How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kimbosbread]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have no doubt the barns provide some protection against FPVs.  They simply don't have enough explosives power to go through shielding and have enough oomph left over to penetrate the vehicle's armor.  TOW and Javelin would not have that sort of problem.  Probably not NLAW either.

Does a modern AT weapon cost more or less than the cope-barn?

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, kimbosbread said:

Does a modern AT weapon cost more or less than the cope-barn?

Sure, but the point of the cope barn is to protect the thing under it, and that costs a LOT more than a modern AT weapon.  So what the Russians are doing is adding cost while the AT weapon stays the same.

The added cost, at the expenses of mobility, is to defeat FPVs.  So to the extent it can do that, it's cost effective because a $3000 FPV would otherwise knock out a $1m vehicle.  Adding something like $20,000 cost to the vehicle in exchange for not blowing up is a cost effective measure for sure.

Steve

[FancyCat]

how do we feel about the supply of ATGMs? feels like videos are dried up a bit of those. 

 

[JonS]

29 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

feels like videos are dried up a bit of those. 

Probably because the targets have dried up too.

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Probably because the targets have dried up too.

IIRC I read an interview with a member of a Stugna squad maybe 10 months ago and ATGMs were in extremely short supply.

[Grey_Fox]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

how do we feel about the supply of ATGMs? feels like videos are dried up a bit of those. 

 

It's probably a symptom of heavy fighting and the casualties that comes with them. People don't have time to upload videos to youtube while fighting in trenches.

Also bear in mind that ATGMs can't really be crowdsourced, while consumer off-the-shelf FPV drones can be, so propaganda efforts may be directed towards those (a phenomenon alluded to by Mike Kofman and Rob Lee).

Edited April 29 by Grey_Fox

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sure, but the point of the cope barn is to protect the thing under it, and that costs a LOT more than a modern AT weapon.  So what the Russians are doing is adding cost while the AT weapon stays the same.

The added cost, at the expenses of mobility, is to defeat FPVs.  So to the extent it can do that, it's cost effective because a $3000 FPV would otherwise knock out a $1m vehicle.  Adding something like $20,000 cost to the vehicle in exchange for not blowing up is a cost effective measure for sure.

Steve

But we have to keep in mind that 99% of the FPV drones out there are made with random RPG-7 warheads from the approximate infinity of them the USSR left lying around. At some point they will start making new tandem warheads for them that approximate an RPG-29. That will instantly make scrap metal cope cages obsolete. Then the whole back and forth cycle will go another round.

[Grey_Fox]

Just now, dan/california said:

But we have to keep in mind that 99% of the FPV drones out there are made with random RPG-7 warheads from the approximate infinity of them the USSR left lying around. At some point they will start making new tandem warheads for them that approximate an RPG-29. That will instantly make scrap metal cope cages obsolete. Then the whole back and forth cycle will go another round.

The problem with this is that there are tradeoffs when it comes to strapping larger payloads to UAVs, in the form of size, speed, agility, range, and cost. Mike Kofman and Rob Lee discuss this on recent podcasts.

Strapping a grenade or RPG-7 warhead to a UAV may be feasible for your $500, but a larger tandem warhead will drive up the size requirements of the drone in order to achieve similar performance, which means greater cost and possibly lower survivability. And bear in mind that the FPV drones have a low success rate to begin with.

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

The problem with this is that there are tradeoffs when it comes to strapping larger payloads to UAVs, in the form of size, speed, agility, range, and cost. Mike Kofman and Rob Lee discuss this on recent podcasts.

Strapping a grenade or RPG-7 warhead to a UAV may be feasible for your $500, but a larger tandem warhead will drive up the size requirements of the drone in order to achieve similar performance, which means greater cost and possibly lower survivability. And bear in mind that the FPV drones have a low success rate to begin with.

This is true, but trading even ten or twenty $2500 dollar drones for a multimillion dollar tank or AFV is still great deal. And remember last mile autonomy, and then more or less complete autonomy, are bearing down like an oncoming train. Throw in the fact that tanks can't get any heavier and still move, and my money is on the drones long term.

Just tried to check, and the RPG-29 tandem warhead is essentially identical to the RPG-7VR, and they both seem to weigh about double the basic RPG-7 anti armor round. That isn't insignificant, but it certainly doesn't seem unsurmountable in terms of drone reengineering. A cope cage that stand up to the tandem charge though....

 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Probus said:

I'm beginning to believe that the slowness of the West's response to Ukrainian needs must be hugely encouraging to Putin and his gang.  You guys have probably hashed this out already and I missed it.  I really hope support for Ukraine does not wain again.  Are most of you still in the camp that Ukraine can win militarily? 

And we are back to "define win."  Can Ukraine retake every inch of terrain back to pre-2014 lines...woohee that is a tall order.  I think they could but we could be talking years of grinding and western support - think Vietnam.

Can they turn back recent Russian tactical gains and re-take some ground - yes.  Can they pull off another RA operational collapse...now that is the big question.  Theoretically, yes.  But since we are not even sure what it takes to do this right now it really is a crap shoot.

Ukraine can definitely freeze this thing and keep bleeding Russia white.  The West has bought itself some runway to get its act together on organizing support.  NATO and the EU really need to step up because at least until this Nov (and possibly beyond) the US may prove to be an unreliable ally.  Worst case is Trump gets in and cuts off US support and guts NATO, because...reasons.  But that is six more  months of RA bleeding.  Ukraine needs to sort out its force generation as well.  Lot moving parts.  It is really a race to see who runs out of what first - a straight up war of Exhaustion.  Unless we get a Hail Mary and the UA can pull off something really dramatic.

So solid, maybe, hopefully...we will see.  

Edited April 29 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

It's undoubtedly encouraging Russia to continue, the West shot itself in the foot over the lack of ramp up, will, and ignorance to increase its MIC capability.

I mention again, who the hell in Ukraine wants to enlist and spend their time getting shelled by Russia pumping out these shells while Europe lifts their nose at Indian made artillery shells? And America acts like a absolute idiot? More equipment to Ukraine. I'm actually starting to get pissed by the high dollar amounts touted by the West, numbers dammit, not cost.

 

I have no earthy idea what that was supposed to show.  I saw 5-6 gun trucks (at least one tank) make a gangsta style gun run into a town, entirely unsupported mind you.  And 2 came out, likely damaged.  They look like they ran around and shot things up at a vehicle loss of 3-4 and then drove back out.  Not sure what the point of that entire rodeo was but if it was to prove that the garden sheds that the Russian's are bolting on armor are working...well, not sold.

[Vanir Ausf B]

5 hours ago, Kraft said:

The protection does seem to be working, Im sure there have been attempts at taking them out with FPV but nothing was ever published, so they likely all failed so far.

All we have are anecdotes

The Podors are storming in columns in the Bakhmut direction!!!!! All the equipment is stupidly scalded with metal, from 5 units it was possible to destroy a tank and an armored personnel carrier. A lot of FPV was spent on one tank. Everyone laughs at their construction of barns, but in fact they work like hell

https://t.me/The_life_of_Predova/2241

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

And we are back to "define win."  Can Ukraine retake every inch of terrain back to pre-2014 lines...woohee that is a tall order.  I think they could but we could be talking years of grinding and western support - think Vietnam.

 

I've been saying since this war started that the only way Ukraine would get back it's territory is if Russia has a complete military collapse.  Even then, I'm not sure they'd get it all back.  Especially Crimea.

If central authority in Russia collapses it will likely be quickly replaced by another group of thugs that will keep the war going.  Since the soldiers are complaint, if not comfortable, with the idea of dying for a dead empire dream, they will keep fighting.  Even if central Russian authority isn't quickly reestablished, it's entirely possible we might see the repeat of the German Freikorps movement.

Best case for Ukraine after a collapse is they get back a big chunk of land and obligate Russia to limit the war effort to holding the rest.

Therefore, if someone insists (for no justifiable reason) that Ukraine must take back all of its 2022 or 2014 borders in order to "win", then that person has already written off Ukraine as a lost cause without understanding why it's wrong to do so.

Steve

[Offshoot]

48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Since the soldiers are complaint, if not comfortable, with the idea of dying for a dead empire dream, they will keep fighting.

Hopefully this guy and more like him can get the message out then. He makes no bones about it not being worth it.

Quote

He says that only fools would entertain such an idea, as any sense of patriotism fades rapidly once you realise that you want to live.

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've been saying since this war started that the only way Ukraine would get back it's territory is if Russia has a complete military collapse.  Even then, I'm not sure they'd get it all back.  Especially Crimea.

If central authority in Russia collapses it will likely be quickly replaced by another group of thugs that will keep the war going.  Since the soldiers are complaint, if not comfortable, with the idea of dying for a dead empire dream, they will keep fighting.  Even if central Russian authority isn't quickly reestablished, it's entirely possible we might see the repeat of the German Freikorps movement.

Best case for Ukraine after a collapse is they get back a big chunk of land and obligate Russia to limit the war effort to holding the rest.

Therefore, if someone insists (for no justifiable reason) that Ukraine must take back all of its 2022 or 2014 borders in order to "win", then that person has already written off Ukraine as a lost cause without understanding why it's wrong to do so.

Steve

I fully agree it would take some sort of epic crack up in the Putin regime for Ukraine to get it all back. But if the regimes DOES crack their are simply so many ways it could go all anybody will be able to do is try to surf the avalanche. 

[Flibby]

In practical terms does anyone know how contiguous the front lines are? 

Do the respective armies focus around main roads and towns, leaving obstacles and mines etc over the open ground, or do the fortifications manage to cover most of the no man's land between the armies?

What would a typical permissible gap be between say a platoon and the next, or a company and the next?

In terms of the feasibility of flanking attacks and manoeuvre does that answer why were looking more and more at the use of artillery and less light infantry tactics, and does the west's emphasis on manoeuvre look a little misplaced now?

[Flibby]

In practical terms does anyone know how contiguous the front lines are? 

Do the respective armies focus around main roads and towns, leaving obstacles and mines etc over the open ground, or do the fortifications manage to cover most of the no man's land between the armies?

What would a typical permissible gap be between say a platoon and the next, or a company and the next?

In terms of the feasibility of flanking attacks and manoeuvre does that answer why were looking more and more at the use of artillery and less light infantry tactics, and does the west's emphasis on manoeuvre look a little misplaced now?

[LongLeftFlank]

Two economics snapshots that tell interesting stories:

1. RU piped gas to EU and LNG exports have surged. While you're hitting the O&G infra, and you have all those Sea Babies lying around....

2. EU has 'grown a pair', and is looking at slapping tariffs of up to 50% on BYD EVs, to stop their auto sector going the way of their solar and wind industry (and so many others) in the face of subsidised Chinese dumping of, well, every goddam' thing...

There is of course much wailing and gnashing of teeth among Green apostles who view China-subsidised (and coal powered) everything as the saviour of the planet.

Edited April 30 by LongLeftFlank

[Maciej Zwolinski]

12 hours ago, FancyCat said:

how do we feel about the supply of ATGMs? feels like videos are dried up a bit of those. 

If the FPV AT drones work, then the ATGM videos are going to be replaced mostly by FPV attack videos, basically for 2 reasons.

First, FPV drone is a non-LOS weapon and can engage significantly earlier than ATGMs, which in the ZSU are  of the LOS only variety. Before the vinea tanks (d)evolved, many videos were precisely about mechanised attacks being defeated during the approach march and Russians running away before they tanks could even engage. In all those cases there was neither need or opportunity for the Ukrainians to shoot ATGMs.

Second, all FPV attacks are coupled with a video feed ready to be saved and posted on Youtube if the operator wants to. In the case of ATGMs a separate camera (usually from a drone) needs to be used, not guaranteed.

BTW the comment under "First" shows in what way the vinea tanks are in my view useful and what they limitations are. They do seem to be good to the extent they are able to prevent/limit the loss of tanks from FPV drones on the approach march. Thus they are able to cross that zone, in which the normal tanks were extremely vulnerable while not being  able to engage themselves. However, when they actually attain the LOS to the enemy, they should be able to start firing, suppress the ATGM defense in the LOS fight and then start suppressing the antipersonnel weapons, whereupon the assault could start- and there is where the vinea construction becomes a huge liability. With their angle of fire worse than an Mk I Male of 1917, they are not likely to suppress AT defence and shoot the infantry in. So while this contraption allows the tanks to reach the battlefield in a safer way, it makes them almost useless once they get there - at the end of the day it does not help Russians in any meaningful way. That's my view of this.

 

[FancyCat]

Guess precision took a hit...ugh. hey, great, a lesson for the future. Can we please just get 3rd party ammo sourced worldwide to Ukraine now? (I will assume with U.S aid unblocked this will resume, but a pox on certain European countries for insisting on EU based manufacturing at the expense of Ukraine.

Quote

Maybe low-cost autonomous terminal guidance at scale solves this problem in the future. But for the foreseeable future, it suggests that electric warfare presents a serious challenge to precision-guided munitions & quantities required to deliver a given effect.

Quote

The effectiveness of Ukraine's Excalibur GPS-guided rounds decreased from 70% to 6% within six weeks as Russia adapted and employed various EW assets to counter them. Source:

https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116957/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS35-Wstate-PattD-20240313.pdf

Quote

The Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies think tank reported two days ago that "Ukrainian Defense Forces ceased the deployment of GLMRS on the battlefield due to GPS signal suppression by the enemy." I am not sure whether the cessation is complete, but Russians significantly improved their ability to degrade the effectiveness of GPS-based munitions delivered by Ukraine's Western partners.

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

If central authority in Russia collapses it will likely be quickly replaced by another group of thugs that will keep the war going.  Since the soldiers are complaint, if not comfortable, with the idea of dying for a dead empire dream, they will keep fighting.  Even if central Russian authority isn't quickly reestablished, it's entirely possible we might see the repeat of the German Freikorps movement.

You basically described 1917-1918 Russia and its impact on the WW I eastern front. Please note before the demise of the first set of thugs and the ascendancy of the second, there ought to be a period of confusion counted in at least months when the front would be very vulnerable and it could be heavily reshaped by the Ukrainians. Taking opportunity of this, the Germans got themselves the Brest-Litovsk for their trouble, which translated into modern terms, would mean that the Ukr goes back to its internationally recognised legal border, except for Krimea. That would not be bad at all.

PS. If anyone read about Hitler's plans for Lebensraum in the Belarus, the Ukraine and Western Russia (Muscovy) and thought the man should have used less of lead-based paints for his pictures, actually he had a recent living example of his desired arrangement in the form of post-Brest Litovsk German-occuppied lands from the Baltics to the Ukraine in the south. It arose of pretty unique set of circumstances and was very short lived, of course, but was not physically impossible.

[panzermartin]

You think a "double floor" cage be able to defeat a tandem RPG round falling from an FPV? 

[FancyCat]

A frozen front line without a ceasefire is not a win for Ukraine or the West. A situation that presumably allows Russia to missile strike and drone attack into Ukraine's cities is one that will result in Ukraine's slow bleed out thru civilian morale collapse. I assume that a situation without ceasefire being agreed means ukraine is unable to threaten Russia with enough retaliation to bring Russia away from contently lobbing missiles. Mind you pre-2022 ceasefire and negotiations were in much different contexts than today. We have no idea what Russia's breaking point to begin negotiations to formalize a freeze is and not a form of surrender or Western loss.

It is therefore essential to define win in terms of a maximal, seeking quick as possible goal, in order to best pressure Russia towards peace, to best prep western governments to aspire and support Ukraine with maximum aid and long term awareness of potential Russian renewal. (Things like arguing over ammo procurement should have never become a issue to the result now where the West looks weak as hell as Russia makes gains and can argue it can make strategic gains eventually, if our goal is to stop the war, anything that allows Russia to convince itself it can win is a failure)(lack of urgency is a failure)

The slow drip of aid, the reactive position of the West to Russia, is a failure. At every step, Russia has escalated, has increased its capabilities, has continued to bet that it can exhaust the West. Instead of providing offramps, Russia sees it as Western weakness to take advantage of.

The fear of Russian collapse, which characterized many foreign policy doves including Jake Sullivan in the Biden administration has resulted in the measures Russia has taken advantage of. It's necessary to no longer concern with Russian collapse (which I don't think has ever been a possibility in hindsight, if you forgot, at every step of escalation Russia has sought to warn of Russian collapse (I include nuclear weapons use as a collapse scenario, as only a hard pressed Russia would want to open Pandora's box) and right now it looks like Russia was stalling (obviously). If anything we need, the West needs to concern itself with Ukrainian collapse and to operate accordingly to prevent it. Accordingly, we must signal to Russia that it's maximal goal is impossible. Certainly the present situation indicates Russia still looks for its maximal goal. Holding up aid for months is certainly not helping the mindset of a dictator who started the full scale invasion in the delusion it would succeed quickly and painlessly.

What does disregarding Russia's potential collapse mean in reality? Well for one thing, the restrictions on Western weapons use in Russia, Germany acting oh so scared of hurting Russian land with a missile as cluster munitions land in Odesa and France being exceedingly selfish procuring ammo are just some behaviors that Putin may be able to take solace in.

[FancyCat]

As for why espouse the rhetoric of "total victory" by the West, well for one thing, aside from that brief stalling period, Russian peace demands and signalling has been maximal. No reason for the West to concede ground. As far as I'm aware of, we have terms from Russia being: the removal of the current Ukrainian government, the annexation of 4 regions into Russia, the blocking of Ukraine into NATO or EU, the demobilization of the Ukrainian military, the formalization of Russian sovereignty over Crimea. At least. There's that drunken idiot thinking of Odesa. Idiot or not, Russian rhetoric remains maximal.

There is no reason to speak rhetorically of anything less than the restoration of full Ukrainian territorial sovereignty over its 1991 borders and the intent of Western aid to support such goals. There is no reason to speak cautiously regarding Western weapons being used inside Russia as they end UN arms embargoes on North Korea and Iran and fire from Russia into all of Ukraine.

No reason to be cautious in rhetoric as Russian jamming affects the Eastern flank of NATO.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

52 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

What does disregarding Russia's potential collapse mean in reality? Well for one thing, the restrictions on Western weapons use in Russia, Germany acting oh so scared of hurting Russian land with a missile as cluster munitions land in Odesa and France being exceedingly selfish procuring ammo are just some behaviors that Putin may be able to take solace in.

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 

What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.

The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).

Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Edited April 30 by Maciej Zwolinski
Edited for clarity