How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-and-china-look-future-war

RUSSIA AND CHINA LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF WAR

 

 

• Quote

  China has likely surpassed the United States in employing modeling, simulation, and OPFOR. The more the PLA relies on gaming and simulations, however, the greater the chance of flawed strategic and operational concepts becoming embedded in PLA doctrine.

  The whole report is a top down look at Russia's and China's long term military plans and goals. However I thought Steve might want to clip the quote above, and go beat a selection of Colonels and Congresspeople with it. They did discuss the risk that the PLA is basing some of it simulations on overly optimistic assumptions. they attribute at least part of this to minuscule amount of fighting the PLA has done since 1953.

• The whole thing is a 32 page PDF, you probaly can't get through it in one cup of coffee.

 

[Battlefront.com]

48 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Quote

China has likely surpassed the United States in employing modeling, simulation, and OPFOR. The more the PLA relies on gaming and simulations, however, the greater the chance of flawed strategic and operational concepts becoming embedded in PLA doctrine.

 

This will be an interesting read

That quote above is completely valid.  Simulations and gaming (a type of simulation) are double edged swords.  Done right, they can provide valuable insights and help shape policy, weapons, tactics, future purchases, etc.  Those in turn can produce better results quicker than they otherwise could have come about.  However, done wrong and the exact opposite can happen.

Two examples from this war:

1.  A wargame was conducted while Russian forces were surrounding Kyiv and occupying what was their maximum footprint north of Kharkiv.  It made all sorts of dire predictions, but in the few days between when they conducted the wargame and published the results, Russian forces pulled out of northern Ukraine because they were totally spent and teetering on operational collapse.  The wargame obviously got it very, very wrong.  What decisions were made by the US and its allies, even Ukraine, based on flawed analysis like this?  I don't know, but I doubt the answer was "none at all".

2.  General Milley stated that wargaming/simulations done with the Ukrainians ahead of the counter-offensive indicated Ukraine would make much faster progress than it has.  This, no doubt, is part of the inflated expectations for what Ukraine could do and therefore questioning them.  Me?  I think it is more likely that there were some fundamental mistakes made by NATO planners in assumptions about what NATO training and equipment could do in the face of thick Russian defenses.  We're still seeing these perception errors playing out now so it's unclear how much impact they have had, but again I would bet it isn't "none at all".

The first example is a carry over of what existed before the war, which was a gross overestimation of Russia's capabilities, an underestimation of everybody else (not just Ukraine).  Two examples of the US getting it wrong about its own capabilities matched up against Russia's:

The US Army Doesn't Seem Real Sure It Could Stop a Russian Invasion of Europe

https://www.vice.com/en/article/j59kyy/the-us-army-may-not-be-able-to-hold-off-russian-attack-in-europe

And this as well:

If Russia started a war in the Baltics, NATO would lose in 36 hours

https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-could-steamroll-into-the-capitals-of-natos-most-exposed-members-in-36-hours-2016-2

I remember when these reports came out and I vehemently disagreed.  I thought they were fundamentally flawed in large part because I thought the Baltic countries would fight more-or-less as Ukraine did and that Russia would, more-or-less, have similar problems as it did in February and March.

However, proving that a good analysis of a bad wargame/sim can produce good results... not that it matters a hill of beans, but looking at this stuff back in 2016 caused me to think about Russia's problems and NATO's strengths in a way that gave me great confidence well ahead of January 2022 that Russia was going to get its arse handed to it.  If I had not see this report in 2016, I might not have been so sure.

Steve

[dan/california]

20 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This will be an interesting read

That quote above is completely valid.  Simulations and gaming (a type of simulation) are double edged swords.  Done right, they can provide valuable insights and help shape policy, weapons, tactics, future purchases, etc.  Those in turn can produce better results quicker than they otherwise could have come about.  However, done wrong and the exact opposite can happen.

Two examples from this war:

1.  A wargame was conducted while Russian forces were surrounding Kyiv and occupying what was their maximum footprint north of Kharkiv.  It made all sorts of dire predictions, but in the few days between when they conducted the wargame and published the results, Russian forces pulled out of northern Ukraine because they were totally spent and teetering on operational collapse.  The wargame obviously got it very, very wrong.  What decisions were made by the US and its allies, even Ukraine, based on flawed analysis like this?  I don't know, but I doubt the answer was "none at all".

2.  General Milley stated that wargaming/simulations done with the Ukrainians ahead of the counter-offensive indicated Ukraine would make much faster progress than it has.  This, no doubt, is part of the inflated expectations for what Ukraine could do and therefore questioning them.  Me?  I think it is more likely that there were some fundamental mistakes made by NATO planners in assumptions about what NATO training and equipment could do in the face of thick Russian defenses.  We're still seeing these perception errors playing out now so it's unclear how much impact they have had, but again I would bet it isn't "none at all".

The first example is a carry over of what existed before the war, which was a gross overestimation of Russia's capabilities, an underestimation of everybody else (not just Ukraine).  Two examples of the US getting it wrong about its own capabilities matched up against Russia's:

The US Army Doesn't Seem Real Sure It Could Stop a Russian Invasion of Europe

https://www.vice.com/en/article/j59kyy/the-us-army-may-not-be-able-to-hold-off-russian-attack-in-europe

And this as well:

If Russia started a war in the Baltics, NATO would lose in 36 hours

https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-could-steamroll-into-the-capitals-of-natos-most-exposed-members-in-36-hours-2016-2

I remember when these reports came out and I vehemently disagreed.  I thought they were fundamentally flawed in large part because I thought the Baltic countries would fight more-or-less as Ukraine did and that Russia would, more-or-less, have similar problems as it did in February and March.

However, proving that a good analysis of a bad wargame/sim can produce good results... not that it matters a hill of beans, but looking at this stuff back in 2016 caused me to think about Russia's problems and NATO's strengths in a way that gave me great confidence well ahead of January 2022 that Russia was going to get its arse handed to it.  If I had not see this report in 2016, I might not have been so sure.

Steve

If i could throw in one more specific thing. CM needs a vastly better simulation of mines, mine clearing, and relatede combat engineering. Can the cost of that be justified in absence of a nice military contract, I have no idea, but the third phase of this war has been mines and what to do about them, while each sides artillery did every thing it could to make the minefields even less pleasant. Yes that is an oversimplification, but it is a pretty good one.

[JonS]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

CM needs a vastly better simulation of mines, mine clearing, and relatede combat engineering.

CM:CE (Combat Mission: Combat Engineering) would be about as much fun as CM:LG (Combat Mission: Lawn Growing), and sell about as well as lamp oil.

[Doc844]

Just a quick fly by in regards to the strikes in Crimea.  I've been following along intermittently just lately, work sucks at times, some days I have to bash through 10 pages or more just to get caught up.  My overall gut feeling is that things are starting to feel more loose, both in the North and south, the RA is creaking and groaning and doing slap dash fixes where it can. 

So this massive step up of long range strikes has been planned and timed very well and is acting as a stressor to overload the RAs already terrible command and control.  I don't think it is primarily about degrading assets in Crimea to help further down the road, its as I stated more about adding more problems on top of what the RA C&C already cant deal with.

I would not be surprised if we see something really break on the RA defensive line in the next week or so and I mean REALLY break.  The timing of all these strikes is just to specific.  Thoughts?

[Doc844]

Ooh before I forget, couple of things, I didn't want to comment on these earlier because I was way behind the thread.

Bayonets.  Bayonet drill is still very much taught in the British military, well in all infantry units it is.  Firstly its a good beasting, erm sorry not allowed to use that term anymore.  It's a good exhaustion exercise.  It is absolutely knackering but you are expected to keep your tempo and aggression levels up all the way through it.  It is also a good way to teach controlled aggression, to keep awareness even while your knackered and slavering like a wild dog.  Lastly its bloody good fun.

In general, I would rather have than have not, as someone previously stated, bayonets don't run out of ammo.  Also what may not be quite well known is that the British bayonet can also be used as wire cutters.  How cool is that, you can either kill someone with it or cut fences.  

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, Doc844 said:

How cool is that, you can either kill someone with it or cut fences.

Like the cutthroat razor, you can shave but also still cut somebody's throat with it. Best of all you don't need electricity. Peaky Blinders were also British veterans. They kept it in their caps.

[Offshoot]

More on the area south of Bakhmut, the Ukrainian general staff are claiming they have taken Andriivka. According to DeepState, this area was being held by the beleaguered 72nd separate motor rifle brigade ( https://deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.4919/37.9550 ).

Original source - https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0saPL1Cq3wL3kg9w8GeAJvQh4a2nT6ffYMvEpq1chakAH9bXeT29Y6G7Y21YEogSrl

Google translate:

Quote

In the zone of responsibility of the operational-strategic group of troops "Khortytsia" in the Bakhmutsky direction, the enemy does not stop trying to break through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area of Bohdanivka. In turn, the Defense Forces of Ukraine had partial success in the Klishchiivka area during offensive operations. During the assault operations, they were successful and captured Andriivka in the Donetsk region, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in terms of manpower and equipment, and entrenched themselves at the achieved frontiers.

 

Edited September 15, 2023 by Offshoot

[Maciej Zwolinski]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

Or is that surname just much more common than I realized?

Popov is a very common surname

[Maciej Zwolinski]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

2.  General Milley stated that wargaming/simulations done with the Ukrainians ahead of the counter-offensive indicated Ukraine would make much faster progress than it has.  This, no doubt, is part of the inflated expectations for what Ukraine could do and therefore questioning them.  Me?  I think it is more likely that there were some fundamental mistakes made by NATO planners in assumptions about what NATO training and equipment could do in the face of thick Russian defenses

I agree, but would add 2 more factors for the discrepancy, which I think were significant: 2. different Russian behaviour than simulated. The fact that the Russians had built before the offensive multiple lines of defence suggested that they had planned to make tactical retreats and trade space for time and casualties much more often, than in reality. Actually they defended in place on the 1st line and always counterattacked. Adopting a different posture of the RUS logically should have resulted in longer advances, but lower casualties in the wargame; .3 Much more extensive minefields than in reality by orders of magnitude. In NATO those kind of densities and areas are never contemplated, so there is no idea on the basis of which this part of the defence (or denial, as the_Capt calls it) could be coded into the simulation. 

 

[SteelRain]

Russian State TV clown show reporting about the meeting of 2 neurotics in the east, starved of toilette bowls and washing machines. Also featured a clueless Shoigu.

 

 

 

[Haiduk]

3rd assault brigade had confirmed liberation of Andriivka. Yesterday the brigade refuted claims of MoD deputy Hanna Maliar, that the village under UKR control. UKR troops really were in the village, but premature statement has interfered to accomplish the operation. It's knowingly, on tactical level, information about changes on the ground comes to higher HQs with delay, because company/battalion commanders if they lost a ground try to restore situation and only after several failed attempts reported on higher level about troubles - they just fear they will be fu...d out by higher chief. But, when Russian higher HQs get information first about ground loosing from social networks or premature official persons statements, they fu.k out lower HQs at all, but have a time to conduct some counter-actions, if information confirmed. Yesterday Russians after Maliar statement launched fierce "last hope" counter-attack with intensive arty support and the could prevent our troops to take foothold in the village completely. Only during next 24 hours 3rd brigade completely liberated Andriivka and held on positions.

Brigade press-service claims during long battle for Andriivka they completely wiped out enemy 72nd motor-rifle brigade. Russian suffered heavy looses in personnel and command staff. It's claimed brigade recon chief and three battalion commanders were killed. At the final phase UKR troops encircled Russians in the village and completely eliminated them. Details, videos etc will be soon

Edited September 15, 2023 by Haiduk

[Bulletpoint]

I know it's almost heresy to say on these forums, but as we are now halfway through September and Ukraine is still quite far from Tokmak, and Tokmak is quite far away from the sea of Azov, I've begun considering the offensive a failure.

Of course I can't say for sure. I'm no military expert, and I don't have access to much information. Maybe the Russians are close to breaking point and collapse. Hopefully they are. But the front line is just not moving very much.

Ukraine has been fighting hard and taken heavy losses, and still only have very few gains to show for it. The Verbove penetration is only about 10x10 kilometres and even though it's now two weeks since the Russian line was claimed to be penetrated, the front line has barely moved since then.

But I'm not writing this to start another debate about whther the offensive has failed or not.

I'm thinking about what will happen if it has indeed failed. Just for the sake of the argument, let's say autumn rain and mud arrives and Ukraine is still barely halfway to Tokmak. What happens then?

I'm guessing both sides would try to struggle on through autumn and winter, but mostly the war would be in pause. How does the situation look next spring, then, both militarily and on the political level?

For all the talk about whether the Russian people are fed up with the war, how about Western voters? When I look around here in Denmark, it seems the war has gone from a matter of great urgency to just background noise. I think that a failed offensive would lead many people in the west to conclude that this was is not really winnable.

Before, there was this sense that since Ukraine had beaten Russia so badly in the beginning of the war, with Russia at full strenght and Ukraine armed with pitchforks and home-made molotovs, surely the Ukrainian counteroffensive would be a great success now that Russia has been mauled and Ukraine has been supplied with some of the best weapons NATO has to offer. Yet that's not what we see. And I think that's a sobering thought for many.

[Kinophile]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This will be an interesting read

That quote above is completely valid.  Simulations and gaming (a type of simulation) are double edged swords.  Done right, they can provide valuable insights and help shape policy, weapons, tactics, future purchases, etc.  Those in turn can produce better results quicker than they otherwise could have come about.  However, done wrong and the exact opposite can happen.

 

Garbage in, Garbage out.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

3rd assault brigade had confirmed liberation of Andriivka. Yesterday the brigade refuted claims of MoD deputy Hanna Maliar, that the village under UKR control. UKR troops really were in the village, but premature statement has interfered to accomplish the operation. It's knowingly, on tactical level, information about changes on the ground comes to higher HQs with delay, because company/battalion commanders if they lost a ground try to restore situation and only after several failed attempts reported on higher level about troubles - they just fear they will be fu...d out by higher chief. But, when Russian higher HQs get information first about ground loosing from social networks or premature official persons statements, they fu.k out lower HQs at all, but have a time to conduct some counter-actions, if information confirmed. Yesterday Russians after Maliar statement launched fierce "last hope" counter-attack with intensive arty support and the could prevent our troops to take foothold in the village completely. Only during next 24 hours 3rd brigade completely liberated Andriivka and held on positions.

Brigade press-service claims during long battle for Andriivka they completely wiped out enemy 72nd motor-rifle brigade. Russian suffered heavy looses in personnel and command staff. It's claimed brigade recon chief and three battalion commanders were killed. At the final phase UKR troops encircled Russians in the village and completely eliminated them. Details, videos etc will be soon

Excellent - higher echelon leadership getting killed means theyre pushing forward to c&c, because things are getting hairy at the front. 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, JonS said:

CM:CE (Combat Mission: Combat Engineering) would be about as much fun as CM:LG (Combat Mission: Lawn Growing), and sell about as well as lamp oil.

https://www.amazon.com/lamp-oil/s?k=lamp+oil  

https://store.steampowered.com/app/1480560/Lawn_Mowing_Simulator/

For the average “I just want things to go boom” player, perhaps.  If you want a serious realistic wargame simulation then obstacles and breaching ops are clearly a requirement.

 

[Tux]

43 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I know it's almost heresy to say on these forums, but as we are now halfway through September and Ukraine is still quite far from Tokmak, and Tokmak is quite far away from the sea of Azov, I've begun considering the offensive a failure.

Of course I can't say for sure. I'm no military expert, and I don't have access to much information. Maybe the Russians are close to breaking point and collapse. Hopefully they are. But the front line is just not moving very much.

Ukraine has been fighting hard and taken heavy losses, and still only have very few gains to show for it. The Verbove penetration is only about 10x10 kilometres and even though it's now two weeks since the Russian line was claimed to be penetrated, the front line has barely moved since then.

But I'm not writing this to start another debate about whther the offensive has failed or not.

I'm thinking about what will happen if it has indeed failed. Just for the sake of the argument, let's say autumn rain and mud arrives and Ukraine is still barely halfway to Tokmak. What happens then?

I'm guessing both sides would try to struggle on through autumn and winter, but mostly the war would be in pause. How does the situation look next spring, then, both militarily and on the political level?

For all the talk about whether the Russian people are fed up with the war, how about Western voters? When I look around here in Denmark, it seems the war has gone from a matter of great urgency to just background noise. I think that a failed offensive would lead many people in the west to conclude that this was is not really winnable.

Before, there was this sense that since Ukraine had beaten Russia so badly in the beginning of the war, with Russia at full strenght and Ukraine armed with pitchforks and home-made molotovs, surely the Ukrainian counteroffensive would be a great success now that Russia has been mauled and Ukraine has been supplied with some of the best weapons NATO has to offer. Yet that's not what we see. And I think that's a sobering thought for many.

I don't think you'll get any argument that the Ukrainian offensive has fallen short versus what a lot of people hoped for.  Naturally, as you imply in your second paragraph, we don't yet know the final results and so it's difficult to judge whether it has "failed", per se.

I do agree that there's a risk associated with how the Western public perceive the offensive, though.  For me it's mostly about how much traction the inevitable alarmist narratives from fringe outlets will gain because I credit most people with the ability to understand that war is tough and to get on with it (largely because they usually seem to have done so in the past).

However, if it does gain traction and become a problem I think it will not be because of the 'low gains' made by Ukraine but because of the high losses.  It seems clear that, starting after the two World Wars, we in the West have culturally internalised a correlation between low losses taken and military success.  At our memorial services we focus on the fact that the dead died and we mourn them.  There are many reasons for this and it hasn't helped that our most recent war or three has seemed to confirm this correlation.  It does mean that we try really hard to avoid casualties and therefore we do better than most at achieving that but it might also leave the general public prone to asking pointed questions if they are served up a high-loss, low-gain offensive and asked to consider it a positive.

Interestingly, in the USSR/Russia, the Great Patriotic War led to them internalising a correlation between high losses incurred and military success.  In their memorial services they focus on the fact that the dead won and they celebrate them.  This seems to have bedded in to the extent that they almost seem to seek out losses of men and materiel in order to reassure themselves that they're 'doing it right'.  And, again, their most recent war or three has seemingly confirmed this for them.  Unfortunately that means the general public are not phased by high loss rates (potentially even the opposite) and so it makes them more immediately resilient in the face of 'bad news from the front'.

All of which is to say it's probably about time we understood war a little better in the West; a slightly more 'warts-and-all' cultural understanding of warfare could serve us all very well in the weeks, months and decades to come.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

I know it's almost heresy to say on these forums, but as we are now halfway through September and Ukraine is still quite far from Tokmak, and Tokmak is quite far away from the sea of Azov, I've begun considering the offensive a failure.

Of course I can't say for sure. I'm no military expert, and I don't have access to much information. Maybe the Russians are close to breaking point and collapse. Hopefully they are. But the front line is just not moving very much.

Ukraine has been fighting hard and taken heavy losses, and still only have very few gains to show for it. The Verbove penetration is only about 10x10 kilometres and even though it's now two weeks since the Russian line was claimed to be penetrated, the front line has barely moved since then.

But I'm not writing this to start another debate about whther the offensive has failed or not.

I'm thinking about what will happen if it has indeed failed. Just for the sake of the argument, let's say autumn rain and mud arrives and Ukraine is still barely halfway to Tokmak. What happens then?

I'm guessing both sides would try to struggle on through autumn and winter, but mostly the war would be in pause. How does the situation look next spring, then, both militarily and on the political level?

For all the talk about whether the Russian people are fed up with the war, how about Western voters? When I look around here in Denmark, it seems the war has gone from a matter of great urgency to just background noise. I think that a failed offensive would lead many people in the west to conclude that this was is not really winnable.

Before, there was this sense that since Ukraine had beaten Russia so badly in the beginning of the war, with Russia at full strenght and Ukraine armed with pitchforks and home-made molotovs, surely the Ukrainian counteroffensive would be a great success now that Russia has been mauled and Ukraine has been supplied with some of the best weapons NATO has to offer. Yet that's not what we see. And I think that's a sobering thought for many.

Not heresy in the least.  The lines have not moved much despite all the action, no disputing that.  We have not seen an operational breakthrough, largely tactical pulses which have not added up yet.

So a couple thoughts/questions:

- If this whole offensive is a road to nowhere…why is the UA still pushing?  The UA has a lot to lose and knows that they must preserve their forces.  They cannot afford the human wave wastage Wagner and the RA demonstrated last winter.  Yet they are still pushing…why?  My only guess can be that they still see achievable objectives and their picture of the RA supports this.

- We have seen a lot of indications that the RA war machine is in trouble.  To the point that I am not even sure what is still holding it together.  This may be an example of that Russian steel everyone was going on about at the beginning of this war.  Right now the RA appears glued together by pure stubbornness.  Their losses have been historic and a lot of capability is simply gone.  The central question is, “are they close to tipping?”  No idea but I am pretty sure the UA and western military support “inside the box” have a much better bead.

- Ok, the UA offensive of 2023 fails…now what?  Well, we might have to start thinking about frozen lines and a much longer conflict.  So what does that look like?  How do we support that?  There is no “cutting and running” on this one yet, our sunk costs are too high and the opportunity to continue to cripple Russia too good.

One thing we do need to get out of our heads is the idea that “not retaking every inch of pre-2014 Ukraine = losing”.  That was a dangerous binary position to take and it will not serve well moving forward.  Losing is an Ukraine no longer able to decide when and where to prosecute this conflict.  Losing is an Ukraine no longer able to be independent of Russian Will.  Losing is western powers surrendering strategic initiative.

All war is negotiation.  With the other parties, with oneself and with the situation as it evolves.  My read is that Ukraine is continuing to negotiate from a position of strength and no matter how this year’s offensive turns out, if they can sustain that then we still have options.

[TheVulture]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This will be an interesting read

That quote above is completely valid.  Simulations and gaming (a type of simulation) are double edged swords.  Done right, they can provide valuable insights and help shape policy, weapons, tactics, future purchases, etc.  Those in turn can produce better results quicker than they otherwise could have come about.  However, done wrong and the exact opposite can happen.

Two examples from this war:

I know I've argued before that using wargaming to predict the future - in the sense of "this is how this battle is going to play out" - is never going to give you good results, for all sorts of reasons.

What wargaming does very well is allowing you to run the same scenario many times, and possibly with slight variations. This lets you build up a picture of what is important and what isn't (and by extension, what it is important to simulate correctly in your wargame to improve its fidelity). 

You might find from your wargaming that the primary limiting factor on your ability to advance is the keeping the logistics flowing. Or you might conversely find that your logistics are fine, but your communications systems are too vulnerable and that 90% of your failed offensives are because key comms hubs got whacked too easily. Or that your doctrine greatly over/underestimates the density of troops needed to hold a defensive feature.

So maybe you learn that a) your doctrine needs to put more emphasis on protecting comms or having redundant capacity so that C3 is maintained for longer, and that simulations need to take care to model the effects of the presence or lack of effective C3,

For a specific battle you might end up identifying a key terrain feature that wasn't picked up by intelligence map preparation, but which control of often ends up playing an important role in the wargaming.

That kind of hypothesis testing and determining which are the critical inputs and which matter less, is what wargaming is great at. IMHO.

[Bulletpoint]

1 hour ago, Tux said:

However, if it does gain traction and become a problem I think it will not be because of the 'low gains' made by Ukraine but because of the high losses.  It seems clear that, starting after the two World Wars, we in the West have culturally internalised a correlation between low losses taken and military success.  At our memorial services we focus on the fact that the dead died and we mourn them.  There are many reasons for this and it hasn't helped that our most recent war or three has seemed to confirm this correlation.  It does mean that we try really hard to avoid casualties and therefore we do better than most at achieving that but it might also leave the general public prone to asking pointed questions if they are served up a high-loss, low-gain offensive and asked to consider it a positive.

Interestingly, in the USSR/Russia, the Great Patriotic War led to them internalising a correlation between high losses incurred and military success.  In their memorial services they focus on the fact that the dead won and they celebrate them.  This seems to have bedded in to the extent that they almost seem to seek out losses of men and materiel in order to reassure themselves that they're 'doing it right'.  And, again, their most recent war or three has seemingly confirmed this for them.  Unfortunately that means the general public are not phased by high loss rates (potentially even the opposite) and so it makes them more immediately resilient in the face of 'bad news from the front'.

This is an interesting perspective, and you may well be right about the Russian war culture. But I don't think the Western audience is so worried by high Ukrainian casualties. Saddened, yes, but we are saddened every time we turn on the news. It's not our countrymen returning home in boxes - apart from a few Western volunteers of course.

I think the main narrative shift is from "this war will be won easily" to "this war will be won with high losses" and then finally to "this war cannot be won - we need a negotiated settlement". In this shift, it matters a lot whether Ukraine is making gains on the battlefield or not.

Again, I might be wrong about the offensive failing. I have been wrong before about this war. But I think there's a lot at stake here in these last few weeks before winter.

[holoween]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

- Ok, the UA offensive of 2023 fails…now what?  Well, we might have to start thinking about frozen lines and a much longer conflict.  So what does that look like?  How do we support that?  There is no “cutting and running” on this one yet, our sunk costs are too high and the opportunity to continue to cripple Russia too good

Id say the biggest question regarding the war if the offensive fails is why it failed.

So far it seems ukraine does mostly company sized bite and hold attacks which are at best simultaniously done but not coordinated. (feel free to correct me if i have the wrong impression)

So why didnt they run larger attacks?

- lack of c&c?

- lack of support assets?

-too high russian force density?

Whatever the cause if ukraine can figure out how to scale up their attacks over the winter and implement it it stands a good chance to overrun the russian defenses next time.

[Tux]

26 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

This is an interesting perspective, and you may well be right about the Russian war culture. But I don't think the Western audience is so worried by high Ukrainian casualties. Saddened, yes, but we are saddened every time we turn on the news. It's not our countrymen returning home in boxes - apart from a few Western volunteers of course.

I think the main narrative shift is from "this war will be won easily" to "this war will be won with high losses" and then finally to "this war cannot be won - we need a negotiated settlement". In this shift, it matters a lot whether Ukraine is making gains on the battlefield or not.

Again, I might be wrong about the offensive failing. I have been wrong before about this war. But I think there's a lot at stake here in these last few weeks before winter.

Actually, I think that (again) if a problem appears among Western audiences it will be constructed upon the tragedy of Ukrainian casualties.  Even on this thread a certain type of anti-war position has been presented as 'the Ukrainians are dying for us because of our putting them up to this proxy war'.  There is enough post-imperial guilt among Western European nations, at least, that the idea of encouraging Ukrainians to die for our benefit will not sit well.  And make no mistake, that's how it will be portrayed by those who want to gain clicks and/or undermine Western support for the war.

As regards the narrative shifts you describe, they are hanging an awful lot on the definition of "winning" and that's actually what I meant by needing a cultural shift in the West - not just that casualties happen but that you can take heavy casualties and still "win".

As many have said before it is not reasonable to present total expulsion of Russia from everywhere that was Ukrainian ten years ago as the only definition of victory.  If this was ever an existential war for Ukraine (as no-one would have said it wasn't on Day 1 of the invasion) then Ukraine have already won, since this war is not going to extinguish them as a nation state.  So I agree that a narrative shift from "this war will be won easily" (if that was ever truly "the narrative") to "this war will be won with high losses" is entirely sensible.  I don't agree that the narrative of this war will ever have to shift to "this war cannot be won", though.

Also, negotiation is always happening (even diplomatic negotiation, if you don't like The_Capt's "war is negotiation" definition).  Currently, Russia's position is that they want control of Ukraine (which they will clearly never achieve miltarily).  Ukraine's position is that they want back everything they've lost since 2014 (which they theoretically might still achieve militarily), plus reparations, etc.  Difficulties encountered during this year's fighting may result in Ukraine softening their demands but it will never result in them agreeing to Russia's current terms.  So, for all that we would all love an immediate end to the suffering that really isn't in the West/Ukraine's power at the moment.  Russia are the only ones who can possibly make that happen.

[The_Capt]

33 minutes ago, holoween said:

Id say the biggest question regarding the war if the offensive fails is why it failed.

So far it seems ukraine does mostly company sized bite and hold attacks which are at best simultaniously done but not coordinated. (feel free to correct me if i have the wrong impression)

So why didnt they run larger attacks?

- lack of c&c?

- lack of support assets?

-too high russian force density?

Whatever the cause if ukraine can figure out how to scale up their attacks over the winter and implement it it stands a good chance to overrun the russian defenses next time.

Why UA is not massing?  Well it may also be for the same reason the RA has avoided it, mass is dangerous.  The few times last year the RA tried massing they got severely damaged doing so.  We saw the UA go through the same thing earlier this summer.  The reason is that massing dramatically increases ISR signatures and opens one up to counters.  There has been a drive towards higher distribution of forces this entire war and I do not think it is a question of coordination or ability as much as it is that concentration of forces is a good way to lose them.

The UA’s current “small bites” is not that different from the RA’s over the winter, albeit delivered via different tactical capability.  I suspect they are small-biting until the RA are eroded to a point that UA massing cannot be countered, then we may see a larger concentrated break out.  For now I am not even sure traditional air superiority would do it as ISR is everywhere and unmanned/PGM cannot be countered by conventional air systems.

I have heard this “well why are they not just doing X?” from western military experts and the answer is likely “because they tried that and it does not work”.  I also am starting to believe that “not working” is not due to UA shortfalls in C2 or training after 18 months of western support and lessons learned from this war.  Instead it is likely due to shifts in warfare itself.

[Kinophile]

Destroying (not defeating) a company is a big job;  a battalion,  that's hard AF. An entire brigade? In close combat? (and not just long range slaughtering of a stupidly planned, badly lead,  daylight assault across open plains). 

Bloody hell.  

Yep it was not in great condition, but that's par for the course,  that's part and parcel of how you do it. 

The nice words here are "thrust"  and "maneuver"  and "cut off". 

You don't achieve that with plodding PBI, it takes vehicles moving quickly without minefields slowing them down and,  while taking losses,  not enough to stop them. Plus fires dominance. 

Looks like the ZSU has achieved mechanized maneuver at last,  at least locally.  They exploited the seams between units and chomped off the 72nd.

Edited September 15, 2023 by Kinophile

[Bulletpoint]

4 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Destroying (not defeating) a company is a big job;  a battalion,  that's hard AF. An entire brigade? In close combat? (and not just long range slaughtering of a stupidly planned, badly lead,  daylight assault across open plains). 

Bloody hell.  

Yep it was not in great condition, but that's par for the course,  that's part and parcel of how you do it. 

I wonder if the loss of so many local higher command was the catalyst for tactical collapse. 

They had been holding out in that tiny village less than 500x500 metres for nearly a month (since 20/08). Sounds to me like they were shelled into submission and finally overrun.