How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_MonkeyKing]

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:

https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

 
A car trip that used to take a couple of hours from Saint Petersburg to Helsinki now will take over 20h. International media is not really picking this up because it is not "total closure" but in practise it is.

[Rokko]

15 hours ago, Kraft said:

I want to add that UA needs to maintain a 3(4) to 1 ratio just to keep force parity. A 1-1 ratio is only ever good if it leads to strategic payoffs, which it did not.

Assuming ofc a constant, not declining.. supply of vehicles from the West.

This is a big if too, because I dont see another hundred or so european tanks/.. coming next year, even if the will is there. This can only be really done by the US. Meanwhile Russia will continue to restore and produce with increasing numbers in 2024.

I agree with this. And I also don't really see more Western AFVs being sent to Ukraine as all that likely, unfortunately. They got what they got in 2022/23 and that's basically it. Maybe the US can be bullied into digging deeper into its stockpiles, but for the European stuff, the well has pretty much run dry I'm afraid, and most European countries seem to be focused on backfilling their own arsenals for the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, all the fancy heavy stuff does not really seem to have been really all that effective, anyways. Definitely not in proportion to their logistical footprint and public profile. Whereas all the things that do the heavy lifting are either easily replaced (artillery shells) or even domestically produced (FPV drones, etc). Attrition through the most cost-efficient and simple means will be the game from now on would be my guess.

F16s will be big deal, of course, but not as big as many make them out to be. I see them more as augmenting and replacing the current capabilities offered by the dwindling fleet of Soviet-era jets with the added benefit of easier integration with more and possibly different types of Western PGMs.

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russia's defenders were mostly infantry based, so only comparing vehicles isn't really telling the whole story.  Also, let's remember that the slaughter fest of Avdiivka in October is an outlier event, so comparing anything against it will create a distorted comparison.

My sense of Russia's losses in the south come from reading the daily summaries and watching the Russian forces there melt away and have to be replaced.  Videos are anecdotal, so not much value in those in determining overall losses.

The daily reports noted wave after wave of Russian counter attacks in the forward positions.  We discussed them constantly here and a lot of us were scratching our heads as to why the Russians were fighting so hard in a zone that normally isn't fought so hard over.

Steve

I think this is a safe conclusion, the whole affair involved much less mechanized force than what is currently going on around Avdiivka and assuming that personnel losses might be proportional to vehicle losses is ultimately just a guess. And if these daily reports of waves of counter-attacks (read: unreliable own-side claims) are to be taken as indication, then why are not backed up by proportionally plentiful video evidence? I think I have seen more footage from Avdiivka in the last month than during the entirety of the summer offensive. Heck, even the 47th seems to have released more footage since they were to deployed to Avdiivka than in the 5 previous months.

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Look, it was clear that Ukraine understood VERY WELL that the counter-offensive was going to be costly.  They were preparing people for it well ahead of time.  The overall plan seems to have been pretty sound too.  And as I stated, they ALMOST pulled it off.

I don't get how we can say that they almost pulled it off, if less than month after had all but petered out the Russians had sufficient Reserves to burn 200 AVFs and several brigades near Avdiivka? Wouldn't they just have sent whatever they are losing now in completely voluntary actions as reserves towards Zaporizhia, had the UKR offensive been more threatening to them?

[Beleg85]

9 hours ago, dan/california said:

Very interested in what our Polish friends have to say.

Didn't read it, but some experts on Ukraine actually living there are rather critical of the book- it is collection of interviews with various named and unnamed officials, not proper historical work that would cross the sources with each other and present effects to the reader. Interesting piece to be sure, but inherently subjective. We will need to wait for in-depth works for several years.

 

Meanwhile, short summary of effects of trip of the same crew of analytics as before. Conclusions are unsurprising and not very optimistic: https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1725157813364600855.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=pl&_x_tr_pto=wapp

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:

https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

Given the length and character of FIN-RU border, it was to be expected. Problem will likely only grew in time and scope, as it is great source of income for middle-level aparatchiks.

Edited November 16, 2023 by Beleg85

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Zeleban said:

However, for all this there is no main thing - the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to carry out these tasks (for a variety of reasons). In their current state, they are simply not able to overcome the echeloned and prepared enemy defense system in this operational direction (I suspect that in others too) with an acceptable and adequate pace and scope. For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that this was the “main” direction in the last summer-autumn campaign of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Therefore, General Zaluzhny is entirely right in his assessment of the general (strategic) situation that has developed, no matter who and no matter what objects to him from among the official (and unofficial as well) representatives of our military-political leadership. General Zaluzhny cannot, in his assessment of the situation, proceed from any considerations other than purely military ones.

He, as the Commander-in-Chief, is directly responsible for the planning, organization and practical use of the troops under his command. It makes no sense to him to say black and white or vice versa. He is not a politician, not a businessman.

The only thing that can be “discussed” with General Zaluzhny’s point of view is the methods and forms through which, as he believes, it is possible to correct this situation, and regarding the causes and mistakes that led to it.

But again, I repeat, this discussion should be non-public and exclusively among those people (officials) who are directly involved in making management decisions at the appropriate level. To organize a farce and “showdowns” in the public information sphere on the topic “what did Zaluzhny mean” or “what did Zelensky mean” means very significantly harming the overall implementation of the war strategy of our state.

Thanks for the translations!

I have a suspicion that Mashovets is under selling the importance of Solodka Balka.  Looking at a map it appears this is being used as the primary supply point for areas just west of Robotyne and could become a threat to Ocheretovate which anchors a large section of front to the south and east of Verbove.

As for his general assessment of how difficult it will be to get to Tokmak, yeah... it's pretty obvious that Ukraine is only going to inch towards it at great expense rather than have any possibility of storming it.  But with Solodka Balka securely in hand that puts Tokmak well within normal artillery range.  That's definitely worth going for.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I agree with this. And I also don't really see more Western AFVs being sent to Ukraine as all that likely, unfortunately. They got what they got in 2022/23 and that's basically it. Maybe the US can be bullied into digging deeper into its stockpiles, but for the European stuff, the well has pretty much run dry I'm afraid, and most European countries seem to be focused on backfilling their own arsenals for the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, all the fancy heavy stuff does not really seem to have been really all that effective, anyways. Definitely not in proportion to their logistical footprint and public profile. Whereas all the things that do the heavy lifting are either easily replaced (artillery shells) or even domestically produced (FPV drones, etc). Attrition through the most cost-efficient and simple means will be the game from now on would be my guess.

I know a lot of people here were tamping down, if not stomping upon, expectations that Western tanks were going to make any difference in the war.  The skeptics were correct, I think.  That said, Ukraine still needs SOMETHING to replace battlefield losses if it wants to retain options.  Hopefully the US will finally commit to making that happen.

As you say, shells, artillery, air defenses, and aircraft are more important.  Those have way more impact on the war than AFVs.

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I think this is a safe conclusion, the whole affair involved much less mechanized force than what is currently going on around Avdiivka and assuming that personnel losses might be proportional to vehicle losses is ultimately just a guess.

That's my point... do NOT assume that personnel losses are proportional to vehicle losses.  That's not a good guess, though obviously any guess is just a guess.

Think about it in CM terms.  Defender has 1 company of infantry and 10 AFVs.  Attacker has 2 companies of infantry and 20 AFVs.  At the end of the battle the attacker has the ground and each side has lost 10 AFVs.  If "proportional" to AFVs rule held, then the defender would have 0 infantry and the attacker would have lost a full company.  This is unlikely, therefore assumptions about ratios is already on shaky ground.

However, there is even a better reason to not assume ratios based on AFV losses.  Again, consider a CM scenario where the counter attacking force has 1 company of low quality infantry with no AFVs, the defender has good quality infantry and 2 AFVs.  At the end of the battle the counter attacker shows neither side losing AFVs.  Does this mean neither side suffered infantry casualties?

To further deflate any notion of using AFVs as indicators of infantry casualties... what about artillery?  Give me a CM scenario with one side having awesome artillery support and the other side crappy, and I guarantee you I'll cause WAY more infantry casualties than AFVs.

The Russian counter attacks to regain land were, by all accounts, largely infantry based.  In many cases Ukraine was defending with infantry backed by superior artillery.  AFVs, therefore, are a bad metric to use.

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

And if these daily reports of waves of counter-attacks (read: unreliable own-side claims) are to be taken as indication, then why are not backed up by proportionally plentiful video evidence? I think I have seen more footage from Avdiivka in the last month than during the entirety of the summer offensive. Heck, even the 47th seems to have released more footage since they were to deployed to Avdiivka than in the 5 previous months.

Oh boy, the "absence of evidence indicates the evidence of absence" is a terrible foundation for an argument.  First, Ukraine had a pretty good information blackout in place for the first few months.  We saw very few videos of any sort coming out, so are you suggesting that there was very little fighting going on?  Or was their intense fighting and we just didn't see videos of it?  Definitely the latter, right?  So this concept of evaluating what happened and what didn't goes right out the window.

Also, you forget that many of the accounts coming out of the frontlines, especially early, were coming from Russian sources.  They were the ones talking about all the counter attacks in detail.  The Ukrainian information space largely relied upon them as a starting point, debunking claims when possible.  For example, there was a time when Russians were talking about still controlling Robotyne when video clearly showed Bradleys freely roaming the streets.  Then the Russian accounts changed to "we have a garden shed that is technically still in Robotyne, so our forces still hold!".

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I don't get how we can say that they almost pulled it off, if less than month after had all but petered out the Russians had sufficient Reserves to burn 200 AVFs and several brigades near Avdiivka? Wouldn't they just have sent whatever they are losing now in completely voluntary actions as reserves towards Zaporizhia, had the UKR offensive been more threatening to them?

We've discussed the impracticality of Russia being able to move the bulk of the forces committed to Avdiivka anywhere else because the backbone of the force was DPR and could NOT be deployed anywhere other than Donetsk.  The other forces used for the offensive came from the nearby sectors in Luhansk.  Transporting them to the south instead would be possible, but would have been much harder and time consuming.  Therefore, again, your metric for assessing is fundamentally unsound because the facts don't support the position you've staked out.

Now, as to what I meant by Ukraine almost pulling off something in the south.  Prior to the counter offensive starting people had a wide range of expectations for what could be achieved.  I was one that was trying to lower expectations because of the defenses, area, and problems with securing extended flanks within one campaign season.  I thought the best Ukraine might achieve would be to isolate (not take) Melitopol.  And even then only if they could get over the Dnepr.  Once it became clear how strong the defenses were I adjusted my hopes for isolating (not not taking) Tokmak. 

To achieve any of this Ukraine would have had to achieve some form of local or operational collapse.  This is what almost happened.  Russia had run out of ready reserves and its frontline forces had, even by Russian accounts, been destroyed (in large part due to idiotic counter attacks).  The collapse was nearly there.  Unfortunately, Ukraine wore itself out before it could tip it over the edge.  A similar thing happened to Ukrainian forces fighting south of Bakhmut this summer. 

In both cases it came down to Russia being able to find enough bodies to throw at the Ukrainians to cause them to slow down and then stop.  Russia's supply of bodies got dangerously low, but as discussed here every few dozen pages or so, somehow Russia is managing to have enough to keep the territorial status quo.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Meanwhile, short summary of effects of trip of the same crew of analytics as before. Conclusions are unsurprising and not very optimistic: https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1725157813364600855.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=pl&_x_tr_pto=wapp

I think he overstates some things, perhaps unintentionally, but his basic conclusions are sound.  Ukraine will not likely have a large offensive force prepared for Summer 2024 unless the West somehow coughs up a lot of stuff.  Even if Ukraine rebuilds its losses, it won't have 10+ brigades in reserve for 2024.  I know more are planned, but I suspect they won't have as much success as they did earlier this year.

At the end of 2022 many of us here, and elsewhere of course, had a sense that Ukraine needed to do something spectacular in 2023 or 2024 would likely be a defensive year for Ukraine.  Clearly nothing spectacular happened this year, despite a lot of meaningful successes (especially smashing the Black Sea Fleet and degrading Russia's artillery capabilities), so yup... 2024 is going to be Ukraine on the defense.

Russia will likely continue to try to stay on the offensive, which is good because they suck at it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Two things to highlight in yesterday's ISW report.

The first is in the "WTF?!?  I thought this was already in place!!!!" segment of the report:

Quote

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia. The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) given precision machine tools’ importance in industrial manufacturing. Bloomberg reported on November 15 that the EU’s 12th sanctions package proposes a ban on the export of precision machine tools and machinery parts that Russia uses to make weapons and ammunition, such as welding machines, lithium batteries, thermostats, motors, and drone motors.[1] Bloomberg reported that Russia has been importing precision machines and precision machine tools from Europe to sustain its ammunition production and other DIB production efforts. Bne Intellinews reported in June 2021 that Russia’s near total reliance on European- and US-produced precision machine tools makes Russia particularly vulnerable to such sanctions and noted that at the time Russia imported almost all of the precision machines it required.[2]

I'm shocked.  I thought precision tooling was in the earlier sanctions packages.  I can't believe it's nearly two years and this is only now being addressed.  Better late than never?

This is telling.  I underlined and bolded the important bit:

Quote

Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations. The Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organization – reported on October 31 that 55 percent of respondents to a recent poll believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations while 38 percent favor continuing to conduct the war.[13] The Levada Center observed that while these numbers slightly increased between September and October by four percent, they have largely remained consistent since July 2023.[14] The Levada Center added that support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine remained high with 76 percent of respondents stating that they support Russian military operations in Ukraine. The Levada Center reported that 62 percent of surveyed Russians believe that the full-scale invasion is progressing well, while 21 percent of respondents believe that the war is going reasonably or very poorly for Russia.[15] The Levada Center reported on November 14 that two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is headed in the right direction and of those who believe the opposite, 45 percent cited the war in Ukraine.[16] Opposition-leaning Russian research organization Russian Field reported similar numbers supporting negotiations on November 15, noting that 48 percent of respondents said that Russia should engage in peace negotiations and that 74 percent would support Russian President Vladimir Putin if he signed a peace agreement “tomorrow.”[17] Russian Field stated that 36 percent of respondents believe that the war is going well for Russia whereas 25 percent believe that the war is going poorly for Russia and that respondents who trust Telegram channels are twice as likely to believe that the war is going poorly for Russia as those who rely on Russian television.[18]

The stat I flagged tells us a lot, I think.  Coupled with the other stats, the survey seems to say:

"I support the war, I think it's going great, and we are headed in the right direction.  But I strongly support ending it tomorrow".

Does this strike anybody as being a little inconsistent?  I mean, if things are going great and you're all in favor of the war, then why are you so eager to stop it IMMEDIATELY when Putin's publicly stated goals of liberating all of Luhansk and Donetsk hasn't happened, not to mention all the other fanciful things he stated at the beginning of the war that haven't happened?  I don't know of a time in history when people who supported a war that was "headed in the right direction" were in favor of ending it immediately.

This seems to highlight the history of unreliable answers in Russian polling.  People likely felt pressured to answer YES to the patriotic and pro-war questions, but the open-ended question of ending the war "tomorrow" gave them an opportunity to express themselves more truthfully.  If true, this means the Russian population might have a majority against the war even if they won't come out and say it.

We can hope at least.

Steve

 

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The stat I flagged tells us a lot, I think.  Coupled with the other stats, the survey seems to say:

"I support the war, I think it's going great, and we are headed in the right direction.  But I strongly support ending it tomorrow".

Does this strike anybody as being a little inconsistent?  I mean, if things are going great and you're all in favor of the war, then why are you so eager to stop it IMMEDIATELY when Putin's publicly stated goals of liberating all of Luhansk and Donetsk hasn't happened, not to mention all the other fanciful things he stated at the beginning of the war that haven't happened?  I don't know of a time in history when people who supported a war that was "headed in the right direction" were in favor of ending it immediately.

This seems to highlight the history of unreliable answers in Russian polling.  People likely felt pressured to answer YES to the patriotic and pro-war questions, but the open-ended question of ending the war "tomorrow" gave them an opportunity to express themselves more truthfully.  If true, this means the Russian population might have a majority against the war even if they won't come out and say it.

We can hope at least.

Steve

 

I think this might be strategic signaling...or BS to try and divide western positions.  I do not believe for a hot second that any poll coming out of Russia is not actually coming out of the Kremlin right now.  So Putin has just appeared to give himself permission for peace talks.  Could be genuine or could be garbage to try and appeal to weak western support - "look they are trying to be reasonable".

Or could just be pinging to see how everyone reacts.  It is basically everything except genuine public opinion in Russia.  

Edited November 16, 2023 by The_Capt

[Twisk]

Part of the problem with western equipment is that the supply has been in penny packets. I suspect Ukraine could do a lot if they were guaranteed a certain flow of equipment per month/per year.

Tanks, IFVs, eventually F16s, artillery, drones, going all the way down to artillery shells.

 

How does Ukraine plan for 2024 when they might have 0, 10, or 100 of something? How do they utilize what they have now and properly allocate it if they don't know when new will arrive? Ukraine is fighting an actual peer war and western aid is being treated like spring cleaning. "Oh we will deliver this to the donation center when we have time"

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Two things to highlight in yesterday's ISW report.

The first is in the "WTF?!?  I thought this was already in place!!!!" segment of the report:

This part.  All war is sacrifice.  And in this regard the Western world is perhaps as weak as it has ever been.  Our willingness to sacrifice anything for greater causes is woefully weak.  We will make a lot of noise, cancel people, whatever.  But actually sacrificing something that hurts...no freakin way.  We are three generations into entitlement and no empire in the history of the planet has done well when it pushes the sacrifice to "lessers" (be they internal or external).

Tax havens, choking out social programs, defence spending that does not loop back into our own pockets.  Gawd help us, oil, gas and " export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia."

I am not even sure we know how to really give sacrifice anymore.  If someone told people they could cure cancer and have world peace but would have to give up their cellphones, I am pretty sure I know which way it  would go.

So as to Russia, and China for that matter, what is most disconcerting is that this war (and maybe the next one) are highlighting that our adversaries still know how to sacrifice.  Ukraine knows how to sacrifice.  I mean really pay the red coins to achieve something.  In Russia's case it is utterly evil, immoral and illegal by any angle, but say what you will, the Russian's still know how to sacrifice.

So we can talk about Glass Dragons, real estate bubbles, Russian doomed trajectories and demographic statistics all day long.  But until we recognize that our adversaries are willing to lose more than us in order to gain, we are in trouble.  we can't get people to wear masks and take free vaccines in the middle of the worst pandemic since 1918, how can we expect them to endure famine and war?

My biggest fear is that by the time we figure it out, it will too late.  We are like the European powers in 1899, rich entitled and heading off a cliff...all arguing about who should go first.  

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, Twisk said:

Part of the problem with western equipment is that the supply has been in penny packets. I suspect Ukraine could do a lot if they were guaranteed a certain flow of equipment per month/per year.

Tanks, IFVs, eventually F16s, artillery, drones, going all the way down to artillery shells.

 

How does Ukraine plan for 2024 when they might have 0, 10, or 100 of something? How do they utilize what they have now and properly allocate it if they don't know when new will arrive? Ukraine is fighting an actual peer war and western aid is being treated like spring cleaning. "Oh we will deliver this to the donation center when we have time"

So here is the thing...the honest brutal truth.  This is as ad hoc a force generation framework I have ever seen.  Less coherent than whatever the RA has left to be perfectly blunt.  And the brutal truth is that it is going to stay that way.

It is not "spring cleaning" it is the fact that a fully integrated, back-thru-to-industry supply/force generation chain is not going to happen for this war.  Maybe if we get  a decade of frozen conflict we could get it in motion but no single nation or group of nations is set up to deliver a coherent iron mountain with an iron river behind it to Ukraine.  People point to tank parks in Ft Hood and say "ya but", well that is the US strategic armor reserve and it would be political suicide to give that away.  Other nations have given a lot are are dipping into strategic stocks already because they can get away with it.

There are no national defence industrial complexes built for this war.  There might not even be after it.  No one is going to be able to send the quantities of equipment, the supporting elements nor do the training to the levels that the UA likely need to break this thing.  Hell, given what I have seen I am not sure the technology exists yet to break this thing.  We may be truly stuck.

So ya, basically not going to happen with respect to coherent integrated "guarantees."  Sucks, but Ukraine needs to plan accordingly I am afraid.  The best shot may have been last summer, or maybe this winter when the ground freezes along with several thousand Russian troops.    

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Other nations have given a lot are are dipping into strategic stocks already because they can get away with it.

In part because they know the US isn't giving away its stocks.

I'm not sure Poland would have been so generous if the US announced drawing down its strategic reserves and also not ramping up production.  Why?  Because some of what Poland gave up is going to be made good by US replacements.  No replacements?  No giving up what is in hand. Poland (and any other nation) would be negligent if they gave up capabilities without a ready sense of replacement and/or backup.

The solution for the West's reluctance/inability to have massive stocks of weaponry for both its own needs and unexpected support of other is to abandon the high priced, low production mentality it has adopted over the last 40 years.  Focus on relatively inexpensive and prolific things like drones and PGMs, then build the HELL out of them.  $1.2b for several hundred thousands drones and PGMs instead of 1 laser defense system per year for 4 years should be a no brainer.  Heavy emphasis on "should be".

Steve

[dan/california]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

In part because they know the US isn't giving away its stocks.

I'm not sure Poland would have been so generous if the US announced drawing down its strategic reserves and also not ramping up production.  Why?  Because some of what Poland gave up is going to be made good by US replacements.  No replacements?  No giving up what is in hand. Poland (and any other nation) would be negligent if they gave up capabilities without a ready sense of replacement and/or backup.

The solution for the West's reluctance/inability to have massive stocks of weaponry for both its own needs and unexpected support of other is to abandon the high priced, low production mentality it has adopted over the last 40 years.  Focus on relatively inexpensive and prolific things like drones and PGMs, then build the HELL out of them.  $1.2b for several hundred thousands drones and PGMs instead of 1 laser defense system per year for 4 years should be a no brainer.  Heavy emphasis on "should be".

Steve

Just a reminder that BFC has as much power as anyone/thing outside the Senate Armed Services Committee to make that happen. The way the next games portrays modern and near future warfare is just about the biggest truly independent pressure factor out there. No pressure or anything...

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

In part because they know the US isn't giving away its stocks.

I'm not sure Poland would have been so generous if the US announced drawing down its strategic reserves and also not ramping up production.  Why?  Because some of what Poland gave up is going to be made good by US replacements.  No replacements?  No giving up what is in hand. Poland (and any other nation) would be negligent if they gave up capabilities without a ready sense of replacement and/or backup.

The solution for the West's reluctance/inability to have massive stocks of weaponry for both its own needs and unexpected support of other is to abandon the high priced, low production mentality it has adopted over the last 40 years.  Focus on relatively inexpensive and prolific things like drones and PGMs, then build the HELL out of them.  $1.2b for several hundred thousands drones and PGMs instead of 1 laser defense system per year for 4 years should be a no brainer.  Heavy emphasis on "should be".

Steve

Related to your post.

Northrop Grumman explores ammunition co-production in Poland (reuters.com)

 

Edited November 16, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[kimbosbread]

32 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Just a reminder that BFC has as much power as anyone/thing outside the Senate Armed Services Committee to make that happen. The way the next games portrays modern and near future warfare is just about the biggest truly independent pressure factor out there. No pressure or anything...

Or videos demoing a swarm of drones flying through the forest autonomously. Or a US ship being taken out by a drone swarm.

EDIT: On second thought, that will justification for even more expensive lasers.

Edited November 16, 2023 by kimbosbread

[Harmon Rabb]

I brought up this fine organization before. Was hesitant to bring this campaign up because I don't speak Czech and did not know if it was real. Guess it is.

Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter for Ukraine (weaponstoukraine.com)

Edited November 16, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Bearstronaut]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

This part.  All war is sacrifice.  And in this regard the Western world is perhaps as weak as it has ever been.  Our willingness to sacrifice anything for greater causes is woefully weak.  We will make a lot of noise, cancel people, whatever.  But actually sacrificing something that hurts...no freakin way.  We are three generations into entitlement and no empire in the history of the planet has done well when it pushes the sacrifice to "lessers" (be they internal or external).

Tax havens, choking out social programs, defence spending that does not loop back into our own pockets.  Gawd help us, oil, gas and " export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia."

I am not even sure we know how to really give sacrifice anymore.  If someone told people they could cure cancer and have world peace but would have to give up their cellphones, I am pretty sure I know which way it  would go.

So as to Russia, and China for that matter, what is most disconcerting is that this war (and maybe the next one) are highlighting that our adversaries still know how to sacrifice.  Ukraine knows how to sacrifice.  I mean really pay the red coins to achieve something.  In Russia's case it is utterly evil, immoral and illegal by any angle, but say what you will, the Russian's still know how to sacrifice.

So we can talk about Glass Dragons, real estate bubbles, Russian doomed trajectories and demographic statistics all day long.  But until we recognize that our adversaries are willing to lose more than us in order to gain, we are in trouble.  we can't get people to wear masks and take free vaccines in the middle of the worst pandemic since 1918, how can we expect them to endure famine and war?

My biggest fear is that by the time we figure it out, it will too late.  We are like the European powers in 1899, rich entitled and heading off a cliff...all arguing about who should go first.  

To be completely honest I think millions upon millions of Americans would be perfectly willing to sacrifice our prison population and poverty-stricken ethnic minorities to the jaws of war.

[Vet 0369]

On 11/13/2023 at 4:51 PM, The_Capt said:

Heh, well it depends how one listens.  Often to what is not said.  A trained ear can pick up some very good stuff in these BS venues.  Why?  Because we try and hide our truths in our lies.

I would trust this source over other "expert analysis" on quite a few occasions.  It can be the really good stuff, it just takes longer. 

It can be quite amazing how many sources an adversary can exploit for intelligence gathering. Future U.S.President John F. Kennedy was almost cashiered by the U.S. Navy during WW II because he was having an assail with a known German agent. Every young service member is reminded that “loose lips sink ships,” but most don’t realize that some of the most dangerous are “service employees” such as waiters, cleaning services, (previously elevator operators), etc. because we tend to discount their presence, and they are invisible to us. When I was stationed at MCAS Iwakuni in Japan, we’d sometimes go to Kintai Castle, about 10 kilometers from the base, and home to the only original five-span bridge left in Japan. We’d clime to the top of the Castle, which was on top of a “mountain,” to an observation deck. You could put a one yen piece into a telescope and zoom in to see the entire base, including the flight line. One day, a Staff Sgt. in our Squadron S2 (intelligence) happened to zoom in on one of our F-4Js (a fighter bomber that was so new and advanced in 1970 that the Navy didn’t allow any to be deployed into Vietnam, while the Avionics Marines had the Radome open to work on the radar, and he could see many of the Secret components of the radar. As soon as he got back to the Squadron, the C.O. ordered that tents be used to hide the radar if the radome had to be opened on the flight line. Bottom line is that hundreds, if not thousands of Marines over the years used those same observation telescopes to look at the base over the years, but never put two and two together.

Most intelligence isn’t gathered in one fell swoop, but by piecing together a picture from a multitude of unrelated sources. @TheCp’t and @LongLeftFlank both have different ways of forming their “intentions assessments,” but both work, so there shouldn’t be any “comments from the peanut gallery” about how effective either are.

[Twisk]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

snip

In a literal sense its not spring cleaning but the deliveries are coming in stops and starts and, as you said ad-hoc fashion.

I generally don't buy that its political unfeasible. You don't need an "Arsenal of Democracy" for there to be benefits of regular deliveries. The U.S. has delivered 31 Abrams and I think 100 BFVs. Which is good but if the U.S. then said "you will receive ~3 Abrams and ~5 BFVs per month for two years"  you create a guarantee for Ukrainian planning and consumption without breaking the bank or reserve.

 

They have 100 BFVs and since July or whatever they would have received ~25 and that isn't huge numbers but its a known number.

 

 

[akd]

Failed VBIED attempt (or possible intentional use for breaching):

 

[dan/california]

33 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Or videos demoing a swarm of drones flying through the forest autonomously. Or a US ship being taken out by a drone swarm.

EDIT: On second thought, that will justification for even more expensive lasers.

I should have specified that I was excluding actual battlefield results. I don't think videos have that much weight, there are just too many of them.

[Kinophile]

https://news.usni.org/2023/11/15/a-brief-summary-of-the-battle-of-the-black-sea

Interesting overview. 

Taking bets on how long before we see UKR kamikaze naval drones launching swarms of kamikaze air drones as they approach their target... 

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, Twisk said:

In a literal sense its not spring cleaning but the deliveries are coming in stops and starts and, as you said ad-hoc fashion.

I generally don't buy that its political unfeasible. You don't need an "Arsenal of Democracy" for there to be benefits of regular deliveries. The U.S. has delivered 31 Abrams and I think 100 BFVs. Which is good but if the U.S. then said "you will receive ~3 Abrams and ~5 BFVs per month for two years"  you create a guarantee for Ukrainian planning and consumption without breaking the bank or reserve.

 

They have 100 BFVs and since July or whatever they would have received ~25 and that isn't huge numbers but its a known number.

 

 

So a predictable trickle?  How many systems are Ukraine losing per month?  People have been flashing a bunch of infographics to show how bad it is.  It isn't a single line of "3 Abrams and 5 BVF per month" it is integrating about a dozen bilateral lines, all with political issues. Or a single nation takes on the whole bill, and we are back to political.

Fixing this (eg breaking deadlock) is a lot more than 3 Abrams per month.  Stops and starts are how democratic nations work is the other issue.  Few democracies are set up to pass multi-year plans on something like this without more formal diplomatic agreements in place.  

Buy it or don't, it is very likely going to happen this way.  I honestly think Ukraine is likely at the point where it can no longer "hope" things will get smoother with respect to western support.  "What they should do" is leaving the building.  Best case is we are able to sustain the support in motion but it likely will not be predictable or in a smooth strategic supply chain across the dozen+ nations all shoveling "stuff" at the problem.

Big spenders are coming under domestic pressure as post-pandemic economic chickens are coming home to roost.  About the only thing that may remain predictable, and it is probably the most important thing, is money.  We talk about tanks, guns and stuff but money keeps the Ukrainian economy afloat right now. 

[cyrano01]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So we can talk about Glass Dragons, real estate bubbles, Russian doomed trajectories and demographic statistics all day long.  But until we recognize that our adversaries are willing to lose more than us in order to gain, we are in trouble.  we can't get people to wear masks and take free vaccines in the middle of the worst pandemic since 1918, how can we expect them to endure famine and war?

 

My biggest fear is that by the time we figure it out, it will too late.  We are like the European powers in 1899, rich entitled and heading off a cliff...all arguing about who should go first.  

Tend to agree regarding our societal level lack of appetite for sacrifice in the 'West', that said a comparison with fin de siècle Edwardian Europe has its limits. Entitled those societies may have been but subsequent events did not show a lack of willingness to sacrifice, however badly directed or misguided.

I've a suspicion that perhaps they were rather more cohesive and obedient to authority than today.

 

[mosuri]

Continuing on the sanctions topic, this can be rather significant if it becomes more than just words: Denmark might start inspecting russian tankers passing Storebaelt: https://maritime-executive.com/article/denmark-may-begin-checking-russian-tankers-insurance-in-baltic

If it came to altogether blocking primorsk as an oil terminal, russia could maybe divert some pipeline oil to arctic direction. But I don't know if that route would have comparable capacity. primorsk is pretty major.

My crystal ball says that if EU really throttles the Baltic route for russian oil, some of those poor old vessels will have an accident, either spill a bit on the shores of Copenhagen or knock on the Storebaelt bridge. But the crystal ball isn't sure which one.