How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Blazing 88's]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Minefields, and the breaching of same, were a MAJOR element of El Alamein. That is probably the only battle in the North Africa campaign most people can name.

~Raises hand in the air~ I could ramble off approx. 50 prior to even thinking of El Alamein!

We are out there!! 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/15/opinion/ukraine-war-putin.html

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

A Trip to Ukraine Clarified the Stakes. And They’re Huge.

Any kind of formal or informal cease-fire is possible. But what’s impossible is this: Ukraine agreeing to any permanent or temporary end to this conflict without the promise of a NATO Article 5 security guarantee (or some equivalent from the U.S. and Europe). Such a security guarantee would signal to exhausted Ukrainians, foreign investors and the millions of Ukrainian refugees abroad that the war is basically over and Putin can’t just rearm and reinvade without the U.S. and Europe defending Ukraine.

 

It took him a year and a half, but Friedman has seen the light. 

[Kinophile]

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukraine-tackles-artillery-zoo-with-research-based-solution/

 

[Kinophile]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-aims-make-100000-artillery-shells-per-month-2025-us-official-says-2023-09-15/

Finally. 

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

 

It took him a year and a half, but Friedman has seen the light. 

yes, one of the 'serious people', one of the enlightened ones, just now comes to realize this.  jeeeebus, now he'll f-ing lecture us all about it.  Like when Bret Stephens, editorial head of NYT editorial page, finally decided a couple years ago that climate change was real and serious and told us all how serious it was.  uhhhhh, mr arrogant dumb-ss, most of us have known that for a quarter century.  But, anyway, thank you Mr Friedman for letting us peasants know it's ok to know what we've all known the whole time.  dang, I'm a big salty today.  

On a happier note:

2 hours ago, Blazing 88's said:

~Raises hand in the air~ I could ramble off approx. 50 prior to even thinking of El Alamein!

We are out there!! 

Blazing88s restores my hope for humanity.

[chuckdyke]

59 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

finally decided a couple years ago that climate change was real and serious

Yes around the time of WW 2 scenarios people didn't worry about climate change and doctors and nurses had plenty of work. It is the way people can tell the truth. 

[LongLeftFlank]

On 9/13/2023 at 10:24 AM, LongLeftFlank said:

 

https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-236-russias-long-war-economy

Adam Tooze, from late August. Not optimistic about likelihood of Russian economic collapse.

Setting aside the economist-speak, key points:

- Emigration and mobilisation may have cost the Russian workforce c.2% of male workers aged 20-49.... [Up to] 10% of the high tech workforce left Russia in 2022.

- Unlike Ukraine, Russia is running nothing like a total war economy.... [RU military spending] might be in the ballpark of US spending during the Vietnam war, at around 9-10% of GDP. This spending has provided a boost to some industrial sectors.

- The deficit in 2022-2023 of 2% of GDP is a large stimulus but far short of the kind of deficit that would trigger hyperinflation and a currency collapse. Kremlin policymakers still have measures available to sustain the militarised economy. Their planning cooly estimates the probability of rising unemployment and losses of real income.

- The war in Ukraine is woven into the fabric of public life in Russia....

 

Edited September 16, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[chuckdyke]

Who done it? 

 

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-236-russias-long-war-economy

Adam Tooze, from late August. Not optimistic about likelihood of Russian economic collapse.

Setting aside the economist-speak, key points:

- Emigration and mobilisation may have cost the Russian workforce c.2% of male workers aged 20-49.... [Up to] 10% of the high tech workforce left Russia in 2022.

- Unlike Ukraine, Russia is running nothing like a total war economy.... [RU military spending] might be in the ballpark of US spending during the Vietnam war, at around 9-10% of GDP. This spending has provided a boost to some industrial sectors.

- The deficit in 2022-2023 of 2% of GDP is a large stimulus but far short of the kind of deficit that would trigger hyperinflation and a currency collapse. Kremlin policymakers still have measures available to sustain the militarised economy. Their planning cooly estimates the probability of rising unemployment and losses of real income.

- The war in Ukraine is woven into the fabric of public life in Russia....

 

Well, it is all a guessing game because a) nobody really knows what is going on within an autocratic and deceitful state known for putting out bad data and b) nobody at all knows where Russia's breaking points are because there is no way to predict them.

For example, Tooze states:

Quote

Their planning cooly estimates the probability of rising unemployment and losses of real income depending on how far sanctions are tightened. None of their scenarios predicts a collapse, though, in the worst case, poverty rates would rise and the middle class might shrink back to 1990s levels.

Right, but one of the fundamental pillars of support for the Putin regime is NOT returning to the 1990s.  So what happens if that does become a reality, along with other major backsliding from previous days of the Putin regime?  Nobody knows, however when I see someone use the term "worst case" for a situation that might in fact be "best case", I have to wonder how thoroughly the person understands historical dynamics of regime collapse.  "Best case" that I see is Russia becomes another stunted regime, like North Korea, without a regime change like what happened in 1991, "worst case" is Russia 1917.

For sure Russia is managing this economic storm better than the war.  Hands down.  However, like the war the regime is cutting corners, breaking promises, and running down its options with the economy.  It can put off the inevitable, but not forestall it.

Not that this says anything positive about Ukraine's relative economic condition.  That's a whole different story.  But the author should remember that Ukraine has the backing (at least to some extent) of the richest countries in the world, while Russia does not.  It isn't an economic war between Russia and Ukraine, but Russia and the bulk of the world's economic power.  It would be good for someone making an economic comparison to factor that into the equation.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Speaking of Russian economic news, this just in from Friday's news (e.g. 2 weeks since the above report LLF posted):

Quote

Russia's central bank just hiked interest rates again in an urgent bid to quell inflation and support the sagging ruble.

The Bank of Russia raised its benchmark interest rate another 100 basis-points to 13% on Friday, marking its third interest rate hike in a row.

That comes just a few weeks after Russian central bankers delivered an emergency rate hike in August, where they raised interest rates by a steep 350 basis-points to prop up Russia's plummeting ruble. 

The ruble traded around 96 against the US dollar on Friday, hovering close to a 16-month low. Meanwhile, Russia's economy ministry raised the nation's inflation forecast for 2023 to 7.5% this week, well-above the target of 4%. 

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/russia-economy-inflation-ruble-putin-moscow-interest-rates-ukraine-war-2023-9

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I think this is an example of a Ukrainian PsyOp:

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukrainian-partisans-say-russian-serviceman-helped-plan-crimea-attack-2023-9

Basically, Ukrainian partisans are crediting "double agents" within Russia's Sevastopol workforce for aiding the attacks on the shipyard.  What info could workers give that Ukraine couldn't get from satellite images and a little sniffing around?  Nothing critical.  However, how much damage might Ukraine do by stoking Russian paranoia about intel leaks?  Oh, now that could be fun!  Maybe not as fun as Russian police shooting it up with Russian military levels of fun, but it could still be good.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Here's something ISW points out that we should ponder:

Quote

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov explicitly stated that mobilized personnel will only demobilize at the end of Russia’s “special military operation.”[14] Kartapolov added that Russian mobilized personnel will not receive rotations, but that they are entitled to leave every six months.[15] Kartapolov’s explicit commentary is likely meant to dissuade Russian legislators from considering a proposed amendment that would establish terms for demobilizing personnel mobilized in autumn 2022.[16] The Kremlin continues to resist formally rescinding the partial mobilization decree in order to legally justify the continued service of mobilized personnel for an indefinite period of time.[17]

This is apparently yet another method Russia is employing to stave off another mobilization... don't let the previously mobilized leave after 1 year's service as they are supposed to.  Nope, at best they will get 6 months off from service before being dragged back in. 

Also interesting that the Duma is apparently trying to undermine the Kremlin's desire to keep mobilized citizens in service indefinitely.  Another hint at how delicate a topic mobilization is within Russian society.

Steve

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's something ISW points out that we should ponder:

This is apparently yet another method Russia is employing to stave off another mobilization... don't let the previously mobilized leave after 1 year's service as they are supposed to.  Nope, at best they will get 6 months off from service before being dragged back in. 

Also interesting that the Duma is apparently trying to undermine the Kremlin's desire to keep mobilized citizens in service indefinitely.  Another hint at how delicate a topic mobilization is within Russian society.

Steve

I think you read that far to generously, my take was that they get a week or two off every six months. As well as being signed up for the duration, regardless of what the initial paperwork said. My guess is that the next decree will also cut cut their pay by three quarters.

Edited September 16, 2023 by dan/california

[kimbosbread]

7 hours ago, Jiggathebauce said:

Maybe it's time finally for the unmanned battlemechs to emerge and replace the tank, just need the artificial muscles that can carry the loads lol. Carry on, I'm playing a lot of battletech lately. 

The depressing thing about powered armor and mechs is that the control systems and very likely machine learning necessary to synchronize all those muscles properly mean that you don’t actually need a pilot anymore, and the whole thing reverts to super lame smart mines that can walk around.

If we evolve to a super analog Dune-style world where computers are absolutely haram, hopefully we get mechs.

[JonS]

21 hours ago, dan/california said:

Minefields, and the breaching of same, were a MAJOR element of El Alamein.

At the operational level; sure. But at the intimate tactical level (you know, the level that CM deals with), minefields were kind of a non event. They explain why particular actions were fought where they were fought, but they didn't really influence the actions themselves.

SNIPE was fought 'on the far side' of the devil's garden, not in it.

8th Armd Brigade's inept reproduction of the Charge of the Light Brigade was 'on the far side' of the devil's garden, not in it.**

Tel el Eisa was fought ... actually, nowhere near minefields.

Alam Halfa was fought on the near side of the minefields.

Ruweisat Ridge (battle no.s 1 through to about 6 or 7) was fought before the minefields were a thing.

El Mrier didn't feature minefields.

etc.

There was some fighting for defensive positions on the night of 23 Oct, but those were mostly walkovers (= boring from a CM perspective). Most of the opening night consisted of extended lines of infantry plodding forward behind barrage lines across 2-3km of rocky desert in the dark, hoping like hell they didn't step on any 'slpodies. There were numerous platoon-company sized actions during that night to reduce defended localities, outposts, and listening posts (which could make for some interesting byte-battles), but as a designer there would be no play value in simulating the approach plod through the garden. Just cut to the good bit where the contact actually occurs. Then there is no need for breaching, and no need for artillery even since the barrage has buggered off into the distance.

All of which is to say that a tactical level look at Alamein without breaching is at least as do-able as a tactical level look at OVERLORD without gliders or landing craft.

 

** in the process clearly demonstrating that armour has been obsolete since October 1942!

Edited September 16, 2023 by JonS

[Teufel]

5 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-236-russias-long-war-economy

Adam Tooze, from late August. Not optimistic about likelihood of Russian economic collapse.

Setting aside the economist-speak, key points:

- Emigration and mobilisation may have cost the Russian workforce c.2% of male workers aged 20-49.... [Up to] 10% of the high tech workforce left Russia in 2022.

- Unlike Ukraine, Russia is running nothing like a total war economy.... [RU military spending] might be in the ballpark of US spending during the Vietnam war, at around 9-10% of GDP. This spending has provided a boost to some industrial sectors.

- The deficit in 2022-2023 of 2% of GDP is a large stimulus but far short of the kind of deficit that would trigger hyperinflation and a currency collapse. Kremlin policymakers still have measures available to sustain the militarised economy. Their planning cooly estimates the probability of rising unemployment and losses of real income.

- The war in Ukraine is woven into the fabric of public life in Russia....

 

How is mafia affiliated unrest an indication of failing economies? Ask any politician that been in power around periods of decreasing purchase power and sustained high inflation.

Sure the Russian GDP is pumped up by military spending and overall economic indicators show softening blows. Tanks don’t build power plants, perform surgeries nor teach children to read. 2% of labor force overall, but per less densely populated areas, those 2% are 10%, 15% or even 20% of the total workforce. It’s not Moscow and St. Petersburg we need to be looking at, it’s the far east, let’s look what we may see. For example, Siberia around lake Baykal.

Edit: don’t take the video as interpretations of military unrest, rather crackdown on workers. We seeing social unrest, not civil war.

Let’s add to that more “voluntary mobilization” of Russian people, from regions other than Moscow.

 

Edited September 16, 2023 by Teufel

[Teufel]

There is no shortage of fuels in Russia, but the Belarus offers to ship 120,000 tons of distillates to Russia. Right, no shortage but we want to import the very products that makes up our countries economy. No economic problems in Russia they say, right…

https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-belarus-lukashenko-fuel/belarus-lukashenko-says-minsk-ready-to-increase-fuel-shipments-to-russia-ifax-idUKR4N3AO00A

I can go on and on about why it’s easy to point at aggregated information about economics and say, no fire here, nothing to see folks, move along. It’s not that simple, South Africa is on paper prosperous country, particularly on regional level. Anybody set foot in South Africa will tell you what? Biggest social experiment in the World on social and economic inequality. Well maybe until Putin made wrong turn at the border and entered Ukraine.

Please, don’t buy anything that suggests Putin and Russia are not something resembling multi-ill patients at intensive care unit. Their pains are made worse by compounding of their conditions.

Edited September 16, 2023 by Teufel

[Teufel]

Ok, end of rant but must add this to the discussion on propaganda and information, intentionally or unintentionally spreading Russian narratives. Not pointing fingers at anyone or any single post in the thread but think it’s important to remind ourselves of the importance of such.

Other activities that require my attention and can’t elaborate on this in as much detail as I’d liked. Here is oldie (2017) but goldie academic pieces from US Air Force on the topic.

For those thinking, aw man, here he goes again about Russian propaganda, intro of article;

“This article demonstrates how social media is a tool for modern information-age warfare. It builds on analysis of three distinct topics: social networking, propaganda, and news and information sharing. Two case studies are used to show how state and nonstate actors use social media to employ time-tested propaganda techniques to yield far-reaching results.”

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf

Edit: Guilty as charged, no shame in admitting to being am agent of anti-Russian propaganda. So bring it!

Edited September 16, 2023 by Teufel

[Bulletpoint]

19 hours ago, Butschi said:

From the German perspective: A failed offensive doesn't mean we are just going to cancel support for Ukraine. Not because we are so kind and patient but because it  just doesn't work like that.

[...]

But with a failed offensive I guess(!) we may see an increase in politicians stepping forward and arguing we should, while of course still supporting Ukraine 100%, try to meditate between Russia and Ukraine. Because of the human cost, suffering civilians and all that. And maybe, because we absolutely like to present ourselves as honest brokers, there will be an increased reluctance to send over the latest and greatest equipment - on top of the already existing reluctance, of course.

I didn't mean that if Ukraine doesn't make it to a certain line before a certain date, then suddenly all Western support will fall away.

I meant that the narrative might gradually start to shift, and that before we know it, we are no longer talking about sending more stuff to Ukraine so they can win faster, but about what the inevitable terms of the peace deal should be.

And if that happens, then most countries will of course not be eager to send more assistance, because that would be seen as investing in a lost cause. Which might lead to a vicious cycle of less assistance, less progress on the battlefield, less asistance, etc.

Not to be the forum's doomsayer, but I think this is a real political risk for Ukraine at the moment. And that's why I think this offensive needs to produce tangible results - it's not just a case of "oh well, we didn't win this year, but there's always next season".

Edited September 16, 2023 by Bulletpoint

[The_Capt]

12 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

So no, cheap ways of killing tanks do not render tanks obsolete. Cheap ways of killing anything has never rendered anything obsolete.

Well yes, and no.  Cheap bowmen rendered very expensive knights obsolete.  Not sure the cost of muskets versus pikemen.  A single machine gun has to be cheaper than a squadron of cavalry.

The question is less “can it be killed” and more “how much value does it render before it dies”.

The cost equation is one factor.  In warfare things become obsolete for what appears to be at least two main reasons:

- Denial.  The capability advantages of the thing are denied to the point it becomes a liability - see Battleships v Carriers.

- Replacement.  The capability advantages of a thing are replaced by a capability that is not denied - see Battleships v Carriers.

The modern tank is currently being operationally compressed…significantly.  It has become very apparent that one can wage Defence and Denial without tanks at all.  The big question is, “can one wage Offence?”  The modern tank is definitely seeing Denial in Ukraine, however, as an offensive weapon we are not seeing a replacement, yet.  I personally do not think the tank is entirely dead but it utility is definitely on a one way trip.  The role of the tank is becoming much narrower - currently a rapid, well protected indirect fire system.

And this is bigger than tanks.  We are not seeing a lot of IFV/AFV success either.  We do still see them in infantry support roles, however, they are also blunted.  The entire mechanized portfolio is currently getting compressed into a capability with a much narrower role.  

So where do we go from here?  It is weird how in times of disruption in warfare we always seem to fall back on basics.  In this war it has been infantry and indirect fires (including UAS etc).  These are two capabilities that still work.  Both sides appear to be wrestling with the fact that the other elements of mechanized combined arms are not working - armour/mech and engineering.  The modern battlefield also appears to be denying two major principles of war - concentration of force, and surprise.  This is not small.  

I suspect UGVs and some sort of Shield capabilities will be combined to break the deadlock, and get Offensive manoeuvre via mobility back on the menu.  We are far too deeply invested not to try and buy our way out.  My sense though is that others are too deeply invested in taking away the cornerstones of the western way of ground warfare.  So in the end the tank will become obsolete because there is a lot of incentive to make it go away.  Then the race to master whatever comes next will be on.

[Beleg85]

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Source is questionable, but it does seem that something is going on with Kadyrov.  On that assumption...

Unless there is something VERY dramatic and very negative going on between Putin and Kadyrov that we have seen zero hints of, it wasn't Putin.  Kadyrov has gone out of his way to be a cheerleader and supporter of Putin, mostly because without Putin directing the Kremlin to slosh money into his troth things would not be good for Kadyrov.  On the other side of the coin, the last thing Putin needs is for Chechnya to become actively disruptive again.  Since things become uncertain without Kadyrov, there's no way Putin would risk whomever might succeed him unless there was strong evidence of massive disloyalty.

I don't know what the internal politics of Chechnya are like these days, but my sense is nobody is openly gunning for his throne.  Why the Hell would anybody want that job?  Especially because it seems that Kadyrov has wisely kept the money flowing to enough people that would-be rivals are content to cash their paychecks (so to speak) and let Kadyrov shoulder the responsibilities.  As long as Kadyrov is able to do so, that is.

 

As things seem to be standing now, the question of succession wouldn't be that problematic. Oldest son of Ramzan, Akhmet already travelled to Kremlin to obtain precious personal picture with Putin, which was received by people knowledgeable about region as first step towards succession.

On the other side, Ramzan during this war pictured himself much more often with other son, Adam. This chubby little brat seem to be more resembling his father- there are accusation that being 15-years old, he already took part in fighting in Ukraine (ofc. tik-tok way), tortured (or at least humiliated) prisoners and "defended" islam by assaulting somebody who reportedly tried to burn Quran (and "accidently" being Ukrainian living in Russia...):

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/16/7415816/

So it isn't impossible that we just see small Kim Dzong Un in statu nascendi. There also a possibility that Kremlin would like to assert his power in Chechnya, bring Russian governor and break monopoly there of Kadyrov clan. Muscovite population would love that, as Chechens are hated in Russia almsot universally. But it is a risk and given current situation, Putin may choose easier path of preserving current system.

What I wouldn't count for is some wide anti-russian sentiments int he form of uprising. This chapter seem to be over, as first generation of Ichkerians is scattered abroad, dead or too old. And second one took heavy beatings after ISIS fall; there were rumours that quarter of Pankisi valley in Georgia was covered in mourning after Mosul and Raqqa fell...

[Grossman]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, it is all a guessing game because a) nobody really knows what is going on within an autocratic and deceitful state known for putting out bad data and b) nobody at all knows where Russia's breaking points are because there is no way to predict them.

For example, Tooze states:

Right, but one of the fundamental pillars of support for the Putin regime is NOT returning to the 1990s.  So what happens if that does become a reality, along with other major backsliding from previous days of the Putin regime?  Nobody knows, however when I see someone use the term "worst case" for a situation that might in fact be "best case", I have to wonder how thoroughly the person understands historical dynamics of regime collapse.  "Best case" that I see is Russia becomes another stunted regime, like North Korea, without a regime change like what happened in 1991, "worst case" is Russia 1917.

For sure Russia is managing this economic storm better than the war.  Hands down.  However, like the war the regime is cutting corners, breaking promises, and running down its options with the economy.  It can put off the inevitable, but not forestall it.

Not that this says anything positive about Ukraine's relative economic condition.  That's a whole different story.  But the author should remember that Ukraine has the backing (at least to some extent) of the richest countries in the world, while Russia does not.  It isn't an economic war between Russia and Ukraine, but Russia and the bulk of the world's economic power.  It would be good for someone making an economic comparison to factor that into the equation.

Steve

Steve. This link points to potential domestic turmoil in Russia as the economy falters

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/driving-towards-brighter-past-brezhnevisation-russias-internal-market

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

I didn't mean that if Ukraine doesn't make it to a certain line before a certain date, then suddenly all Western support will fall away.

I meant that the narrative might gradually start to shift, and that before we know it, we are no longer talking about sending more stuff to Ukraine so they can win faster, but about what the inevitable terms of the peace deal should be.

And if that happens, then most countries will of course not be eager to send more assistance, because that would be seen as investing in a lost cause. Which might lead to a vicious cycle of less assistance, less progress on the battlefield, less asistance, etc.

Not to be the forum's doomsayer, but I think this is a real political risk for Ukraine at the moment. And that's why I think this offensive needs to produce tangible results - it's not just a case of "oh well, we didn't win this year, but there's always next season".

I agree, what I wrote was directed at the broader audience to pre-empt comments that the (Western-)Europeans and especially Germany are just waiting to find an excuse to drop Ukraine like a hot potato.

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-236-russias-long-war-economy

Adam Tooze, from late August. Not optimistic about likelihood of Russian economic collapse.

Setting aside the economist-speak, key points:

- Emigration and mobilisation may have cost the Russian workforce c.2% of male workers aged 20-49.... [Up to] 10% of the high tech workforce left Russia in 2022.

- Unlike Ukraine, Russia is running nothing like a total war economy.... [RU military spending] might be in the ballpark of US spending during the Vietnam war, at around 9-10% of GDP. This spending has provided a boost to some industrial sectors.

- The deficit in 2022-2023 of 2% of GDP is a large stimulus but far short of the kind of deficit that would trigger hyperinflation and a currency collapse. Kremlin policymakers still have measures available to sustain the militarised economy. Their planning cooly estimates the probability of rising unemployment and losses of real income.

- The war in Ukraine is woven into the fabric of public life in Russia....

 

Gawd, I hate all economist.  A quick internet search and one can get the full spectrum of “Russian economy is doin fine” to “It is collapsing right now.”  

I guess the thing I worry about in all this is where are people getting the data from?  Objective numbers on the Russian economy appear hard to find.  The rest are supplied by Russia.  For example, how much is Russia spending on this war a la GDP?  Well that number is not going to come from an outside audit.  It is going to come from Russian sources.  And Russian sources are notoriously full of crap.  If I was in Russian leadership I would want nothing more than to project an ability to outlast Heaven and Hell themselves in this war.

We can get objective reality data - exchange rate of ruble, imports and exports.  But any internal metrics are going to be heavily skewed by Russian information ops.

The economic end of this war is like everything else as far as I can tell…we will know when it happens. 

[poesel]

The German Bundeswehr plans to increase its numbers from 183.000 to 203.000 in 2030 (IIRC). Problem is, that not enough young people are interested in a career as soldier to reach those numbers. It is already reckoned that this target will be missed.
I guess other armies will or do face the same problem.

Is unmanned a way out of this?
Just by the name of it you need less people because its not manned (d‘oh). But you still need people to operate it, but I have no idea if the total logistic chain for an UGV is more or less than a comparable tank.
Also, the job requirement for unmanned is more technical and less crawling through the mud. That might make it more attractive to prospects.

So is unmanned a win-win for future armies?