How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Calamine Waffles]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Kh-22 had three generations and this one of first generation, which can use radar only against large ships already decomissioned from service. In present time Tu-22M3 bombers use third N-generation: Kh-22N (active), Kh-22NA (inertial with course corrections by relief) missiles, which has CEP 100 m (for Kh-22N, for NA I didn't found, but it СEP should be worse). Though, some number of second M-generation with CEP in 500 m also could be used. 

Since May 6, when was first launch, Russian Backfires launched 46 Kh-22 missiles and 8 newest Kh-32 (latter all were launched on May 6 on Kramatorsk area).

According to some sourcs USSR produced about 1000 Kh-22 of all modifications. Kh-32 was designed for Tu-22M3M usage, but since 2016, when it was adopted Russia allegedly produced (upgraded from existed Kh-22 to be precise) 30 of theese missiles.

Because Kh-22 has too high speed (4-6M) we havn't AD assets, capable to intercept it with good probability. Only our S-300V1 has some small chanses to intercept it close to the target on final section of trajectory. Reportedly 3 Kh-22 were shot down, once even was a reportage how a soldier shot Kh-22 with MANPAD, but this is ridiculos. I think, all theese three Kh-22 rather just crashed due to technical reasons, than were intercepted. 

Also active types of Kh-22 work on single frequency, so can be supressed by EW assets, but how to know which target Russian will choose next time?    

I don't know where you get the CEP figures for those from, but I'm pretty confident it's not 100 m against land targets for the radar ones. Even KSR-5 from the 1970s with radar is credited with a CEP of 1-2 nautical miles against land targets. For comparison Block-I nuclear Tomahawk (TLAM-N) had a CEP of 80 m using TERCOM and INS from the 1980s.

Both Kh-22MA and Kh-22NA with TERCOM only have thermonuclear warheads.

From airwar.ru:

Quote

The growth of performance characteristics was ensured by the use of a new rocket engine. But the noise immunity of the Kh-22N remained insufficient, since all the equipment operated at single fixed frequencies, and there was no equipment for identifying a target against the background of interference. The resolution of the active seeker was only sufficient to detect a target such as a large ship, bridge, etc.

Out of those 1000, how many are Kh-22N/NAs? How many Kh-22s are even left? It is known that Ukraine returned 386 Kh-22s to Russia, but another 423 were scrapped by Ukraine. I doubt they are going to use all their Kh-22s (especially new ones), they still need them in case of a confrontation with NATO for the Tu-22M3s.

Kh-22 almost certainly does not have a top cruise speed of Mach 6. That's hypersonic. The original Kh-22 has a cruise speed of between 3,000 to 3,600 km/h.


I don't have the numbers for the Kh-22M/N, but I suspect the speeds you are quoting are the maximum in the terminal dive phase.

None of these are low-altitude terrain-following missiles like Kalibr. They should be interceptable with S-300P as well as S-300V in the cruise phase. Probably in the terminal dive phase you might need S-300V.

http://www.airwar.ru/image/i/weapon/x-22_cx_n.gif

The main problem is Ukraine doesn't have enough S-300s to protect every city.

Edited July 17, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[dan/california]

Edit: Still a slow grind, but the pace seems to be picking up a bit with Himars and other new equipment.

Edited July 18, 2022 by dan/california

[Chibot Mk IX]

9 hours ago, fireship4 said:

Something occurs to me about the longer logistical routes - I have little knowledge on the subject and would be happy to be corrected.  I get the impression that this should affect the ability of the logistics system to respond to changes, but not necessarily affect throughput except where transport vehicles are a limiting factor.

If there are plenty of vehicles and demand stays the same, then the supply will arrive at the same rate: the rate at which they are sent out (allowing for mistakes along the way which will increase with more distance).  The journey time will be longer but this will have more effect if units use their own (likely more limited) number of vehicles to go and collect what they need from supply points, as they will be able to make fewer trips in the same amount of time.

Am I on the right track and does anyone know how resupply is handled in the Russian system?

There were lots of discussion on logistics in first 500 pages, when the war was still in the "maneuver" phase. 

I highly recommend below article as a quick start reading on this topic

" FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI"

https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/

Quote

Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile range (73km): One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles (146km), and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles, the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.

This is an estimation based on idea situation. Russian Army , after the 2008 Serdyukov reform, has changed from Soviets' style deep battle to an army that will limit it's operation to no more than 50km. The relatively low number of trucks under the Army HQ should not be a big issue in a low intense - high tech warfare. But in this  "WW I style bombardment" war,  it has already become an issue. Part of the reason Russian crawling from Rubizhne, Popasna into Severodonetsk-Lysychans'k is, usually they running low on artillery shell after 3 days operation, so next offensive to push another 10km into UA defense line needs a week to buildup.   Now , with ammunition dump move to a place >100km to the front line troops, the issue could become a disaster. Back in March when Russian tanks were 150km-200km away from the railhead they can barely keep 1/3rd of the force operational.  

 

 

 

8 hours ago, poesel said:

If the last depot is further away from demand (the guns) then you need more trucks in total to keep up the same supply rate. Because those trucks might share the same roads, you may not have the capacity to keep up the supply rate to every gun (basically a bandwidth problem).
Those trucks might break down or be destroyed, creating even more congestions.

And I would like to add one more thought here. This is not about Russian army or US army, this is more about the human nature (and many big corporations are likely to make the same mistake) . If a congestion happens and that reduces the frontline troops' received supplies significantly, the decision maker is very likely to push more trucks with supplies down the road, which in turn causes more congestions and reduce the received supplies further.

[danfrodo]

31 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Edit: Still a slow grind, but the pace seems to be picking up a bit with Himars and other new equipment.

Finally, some good news on the ground.  I am hoping for some RU units to break somewhere along this front.  It wouldn't  be some huge armored thrust I suppose, but maybe some nice ground gained and some panic by Putin.  A panicky Putin might make some less than optimum military choices.

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Finally, some good news on the ground.  I am hoping for some RU units to break somewhere along this front.  It wouldn't  be some huge armored thrust I suppose, but maybe some nice ground gained and some panic by Putin.  A panicky Putin might make some less than optimum military choices.

The Ukrainian's previous victories have come when they just made it too unpleasant for the Russians to stay somewhere. I am expecting that Kherson will go the same way. The supplies just get ever more strangled. The partisans get ever more supplied with platter charges and claymores and all kinds of unpleasant go bang, and the rain of 155 just never stops. Any unit that displays real competence gets GMLRSed. Remember that the Ukrainian supply situation is considerably easier on that side of the Dnipro. It should be by far the easiest place for them to win the artillery logistics battle. My biggest question is when the Russians want to go, do they let them to lessen civilian casualties? Or go for a full up cauldron and try to take five or ten thousand Russian prisoners?

[danfrodo]

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The Ukrainian's previous victories have come when they just made it too unpleasant for the Russians to stay somewhere. I am expecting that Kherson will go the same way. The supplies just get ever more strangled. The partisans get ever more supplied with platter charges and claymores and all kinds of unpleasant go bang, and the rain of 155 just never stops. Any unit that displays real competence gets GMLRSed. Remember that the Ukrainian supply situation is considerably easier on that side of the Dnipro. It should be by far the easiest place for them to win the artillery logistics battle. My biggest question is when the Russians want to go, do they let them to lessen civilian casualties? Or go for a full up cauldron and try to take five or ten thousand Russian prisoners?

Well said, Dan/CA. 

But is Kherson such a big propaganda loss for Putler that he decides it must be held at all costs?  It could be a potential disaster for RU, both in lost forces and in propaganda. 

I like that UKR has very low risk in fighting on this front while RU has great risk of taking massive losses.  If RU counterattacks UKR can simply fall back locally and there's no operational objectives at risk.  While for RU, they are in constant danger of having a huge portion of their forces being completely cut off and losing a region that Der Putler has already boasted will be a new breakaway republic/puppet state..  I am starting to see why UKR is concentrating their current efforts there.  Low risk, high reward.  And maybe has the nice benefit of getting RU to shift even more forces into a trap.

[dan/california]

46 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Well said, Dan/CA. 

But is Kherson such a big propaganda loss for Putler that he decides it must be held at all costs?  It could be a potential disaster for RU, both in lost forces and in propaganda. 

I like that UKR has very low risk in fighting on this front while RU has great risk of taking massive losses.  If RU counterattacks UKR can simply fall back locally and there's no operational objectives at risk.  While for RU, they are in constant danger of having a huge portion of their forces being completely cut off and losing a region that Der Putler has already boasted will be a new breakaway republic/puppet state..  I am starting to see why UKR is concentrating their current efforts there.  Low risk, high reward.  And maybe has the nice benefit of getting RU to shift even more forces into a trap.

There is at least a strong rumor that that Ukraine is finally going to get ATACAMS. I don't know if those missiles can drop the Kerch straight bridge, but I am absolutely sure they can drop the bridges over the Dnipro behind Kherson at will. I doubt they want to wreck the dam but they can wreck the rail approaches past fixing, especially with Himars waiting to hammer repair crews. At the Kherson bridges they even can even do a simultaneous attack on the air/missile defense with Himars and Tochka. For that matter the front line is only ~55 km from Nova Karkova and the dam. It wouldn't take a miracle to bring the dam into the range of the best 155mm guns, at which point I don't see how the Russians make ANYTHING work on that side of the river. Am I missing something, or is the Russian general staff?

[FancyCat]

25 minutes ago, dan/california said:

There is at least a strong rumor that that Ukraine is finally going to get ATACAMS. I don't know if those missiles can drop the Kerch straight bridge, but I am absolutely sure they can drop the bridges over the Dnipro behind Kherson at will. I doubt they want to wreck the dam but they can wreck the rail approaches past fixing, especially with Himars waiting to hammer repair crews. At the Kherson bridges they even can even do a simultaneous attack on the air/missile defense with Himars and Tochka. For that matter the front line is only ~55 km from Nova Karkova and the dam. It wouldn't take a miracle to bring the dam into the range of the best 155mm guns, at which point I don't see how the Russians make ANYTHING work on that side of the river. Am I missing something, or is the Russian general staff?

Air Defense, there's not a lot to stop Russian aircraft from making mincemeat of any mechanized UKR offensive. That means probably Ukraine is limited to slow moving offensives and unable to gather mass for fear of losing them to air attacks. Not sure how Ukraine resolves this aside from just leap frogging every town and village in Kherson oblast. 

[paxromana]

Quote

hoigu indicated that Surovikin and Lapin will both continue to command forces on the Eastern Axis even though a force concentration and effort of this size should only require a single, very senior overall commander. Surovikin should in principle be in overall command because he outranks Lapin. Shoigu has not even named Surovikin as the head of Russia’s Southern Military District (SMD) despite the likely ousting of SMD Commander General of the Army Alexander Dvornikov and despite Surovikin’s experience commanding the Southern Grouping in Ukraine. Lapin, in contrast, has been and remains commander of the Central Military District.[4] The Kremlin‘s failure to use the operational pause to reorganize the Russian military command structure in Ukraine and its decision to instead retain an ad-hoc command structure is very odd.  The apparent dual command of two very senior generals over operations in a very small area may hinder Russian operations going forward.

Has anyone notded this anomalous situation (ISW report for 16 JUN) - to me, a non expert (but with a background in history) it seems to strongly indicate that the Russians still haven't developed anything resembling a clew.

Or maybe it is simply an indication that Herr Putler is in overall military command and still showing his abilities as a mastert strategist?

[Grigb]

3 hours ago, danfrodo said:

But is Kherson such a big propaganda loss for Putler that he decides it must be held at all costs?  It could be a potential disaster for RU, both in lost forces and in propaganda. 

Ru talks indeed indicate their intent is to hold Kherson. 

It is not just propaganda. While their max goal is destruction of UKR they do not plan to capture all of UKR. The realistic goal is to cut UKR from Black Sea and create land corridor to Transnistria. The western part of UKR is considered too hostile to RU, so they dream Poland will annex it (because they are heinous foreigners). And while Kiev region capture is desirable it is not strongly necessary - after RU and Poland cut significant portions of UKR land remaining UKR will cease to exist as independent nation. 

But the whole plan rests on RU ability to hold Kherson. Either they hold Kherson, or the war is lost because practically they will be back to where they started - extended LDNR does not help much in advancing toward Transnistria.

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, paxromana said:

Has anyone notded this anomalous situation (ISW report for 16 JUN) - to me, a non expert (but with a background in history) it seems to strongly indicate that the Russians still haven't developed anything resembling a clew.

Or maybe it is simply an indication that Herr Putler is in overall military command and still showing his abilities as a mastert strategist?

It is most likely the result of internal Army politics. Generals have egos and they belong to different sub factions with different interests unknown to us. This results in all sorts of strange command arrangements. 

[Huba]

Stumbled upon this blogpost about RU logistics/ materiel. There's hardly anything new written there, that wasn't already posted here, but it sums up everything quite nicely. Great for somebody not neurotically keeping up with every tweet

https://nadinbrzezinski.medium.com/logistics-collapse-945984f5d48e

Edited July 18, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

RUMINT regarding RU MOD volunteers (made it more readable)

 

Quote

Now, as for the volunteers from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Salary. The salary is fixed and amounts to at least 200 thousand rubles per month, depending on the position. An ordinary soldier receives 205 thousand rubles a month, a platoon commander receives 265 thousand rubles.

Preparation. The training center is available, equipment is provided. The training of volunteers takes only one week, and then to the front line and, possibly, immediately into battle, depending on the direction and so on. In fact, if a group of volunteers got into the training center at the end of the battalion recruitment, then the training period may be less than a week. My platoon stayed at the training center for only 4 days, of which I spent three days at the training ground. I will keep silent about the level of combat training and the training of coordination. However, even in a week it is impossible to prepare personnel from among the volunteers of any unit to perform service and combat tasks for a number of objective reasons.

Term. The term for signing the contract, or the agreement, since you will not have the status of a serviceman, is from two months and above. At the same time, you yourself indicate in the relevant documents how much you want to enter the territory of the former Ukraine. You will be told that a month is a trial period. In fact, you can refuse to perform service and combat tasks at any time and demand that you be returned back. The article of the Military Criminal Code for non-compliance with the order does not apply to you, you are volunteers, not military personnel.

Misc. For each day spent behind the ”line”, the Ministry of Defense will pay volunteers. But remember one thing: you are ****ing going to war, or rather to participate in SMO and there will be no ****ing checkpoints in the rear, shops on the front line, baths once a week, the opportunity to wash things in the washing machine and other benefits of civilization. Don't flatter yourself with illusions that you will **** [around] on the front line... I've seen a lot of smart guys like that. I removed five people from my platoon alone. In short, if there is a question of choosing between entering through the Chechens [Chechens run similar programs] or through the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, then choose the second option. I can tell you a lot more about volunteers through the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, but I think the above information will suffice.

[Taranis]

The destruction of ammunition depots in the Kherson sector continues :

"Ammunition warehouse was hit in missile strike in Nova Kakhovka of Kherson region" (one hour ago)
https://t.me/Novoeizdanie/18653

"Warehouses with ammunition were hit in missile strike at Raiske village of Kherson Region" (10 minutes ago)
https://t.me/Tsaplienko/11834

[Aragorn2002]

8 minutes ago, Taranis said:

The destruction of ammunition depots in the Kherson sector continues :

"Ammunition warehouse was hit in missile strike in Nova Kakhovka of Kherson region" (one hour ago)
https://t.me/Novoeizdanie/18653

"Warehouses with ammunition were hit in missile strike at Raiske village of Kherson Region" (10 minutes ago)
https://t.me/Tsaplienko/11834

Apart from the explosion, that looks like a screenshot from CM.

Edited July 18, 2022 by Aragorn2002

[Grigb]

As per our discussion of Kadyrov as the indicator of any Kremlin changes - Civilian "Girkin" (Nesmyan) reports on new Kadyrov's proposal

Quote

The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, proposed to deploy an air defense base in the republic

The logic here is as transparent as a tear. There is no reason to expect an external attack on Chechnya, in any case, the threats of this are extremely small. But in the case of internal Russian turmoil, Chechnya wants to protect itself from repeating the plot of the two previous wars, when the absolute dominance of Russian aviation in the air made the military defeat of Chechnya-Ichkeria predetermined.

Kadyrov assesses the risks of possible events in and around the Kremlin from the point of view of the security of his territory - which is completely logical and reasonable. And whose territory should he worry about first?

At the same time, he is well aware that the special position of Chechnya in Putin's Russia will remain only until Putin is at the helm. What will happen next is unknown to anyone. Therefore, it makes sense to get at your disposal the maximum means of countering possible threats.

More is not less. It definitely won't make it any worse. But will add peace of mind.

By the way, the proposal for the [location of] deployment of air defense systems is also interesting: in close proximity to the ancestral territories of Kadyrov himself.

 

[Grigb]

Summary of Civilian "Girkin" (Nesmyan) report on RU reduction of electricity consumption. 

Quote

The automotive industry, metallurgical enterprises and petrochemical companies are reducing electricity consumption, sources tell Kommersant. The number of regions that reduce planned consumption volumes is growing: since the beginning of the month, the indicator has already fallen in 42 regions, it follows from the data of the ATS [energy market regulator] ...

...Therefore, the drop in consumption is an alarming indicator in itself, but its first derivative - the rate of decline is even more alarming. It looks generally terrifying. Such a rapid collapse literally demolishes the stability of the entire industrial system. Like breaking a dam body.

 

[Taranis]

"Russian Su aircraft crashed near Alchevsk overnight, probably was shot down by own air defense"   
*Luhansk area
 

 

Edited July 18, 2022 by Taranis

[Grigb]

Girkin wrote two posts - one is link to an article about Ru speed of drone development. Most interesting except is below.

Quote

1) 19 years ago, in 2003, the Commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force had a full understanding of the need for the development of UAVs.

2) The development of not only reconnaissance, but also attack UAVs was announced, and Kamov developed the topic of unmanned helicopters.

3) The Sukhoi company developed the S-60 project back in 2003. The purpose is not clear, the appearance is unclear. But 19 years ago something was happened [in proper direction]) Let me remind you that the attack S-70 "Hunter" they say is going to be put into production in 2025 or a little earlier. In 20-22 years [behind])

4) Despite all the "understanding", the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation went to a Five-day war [2008 war with Gerogia] even without battalion or company UAVs in sufficient quantities, although everybody understood everything by the end of the 1990s, and representatives of the military-industrial complex showed the military "Aileron-3" in 2006.

5) Americans have reconnaissance UAVs of battalion and company level such as Dragon Eye and Raven appeared as planned in the USA in 2001-2003. They have been purchased since 2004, of which Raven is produced and purchased for the US Armed Forces to the present and produced in the number of 19,000+ pieces. I mean, our guys were not too far behind the potential enemy in the early 2000s.

6) The next series of promises "we will deal with UAVs - we promise 100%" was given under Serdyukov in 2009-2011.

Gentlemen were in no hurry at all) [Why do puny drones if you can defraud RU state with Armata or 5th generation no-analog fighter for a much bigger amount of money]

 

Second post is recommendation to watch DW translated Petraeus interview (original version below). It looks like RU Nats have become more interested in western military analysis (Original reference was published by crazed RU Nat Viktor Alksnis). Girkin adds: "The opinion refers to the month of May, but (in my opinion) in the second half of July it is more than relevant."

[Grigb]

Why RU believe UKR Army collapse is imminent - latest UKR reinforcement arrived to the frontline.

 

 

[Grigb]

RU anonymous Nat linked to VKS (He is possibly pilot piloting a desk) got upset (possibly due to recent RU aircraft loss) and wrote a small rant. It looks like low level RU Nats started to realize that initial VKS claims were BS. 

Quote

Judging by the number of Russian Defense Ministry claims of downed  litakov [Aircraft] AFU in the skies of Ukraine by our fighters and Pvoshnikami [AD] as of today, it is quite safe to say that on February 24 at enemy airfields there as was near-zero number of serviceable aircraft destroyed, which in turn once again confirms the assumption that the Ukrainians were well aware of the day and hour of the start SMO.
And here, a number of, for the most part, rhetorical questions arise, to which, I hope, answers have already been found.
1) From where, or from whom did the Ukrainians learn about the time "H"?
Was the information obtained using technical means of intelligence, or were they obtained in a way that is a thousand years old? [hint at bribery] 
Was it possible to block the source of this information [in advance]?
2) If we knew they knew, why weren't the targets adjusted?
3) If we didn't know what they knew, then why didn't we know?
4) If enemy aircraft were withdrawn in advance, does this mean that the rest of the troops and weapons, including air defense systems, were also withdrawn to pre-prepared positions in the same way?
5) Where and into what, in this case, were the Air-radar missiles fired?
6) What was the real effectiveness of the first strike?

The answer to these, as well as many other, rhetorical questions, and most importantly, the conclusions from these answers, are the guarantee of our victory.

[Grigb]

Conflict Intelligent Team (Ru partner of Bellingcat) says it got reports that RU military is forcibly moving refusneiks to UKR border. They are not sure about the scale and are trying to determine it now.

Again, it might be my confirmation bias but for me it all looks like preparation for a big victory offensive.

[EDIT] For alternative view CIT itself believes the offensive is not ready yet.

Quote

The Ministry of Defense reports that after this trip Shoigu gave instructions "to further increase the actions of the groups in all operational areas." We do not believe that this is a command for a large-scale offensive, since the Third Army Corps has not yet been fully formed, the volunteer battalions have not been trained. We believe that this is a command to strengthen rocket and artillery attacks.

 

Edited July 18, 2022 by Grigb

[paxromana]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

It is most likely the result of internal Army politics. Generals have egos and they belong to different sub factions with different interests unknown to us. This results in all sorts of strange command arrangements. 

Even so, a Master Strategist such as Putler should surely understand it's a really bad idea to have a divided command?

Or is he worried that a general in overall command might ... get ideas beyond his station?

[Grigb]

5 minutes ago, paxromana said:

Even so, a Master Strategist such as Putler should surely understand it's a really bad idea to have a divided command?

Or is he worried that a general in overall command might ... get ideas beyond his station?

Yes, that is part of the equation as well (especially now - General Lebed has become popular during the first disastrous Chechen war). But there are also different idiosyncrasies of The System as well. If you upset a sub faction, then unified command will not be very effective as the whole thing could be sabotaged.

We are not talking about a Western racing car army. We are talking about horse driven cart army.  You have to be political to make all horses move the cart where you want it.

[The_MonkeyKing]

Why Giving Ukraine F-16s Makes Sense
https://podcast.silverado.org/episodes/analysis-of-the-war-in-ukraine-july-17-2022

• F16 is very doable (if stated 6month ago we would be very close already)
• Escalation risks are being proven false. Now to a level without doubt
• long terms supply must be started. Aid so far is very short term. Nobody can efficiently manage a zoo of equipment long term

Edited July 18, 2022 by The_MonkeyKing