How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

48 minutes ago, Hapless said:

If no one can attack the result is... peace?

I mean, caveats ahoy and not necessarily a warm, fun peace that everyone enjoys... maybe more like the 90s where it's 'peace' if you live in the right places and people living everywhere else double down on that asymmetry thing.

Or a grinding war of Exhaustion.  Guy named Bowdish did a long history view and came up with 5 basic military strategies:

- Extermination (not used as much these days but does happen), complete removal of an opponent bottom to top.  Mongols were really good at this one.

- Exhaustion.  Essentially fighting until one side can no longer hold it together on a societal scale. Think end of WW1.

- Annihilation.   The destruction of an opponents ability to fight.  Two sub methods here: Attrition and Dislocation.  Attrition is basically wearing down until military failure happens.  Corrosion is a modern spin on this theme, think of it as rapid precise Attrition.  Dislocation is Manoeuvre Warfare, out tempo, out move and fracture while imposing your own order.

- Intimidation.  The land of Deterrence and Coercion.  However there are examples of Compellance in this space as well.

- Subversion.  We have talked a lot about this one and all that Grey Zone stuff.

So both sides in this war have tried Annihilation and they may have taken it as far as it can go.  Manoeuvre is a distant memory.  Attrition is happening but we may have even run out of options room here.  So we are likely down to Exhaustion.  Keep in mind this is deeper than military Attrition, the calculus is different.  It is essentially draining things like human capita, industrial capacity and economics.  One bleeds an opponent out an a national scale, slowly.  Will becomes very important in Exhaustion and this is why Russia will likely try and keep the conflict in this arena - Putin figures that Russia can take more, longer than the West is willing to give.  He is basically playing chicken with his own society.  Of all the crap he has done, this is probably the most irresponsible: he is betting that a nuclear power won’t totally collapse before the West pulls back.  That is bigger than his or Russian insular BS as we are talking Sum of All Fears stuff.

But here we are.  The good news is that the support bill for the UA will likely go down drastically as defensive warfare will be prioritized.  And as Russia has demonstrated one can basically hold that together with landmines and bailing twine [aside: I wonder what Ukraine and the Wests landmine stocks look like?].

Or maybe peace breaks out.  A dirty unsettled peace that will never heal over.  We will very likely do this again in 10 years or so unless we can cauterize.

Edited November 8, 2023 by The_Capt

[cesmonkey]

48 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Last one I promise, good news but not locked yet. 

 

 

 

https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/4175

The committee "marked it up"  yesterday, but I'm not sure of the real status:

https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/markup/hfac-markup-on-various-measures-3/

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

Minor update on shell production.

 

[JonS]

This is a variation of the mass vs precision thing.

In the paper-scissors-rock of modern warfare, precision artillery beats mass artillery, as we have already repeatedly seen proven over the past 20+ months.

Tl;dr: I'd much rather have/be supported by a Western artillery system with fewer shells than a Russian system with more shells.

Edited November 8, 2023 by JonS

[Tenses]

You also need to count in the shells, which are detonated before firing. Ukraine is very helpful with that to their Russian comrades. Saves a lot of effort with bringing shells to the frontline, when you can blow them en masse while stockpiled. 

[danfrodo]

Great points above JonS & Tenses: shell production deficit is not the whole picture.  

[Battlefront.com]

32 minutes ago, Tenses said:

You also need to count in the shells, which are detonated before firing. Ukraine is very helpful with that to their Russian comrades. Saves a lot of effort with bringing shells to the frontline, when you can blow them en masse while stockpiled. 

Yes, good point.  I was thinking just the other day with the big hit in Donetsk... "cripes, when will the Russians learn!"

Related, how many of the shells Russia produces or gets from NK or Iran don't work as intended?  We have seen Russians complaining that their ammo sucks.  I know NATO ammo isn't error free, but I think it's safe to assume it's more reliable by comparison.  I don't think the number of duds is huge, but I do bet it is statistically significant.

Steve

[poesel]

China builds the first drone carrier (article in German).

https://www.wiwo.de/technologie/wirtschaft-von-oben/wirtschaft-von-oben-235-chinesische-marine-china-will-den-ersten-drohnentraeger-der-welt-bauen/29465318.html

Seems logical to have such a thing.

[alison]

The Type 076 looks a bit like a traditional aircraft carrier, just smaller, and (as mentioned in the German article) has been planned for several years. Here is an English-language article: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/whispers-of-076-chinas-drone-carrying-assault-carrier/ There are several prototypes and models floating around in this direction, but I'm not sure how many are realistic attempts and how many are just the usual janky mock-ups from entrepreneurs trying to land those lucrative government research deals.

One thing has already hit the waves is the "civilian" drone mothership 珠海云. Haven't had much luck finding an English language source that isn't paywalled, so you might have to make do with notorious state media Global Times: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202301/1283744.shtml What's cool about it is that the ship itself is also autonomous, a bit like those drone-carrying-drone flying mothership prototypes that have also popped up in recent years.

It's definitely a pretty exciting industry, insofar as robots-that-kill-people can be considered exciting. I wish there were some English language Perun-like chaps talking about developments in the space, but perhaps the fact we don't appear to have that is evidence that although there are lots of rumors and prototypes, none of it is quite ready for prime time yet.

Edited November 8, 2023 by alison
typo

[Kraft]

2 hours ago, JonS said:

This is a variation of the mass vs precision thing.

In the paper-scissors-rock of modern warfare, precision artillery beats mass artillery, as we have already repeatedly seen proven over the past 20+ months.

Tl;dr: I'd much rather have/be supported by a Western artillery system with fewer shells than a Russian system with more shells.

Should be kept in mind that things like Excalibur rounds are easily thrown off by gps jamming and can hardly be used in certain areas right now.

Edited November 8, 2023 by Kraft

[JonS]

There is more to a system than one round.

There is more to precision than gps.

Edited November 8, 2023 by JonS

[Harmon Rabb]

Is Russia going to repay them in the oh so valuable rubble? Did I spell that right? no matter these days.

[The_Capt]

27 minutes ago, JonS said:

There is more to a system than one round.

There is more to precision than gps.

This is an excellent point.  We have seen some incredible gunnery on the UA side. Hi res observation, precise target location, communications and onboard modern FCS really mean a battery can achieve in a single round per gun salvo what it took 6 to do in the past.  Not everything has to be PGM to be precise.

Edited November 8, 2023 by The_Capt

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This is an excellent point.  We have seen some incredible gunnery on the UA side. Hi res observation, precise target location, communications and onboard modern FCS really mean a battery can achieve in a single round per gun salvo what it took 6 to do in the past.  Not everything has to be PGM to be precise.

Nobody should ever forget this:

At the time of the infamous Siverskyi Donets river crossings Ukraine had no PGMs and no armed drones except for a few Bayraktars.  What it did have was some really bright junior and mid level officers who had initiative and excellent communications.  Oh, and an unarmed drone to have a bit of a peek-a-boo.

To refresh people's memory, Ukraine figured Russia was up to something, they asked an engineer officer where the best place for the crossing might be, he looked on a map (Google Maps for all we know!), and had a drone sent there to check it out.  Sure enough, a crossing was being established.  They called in regular old artillery and the rest is history.  As it was for the other half dozen attempts.

In this case PGMs were not necessary.  Normal artillery in the hands of competent gunners was all that was necessary to slaughter an extremely large force.  "Precise enough" works just fine.

Steve

P.S. I just noticed Google Maps has updated this area.  It shows the remains of the pontoon bridges are still there:

48.95056, 38.22606

[Fenris]

An investigation into claimed corruption and fraud in UKR military procurement.  Haven't finished watching it yet, is a bit hammy with camera effects etc, but an interesting exercise in following the money.  Obviously I can't vouch for the accuracy of the story, UKR friends might be able to shed light on that.  I'm mainly going off this channel having had some good reports in the past.    Has english subs.

Quote

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine spent two billion UAH on three contracts for the purchase of ammunition.

This is a contract with the Ukrainian company "Lviv Arsenal" for the supply of 100,000 mortar mines ($37.6 million), with the Croatian WDG promet – for 30,000 tank rounds ($32.5 million) and with the Slovak Sevotech – for the purchase of 15,000 sets of helmets and body armor (€13 million). All three contracts failed.

At first glance, they are not related to each other, but in fact they are all parts of one big story. Hromadske investigators found out where the money went, why there is still no ammunition and who is to blame.

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Nobody should ever forget this:

At the time of the infamous Siverskyi Donets river crossings Ukraine had no PGMs and no armed drones except for a few Bayraktars.  What it did have was some really bright junior and mid level officers who had initiative and excellent communications.  Oh, and an unarmed drone to have a bit of a peek-a-boo.

To refresh people's memory, Ukraine figured Russia was up to something, they asked an engineer officer where the best place for the crossing might be, he looked on a map (Google Maps for all we know!), and had a drone sent there to check it out.  Sure enough, a crossing was being established.  They called in regular old artillery and the rest is history.  As it was for the other half dozen attempts.

In this case PGMs were not necessary.  Normal artillery in the hands of competent gunners was all that was necessary to slaughter an extremely large force.  "Precise enough" works just fine.

Steve

P.S. I just noticed Google Maps has updated this area.  It shows the remains of the pontoon bridges are still there:

48.95056, 38.22606

If I recall correctly, the engie in question personally recon'ed the area, he didn't just rely on drone and gmaps. I believe he did this just before the assaults began, but after the initial RUS bombardment (I think?). Mark 1 eyeball and all that.

Edited November 9, 2023 by Kinophile

[Harmon Rabb]

Sweet, Denmark is letting know Putin we are not going to abandon Ukraine. I hope other NATO countries will demonstrate similar long term commitments.

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

If I recall correctly, the engie in question personally recon'ed the area, he didn't just rely on drone and gmaps. I believe he did this just before the assaults began, but after the initial RUS bombardment (I think?). Mark 1 eyeball and all that.

Correct!  Thanks for the reminder!  Order of events were:

1. Area commanders had intel that Russian units were massing on the other side of the river somewhere.
2. He was asked to predict where they might land.  Based on maps and the intel reports he focused on Bilohorkiva and neighboring Hryhorivka
3. Along with recon elements, he went to explore the two in person.
4. He concluded the most likely landing spot was a specific place in Bilohorkiva (which it was)
5. Further, based on various factors he estimated what the Russian operation would consist of and warned the local defending unit to be on the alert for motor boat engine sounds.
6. The defending unit heard them and that triggered the massive artillery and even aviation response

The landing furthest west (Dronivka) was stumbled upon, IIRC.  Someone heard something and they sent a couple of guys to see what was up.  They found it and artillery and direct fire smashed them.

That said, when there was all kinds of confusion about where the Russians were crossing it didn't take me long to identify the logical places using Google Maps.  I did use the few pics that were available to help geolocate, but I have to say it wasn't too hard to see confirm them simply by looking for where roads existed on both sides of the river.  There weren't that many places.

Anyhoo, my point is you don't need precision munitions if you have precision ISR and the ability to effectively leverage it.

Steve

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Anyhoo, my point is you don't need precision munitions if you have precision ISR and the ability to effectively leverage it.

Steve

Precision munitions aren't even that useful without precision ISR.  Without the ISR you might get nice bombardment patterns, but no guarantee you're hitting anything useful.  With the precision ISR you can much more effectively use less precise artillery (and other stuff) as long as you account for the limits of your equipment.

[Zeleban]

The situation on the left bank of the Dnieper from Konstantin Mashovets:

You can treat the active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in any way you like. Consider this a “PR gamble with blood”, a pointless waste of resources, or seriously consider the possibility of a “breakthrough to Crimea” in this direction.

But so far, real events indicate that the Russian command in the Crimean-Tavrian direction, at least, received a significant “headache” that was clearly not planned by them. This is already a fact, no matter how you evaluate and interpret it.

As far as I understand, everything there is going exactly “according to plan”, however, obviously not to the Russian one:

- At least 2 tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the road and railway Antonov bridges have already turned into 1, but more than the previous two. Moreover, apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding him quite tightly.

- In the area of the village of Krynki, units of the enemy’s 26th motorized rifle regiment apparently still hold part of the forest south of the village and the north-eastern part of the village itself, but the situation there for the Russians is clearly developing, somehow “in the wrong direction.” Moreover, even the Storm-Z, driven from the direction of Korsunok, does not help. In turn, several units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russians tried to “probe the Ukrainian bridgehead” in this area, as they say, head-on, impudently, but it turned out unsuccessfully for them.

- In at least 2 places, the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the section between Oleshki and Novaya Kakhovka managed to cut the coastal road that goes from Novaya Kakhovka to Oleshki, which, in itself, is a little strange. But it will be even stranger if Ukrainian units go to the next road E-58. And they have such an opportunity, in which case the situation will change completely, radically.

– Along the Podstepnoe – Peschanivka line there is also some “vanity and disorder”. In the area of Chaika Island, the enemy (probably units of the 177th separate marine regiment and the 171st separate airborne assault battalion from the 7th airborne assault division) are trying to hold the first position of the main line of defense. It is quite possible that separate units of the enemy’s 205th Infantry Motorized Rifle Brigade are also involved there. But, despite this, even judging by open sources, the situation there is also heating up for the enemy, especially north of the village of Podstepnoe.

In short, the enemy somehow did not have an effective line of defense from the Dnieper flood plains. How does Teplinsky and Company react to all these events? Of course, in the typical Russian style:

 

- Transferring additional forces and assets to the “dangerous area”;

- Organizing and conducting numerous series of attacks in 24/7 mode.

Moreover, the introduction of formations, units and subunits into battle occurs in the same way as always, “as they concentrate and deploy.”

 

We are talking, first of all, about two main formations that the enemy obviously intends to use to “liquidate the Dnieper crisis” - the 70th motorized rifle division from the 18th combined arms army, as well as the 7th airborne assault division

[Zeleban]

For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that I already wrote that from the 7th Airborne Division in this direction, until recently there were essentially only three battalions (171st separate air assault battalion, 104th separate tank battalion and 162nd separate reconnaissance battalion). The main forces of the division (3 of its air assault regiments) were, at one time, transferred “near Verbovoe” to take part in flank counterattacks against the advancing Ukrainian group.

Well, now, given the fact that with the “flank counterattacks” in the Tokmak direction, nothing meaningful happened anyway, and the Ukrainian marines staged a fatal counter-strike for the Russian motorized rifles and mobs in the Dnieper floodplains, Monsieur Teplinsky clearly demanded from his “senior commanders” return this formation of airborne troops “back” to him. Let me remind you that the regular position of this general is commander of the airborne troops of the Russian Federation.

However, the fact is that the Russian command is now unable to pull out the main forces of the 7th Airborne Division from under Verbovoy in the Tokmak direction “purely physically.” The division's 108th and 247th air assault regiments are closely involved in the fighting. And the 56th Airborne Regiment, which has already been reorganized “almost anew” 2 times, can send “to Teplinsky” right now no more than 2 of its battalions. Although, probably, “a little later,” this Feodosian rabble will go to the Dnieper in full force (if it hasn’t already).

As for the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 2 of its motorized rifle regiments are ALREADY involved - the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment is still unsuccessfully trying to push our marines back from Krynki to the flooded areas, and the 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is probably included in the second echelon of the tactical group operating along the line Peschanka - Podstepnoe, north of the village of Radensk, somewhere southwest of the village of Chelburda. At least one small infantry regiment and another tank regiment (tp) of this division are also “roaming somewhere.”

A month ago there was information about the tank regiment that it was continuing to be “reformed” in northern Crimea, and the motorized rifle regiment was allegedly concentrated in the area of Skadovsk.

Be that as it may, the enemy will soon be forced to “deal with the problem of Ukrainian bridgeheads” on the Dnieper. After all, if they leave this issue to chance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will still be able to get a section of coastline on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of Russian artillery will not reach. It’s not for me to explain to you what it will be.

Naturally, it still has to be reliably covered from the air. On this score, I also have certain, far from unfounded (judging by the information coming from the troops) hopes.

[Zeleban]

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.

Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:

- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”

- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).

- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

[TheVulture]

Interesting (if long) video of a talk on nuclear escalation in Ukraine and deterrence stability. Some interesting stuff about nuclear threats in October 2022 too.

 

 

Edited November 9, 2023 by TheVulture

[LongLeftFlank]

9 hours ago, Zeleban said:

“First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days... the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment..."

 

[Kinophile]

9 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

 

[Caveats galore] These were classic Soviet tactics in WW2, I believe? In the later, Bagration stage I mean. Drove the Germans bananas because they had to squash even tiny bridgeheads immediately before they rapidly grew. The Soviets, I believe, then poured men into whichever bridgeheads had not been squashed, presenting the impossible task of a multitude of danger points to the overstretched defenders.

Allied approach was a lot more deliberate, focussed and aimed to overwhelm locally with a massive force, while Soviets aimed to overwhelm operationally (sorta) with smaller forces, expanding whichever one proved successful. Former was less loss-prone, the latter was costly but almost guaranteed success, eventually.

There other points along the Dnipr where the ZSU has bridgeheads. Perhaps we'll see them expanding soon...