How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

UKR troops reached to the place from known video, where Russians lost two T-90A during counter attack probably on 24th Sep. This appeared to be near Kurylivka village, next to Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi. Tanks belonged to 27th GMRD of 1st GTA. Brigade has T-90A and BTR-82A, dislocated in Moscow oblast. 

 

Edited October 1, 2022 by Haiduk

[Grigb]

Yes, Grey Zone starts getting angry at Kremlin for not leaving Lyman earlier (will translate later)

[Grigb]

More and more RU reports that RU troops left Lyman. Fighting is ongoing mainly along Torske-Kreminna road.

[Haiduk]

21 minutes ago, Grigb said:

More and more RU reports that RU troops left Lyman. Fighting is ongoing mainly along Torske-Kreminna road.

Russians can retreat also not only on the road, but using dirt roads across fields and treeplants, that will lead them in area NW Kreminna to villages Chervonopopivka, Pishchane and Zhytlivka

Edited October 1, 2022 by Haiduk

[The_MonkeyKing]

Where are the Russians? Once again the content slipped out? How has there been no pockets in this war that end in POWs? (Mariupol as exception) 

EDIT: Now that I think about it the reason must be the long front combined with the relatively few military units. The unit density is commonly agreed to being exceptionally low. This must enable easy breaking out and especially "trickling out" of pockets. Russians were exceptionally good at this even in WWII. (of course "trickling out" means losing all organization and equipment)

Edited October 1, 2022 by The_MonkeyKing

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Russians can retrat also not only on the road, but using dirt roads across fields and treeplants, that will lead them in area NW Kreminna to villages Chervonopopivka, Pishchane and Zhytlivka

But to keep local roads open they have to keep UKR troops on the other side of Kreminna road. Looks like this is their current plan.

[akd]

Is this here: 49.02160° N, 37.95275° E ?

Video:

 

Edited October 1, 2022 by akd

[Grigb]

16 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Where are the Russians? Once again the content slipped out? How has there been no pockets in this war that end in POWs? (Mariupol as exception) 

Most likely they started to reatreat yesterday and were retreating whole night. Probably today we saw rearguard battles in area Torske-Kreminna.

Regarding POW we will not know for sure untill UKR officers give some of us their lectures. But I have few thoughts:

1. RU too inept and inflexible

2. UKR have no superiority in the air and their CB capabilities are rather modest. As result RU can concentrate Air assets and Fire Support assets (including TOS) to blow holes in any UKR lines. On top of that UKR troops avoid hard concentration to avoid being hit. So, when advancing UKR forces are softer in this regard then modern western forces.

Basically if RU wants to get out they will get out give enought FS assets. The questions is though how many of them would survive and how many lend lease vehicles would they provide.

[Haiduk]

The road in vicinity of Lyman, as said cameraman. Destroyed Russian convoy of cars and minibus, corpses on the road. Likely some volunteer like BARS or LPR mobiks unit. In comments somebody noted this can be minor road between Lyman and Stavky village

 

Edited October 1, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Taranis said:

"During Vladimir Putin's annexation speech, in Luhansk, Ukraine, September 30, 2022. AP"

*They don't seem very numerous for people who voted more than 90% to join Russia.

That's 90% of the people who wanted to join Russia

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

UKR troops reached to the place from known video, where Russians lost two T-90A during counter attack probably on 24th Sep. This appeared to be near Kurylivka village, next to Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi. Tanks belonged to 27th GMRD of 1st GTA. Brigade has T-90A and BTR-82A, dislocated in Moscow oblast. 

More evidence of how poor Russia's logistics are in this specific area.  They had a week to recover two top of the line tanks and did not.

My assumption of Russian forces since the Kharkiv offensive first advanced is that there are next to no support units in the entire area.  Russia was never strong in this area (yeah, shocking news for you ), but after 6+ months of having their logistics hammered they must be very thin indeed.

Steve

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks for your analysis.  I found it quite an interesting read.

To summarize your analysis, you feel Russia is going to fight more deliberately and effectively now that it's forced to.  Lyman being an example of this.  The primary intention is to rebuild and reinforce units on the eastern bank of the Oskil, stall the Ukrainian offensive (or have the weather do it!), build new defensive positions, and try to hold Ukraine there.

This all sounds like what the Russians are planning on doing, but I'm not sure that they can.  The major reason is manpower, which is something we have to completely guess at.

The question, therefore, is how much of the 1st GTA still exists?  It seems the answer is "not much".  That's a big problem as this was the backbone of the defense of the entire area.  From what I've seen in OSINT world, the 1st GTA was badly depleted even before the offensive kicked it out of its positions.  As you stated, a lot of their heavy and specialized equipment was left behind.  You also state that the 144th GMRD was badly mauled during the Kharkiv offensive.  Some OSINT I've seen has it effectively written off as a combat capable unit.  Not due to equipment as much as personnel.

The next question is about the LPR manpower status.  Putting aside whatever they are about to lose in Lyman, the OSINT on these units is not favorable.  Months of heavy losses has reduced their capabilities significantly, in some ways made worse by waves of unwilling mobilized men being forced into service.  ISW assesses that the inevitable and totally predictable has happened... LPR doesn't have any combat aged and conditioned men to throw into the fight any more.

On top of this, it appears that the Russian forces have lost a lot of men defending Lyman and they are about to lose a lot more in the conclusion of the fight.

The untrained Mobiks and limited BARS forces, plus whatever 3rd Army Corps units can be scraped together, is not apparently helping much.

What I sense is that Russia's manpower shortage in the area is acute.  Reorganization is not feasible when the forces in question are either forces to relocate or are expected to conduct military operations other than building defensive positions.  This appears to be what is happening.

As for Russia's plan to use the Oskil as it's new front line, this seems to be already seriously compromised by Ukraine pushing up between Zarichne and Kreminna, well behind the river.  It is also likely going to be directly threatened from the Kupyansk direction, which will likely link up with push north of Lyman.  It also seems that Ukraine has flanked the river to the far north too.

The next defensive line after that is Troitske-Svatove-Krasnorichenske-Kreminna.  Troitske might already be out of the equation, Kreminna is threatened.  Svatove and Krasnorichenske are not good defensive positions as they set at the bottom of a ridgeline that Ukraine is likely going to secure fairly soon.

 

In short... I don't think Russia has the manpower or the support it needs to hold the Oskil line or even the next logical line beyond it (Zherebets River), which is already itself compromised (Kreminna area).  All Russia can hope for is the weather turning terrible and/or Ukraine's forces being too tired to advance.  At some point that will happen, but it seems Ukraine is capable of doing a lot more damage before it is obligated to stop.

Steve

Just to chime in on this, I think we are suffering from “other shoe-itis” in the west on this war.  We have spent over 6 months now waiting for the “other shoe to drop”, and frankly I do not think Russia has any shoes left.

We have discussed the nuclear card at length - I still think it is a possibility but still remote.  Most likely a demonstration in an empty field p, if at all.

Unconventionally, the cyber-information warfare apocalypse never showed up - I think we way overestimated Russian capability here, at least in a traditional warfare sense.

Conventionally the term used is “trained effective strength”.  This is manpower that can integrate into an operational system at equal or better quality.  The major problem with the 300k conscript push is that is will lower the overall quality of the RA operational system — which was not in great shape after Phases I and II.  The Russians are clearly going for mass, likely because it was the only thing that came close to working in the Donbas.  I suspect they, and we, are about to get a further lesson on the utility of dumb mass in modern warfare.  

The UA has gotten past the “throw anyone at the problem” and are in fact the side that is actually being deliberate in operations.  They have the initiative and are biting and slicing while the RA bleeds out, as they have pretty much done this entire war.

Nothing in the Russian defence looks deliberate at this point.  I see no Putin-line, nor is the UA giving them time to build one.  Big defensive belts take months and years to build, time the RA does not have.  And they also likely do not have the expertise at this point either as they have been killing off a lot of their highly trained and ready troops.

So I expect the UA will continue it campaign of slow and methodical corrosive warfare until the RA collapses (again)…rinse and repeat until one hits the border.   

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Where are the Russians? Once again the content slipped out? How has there been no pockets in this war that end in POWs? (Mariupol as exception) 

EDIT: Now that I think about it the reason must be the long front combined with the relatively few military units. The unit density is commonly agreed to being exceptionally low. This must enable easy breaking out and especially "trickling out" of pockets. Russians were exceptionally good at this even in WWII. (of course "trickling out" means losing all organization and equipment)

I've been setting my expectations for Russian POWs pretty low in general, but I was hoping this time we'd get news of at least a few hundred.  I figured that this particular group would fight longer than they had to retreat.  Instead, it looks like they ran away just in time.  We won't likely know for sure any time soon.

The primary reason I think Ukraine has had difficulty capturing a lot of men in one place is that they run away (very literally) before the area can be effectively sealed off.  At some point someone realizes that they're surrounded, they abandon everything, hop in civilian cars, and drive like crazy to get out.  If they meet resistance on a road they simply go on foot.  There is no attempt to preserve combat strength.  Probably not much care taking for wounded either.

Ironically, the lack of discipline, morale, and concern for what their actions do to others gives the individual Russian soldier a much higher chance of escaping.

Unfortunately for the Russians trying to flee, the chances of being killed go up dramatically.  No disciplined withdrawal means any encounter with any Ukrainian unit is unlikely to go well.  Quote from the above linked to 1st hand documentation of the slaughter:

Quote

Lot of people on foot, some running down the road, some trying to make their way through the forest to the south of the road. A half-a-dozen Russians came into the woods where we were in a hide to catch our breath and eat, they almost ran into us, but as usual, were moving fast and talking. We cut them down before they knew what was happening. They had little ammo, no med kits, very little food, and no info at all on them except for their phones and some family stuff. Trying to get intel off stiffs here is a very disappointing exercise.

Steve

[akd]

womp-womp

[kevinkin]

Agree and this happened during the great encirclements in WW2 as well. But, in 2022, the battlefield is even deadlier and being dispersed means survival. Large formations attacking their way out are just too detectable, when the Army as a whole is crumbling, and easy to pound upon. I don't even think small bands of Russians have any motivation to become rear area partisans either.  And good luck trying to reform them into functioning units any time soon. Ukraine will have to judge what's in front based on incoming fire not POW numbers. 

[Huba]

A transcription of call with somebody from recon group operating on the road to Kreminna. He tells a story of complete bloodbath and massacre of fleeing RU soldiers. Horrifying read. 

 

[Zeleban]

Allegedly, one of those who left the encirclement claims that with the capture of Liman, the Ukrainian troops got the opportunity to attack both in the east and in the north

[Aragorn2002]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

That's 90% of the people who wanted to join Russia

Steve

[Taranis]

Its sumup transcripted (from youtube bad punctuation, sorry) :

Quote

mobilization until now hampered the impact that it's had the cannibalization of training units and the running down of equipment stockpiles means that Russia isn't going to get the same impact data mobilization now that it would have if it had begun in say April I'd also note that there's very little reason to take Choigu or Putin at their words when they talk about this being a partial mobilization of a select group of people numbering no more than three hundred thousand the written orders supporting it don't include those sort of protections and Provisions and what we've seen out of mobilization so far suggests a far wider net is being cast and far greater problems are emerging problems that are being admitted even by the Russian propagandists and state figures themselves in a number of cases troops that are mobilized are getting terrible equipment. Very little training and they're not being sent to cush your support roles they're being sent to flash points like her son predicting how efficient these troops are going to be once they get there is very difficult it depends on how Russia answers the number of questions but the evidence we have from how DPR and LPR conscripts have previously performed suggest that these units unless they're given proper training are probably going to have some military utility on the defense but very little offensive power be prone to high casualties and ultimately have their military usefulness asterisk by questions over their morale and staying power contrary to some of the triumphalus narratives out there I think Russian mobilization has the potential to be extremely significant but only if Russia is able to overcome some of the serious problems that it faces and critically only if Ukraine doesn't receive the resources it needs to keep up the pressure at the front because if fighting remains intense then there will always be pressure on the Russian command to direct nearly mobilized Personnel to the front immediately it would be wrong to underestimate the sort of impact that hundreds of thousands of new troops might have but at the same time it would be equally unwise to turna blind eye to the sort of challenges that Russia will face in terms of developing these new recruits into a combat effective Force fresh Russian conscripts are going to have to fight potentially hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian veterans in many cases Western equipped and in many cases buoyed with confidence after their experience in the Kharkiv counter-offensive in the war for fourth generation Ukraine has had a seven month Head Start as well as the advantage of a much deeper level of social mobilization and Military morale and perhaps that's why Anton garushenko an advisor to the ministry of internal affairs in Ukraine recently posted an alleged quote of Valerie zolusny quote we have finished off the Russian professional Army now it's time to finish the amateur one

• Russia's delayed decision to implement mobilisation has hampered its impact

• Legal instruments and pratice have not matched announcements
• Stop-loss and referenda also extremely imortant, not just call ups
• Extensive issues/challenges with mobilisation observed so far
• Predicting efficacy difficult - depends on utilisation & motivation
• Potentially extremely significant - but only if Russia overcomes barriers & Ukraine stagnates

Edited October 1, 2022 by Taranis

[cesmonkey]

RIA Russia newswire site says:

The Ministry of Defense announced the withdrawal from Krasny Liman to more advantageous lines
The Ministry of Defense announced the withdrawal of troops from Krasny Liman due to the threat of encirclement
https://ria.ru/20221001/minoborony-1820867747.html
 

[poesel]

So next Kessel is Borova? If they continue to attack north and support from Kupyansk..?

Btw, what happened to that Inhulets dam in Krywyj Rih that the Russian had shelled? Was that fixed, or did it just run dry?

[Grigb]

14 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

Allegedly, one of those who left the encirclement claims that with the capture of Liman, the Ukrainian troops got the opportunity to attack both in the east and in the north

Here is the full translation:

Quote

The situation is difficult, it was extremely difficult to defend the Red Lyman. Now the front is shifting closer to Kremenna, the enemy is approaching the highway toward Svatove and trying to encircle Kreminna.

The abandonment of the Lyman allows he enemy to enter the operational space [space behind prepared defenses - means UKR gets freedom of maneuver and can start exploitation phase] and can act further both in the eastern direction towards Kreminna - Rubezhne and north towards Svatove - Starobelsk.

The situation can only be reversed by the introduction of full-fledged combat-ready reserves.

We came out of the encirclement and now occupied the defense of Kreminna and the road from Kreminna to Lyman.

I hope that there is no one left in the encirclement, but I can't say for sure. There was a big mess and a hodgepodge of units. We brought with us Luhansk [mobiks], fighters of the BARS-15 and a certain number of federals [RU regulars]. But there were many other units.

The main task now is to prevent the enemy from advancing further, in the direction of Rubezhne and Severodonetsk.

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, poesel said:

So next Kessel is Borova? If they continue to attack north and support from Kupyansk..?

Psychologically difficult decision to abandon Lyman was taken. Borova and everything to the north is much easier to abandon. So, most likely it will be abandoned in short period of time and RU most likely will retreat to defenses in front of Svatove 

 

2 minutes ago, poesel said:

Btw, what happened to that Inhulets dam in Krywyj Rih that the Russian had shelled? Was that fixed, or did it just run dry?

Last news I remember UKR were fixing it.

[Zeleban]

8 minutes ago, poesel said:

So next Kessel is Borova? If they continue to attack north and support from Kupyansk..?

Btw, what happened to that Inhulets dam in Krywyj Rih that the Russian had shelled? Was that fixed, or did it just run dry?

A friend from Krivoy Rog says that they have already repaired it, there is no flooding

[Grigb]

Well:

Quote

[We] left Lyman. We left in the evening. Reinforcements arrived in time to hold the pocket neck. [Leaving is] better  than captivity.

I think I did good:

16 hours ago, Grigb said:

RU vague posts, hinting at ongoing retreat, started to appear. I feel they are going to claim glorious victory out of retreat. 

6 hours ago, Grigb said:

RU info so far is confusing. Mostly they are everything is fine posts.  However, there are few vague post that can be interpreted as RU retreated from Lyman area this night.

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Most likely they started to retreat yesterday and were retreating the whole night. Probably today we saw rearguard battles in area Torske-Kreminna.

They are not difficult to read once you know how they think/talk/lie.