How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

Famous mayor-general Marchenko, which successfully repelled Russian offensive on Mykolaiv and was moved after this on other direction, was appointed back to South. Today he arrived to Mykolaiv. Serious argument for Kherson liberation.

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Billy Ringo said:

I found this very telling.  Based on what I've read it seemed the Russians have continued to take more ground albeit very slowly and at a cost. 

 

They have, but it pales in comparison to all the territory that Russia lost in the north and around Kharkiv.  That was fully 30% of what they gained in the first 4 weeks.  Since then Russia has, I am sure, gained more territory than it has lost.  The recent battles in Donbas took a rather sizeable chunk of land and Ukraine hasn't taken back land on that scale.  I think that might change in the coming weeks

Steve

[Haiduk]

"Cargo 200" flies to Tyva Republic - boxes with zinc coffics in two tiers. Putin burns in mouth of war future of minor Syberian nations 

 

Edited July 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Eddy]

Not sure if this has been linked already but I've found these videos to be a great help in understanding what is happening day to day. Each day is summarised in about 5 mins. Nice and concise.

 

[danfrodo]

I am going with ChrisL's earlier post on naming the coming kessel -- Putin's Pocket.  Which leads to a new game we can play: "what's in Putin's pocket?".   Looks like lots of LPR/DPR and VDV.  I have seen estimate of max of 15,000.  Even 10,000 if captured would be an epic disaster for Putler.  Christmas in July 

Anyone have any good info on what's actually in Putin's Pocket?

[Grigb]

Girkin latest post

Quote

Yes, there is no doubt now - the command of the Armed Forces of RU has "laid the cards on the table" - the offensive is "strictly head-on" along the entire Donetsk front - from Avdiivka in the north to Maryinka in the south. I.e., actually [straight] on Avdiivka, on Peski, on Krasnogorovka, on Maryinka. To all the most fortified enemy positions that you can think of. The bet is again made on the concentration of artillery in the style of the "Verdun meat grinder named after General von Falkenhayn".

Will Avdiivka and all the other specified points be taken? Very likely (although I don't know - in what time frame). Will the AFU units defending them be defeated and partially destroyed? - Also, almost certainly. But there will be no strategic result from this offensive - I have to repeat it again. I am sure. I'll be glad to make a mistake.
The Steamroller should have been sent a different way.

And now we will wait for the response of the AFU. They, too, should soon begin their offensive. With a probability of 90% - it will be on the Kherson front (possibly - on the Zaporozhye, too). I have reason to hope that they will not succeed much or not at all. But we'll see.

 

Interestingly he mentioned Verdun meat grinder. Murz ten days ago wrote a post titled On the eve of the upcoming Verdun

Quote

Since the phenomenon of the formation of "volunteer battalions" in the regions of the Russian Federation is gaining momentum, I want to have time to comment on their fate before their stupid slaughter "for meat" takes place in the upcoming "Verdun of the XXI century", to which everything is inexorably slipping.

New Verdun. So be it.

[FancyCat]

17 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Famous mayor-general Marchenko, which successfully repelled Russian offensive on Mykolaiv and was moved after this on other direction, was appointed back to South. Today he arrived to Mykolaiv. Serious argument for Kherson liberation.

A bit confused, Mayor-General, as in Major General?

[akd]

Just now, FancyCat said:

A bit confused, Mayor-General, as in Major General?

Yes.

[FancyCat]

So far Russia has been seeking to gain territory at the expense of battlefield terrain or better lines, decent change they finally are switching to a stance where they can give up territory to better improve their lines, or allow Ukraine to potentially overextend. 

[Huba]

This is an interesting bit, I assume the training is for Starstreak/ other AA operationns?

Also, Russians set up a ferry in Kherson city:

 

[Taranis]

France is able to send 5% of its gas consumption to Germany
France would be able to send a maximum of the equivalent of 5% of its gas consumption to Germany in winter, if the latter experienced a gas shortage, Reuters learned on Wednesday from the cabinet of the Minister of energy transition, Agnès Pannier-Runacher.

 

source : Le Monde

[Haiduk]

A strike at Horlivka machine-building works. Probabaly DPR vehicles repaired there

 

[Machor]

3 hours ago, LuckyDog said:

I don't think that video is legit - the camera person seems to be standing where any return fire would come, and they are sheltering behind what looks like plywood. Or maybe they really are that inept!

@dan/california @danfrodo @panzermartin

The bearded 40+ guy yells "Allahu Akbar" before starting to shoot - I'm assuming they're Kadyrovites.

[Machor]

Helpful infographics from Volodymyr Dacenko (https://twitter.com/Volodymyr_D_/status/1551964492606709767?cxt=HHwWjoC93ffe14krAAAA )

According to the current balance of power infographic, Ukraine seems to be closing the 'artillery gap' - but ATACMS should have been arriving yesterday; any number of crappy old APCs would also be appreciated:

And another one on Ukraine's AFV numbers at the start, losses, and replacements:

 

[billbindc]

29 minutes ago, Huba said:

This is an interesting bit, I assume the training is for Starstreak/ other AA operationns?

Also, Russians set up a ferry in Kherson city:

 

The bridge situation is quite interesting given that reports are that only one bridge across the Inhulets is fully functioning. If that all bears out then the right bank of Dnieper in the Kherson front has been effectively isolated and bisected.

Edited July 27, 2022 by billbindc

[womble]

21 minutes ago, Huba said:

This is an interesting bit, I assume the training is for Starstreak/ other AA operationns?

 

My read would be that they're hunting enemy Air Defense elements ("...threats to air power..."). So maybe* using drones and ELINT to spot AD systems and using indirect fires (either their own, or other units available to them) or possibly air assets, properly briefed and equipped for the SEAD role, to neutralise them. I would imagine the first step of any SEAD attempt is finding and identifying the targets/threats.

* IANA RAF Regiment trooper. I know two who are, and one of those was a Forward Observer who was extensively trained in solo infiltration. Maybe that's the skillset they're imparting: "sitting in a tree with a radio and a pistol..." as my acquaintance put it.

[FancyCat]

 

 

[dan/california]

That implies they can't even attempt a troop rotation.

 

[dan/california]

https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/special-focus/ukraine-crisis/yale-study-russian-economy-hit-sanctions

If even half of this report is true Putin is going to have an attack of playing nice soon.

[Beleg85]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

You remember that Kozytsin torturer? He was supposed to channel weapons but instead decided to keep some for himself and send others back to RU black market. By the time Girkin got real support war had started.

Or that says Girkin himself...he is endlessly attacked by Russian official propagandists and some other former collegues (hard to call them "companions" in this orkish envirenment of early Donbas militias) that his inactivity lead to de facto defeat of operation. I'll need to dig more into topic of early Donbas "patriots", but proper (unbiased) sources are had to find.

Overall, I am not entirelly convinced he is perceived by larger RU population as "honourable warrior"; rather, he may be viewed as a looser. And this is no-no when talking about taking power.

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

Now, they were discussing the possibility of grabbing power during social unrest for several years. I do not believe they did not prepare storages. So, their starting position this time will be better.

Look, I am not saying you are wrong. I myself for a long time was dismissing the guy exactly for the reasons you said. So, I do support what you say. But then I started translating his/their stuff. I was reading and listening. And I got uneasy gut feeling that this is Lenin/Hitler/Bin Laden type of guy, and they are RU Al Qaeda/ISIS. Now they nobody, next minute boom and Houston, we have a problem.

I have very similar feeling regarding the guy- he stood out of the crowd of Donbas militimen like some smart big Uruk-hai from host of moronic goblins (damn, just can't escape Tolkien comparisions...;) ). But this lead me to exactly opposite conclusion:

1. He is too dogmatic, radical and stiff in his views to lead the country size of Russia, with its 11mln magalopolies, complex web of politics, atomic arsenal and absurd paradoxes of state administration. He is not elastic enough to travel maze of corridors of power; not even entering a lobby, frankly. That is why Nats were always underdogs of Russian politics- of course I mean real nationalists, not state-sponsored funny clowns like narodno-bolsheviks.

2.He is low figure (just a colonel), and outsider of siloviki apparatus. What more, I think he is percepted as influencer, not a soldier. Not our guy. Unless there is hidden serious -and I mean serious- group in security/FSB/military that will support such uprising and put their balls into it (sorry for colloquialism - that they will endanger themselves, their families and careers) just for heroic idea of waging massive total war against entire world order- it is hard to imagine such nationalistic revolution. Everything we know about Russian siloviki branch points to conformism as most prevalent quality.

3. I always had a notion (perhaps I am wrong, but I think it is rather solidly grounded in history) that in country like Russia if you really want power, you cannot allow yourself to get bogged in endless, public blaming games, pages-long grudging and angry influencing. It takes away your charisma and levels you with other actors. Girkin may even be on point every time, common people liking his arguments, treating as one of them, he may have millions of followers etc. And that is precisely why he will not become a new Tsar.

At unconcious level, power is sacred - not for guys like this:

 

(I hope you @Grigb will not find it as overly primitivizing your countrymen. I just always tried to figure out why system of power there works very differently to what is considered "logical" in Europe. And we are all collectivelly very strange creatures driven by our cultural heritage as much as bare necessities, like @TheCaptain said).

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

Navalny is not even a fighter. He consciously avoided any responsibility for starting a rebellion (he was explicitly begged in 2012). Though we also should not underestimate his influence. In the Moscow region his support is not insignificant. And for that he might become face of Prags to convince West to remove at least some sanctions.

Throw Putin under the bus, put Navalny in front. Start pro-western rebellion for freedom and Democracy>Good Press>Ease of Sanctions. Might work. Maybe it is even the only way out for them. 

Yep, 100% agree, that is probably the only reason Navalny is still alive at all (if he is- just prison conditions are slowly killing him anyway or make him unhealthy enough to take power). The guy was always fishy for me btw, especially that he heavily courted the same nationalists we speak about something like a decade ago. Perhaps it was valid tactics by then.

But with those 2 binary personalities in Russian politics, we still need to answer the fundamental question- WHERE is a political force to connect them, finance them and annoint them as "leaders". With Navalny it is reasonable to assume such forces exists and will even grow in case of power vacuum at Kremlin. With Girkin I just don't see them.

On other side, this is Russia. One can expect everything.

But bloody, ideological 1917-20 scenario does not seem plausible for now. So if (and remind you gentlemen, this is BIG IF) Putin will suddenly somehow turn into pile of bones and botox, I would vote for 1990's style of successive power struggles within narrow group of guys that are already at Kremlin. With possibilities of later some of the Republics trying to have more autonomy, but it is dubious that they would try it by force.

 

Uff, a long post, sorry guys for not responding to other arguments (especially @Battlefront.com about real numbers and power of read-to go- Nats. I think they will be crushed within minutes unless having massive support in siloviki, but that is longer story).

Edited July 28, 2022 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/special-focus/ukraine-crisis/yale-study-russian-economy-hit-sanctions

If even half of this report is true Putin is going to have an attack of playing nice soon.

well, that answers the question of who is hurting worst from Putin cutting energy exports to europe.  ha ha ha ha ha ha ha.  He's a hostage taker who puts a grenade instead of a pistol to the victim's head.  Stupid, psycopathic, narcicissitic imbecile.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

That number looks large, but it's pretty much inline with all other conservative and credible sources.  Roughly 18,000 killed and 67,000 wounded using the 1:3 ratio, 15,000 KIA and 60,000 WIA using the 1:4 ratio.  They've probably rotated 500,000 ground troops of all types through since the war started, which would mean roughly 15% casualty rate.  That seems reasonable too.

I'm guessing this does not include "separatists".  For whatever reason they seem to get left out of these numbers, even though shouldn't be.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

40 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Uff, a long post, sorry guys for not responding to other arguments (especially @Battlefront.com about real numbers and power of read-to go- Nats. I think they will be crushed within minutes unless having massive support in siloviki, but that is longer story).

I agree

Let's look at 1990.  In this case the Prags were already in power when big changes were foisted upon the Soviet Union.  They tried to manage the collapse as best they could, but they couldn't stop it.  Gorbachev and his crew saved a lot of lives.  The Ultranats were on the outside and sought to reverse course.  They had enough power to execute a coup, not enough to keep it from collapsing rather quickly.  The reason is the bulk of the Soviet people wanted a new deal and not the deal that the Ultranats were offering.  Especially for the Baltics, Ukraine, and Belarus.  So when they tried to apply force they found extremely limited support for it.

The situation today is different in many ways, but who holds power is the biggest one.  Putin's regime is staffed by people that are neither Prags or Ultranats.  They are some sort of mix of both, but their main focus is on enriching themselves.  This means Putin has two groups aiming to take out him out and then, once power is seized, shut down the other group.  It could be very messy, especially if Putin's group isn't overthrown immediately and aligns with the one not currently the biggest threat.  It could be very, very messy.

My guess is that things would go roughly like this:

1.  Major trigger point is reached.  Could be lots of different things, but a mass surrender/disaster in Kherson is the one that seems to be most plausible right now.  Such an event would signal to both Prags and Ultranats that Putin is finished and the time to act is now.  Especially if there's a ripple effect throughout the military that effectively ends the war.

2.  I expect the Ultranats to have the upper hand in seizing power in Moscow from Putin as they are less likely to talk and more likely to act with extreme violence if necessary.

3.  I do not expect the Ultranats to make much progress convincing everyday Russians to accept their authority.  Especially in regions that already are lukewarm to Moscow control.  The Ultranats will likely have difficulty getting the security apparatus to comply with their extremist views and I think the military is to exhausted to get into a war with its own people on a grand scale.  Control of the media will also be difficult because it has been so pro Putin for decades.  Not easy to switch gears.

4.  The Ultranats will tell the people what their reasons for taking Putin out are and what their vision for the future is.  It will be so divorced from reality and obviously inept that the Prags will have no problem getting people out into the streets, swaying key political and military leaders to join their side (or at least not act against them). and effectively blocking the Ultranats from getting what they want. 

5.  If the Ultranats try and use deadly violence to get their way., they'll be over and done with even sooner than if they don't.   The Ultranats are likely too small in number to win a fight against the Prags, especially because the military will likely side with them.  Worst case is probably a Romania situation, best case is 1991.

6.  The Prags will come to power in some form.  Lots and lots of infighting will follow because the Prags are going to be a mix of people from different clans.  Lots of incompatible idiologies at work.

7.  The first thing the new Prag government is going to need to do is figure out how to resolve the war.  If the military has collapsed it's easier because the war will effectively be over and it will have happened under Putin.  But the economic sanctions will not be lifted until the West is satisfied they should be, and that is going to create lots of problems because some of the Prags are just as nutty as the Ultranats and won't want to give up what they have to for normality to take place.

8.  During all of this, clans in various regions will be acting in their own self interests.  Some will for sure say that now is the time to be independent.  No matter who grabs Moscow, they can't stop the dissolution of the Russian Federation in its entirety.  Just too big a lift to expect from newbies who are also wondering if someone is going to assassinate them at any minute.

9.  Chechnya. in particular, has the ingredients to become an independent state no matter what.  I do not think Russia will be able to mount a 3rd Chechen War for a couple of years, if even then.  Depends on what happens with sanctions and other things.

10.  Some of the regions that break away from Moscow will have significant internal conflict.  Chechnya, again. is the one that will likely be the bloodiest.  Moscow based aid is possible, but I don't think it will be sufficient to prevent an anti-Moscow regime from taking control. 

 

I'll stop there as this is enough to think about

My prediction is things will be very messy, but in the end the Prags will likely win out.  I don't expect much good from them to start with, but who knows... maybe in time Russia might have a functional government after a few painful cycles that doesn't exist simply to enrich itself at the expense of its own people and neighbors. 

As for Girkin specifically... I don't see him leading the Ultranats in the political arena.  He might be their top commander, but not the replacement for Putin.  I don't think he even wants the job.  So yeah. I'm in agreement with Grigb that he might be more like a Bin Laden in that he's powerful and causes a lot of problems. but at the end of the day doesn't rule anything.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

3. I always had a notion (perhaps I am wrong, but I think it is rather solidly grounded in history) that in country like Russia if you really want power, you cannot allow yourself to get bogged in endless, public blaming games, pages-long grudging and angry influencing. It takes away your charisma and levels you with other actors. Girkin may even be on point every time, common people liking his arguments, treating as one of them, he may have millions of followers etc. And that is precisely why he will not become a new Tsar.

Except you just described Lenin perfectly....

 

[dan/california]

 

40 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I agree

Let's look at 1990.  In this case the Prags were already in power when big changes were foisted upon the Soviet Union.  They tried to manage the collapse as best they could, but they couldn't stop it.  Gorbachev and his crew saved a lot of lives.  The Ultranats were on the outside and sought to reverse course.  They had enough power to execute a coup, not enough to keep it from collapsing rather quickly.  The reason is the bulk of the Soviet people wanted a new deal and not the deal that the Ultranats were offering.  Especially for the Baltics, Ukraine, and Belarus.  So when they tried to apply force they found extremely limited support for it.

The situation today is different in many ways, but who holds power is the biggest one.  Putin's regime is staffed by people that are neither Prags or Ultranats.  They are some sort of mix of both, but their main focus is on enriching themselves.  This means Putin has two groups aiming to take out him out and then, once power is seized, shut down the other group.  It could be very messy, especially if Putin's group isn't overthrown immediately and aligns with the one not currently the biggest threat.  It could be very, very messy.

My guess is that things would go roughly like this:

1.  Major trigger point is reached.  Could be lots of different things, but a mass surrender/disaster in Kherson is the one that seems to be most plausible right now.  Such an event would signal to both Prags and Ultranats that Putin is finished and the time to act is now.  Especially if there's a ripple effect throughout the military that effectively ends the war.

2.  I expect the Ultranats to have the upper hand in seizing power in Moscow from Putin as they are less likely to talk and more likely to act with extreme violence if necessary.

3.  I do not expect the Ultranats to make much progress convincing everyday Russians to accept their authority.  Especially in regions that already are lukewarm to Moscow control.  The Ultranats will likely have difficulty getting the security apparatus to comply with their extremist views and I think the military is to exhausted to get into a war with its own people on a grand scale.  Control of the media will also be difficult because it has been so pro Putin for decades.  Not easy to switch gears.

4.  The Ultranats will tell the people what their reasons for taking Putin out are and what their vision for the future is.  It will be so divorced from reality and obviously inept that the Prags will have no problem getting people out into the streets, swaying key political and military leaders to join their side (or at least not act against them). and effectively blocking the Ultranats from getting what they want. 

5.  If the Ultranats try and use deadly violence to get their way., they'll be over and done with even sooner than if they don't.   The Ultranats are likely too small in number to win a fight against the Prags, especially because the military will likely side with them.  Worst case is probably a Romania situation, best case is 1991.

6.  The Prags will come to power in some form.  Lots and lots of infighting will follow because the Prags are going to be a mix of people from different clans.  Lots of incompatible idiologies at work.

7.  The first thing the new Prag government is going to need to do is figure out how to resolve the war.  If the military has collapsed it's easier because the war will effectively be over and it will have happened under Putin.  But the economic sanctions will not be lifted until the West is satisfied they should be, and that is going to create lots of problems because some of the Prags are just as nutty as the Ultranats and won't want to give up what they have to for normality to take place.

8.  During all of this, clans in various regions will be acting in their own self interests.  Some will for sure say that now is the time to be independent.  No matter who grabs Moscow, they can't stop the dissolution of the Russian Federation in its entirety.  Just too big a lift to expect from newbies who are also wondering if someone is going to assassinate them at any minute.

9.  Chechnya. in particular, has the ingredients to become an independent state no matter what.  I do not think Russia will be able to mount a 3rd Chechen War for a couple of years, if even then.  Depends on what happens with sanctions and other things.

10.  Some of the regions that break away from Moscow will have significant internal conflict.  Chechnya, again. is the one that will likely be the bloodiest.  Moscow based aid is possible, but I don't think it will be sufficient to prevent an anti-Moscow regime from taking control. 

 

I'll stop there as this is enough to think about

My prediction is things will be very messy, but in the end the Prags will likely win out.  I don't expect much good from them to start with, but who knows... maybe in time Russia might have a functional government after a few painful cycles that doesn't exist simply to enrich itself at the expense of its own people and neighbors. 

As for Girkin specifically... I don't see him leading the Ultranats in the political arena.  He might be their top commander, but not the replacement for Putin.  I don't think he even wants the job.  So yeah. I'm in agreement with Grigb that he might be more like a Bin Laden in that he's powerful and causes a lot of problems. but at the end of the day doesn't rule anything.

Steve

Forgive me but I am going to refer back to Lenin again.

Lenin came to power through a vanishingly unlikely series of events, but he managed somehow not to get messily dead, and seized the reins with both hands when the chance came. Specifically he realized that the only people whose opinion mattered were those of the military forces around St Petersburg. Those forces wanted peace with Germany at any price, because they believed that being sent to the front was a death sentence. So in complete defiance of elite public opinion, that is what Lenin promised them, and they made him Czar. I realize this is a gross simplification but it isn't wrong. 

Now I don't really have a deep understanding of what the people with guns in and around Moscow count as their hearts desire. I will however bet a case of VERY good whiskey that Girkin at least thinks that he does. If he is correct he is a very dangerous man.