How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[OBJ]

59 minutes ago, photon said:

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.

I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.

I like it, thought provoking without being declarative.

Given your knowledge and references to the 'ancient' period, I'd be interested if you see human nature as the one thing not changed across the millennia, and therefore politics, and therefore wars and reasons for wars.

"We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce," 

 

[OBJ]

1 hour ago, Astrophel said:

@OBJ

I am convinced that Putin has no intention of stopping. Macbeth:

"I am in blood / Stepped in so far that should I wade no more, / Returning were as tedious as go o'er"

He has no way back.

I agree on Putin. As an aside my knowledge of Shakespeare is abysmal. I had to look this up   

"Ignorance is the curse of God; knowledge is the wing wherewith we fly to heaven"

[cesmonkey]

Nice to see the U.S. trying to innovate when it comes to countering the drone threat.

https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3671743/centcom-conducts-week-long-hackathon/
 

Quote

CENTCOM Conducts Week-Long Hackathon
USCENTCOM

Feb. 9, 2024
Release Number 20240209 - 02
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

TAMPA, Fla. – In January, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) hand-selected 15 coders from across the Department of Defense to participate in a "critical mission" hackathon called SANDTRAP. This hackathon focused on data and software challenges related to countering one-way unmanned aerial systems (cUAS), a mission that is critically important to the protection of U.S. and partner forces in CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The SANDTRAP hackathon served as a special event within the BRAVO series, a DoD-wide recurring hackathon. 

Over the course of the week-long hackathon, the coders built prototypes to improve speed and accuracy of cUAS processes. By hosting coders at headquarters, CENTCOM subject matter experts were able to fully integrate with the hacking teams and pave the way for capability transitions out of the hackathon.   

"For mission sets as critical as countering one-way UAS attacks, U.S. Central Command is committed to leveraging every talented individual, technical solution, and innovative process available. The SANDTRAP hackathon combined all three: exceptional coders, brilliant software prototypes, and a repeatable process that can give us creative solutions in the future. The Command will continue to hold hackathon events going forward that will help us get after our most critical operational problem sets," said Schuyler Moore, Chief Technology Officer at CENTCOM. 

“Our strategic approach–summarized by ‘People, Partners, and Innovation,’ is successful when we give team members a chance to bring new and creative solutions to the table,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, CENTCOM Commander. “The SANDTRAP hackathon provided that opportunity, and future hackathons will drive better solutions to critical missions and advance data-centric warfighting for the Command.” 

 

[Fernando]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

WW1 - thanks for the history lesson, I am passingly familiar with how it went down.  Now why did all those Central fronts collapse at the end of the war?  It was not “one last push” at the end of a bunch of Allied manoeuvre or even offensive actions.  It was the punctuation mark in a war of extreme attrition and exhaustion in which defensive primacy ruled.  There are any number of historical examples of decisive defensive victories - Stalingrad, Gettysburg and Waterloo.  Setting the conditions for an opponent to break themselves on a defence as a route to victory is as old as warfare itself.

As to Ukraine, there is absolutely a viable strategy to allow the RA to burn itself out to the point they become vulnerable to collapse.  In fact given the battlefield conditions we are seeing (eg denial and defence), this might be the best strategy they have.  Going back on offensive as a finishing move; like Kyiv, like Kharkiv - then becomes an option.

Conversely Ukraine could lose this war through a series of ill advised and wasteful offensives, because “we expect them to always attack seeking ‘decisions of arms’”.  

As to denying an opponent their will (I.e. stalemate) as “not a victory” - tell that to South Korea.  Or the Cold War.  History simply does not support this position.  It is possible to “win” simply by not losing and denying victory for an opponent and I have noted more than a few examples.  Not every war requires a bold imposition of Will and rolling through their capital.  In fact the majority of wars across history end without that.  For every grand decisive war there are a dozen small side shows that ended in some sort of negotiated limited victory - 1813-1815 in North America, Russia-Japan - 1905, the Balkan Wars, China-Vietnam, Iran-Iraq - hell, the First Gulf War for that matter.

None of these were total victories.  They all ended with levels of simply not losing entirely, nor winning.  In fact it could be argued the true art of war is to “not lose just enough”.  The problem we have in the West is we are so enamoured with ourselves that we only see the wars we want to see.  We only study the “real wars” which gives an extremely biased and skewed view of warfare.  I call this the Ricky Bobby school of military history - “if you ain’t first, you’re last.”  

This is not an accurate or useful viewpoint with respect to this war.  Ukraine may be “only” capable of denying Russia full control of its nation.  That is not a loss by any reasonable metric.  And to accuse them of claiming “a poor man’s victory” smacks of ill informed and shallow analysis of how wars actually work.  War is very often a choice of “bad and worse” with most the effort trying to determine which is which.

 

1. WWI: was NOT just a war where armies slaughtered other armies from their trenches. This is a very simplistic, , western-front-centered  oversimplification. WWI was much more than the Western Front. In fact it was won by the Allies OUTSIDE the Western Front, by collapsing all other enemy fronts. It was also a war of movement indeed.

• In 1914 it was a war of movement in the east and west. Russians broke the A-H front and took most of Galitzia in the East.Germans annihilated two Russian armies in East Prussia and Poland. It was also a war of movement in the west until the front got stabilized after the race to the sea.
• In 1915 Germans and Austrian broke the East Front in Gorlitze-Tarnow then advanced hundred of kilometers. Bulgaria entered the war, so Serbia was defeated and occupied. Turkey invaded the Sinai.
• In 1916, Russians launched the Brusilov offensive. In the best Russian tradition it was a incredible carnage, but there were larger advances and Austria-Hungary was on the verge of colapse. Romania entered the war on the Allied side. It was attacked and mostly occupied in a lighting campaign by the Central Powers. 
• In 1917 Russia collapsed and the Central Power armies advanced hundreds of kilometers inside Russia. The Caporetto offensive almost crushed the Italian Front, so Italy was on the verge of colapse. The Allied offensive captured Sinai and started the campaign which ended with the capture of Palestine and the final Turkish defeat.
• In 1918 the Italians won Vittorio Venetto battle, a general Allied advance in Italy started and A-H began its process to colapse. The Salonica front also collapsed leaving Bulgaria out of the war. Austria-Hungary had NO forces to cover the new fronts and the collapsing Italian front so eventually it surrendered. Then Germany, after Bulgaria, Turkey and A-H surrenders, had no forces to cover the Western Front and the whole Italian+Balkan front. 

In WWI case it was not exhaustion which made Germany surrender. All belligerent countries were as exhausted as Germany. Germany realized it was going to be check mated in three movements, so rather to fight to the grim end conceded defeat and signed an armistice. ALL countries were exhausted, including France, which had some mutinies in 1917, Italy and UK, not only Germany. 

2. At this point in the war I don't believe in a Russian colapse. Perhaps in three of four years, but I am not sure Ukraine will be able to wait for it and avoid collapsing itself. I am afraid that at present, time is more on the Russian side than the Ukrainian one. BTW I support Ukraine with no reservations. 

3. South Korea was a stalemate, not a South Korea-NATO victory indeed. SK survived, but North Korea survived too. Did both sides win? Did both sides lose? The fact is both countries are not even in peace yet. They have just signed an armistice.

4. Do are Stalingrad, Gettysburg and Waterloo examples of winning a campaign by just defending? First of all. They were BATTLES, no campaigns. The whole campaign including maneuvers where the side which took the offensive finally lost. If after those victories the defender had sit in his/her butt, doing nothing, but defending their defensive positions, there had been no results. In fact, in Gettysburg case there were no results. Meade didn't advance for weeks. Then finally, when it finally did it, it was too late, so it was defeated by Lee.

5. I already said an old Spanish saying "Quién no se consuela, es porque no quiere". which could be translated as "The person who does not console himself is because he does not want to do so". If there is no total, decisive victory, each side may claim they won in some degree. If Russia and Ukraine signed an armistice today,  Ukraine would survive as a nation. That would be a victory. However 20% of their territory and perhaps more population (including people who left the country and will not return) would be lost. That would be a defeat, wouldn't it?. Would it be 20% victory and 80% defeat, 80 victory and 20% defeat, or something in the middle?  I left it up to you. 
 

Edited February 9 by Fernando

[photon]

6 minutes ago, OBJ said:

Given your knowledge and references to the 'ancient' period, I'd be interested if you see human nature as the one thing not changed across the millennia, and therefore politics, and therefore wars and reasons for wars.

Actually, I do think there's been some change. For the most part now we can conceive of an international order where competition is not always war. That was unthinkable in the ancient world. For example, in the Second Punic War the Romans suffered something like 10% combat casualties as a percentage of their total population. That would be like the United States losing 13 million soldiers in World War 2, excluding civilian casualties. Having successfully concluded their absolutely devastating war with Carthage, the Romans took a break of... zero years, immediately entering into wars in Cisalpine Gaul and Macedonia. For them, war was the default, and peace an aberration. We don't think that way anymore.

[OBJ]

1 minute ago, photon said:

Actually, I do think there's been some change. For the most part now we can conceive of an international order where competition is not always war. That was unthinkable in the ancient world. For example, in the Second Punic War the Romans suffered something like 10% combat casualties as a percentage of their total population. That would be like the United States losing 13 million soldiers in World War 2, excluding civilian casualties. Having successfully concluded their absolutely devastating war with Carthage, the Romans took a break of... zero years, immediately entering into wars in Cisalpine Gaul and Macedonia. For them, war was the default, and peace an aberration. We don't think that way anymore.

Point, well made.

[Kraft]

Deleate

Edited February 9 by Kraft

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I think every war is a combination of the two to be honest.  Rarely does one side simply “want stuff”.  They very often want people in that stuff to make more stuff, so that means “new rules”.  Even imposing “gimme your stuff” is creating a new rule set - when I want your stuff, you give it…or else.

These really are shades of certainty.  And then there are wars that make zero sense.  Someone is afraid of someone else’s certainty, even if they completely imagine it.  So they react to imagined stimuli and start a war.  Then we get into religion, which could be a rule set but very often gets really weird and irrational as the dictation of that rule set is assigned to an imaginary higher power - one cannot sit God down at the negotiating table.

The most rare form of warfare is total extermination.  They happen but in these cases an entire group of people no longer existing becomes the cause, and objective.  Wars over rules happened all the time with stuff getting rolled in, or vice versa.

Put very simply, wars that achieve things by definition change prestige and hence rules. 

[LongLeftFlank]

17 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Just to circle this back on topic Id want to know where people think a soviet school general that as some claim won the battle of Bakhmut by having such a great casulties ratio advantage as to earn the nickname butcher (not of the enemy though) would innovate this trench warfare, besides the most likely approach of gaining ground by copying the russian tactic of charging people to their death, trench by trench.

Is that in fact what happened? (Tatarigami seems to agree with you, btw, but he wasn't there either. And his primary gripe AIUI seems to be that Bakhmut should have been ceded about a month earlier once it encountered diminishing returns).

...or were there now and then some positions that simply had to be retaken? and the guys who got shot up doing that are unhappy.

 

Hurtgenwald has been mentioned before, but the sad travails of the 'Bloody Bucket' don't extrapolate to the 'average' GI experience in NWE.

Edited February 9 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, riptides said:

He has engaged the American "news" media. This was a small step to gauge reactions and political movements on his part. I bet he offers a second.

This is quite possibly true, but the first shot is the best shot in things like this. Whatever he does in the next one will have less impact simply because the novelty/news factor of simply hearing from him will be gone. Putin had a chance to really present/reset his case to the english speaking world. His most quotable line was that WW2 was Polands fault. So in addition to wasting a golden opportunity to reframe the war to West at large he ensured that one of Ukraines strongest and most important allies will remain such.

[Kraft]

49 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Is that in fact what happened? (Tatarigami seems to agree with you, btw, but he wasn't there either. And his primary gripe AIUI seems to be that Bakhmut should have been ceded about a month earlier once it encountered diminishing returns).

...or were there now and then some positions that simply had to be retaken? and the guys who got shot up doing that are unhappy.

 

Hurtgenwald has been mentioned before, but the sad travails of the 'Bloody Bucket' don't extrapolate to the 'average' GI experience in NWE.

To be fair, I do not know how much of this defense was up to him and how much it came politically "hold at all costs". Same with the counteroffensive which I think after week 2 should/would have been called off but I am 100% certain this was politically not seen as an option.

As for Bakhmut there are many reasons why street fighting evened the playing field between wagner convict mobs and defenders. Personally I have never seen so many dead defenders in russian channels than during the city fighting, especially including Soledar and afterwards, even if I 'account' for this being the biggest battle of the war, towards the end I would say it was 1:1 dead for both sides (not overall)

Trying to supply this nightmare over a road that several times fell into enemy hands and caused dozens of vehicles to be picked off didnt help. Maybe associating him with this is wrong, as it may have been a political decision to hold but I dont see how this grinder and his repuation in any way makes him a better candidate to solve the issues under shell shortage, russian ewar, fortifications/minefields, endless russian assaults and lack of vehicles/...

We will see.

Edited February 9 by Kraft

[cesmonkey]

 

[Battlefront.com]

Every time we talk about Bakhmut here there seems to be a major disconnect between those who think it was an avoidable disaster, marked by incompetence, and those who think it was the least bad of many bad choices.  Then there's the people that focus on what the Ukrainians lost vs. those who focus on what both sides lost and gained.

I've argued since the battle was happening was it was probably the best of many bad choices.  The battle's conclusion was decidedly, and I mean decisively, favorable to Ukraine operationally and strategically.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

18 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Trying to supply this nightmare over a road that several times fell into enemy hands and caused dozens of vehicles to be picked off didnt help. Maybe associating him with this is wrong, as it may have been a political decision to hold but I dont see how this grinder and his repuation in any way makes him a better candidate to solve the issues under shell shortage, russian ewar, endless assaults and lack of military support.

With that attitude, Ukraine should just surrender now because it's totally hopeless/pointless to continue.

I don't agree with that assessment, therefore I think there are things that can be done.  We've only just started talking about what 2024 might look like.  The rough shape of it is Ukraine on the defensive and being prepared to counter Russian offensive moves, such as Avdiivka, in a way that racks up Russian dead far in excess of Ukrainian dead.

As I've been saying since this war started, this always has been and always will be about killing enough Russians to make the war stop.  Maneuver warfare offers nothing of value to Ukraine this year.

Steve

[Kraft]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

With that attitude, Ukraine should just surrender now because it's totally hopeless/pointless to continue.

I don't agree with that assessment, therefore I think there are things that can be done.  We've only just started talking about what 2024 might look like.  The rough shape of it is Ukraine on the defensive and being prepared to counter Russian offensive moves, such as Avdiivka, in a way that racks up Russian dead far in excess of Ukrainian dead.

As I've been saying since this war started, this always has been and always will be about killing enough Russians to make the war stop.  Maneuver warfare offers nothing of value to Ukraine this year.

Steve

I am not arguing for attrition or maneuver.

My point is, if a change is needed in leadership/innovation and a non-political decision needs to be made who is best to replace what makes him the best pick? 

Obviously we dont know enough inside details among the generals for a fair assesement but I am also questioning whether this was a non-political decision with that aim to begin with.

But I also dont want to slander with the little information I have which is why I deleated my original comment.

Edited February 9 by Kraft

[Eddy]

17 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

 

Article can be found here => The F-16 exceeded the expectations of Ukrainian pilots during the exercise. Interview with the pilot of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Phantom (holosameryky.com)

[Harmon Rabb]

I'm trying to avoid talking about "that guy", but some of these twitter memes related to the interview are hilarious.

For the record I did not watch it, I don't want to spoil the Super Bowl weekend with that trash.

 

[Erwin]

I was surprised/shocked that such an experienced interviewer as TC seemed to be at sea and unable to structure his interview "professionally".  He seemed all over the place, repetitive, and finally unable to conclude the interview with any memorable wrap up.  It was left to poor old Putin to shoot the dying interview to put it out of its misery. 

It was very interesting to hear Putin's perspective on how we got to where we are starting way back after after the fall of the USSR.  But, imo much of the time Putin seemed rather "tricky" and "sly". 

While clearly stating that the US empire is falling apart and the world is changing, Putin unintentionally made a good argument that USSR was like the Roman Empire and both were dissolved - and no one is saying that the Romans should get their empire back.  But,TC didn't pick up on that at all.  

https://tuckercarlson.com/the-vladimir-putin-interview/

 

Edited February 9 by Erwin

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, Kraft said:

As for Bakhmut there are many reasons why street fighting evened the playing field between wagner convict mobs and defenders. Personally I have never seen so many dead defenders in russian channels than during the city fighting, especially including Soledar and afterwards, even if I 'account' for this being the biggest battle of the war, towards the end I would say it was 1:1 dead for both sides (not overall)

Most of the statistical studies of urban combat confirm that the loss ratio between the attackers and the defenders goes towards 1:1 or even favours the attacker. 

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Most of the statistical studies of urban combat confirm that the loss ratio between the attackers and the defenders goes towards 1:1 or even favours the attacker. 

what combat situations are those statistics based on? - For example US forces versus Sunni and Shiite irregulars in Iraq would be heavily one sided but hardly relevant to Ukraine.

Edited February 9 by sburke

[sburke]

On 2/7/2024 at 1:46 AM, Carolus said:

I am sure they will find other ways but this is not bad. 

 

 

more on this.

Chinese Bank Deals New Blow to Putin's Wartime Economy (msn.com)
 

Quote

 

The main Chinese bank used by Russian importers has stopped operations in Russia, a move that an expert told Newsweek shows how much firms in China fear breaking U.S.-led sanctions.

The decision by Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank follows Vladimir Putin's boasts about booming trade between Russia and China, which he had hoped would offset the loss in western markets due to U.S.-led measures to cut off funding for its war in Ukraine.

Trade between Russia and China may have hit $218.2 billion between January and November 2023, achieving a goal set by the countries in 2019 a year ahead of schedule, but it appears that Chinese institutions are getting cold feet in their dealings with Russia.

Chouzhou Commercial Bank, the leading settlement bank for Russian importers working with China, has notified clients it was suspending operations with Russia and its ally Belarus, Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported.
A businessman from the Russian city of Izhevsk who buys equipment for machine tools in China told the paper that the bank informed him in December about goods that were prohibited under Western sanctions. A few weeks later, the bank said all settlements with Russia would stop, regardless of the product or currency used.

"Chinese banks strive to comply with U.S. sanctions, therefore, to reduce their own risks, settlements in U.S. dollars in trade with Russia have practically ceased and have been replaced by Chinese yuan settlements," Pavel Bazhanov, a Russian lawyer who provides legal support for Russian businesses in China and the wider region, told Newsweek.

But he said that President Joe Biden's executive Order 14114 issued on December 22, 2023, "creates a new risk of secondary sanctions" for Chinese financial institutions.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions institutions involved in trade supporting Russia's military-industrial base, which could see them denied access to the U.S. financial system.

Some big Chinese banks still handle Chinese yuan payments between Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs, but "usually their compliance is more time-consuming and careful," Bazhanov said.

"The suspension of operations is due to the fact that Chinese banks need to assess the new risks and update their compliance requirements," he said.

While Biden's executive order does not restrict usual trade which is not related to Russia's military industrial complex, Bazhanov said "some Chinese banks may consider theirs risks unacceptably high, or compliance too complicated or costly."

The suspension of the payments occurs during the Chinese New Year holidays, when all business activity is greatly reduced, so the impact would not be too high right now. "The real consequences will be clear later," he said.

Some Chinese banks will still handle yuan transactions related to trade with Russia, which require more paperwork but "some payment options are still available," he added.

Last month, Bloomberg reported that at least two of China's state-owned banks were tightening curbs on funding to Russian clients for fear of secondary sanctions from the U.S.

Sources told the outlet that the banks would stop providing financial services to the Russian military sector and review companies doing business in Russia or sending critical goods to Russia through a third country.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Wednesday that Russian authorities are having a "close dialogue with our Chinese friends and, of course, we will solve all the problems that arise," per AFP.

Russian firms have become more dependent on Chinese institutions and the yuan since some Russian banks withdrew from the SWIFT global financial-messaging system.

But Vedomosti reported information on money flows between China and Russia is available to Western regulators even if conducted through payment systems other than SWIFT like China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).

"Because Biden didn't get his package approved by Congress on Ukraine, the only way out is to press more on the sanctions," Alicia Garcia-Herrero, chief economist for Asia-Pacific at French investment bank Natixis, told Newsweek.

This will lead to "more wariness" from Chinese institutions to trade with Russia. "We will see a deceleration in trade between Russia and China anyway," which will become more marked because of Biden's executive order.

"But you will see an increase in exports from China to Russia through North Korea," she added.

 

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've argued since the battle was happening was it was probably the best of many bad choices.  The battle's conclusion was decidedly, and I mean decisively, favorable to Ukraine operationally and strategically.

Has that battle concluded though? During the 2023 summer offensive there was extensive fighting around Bachmut, with sufficient Ukrainian successes initially, that there was talk of Ukrainians encircling the city. Surely it should be included when discussing Bachmut and the consequences of defending it for as long as it was defended.

And if we include that, then the fighting in the Bachmut direction in parallel with the  Avdieyevka offensive until a couple of weeks ago, when Russians were taking back the Ukrainian summer 2023 gains should also be included, as it is also a direct consequence of the decision not to abandon Bachmut.

So I don't think a comprehensive calculation of the gains and costs of the Bachmut battle can be made yet

[danfrodo]

35 minutes ago, Erwin said:

I was surprised/shocked that such an experienced interviewer as TC seemed to be at sea and unable to structure his interview "professionally".  He seemed all over the place, repetitive, and finally unable to conclude the interview with any memorable wrap up.  It was left to poor old Putin to shoot the dying interview to put it out of its misery. 

It was very interesting to hear Putin's perspective on how we got to where we are starting way back after after the fall of the USSR.  But, imo much of the time Putin seemed rather "tricky" and "sly". 

While clearly stating that the US empire is falling apart and the world is changing, Putin unintentionally made a good argument that USSR was like the Roman Empire and both were dissolved - and no one is saying that the Romans should get their empire back.  But,TC didn't pick up on that at all.  

https://tuckercarlson.com/the-vladimir-putin-interview/

 

you're f--ing kidding right?  TC is an experienced interviewer?  He's the paid shill of a mass murdering monster.  WTF?  You actually sound like you think this sick farce is real?  

(sorry for the tone, but can we please not treat this seriously and waste discussion on it)

Edited February 9 by danfrodo

[dan/california]

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ukraine-the-latest/id1612424182?i=1000644777185

Today's Ukraine the latest has deep and nuanced look at the replacement of Zaluzny, I highly recommend it.

Edited February 9 by dan/california

[hcrof]

7 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

you're f--ing kidding right?  TC is an experienced interviewer?  He's the paid shill of a mass murdering monster.  WTF?  You actually sound like you think this sick farce is real?  

(sorry for the tone, but can we please not treat this seriously and waste discussion on it)

I don't want to defend the guy, and would never watch his show, but didn't he work for fox news for years? You would have thought he would remember to come prepared, even if he was planning an easy interview.