How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Would you put the UKs recon-strike concept and urban phalanx experiments in that bucket? On the face of it there are some pretty radical changes afoot. 

I think it is probable that anything any military anywhere in the world is currently pursuing is not what is needed to address unmanned vehicles.  That said, I am not familiar enough with the UK's new concepts in enough detail to point out how this sweeping statement might apply to them specifically.  I'm going to be spending a lot of time with these new UK concepts in the next few years, so it won't be long before I have a more informed opinion.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3569812/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/
 

Quote

The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $150 million, include:

•            Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
•            AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
•            Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
•            Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
•            155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
•            Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
•            Javelin anti-armor systems;
•            More than 2 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
•            Night vision devices;
•            Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing;
•            Cold weather gear; and
•            Spare parts, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

 

[Vet 0369]

3 hours ago, akd said:

Another Russian mine-roller tank working and dying (warning, more flaming Russians at a distance):

 

Thank you for the warning!

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

The key point here seems to be missed.  Russia was able to maintain the attack on Bakhmut because the Russian population believed:

1. Wagner - highly paid volunteers and it's none of our business what they do with them
2. Convicts - nobody cares about them, so good riddance

Guess what two things Russia now lacks?  Yup, same two things.

If Russia engages in a meat grinder offensive on the scale of Bakhmut it will not go well if they suffer similar casualties.  First, the MoD will be responsible for replacing each dead soldier and it seems to be concerned it's running out of options on that front (see previous comments about rounding up immigrants).  Second, there is no ready pool of tens of thousands of completely disposable manpower any more. 

Therefore, the Russian regime will suffer consequences of some sort or another if they try for another Bakhmut.

Steve

Now all of my opinions here are just conjecture but I do not think anything outside the main 2 population centers matters much for Putins power

I think a while back, someone posted an article about Russian losses calculated per population center, where the two big cities were bearing 0.x% of the deaths (vs double digits in the eastern parts), I doubt it has increased much, as the Regime carefully keeps these people away from danger.

Replacing dead convicts with immigrants is just an extention of the previous, low political cost option, taking just 1% of the male muslims would already replace 150k, without additional buryatis,..., convicts and so on that will still be available, there is a years long way to go at current loss rates before Moskow and StP population start to feel it. 

Now long story short I enjoy watching them burn and die but I do not believe anymore that human cost is what will deter Russia from continuing this before Western support ends.

Comparing Vietnam US sentiment or Soviet Afghanistan reactions, for some reason there is just not the same reaction.

Current parties claim support and years long financing but political landscape is fragile in Europe and US and even current support is enough to retain more or less balance, but pushing through another 30, 50, 100km^2,.. of mined land - I do not see that possible with current donations, judging by the >100 vehicle losses taking just Robotyne

Edited October 26, 2023 by Kraft

[Armorgunner]

3 hours ago, akd said:

Another Russian mine-roller tank working and dying (warning, more flaming Russians at a distance):

 

Whats funny, is that its probably their own mines they got decimated by 

[zinz]

4 hours ago, Kraft said:

Nobody cares for Russian convicts, not even russians care about them. Its free manpower to throw away with no families to pay or suppress. They come at minimal political costs to Putin, while achieving goals just the same. 

This war is not won by reducing Russian penal colonies to 0, or whoever minority edge group they will gang press into service next, I hear Muslim minorities are on the menu now.

On the other hand.. Loosing fortress town Avdiivka and having a retreat slaughter through a narrow path like this, overlooked by the heap and FPV drones,..,.. would be worse than Soledar collapse in scale and severity.

Well but migrants and Muslim minorities are not a great source of disposable people. It's to argue that on average both groups are less invested in Ruskih Mir. I bet that most migrants will have dual citizenship. So pressing them into service will have negative with their original countries. Russias influence in central Asia is already declining. And you only need a few in their home country to make the headlines to seriously damage relations and future worker migrations. 

We have already had some shootings on training grounds last year by ethnic minorities after the mobilization when those were pressed into the service and didn't come willingly. 

Don't forget either with the prisoners or was not only the stick to get them signed up but also the carrot of being free after 6 months. Most complaints you see are not why are we fighting this senseless war, but why are we not treated fairly. (Lack of training, lack of promised compensation, etc. ). So what is on offer for the migrants besides the stick? Russia can barely keep their ethnic Russians in the fight with barrier troops, torture prisons and whatever else they can do that no one leaves. 

At least my understanding of the social deal that is going on inside Russia is, that you get paid handsomely if you go to fight. At least for the low income people. Mix in the fatalism of many Russian males that they will dye young anyways and it seems like right now Russia can recruit enough guys to keep it's manpower up. This does come with some downsides though. This redistributed money has to come from somewhere. The middle class is mostly gone. Many moved outside of Russia last year. Over time these redistributions will eat into the pockets of the oligarchs. So they might at some point have enough of Putin and get rid of him to continue robbing the poor. On the other hand if the Russian regime fails to hold up its end of the bargain with the compensations for those dying at the front this might spark civil unrest. 

Also the usage of convicts was not free in political cost. The carrot of getting out of prison and being a free man was a necessary part of the whole endeavor. But the cost of all the rapes and murders will accumulate only now. Sure you can suppress all the reporting on those incidents but that takes time and resources away from things that the Russian regime would much rather like to do. 

 

About the specific situation in Avdiivka:

Compared to Bachmut last year Russia is using and loosing a lot of vehicles. This might be a relevant positive point from the western countries that want to see Russias military potential diminished long term. 

Of this will turn into a collapse or a controlled withdrawal or a stand by Ukraine is still very much up in the air. That depends on how much Russia is willing to commit. Also with for Russia much more limited resources like plains or artillery. 

[Harmon Rabb]

34 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3569812/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/
 

 

Denmark also keeps the support going.

[Harmon Rabb]

Warning: Graphic video.

[Beleg85]

Rare example of hand-to-hand combat from Russian clip. Russians attack digged Ukrainian, leading muscovite runs out of ammo and attacks defender with end of his rifle.

 

7 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Warning: Graphic video.

Very old video, from 8 months or so.

[Harmon Rabb]

2 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Very old video, from 8 months or so.

Explains why the twitter user used the word archive. I'll admit this is a new video for me, never seen it before, really highlights the tricky process of accepting surrenders.

[Harmon Rabb]

 General Zaluzhnyi in a meeting. Lots of Coca-Cola bottles were spotted.

 

Edited October 26, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Battlefront.com]

49 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Now all of my opinions here are just conjecture but I do not think anything outside the main 2 population centers matters much for Putins power

And yet, no mobilization in 2023 so far despite all the obvious military need of it.  Putin's ability to abuse rural areas is not unlimited.

49 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Replacing dead convicts with immigrants is just an extention of the previous, low political cost option, taking just 1% of the male muslims would already replace 150k, without additional buryatis,..., convicts and so on that will still be available, there is a years long way to go at current loss rates before Moskow and StP population start to feel it.

Zinz covered some of these issues already, but I'll go a bit further.

Prisoners were a literally captive market.  Immigrants, on the other hand, have a choice of going home or not coming to Russia in the first place.  It's the difference between trying to grab 12 chickens from a small hen house and trying to chase 12 free range chickens.  You are going to get vastly better results with the former than the latter.  Apologies for the dehumanizing analogy, but if anybody has tried to do either (or seen others try) you will know it's a good analogy.

Immigrant workers do things for the Russian economy, prisoners took things.  People understand this basic difference, but even if they don't they will once services that require immigrant workers become under staffed.  It might take a while to cause significant problems, but it will appear pretty quickly.  Imagine a company with 80% ethnic Russians and 20% migrant workers.  Guess what will happen to those 80% if they lose the 20%?  Unemployed, pay cuts, etc.

And lastly, as Zinz pointed out, the host countries (much of them former Soviet Republics) will make noise about their citizens being grabbed and thrown into Ukraine.  How do I know this?  Because this happened last year when Russia started to go after migrant workers.

So as I said before, Russia already said "hey cool!  Look at this easy pool of manpower!!  We can grab them and nobody will notice".  Well, they noticed and complained so quickly that Russia backed down.  Might they try it again?  Sure, but if they do there will be consequences which it appears the Putin regime is aware of.

Steve

[dan/california]

43 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Warning: Graphic video.

This is at least six months old, maybe more.

 

[cesmonkey]

According to Rybar ...

 

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

And yet, no mobilization in 2023 so far despite all the obvious military need of it.  Putin's ability to abuse rural areas is not unlimited.

Zinz covered some of these issues already, but I'll go a bit further.

Prisoners were a literally captive market.  Immigrants, on the other hand, have a choice of going home or not coming to Russia in the first place.  It's the difference between trying to grab 12 chickens from a small hen house and trying to chase 12 free range chickens.  You are going to get vastly better results with the former than the latter.  Apologies for the dehumanizing analogy, but if anybody has tried to do either (or seen others try) you will know it's a good analogy.

Immigrant workers do things for the Russian economy, prisoners took things.  People understand this basic difference, but even if they don't they will once services that require immigrant workers become under staffed.  It might take a while to cause significant problems, but it will appear pretty quickly.  Imagine a company with 80% ethnic Russians and 20% migrant workers.  Guess what will happen to those 80% if they lose the 20%?  Unemployed, pay cuts, etc.

And lastly, as Zinz pointed out, the host countries (much of them former Soviet Republics) will make noise about their citizens being grabbed and thrown into Ukraine.  How do I know this?  Because this happened last year when Russia started to go after migrant workers.

So as I said before, Russia already said "hey cool!  Look at this easy pool of manpower!!  We can grab them and nobody will notice".  Well, they noticed and complained so quickly that Russia backed down.  Might they try it again?  Sure, but if they do there will be consequences which it appears the Putin regime is aware of.

Steve

The lever those countries have that Russia would feel the fastest is cracking down on sanctions busting shipments being sent through Central Asia.

[Battlefront.com]

Returning to Tatarigami's post previously posted here:

I really appreciate him sharing his thoughts like he did.  I found myself thinking the same things after multiple days of large scale attacks.  It wasn't surprising that they tried something, it was the place and scale of the attack that made me wonder what I might have missed.

Like Tataritgami I have a feeling that my main failings were related to NOT thinking like a Russian enough.  We keep hearing that the Russians are learning and adapting and I keep seeing no evidence of it.  However, I think I've fallen into the trap of thinking that they will.  I also thought that the Russians would rebuild and launch a winter offensive as they did last year.  I also thought they wouldn't try another massed attack as those clearly aren't viable any more (even if one allows for massive casualties).  Why?  Because militarily it makes sense from a Western and even historical perspective.  Putin's regime obviously has a different concept of making sense.

Now the question is if Russia has enough forces available to mount a winter offensive of some sort or if this was basically all they have.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

According to Rybar ...

 

Here's the most interesting thing about this Rybar report:

"Several more Ukrainian brigades from various directions are expected here in the coming days. This creates ideal conditions for a counter-offensive by the Russian Armed Forces in other parts of the front, where the lines will be weakened."

This is exactly what I was saying a few days ago about where the Russians have thinned their lines.  And yet there's been no major Ukrainian counter attacks.

I think things are shaping up to be another Bakhmut in the sense that for a while both sides were unable to do much of anything else.

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

Kind of like Ukraine lost two Neptune missiles on April 14th 2022.

Edit: Anton Gerashchenko posted a video claiming to show the event.

 

Edited October 26, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[LongLeftFlank]

Request to smoke grogs: does anyone here know what the most persistent human generated smokescreen is made of?

It would seem to be titanium tetrachloride, favoured by warships, which "hydrolyzes readily on contact with moist air, producing thick [and low lying] white smoke consisting of droplets of hydrochloric acid and particles of titanium oxychloride." As you'd expect though, "fumes are irritating and unpleasant to breathe", which would not make it a good choice for masking friendlies from drones for long periods. Not sure that there is a 'pleasant to breathe' smoke source, beyond natural morning fogs.

https://academic-accelerator.com/encyclopedia/smoke-screen

This (AI-generated?) aggregator source is rather detailed, except....

One 50 gallon drum of fog oil can cover 60 miles (97 km) of land in 15 minutes. 

This statement is quite obviously rubbish, which unfortunately calls into question the other information collected there, as does the numerous grammar errors and sentence fragments.

...But it's still an important question, not a panacea of course, but one possible tool to create a short-lived 'bubble' around a tactical movement.

Edited October 26, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

29 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Kind of like Ukraine lost two Neptune missiles on April 14th 2022.

Edit: Anton Gerashchenko posted a video claiming to show the event.

 

I would love to see a map of where? Also, these should have been there last April. 

[Lethaface]

On 10/25/2023 at 7:42 PM, kimbosbread said:

Yeah, and then your corridor immediately fills up again with all the things from outside the corridor, and you are back to square 1.

In the current war at least it would also push towards tac nuke escalation, I'd think. 

 

On 10/25/2023 at 8:03 PM, chrisl said:

As already alluded to - high power lasers are typically pulsed.  They might be powered by a system that’s in the kW range and hit GW in pulses that are a few ns long.    And the short pulses typically are putting all the power in a small area virtually instantly, so you get tremendous local heating and ablation with every pulse - you neglected thermal diffusivity in your bierdeckel calculation. For example, you can power a laser that can engrave rock using a 9V consumer battery.

I think his point was that changing only the (type of) battery doesn't change the theoretical maximum output of the laser. But I guess somewhere the discussion diverged beyond the, for this thread, practical information.

[Lethaface]

On 10/25/2023 at 12:40 PM, The_Capt said:

You are baiting me, right?  “Why they fail” is because this guy has zero idea what he is talking about.  Maybe less than zero.  As in, people lose knowledge just by watching his video.

Starting with the flail is the first hint.  A flail is for admin and rear area clearances.  I know some militaries still have them on assault vehicles but everyone in the business agrees they are dumb.  On the modern battlefield the flail is suicide anywhere but clearing parking lots for Bde HQ.  

Minebots - IED work, not for combat clearing.  At least not yet.

Rollers.  Ok, these are not designed to work in isolation.  In fact it is his entire problem.  Minefield clearing is a team sport.  This guy is pointing to player positions and trying to figure out which one is best at “playing football”.  Plough and rollers are the primary breaching systems.  Rollers are designed to 1) detect a minefield, normally through a strike, and 2) prove a minefield after a plough tank has done a breach.  

Every plough tank can only clear a safe lane “that every one must follow”.  Sorry bald YouTube guy we have yet to invent an area clearance plough.  Ploughs are at the center of mechanical breaching.  But they are also tricky and terrain dependent.  Ploughs and rollers are designed to work together in a team.  With their friends, explosive breaching and engineering vehicles.

So opposed minefield breaching is one of the hardest operations to pull off.  Right next to amphib on the difficulty scale.  You normally have multiple breach lane attempts that use the mechanical and explosive systems. Explosive systems still need to be proven after the breach, normally by rollers.  And engineer vehicles for complex obstacles like AT ditches or dragons teeth in the middle of a minefield.  Adding more systems ups the complexity a lot requiring a lot of training and skill to pull off in the time windows needed to be successful.

Breaches fail when the breaching teams fail.  However that is why multiple breaches are done…we expect half to fail from the outset.  Further based on density and cover, one has to scale the number of breaches to try and get a single success.  In Ukraine the densities are so high we are likely talking double NATO doctrine: so Cbt Teams are likely shooting for 4 lane attempts instead of 2.  

Of course this violates concentration of mass restrictions we are seeing on the modern battlefield.  So one either goes small platoon bites and infantry infiltration.  Or establish conditions for a major breaching op, and risk most of one’s breaching assets.  Establishing those conditions has proven to be the hard part.

Minefield breaching operations as we define them in NATO are failing because the battle space is denied to concentration of mass.  RA ISR can even pick up large concentrations of forces and pick out the breaching vehicles.  We have not created the defensive bubble to fix that.  So minefield breaching is not failing because of individual systems.  It is failing because land warfare as we know it is kinda broken right now.  Until we either fix it, or figure out a new way to do these things…we are kinda stuck.

Thanks for the detailed post.
Although I think the video was more directed towards the 'average' audience, who might wonder why Ukraine 'fails' it's counter offensive even though they got some / various mine clearing tanks. Do they suck at it or sumfink? See, we are wasting our assets sending them to Ukraine. 
With that in mind, the video wasn't necessarily that bad imo; he basically said that mine clearing isn't easy and a single vehicle, even the best one, won't do wonders.
Although there indeed might have been a missed opportunity with regards to going into more detail about breaching operations, although like you note he probably doesn't have enough insight into the matter to really make such a video.

And perhaps people just like to see numbered lists of 'which is the best' (instead of a lengthy one going into the proper details of breaching operations (boring! )and headlines like 'why X fails' seem to be rather dominant on youtube channels, probably for a reason ;-). 
In the end he probably made his youtube channel his profession so he needs views/clicks in order to put bread on the table. Overall his channel is at least decently researched, compared to many other channels who just collect lists of wikipedia and make up stuff to satisfy certain pre-convinced theories like how NATO has everything wrong ;-).
For anyone professionally involved in the subjects, especially above the 'i was trained to operate X vehicle/device', his video's are probably worthless. But most youtube video's are, except for some rare videos but they will usually only have 100 viewers and won't come up into anyone's feed unless one specifically searches for it (and knows what to look for to begin with).

Edited October 26, 2023 by Lethaface

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

And yet, no mobilization in 2023 so far despite all the obvious military need of it.  Putin's ability to abuse rural areas is not unlimited.

Zinz covered some of these issues already, but I'll go a bit further.

Prisoners were a literally captive market.  Immigrants, on the other hand, have a choice of going home or not coming to Russia in the first place.  It's the difference between trying to grab 12 chickens from a small hen house and trying to chase 12 free range chickens.  You are going to get vastly better results with the former than the latter.  Apologies for the dehumanizing analogy, but if anybody has tried to do either (or seen others try) you will know it's a good analogy.

Immigrant workers do things for the Russian economy, prisoners took things.  People understand this basic difference, but even if they don't they will once services that require immigrant workers become under staffed.  It might take a while to cause significant problems, but it will appear pretty quickly.  Imagine a company with 80% ethnic Russians and 20% migrant workers.  Guess what will happen to those 80% if they lose the 20%?  Unemployed, pay cuts, etc.

Steve

The problem for Russia is the prisoners were filling two gaps, not just filling in for boots at the front

Russia's worker shortage is so bad the economy is leaning on the Soviet-era practice of using prison labor, think tank says (msn.com)

In 2022, Russia pulled in an estimated 19.1 billion rubles, or around $204 million from forced prison labor, The Moscow Times recently reported, citing dating from Russia's finance ministry. That exceeded estimates that Russia made the year prior, when budget makers anticipated bringing in just 15.8 billion roubles from forced prison labor.

The nation expected to rake in 15.9 billion rubles in 2023 and 16.2 billion rubles in 2024, according to 2021 budget estimates.There are around 26,000 Russian prisoners forced into labor across 1,700 organizations, according to August 2023 data from Russia's Federal Penitentiary Service. That's more than double what was reported in 2022, when 9,300 prisoners were forced to work, according to the research and analytics firm Jamestown Foundation.

 

[Zeleban]

Be that as it may, I can say that times have changed. compared to last year. I had a development project. But because of the war, I decided that civilian projects would not benefit my country and decided to join the Ukrainian armed forces. Moreover, recently chronic diseases are not considered an obstacle to recruitment

[Zeleban]

I can say that I am not afraid of death or injury, but of the stupidity of my command, or of my future colleagues