is more or less adequate... Yes, I am referring to the decision concerning the transfer of forces and weapons of the 2nd CAA of the Central Military District to the northern part of the Luhansk region.

Good afternoon, Dears...

Consequently, the order that Russian command at one time generated - "standing to death", for the Liman group, was made let's say, under "external [political] pressure". In fact, the control of Lyman and Yampil area did not carry any special significance in the military sense.

After the Russian "defense on Oskil [line]" fell down, the [RU] intent of controlling Lyman  area was generally reduced to "cover of the Kreminna - Rubezhne area"... and only until 2nd BTGr of the 21st mr brigade of the 2nd CAA did not "dig in" to positions along the Zarechne - Kreminna road... So, this morning it became clear that the Russians will have to leave Lyman..., tellingly... "for the sake of defense" of the Kreminna. The question is why it was necessary to put into these forests "the color of Lugansk youth" (this is sarcasm...), if the overall operational situation in the Svatove and Rubezhne directions has not changed in any way... has not even appeared in their dumb heads.

I think in the near future... the enemy command will try to create something like a "strike tactical group" in the Krasnorechenske area (probably it will include 1.5 BTGr "201st MB" [from military base in Tajikistan] and 1-2 BTGr of the 30th mr brigade of the 2nd CAA). And then, they will begin to restore at south of this group what they managed to pull out from Lyman. But, so far, this herd is rolling back disorderly - either to Kreminna, or directly to the Krasnorechenske ... It helps they continue to hold the road through Zarechne to Kreminna, as far as I understand...

The main idea of these actions, obviously, is to create a reserve for "parrying" threats - both in the area of Kreminna, and directly to the west and southwest of Svatove...

But the general situation in the Svatove direction is still developing for the Russian command, let's say... not entirely optimistic, in particular:

– although tough counter-battles with the forward  units of the AFU are conducted in the Borova area, by the group with 1.5-2 BTGr of the 144th mr division of the 20th CAA, the enemy cannot completely stop and stabilize the front "west and southwest" of Svatove... The AFU continues to advance on Svatove south-east of Borove

– also, in the area of responsibility of the units of the 1st Guards TA, as well as the "remnants" of the 11th AK, who were instructed to cover an important north-western section of the Svatove front, events started to happen with incredible speed... 

And, apparently, the Russian command simply does not have enough combat-ready forces and means, or to cover the area northwest of Svatove... At least, the expansion of the Kupyansky bridgehead of the AFU in recent days clearly indicates that the 1st Guards "is not coping with the Glorious mission assigned to it... According to certain information, the AFU is allegedly already y at Arapovka and is advancing to Verkhnyaya Duvanka.

- In fact, the Russian command is now etting "blown out" not only in Lyman itself, but even near Svatove (at least at 2 points)... Given the fact that all this struggle of the Nanai boys [not very serious fight] in the Svatovo area, in the event of the fall of Kreminna, will lose any clear military meaning, I would, in place of the Russian military command, think very hard about the expediency of further stubborn defense of Borova and the adjacent territory... For the diptych Izum- Lyman, can turn into a triptych - Izum- Lyman- Borova. Moreover, for the AFU, it will cost minimal effort (in fact, 2 successful and quick attacks in places that I certainly won't say ...)

 

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1 hour ago, sburke said:

Note also in the article (besides the complete lack of any valid reason to detain him), is the IAEA expressing concern over land mine explosions just outside the plant perimeter. One yesterday (day before?) cut a 6kV power line leading into the plant. There are redundancies so there was no safety issue, however, these land mines have been exploding recently, most likely because of local animals finding them. It's been luck so far that nothing important has been disabled due to this.

Dave 

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@Battlefront.com it looks like their hair is burning from bigger issue at hand - Don Don delicious post

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I have always said: there is nothing better than the voiced truth, even bitter, insulting, but the truth. This is the only way to move forward. Therefore, I cannot remain silent about what happened in the Red Lyman.

The defense of this area was led by the commander of the Central Military District, Colonel-General Alexander Lapin. The same Lapin who received the Hero of Russia star for the capture of Lisichansk, although de facto he was not even there. Lapin got to command the troops of the Western Military District.

The Colonel-General deployed mobilized fighters from the LPR and other units at all the frontiers of the Lyman direction, but did not provide them with the necessary communication, interaction [means] and with ammunition supply. Two weeks ago, Major General commander of the Akhmat special forces, my dear BROTHER [sic] Apty Alaudinov, personally reported to me that our fighters could become an easy target. In turn, I informed the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov about the danger. But the general assured me that he did not doubt Lapin's generalship talent and did not believe that a retreat was possible in the Red Lyman and its surroundings.

A week later Lapin moved his headquarters to Starobilsk, a hundred kilometers from his subordinates, and he was holed up in Lugansk. How can units be managed quickly, being 150 km away from them? Due to the lack of basic military logistics, today we have left several settlements and a large area of territory.

the shame is not that Lapin is a talentless person. But the fact that he is being covered up by the leaders at the General Staff. If I had my way, I would demote Lapin to a private, deprive him of awards and send him to the front line with a machine gun in his hands to wash away his shame with blood.

Army nepotism will not lead to good [situation]. In the army, it is necessary to appoint as commanders people of firm character, brave, principled, who worry about their fighters, who tear [anybody] with their teeth for their soldier, who know that a subordinate cannot be left without help and support. There is no place for nepotism in the army, especially in difficult times.

Didn't we have enough of Izum? Even then I said: shoot at the enemy's military cluster in the izum captured by the Nazis, especially since our artillery at that time had such an opportunity. They would have done away with the main Satanists and fascists at once [he talks about Zelensky visit]. We should conduct SMO in the full sense of the word, and not flirt [with them]. Use any opportunity and any weapon to defend OUR territory. Donetsk is still being shelled. Residents of the 4 joined territories want to be protected.

I do not know what the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reports to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but in my personal opinion, more drastic measures should be taken, up to the declaration of martial law in the border territories and the use of low-power nuclear weapons. It is not necessary to make every decision with an eye to the Western American community - they have already said and done a lot against us.
Yesterday there [they] had a parade in Izyum, today there is flag in Lyman, and tomorrow what?
Everything would be fine if it wasn't so bad.

Given Prigozhin endorsed this post I would say we have Don + Prigozhin alliance forming against RU military. Interestingly I believe Girkin will join RU military. I small a fight between RU rats - Wagnerites + Ticktikers vs Dumb/Dumber + Badmouther. And obviously add Nukes to the mix

This sh*t is getting crazier and crazier.

Edited by Grigb
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Most Delicious excerpt from Rybar post:

Quote

...We can assume that Lapin simply could not cope with the incompetent troops of the Western Military District.

This is the very personification of the proverb "You can't jump higher than your head."

With the exception of the 20th combined arms army, the parade-demostrative troops of the Central Military District turned out to be not ready.

Here there is the fault of both the personnel who lived in soft conditions (lesser extent of guilt), and the commanders who cultivated these conditions and failed to adapt to modern realities (a much greater extent of guilt) — even at the cost of losses.

The "legendary" 1st tank Army began its flight from the Kharkiv region, and continued it, bringing down the front to the northwest of Lyman. And the power and strength of the "fire brigades" from other units was not enough.

If we add to this the problems of interaction between units, formations, types of arms  of the Armed Forces, then the picture is depressing.

It's time to admit that we entered into a special military operation with a completely non-combat ready (with the exception of certain formations) district. And [we need] to start doing something to fix the situation.

We'll  give a hint: throwing untrained mobilized [men] to plug holes at the front will be a fundamentally wrong step. Other measures and other solutions are needed.

 

And another one

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Well, an information coup has begun in the Russian information space against the Russian Defense Ministry — more precisely, its leadership and command on the ground.

Ramzan Kadyrov, Yevgeny Prigozhin, channels controlled by Lubyanka, representatives of security forces of all stripes — from the Rosgvardiya to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, State Duma deputies from the Russian Defense Ministry all are in one row.

Everyone is not satisfied with one thing: the cumulative effect of many years of "successful" reports from the local commands. Now it has resulted in another failure at the front.

There have been similar attempts to stir up society before. But now they are initiated from above. Time will tell whether it will be of any use.

 

Edited by Grigb
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1 hour ago, billbindc said:

The latest shows that from 48% of Russians wanting the war to continue in August now only 29% are detrmined about pressing on. Another 15% are lukewarm and 48% want peace.

Oh my how the worm turns.  And we are back to identity crisis…

Putin replaced by another autocrat that promises “peace with honour”?

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And Kadyrov PR campaign has started

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Please note that Kadyrov himself did not use the term "Nepotism" in his speech. But he has good PR people.

He does not edit the videos himself, but his team makes good info videos.

He probably didn't take notes on BUSV [Field manual], but the training centers in Chechnya gave trained volunteers from all over the country

He was hardly going to sew anything personally, but the volunteers have uniforms and equipment.

It's not about Kadyrov, but his ability to select a team that acts effectively.

 

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51 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Puck me! Maskovets says according to few sources UKR are making move at North. Most important part and map.

tJGjFM.jpg

 

Full post is below

 

Gotta be honest given how the UA have played this Fall, I half expect Kherson to fall tomorrow because we are all looking around Lyman.

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