How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kevinkin]

https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/08/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-briefings/index.html

Pointing fingers is counterproductive and just what Putin wants. Perhaps time to show resolve and being unified in a new way. Maybe a separate public meeting focused on killing Russians.  These old stick NATO summits are just too boiler plate. 

[Jwk]

5 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I still don't understand why the US seems so stingy with these things.

It's just like Steve was saying: Ukraine surviving is more than enough for US interests. On the other hand, Ukraine getting big, attention catching wins is dangerous for Russia's stability. Russia must remain stable for European (and US) security.

Giving Ukraine F-16s will be the last expansion of capabilities that West agrees to. The rest of the heavy equipment in the aid will be on the current levels of supply - a few dozen a month at best. Maybe Ukraine will get a bit more shells per month, but all the expanded MIC production will be hoarded in case of Taiwan invasion or Ukraine suffering some big defeat.

[kevinkin]

https://defensescoop.com/2023/08/07/army-may-procure-multiple-variants-of-lasso-kamikaze-drones-to-boost-production-capacity-acquisition-chief-says/

Neat system. Moving to a more unified UAV where it can be adapted based on the objective/target set? Standardization has benefits in the long run. I wonder to the DOD has civilian engineers observing in Ukraine? If not, perhaps they should. 

[kevinkin]

https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/08/drone-wars-over-moscow/

Here's the conventional wisdom(?) in nutshell:

While drones have proven useful to both sides, they are unlikely to be decisive for either. Their effect on how the war ends will be marginal. In fact, no single weapon or system is capable of providing the decisive edge in this war. Ukraine is receiving – and in the case of drones, producing – weapons of better quality than Russia can field, but Russia retains a numerical advantage and has the ability to escalate in ways Ukraine cannot match, including the use of nuclear weapons. No clear military solution is easily available to either side. This war, like nearly all wars, will end in a negotiated settlement. But that won’t happen until both sides believe they’ll get a better deal by talking than by fighting; right now, both believe they can gain more by fighting. Drone strikes alone are unlikely to change that calculus.

The US buys into that, and so does Putin, but wonder if Ukraine does and are their operations being conducted with that understanding? It's almost as if Putin's war is being directed by China who is the only entity that can force him to the table. Otherwise, he thinks time and attrition are on his side.

[warrenpeace]

I have not been following this thread that closely, but it seems to me that the lack of progress in the Ukranian counter offensive reminds me a bit of Kursk in 1943.  The Soviets had time to prepare defense in depth and made extensive use of minefields and fixed defensive positions to essentially nullify the German offensive advantage.  I think the lesson here is that without massive air superiority, fixed defenses win.  Does anyone else see this parallel?  

[riptides]

11 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

......

The US buys into that, and so does Putin, but wonder if Ukraine does and are their operations being conducted with that understanding? It's almost as if Putin's war is being directed by China who is the only entity that can force him to the table. Otherwise, he thinks time and attrition are on his side.

I think China is dumbfounded as the rest of the world with Putin.

But, they do think the war he has waged is a good thing to distract the US from its other intentions. More economic dominance and a general shift in the order of Taiwan and Asia Pacific in general. Unfortunately the economy of China has hit a major road bump and well the Military is seemly to be undercut by recent events like the Japan exposures of being hacked.

Putin will never negotiate a settlement. Someone else maybe, but no way Putin is in power at that point.

 

 

[Bulletpoint]

15 minutes ago, warrenpeace said:

I have not been following this thread that closely, but it seems to me that the lack of progress in the Ukranian counter offensive reminds me a bit of Kursk in 1943.  The Soviets had time to prepare defense in depth and made extensive use of minefields and fixed defensive positions to essentially nullify the German offensive advantage.  I think the lesson here is that without massive air superiority, fixed defenses win.  Does anyone else see this parallel?  

 

On 6/10/2023 at 11:24 AM, Bulletpoint said:

Maybe this has been discussed before, but I can't help but be reminded of the battle of Kursk... The Germans postponed their offensive in order to wait for more, newer, and better tanks, while the Soviets used the time to dig in and construct heavily mined defensive belts.

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, warrenpeace said:

I have not been following this thread that closely, but it seems to me that the lack of progress in the Ukranian counter offensive reminds me a bit of Kursk in 1943.  The Soviets had time to prepare defense in depth and made extensive use of minefields and fixed defensive positions to essentially nullify the German offensive advantage.  I think the lesson here is that without massive air superiority, fixed defenses win.  Does anyone else see this parallel?  

Not surprisingly, it has been raised as a parallel a number of times since a) it is well documented, b) it took place relatively close by, and c) it had lots and lots and lots of tanks which makes everybody interested in it

There are a number of issues with looking directly at Citadel, the primary one being that the Germans were dangerously positioned when they launched their offensive.  When they were bogged down the Soviets were able to successfully smash the Germans into a general retreat.  The second major difference is that Hitler imposed this upon the military and made things worse as the offensive went on.

In short, Citadel was not just a battle of attacker vs. entrenched defender, but a disaster from the get go.  Who knows how things would have gone if the Germans had developed a more sensible offensive plan or Hitler had not consistently interfered.  What we do know is a piss-poor plan against a well laid out defense doesn't seem to work out very well for the attacker.

In the situation with Ukraine it is pretty clear that Russia is spent as an offensive force and sensible military leadership is in control of the operation.  For sure Ukraine has some very significant factors making this offensive more difficult than it would be (in theory) for NATO, but it is making progress and doesn't seem to have the sorts of Sword of Damocles hanging over its head like the Germans had for Citadel.

We have had many discussions about the possibility that we are entering an age of "defensive primacy".  Too soon to say yet, but it is pretty clear that a well prepared defense with deep and dense minefields protected by artillery, ATGMs, and air power is an extremely difficult nut to crack.

Steve

[Aragorn2002]

31 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

 

Let's not forget thatt Kursk was in fact one big slaughter for the Russians, which only ended because the Germans had no reserves left to continue their offensive and had to withdraw divisions to other fronts, both inside and outside Russia.

[Haiduk]

Several Russian milbloggers reported Ukrainian forces landed near Kozachi Laheri (means "Cossack's Сamps") village on left bank of Dnipro (more exactly, beyond Konka river). As they claimed after Russian command moved VDV troops, guarding this area to Zaporizhzhia front, only mobik unit remained there (Poulet Volant marked 205th motor-rifle brigade of 49th CAA in this area). They missed UKR approach (one Russian TG claims they were drunken) and engaged them only when Ukrainians already landed with support of artillery. As result Russian troops withdrew west.  Who controls Kozachi Laheri is unknown - initially Romanov92 claimed UKR control it, but this is a large village, which had more 2500 of population before the war. Ukrainians landed from seven boats, this is about two platoons with ammunition and some heavy infantry weapon, so it's hard to seize such large village with so small forces. Later Russian milbloggers reported, four boats evacuated some of personnel back, but Ukrainians still present west from the village, occupying watching position and trenches.

Other milblogger later added Kozachi Lahery are under Russians, but there are fierce fight on outskirt

Later Ukrainian military officillay confirmed "success on Tavrian direction" (means Kherson oblast)

Yellow spot - Russian positions west of village, captured by UKR landing group, according to Romanov92

 

Edited August 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[warrenpeace]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not surprisingly, it has been raised as a parallel a number of times since a) it is well documented, b) it took place relatively close by, and c) it had lots and lots and lots of tanks which makes everybody interested in it

There are a number of issues with looking directly at Citadel, the primary one being that the Germans were dangerously positioned when they launched their offensive.  When they were bogged down the Soviets were able to successfully smash the Germans into a general retreat.  The second major difference is that Hitler imposed this upon the military and made things worse as the offensive went on.

In short, Citadel was not just a battle of attacker vs. entrenched defender, but a disaster from the get go.  Who knows how things would have gone if the Germans had developed a more sensible offensive plan or Hitler had not consistently interfered.  What we do know is a piss-poor plan against a well laid out defense doesn't seem to work out very well for the attacker.

In the situation with Ukraine it is pretty clear that Russia is spent as an offensive force and sensible military leadership is in control of the operation.  For sure Ukraine has some very significant factors making this offensive more difficult than it would be (in theory) for NATO, but it is making progress and doesn't seem to have the sorts of Sword of Damocles hanging over its head like the Germans had for Citadel.

We have had many discussions about the possibility that we are entering an age of "defensive primacy".  Too soon to say yet, but it is pretty clear that a well prepared defense with deep and dense minefields protected by artillery, ATGMs, and air power is an extremely difficult nut to crack.

Steve

Just to clarify, the comparison is only to the initial German attacks, not the subsequent Soviet offensive.  I don't think that Russia has enough left in reserve to make a serious counter offensive.  (Of course I think Bradley said the same thing in December 1944, so who knows?).

[Kinophile]

Hmmm

[Haiduk]

Aftermath of yesterday Russian missile strike on Pokrovsk town, Donetsk oblast. Iskander-M hit residential building, when police and emergency services arrived, trough 30 minutes Russians hit nearby with other Iskander-M. As result of strike were killed 7 and wounded 88 of people, among them were wounded 31 policemen and was killed deputy chief of Emergency Service of Donetsk oblast. 

Russians as always claimed they have struck "command center"

 

[Kinophile]

Pretty blatant double tap.  Exactly what they would do in Syria against the White Helmets. 

Goddamn scumbags. 

[cesmonkey]

About 20 minutes in, interview with Fred Kagan of the Institute of the Study of War on the progress of Ukraine's counter-offensive:
https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/why-the-ukrainian-counter-offensive-can-still-succeed/id1612424182?i=1000623828992

[Harmon Rabb]

3 hours ago, Jwk said:

It's just like Steve was saying: Ukraine surviving is more than enough for US interests. On the other hand, Ukraine getting big, attention catching wins is dangerous for Russia's stability. Russia must remain stable for European (and US) security.

Giving Ukraine F-16s will be the last expansion of capabilities that West agrees to. The rest of the heavy equipment in the aid will be on the current levels of supply - a few dozen a month at best. Maybe Ukraine will get a bit more shells per month, but all the expanded MIC production will be hoarded in case of Taiwan invasion or Ukraine suffering some big defeat.

Hey and welcome to the forum.

I'm just curious what your idea of an attention seeking Ukrainian win would be. I think we have already seen more than a few of those last year, the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive definitely comes to mind.

Also what do you mean by Russia's stability? I remember during Prigozhin's failed rebellion plenty of folks on this forum  hoping this could be the end of Putin's regime, and being disappointed that it ended so soon.

Not saying you are wrong but I hope you are and military aid to Ukraine gets increased.

[cesmonkey]

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, warrenpeace said:

Just to clarify, the comparison is only to the initial German attacks, not the subsequent Soviet offensive.  I don't think that Russia has enough left in reserve to make a serious counter offensive.  (Of course I think Bradley said the same thing in December 1944, so who knows?).

Yup, understood.  However, with these sorts of operations it really isn't possible to separate out overarching constraints.  If the Germans didn't have their entire northern pincer crushed and resources diverted to plug the gaps, what difference would that have had on the tactical battlefield?  What if the Allies had not landed in Sicily when they did?  It's been years since I studied the operation in detail, but my memory says it would have been significant.

My point is that it seems attrition is really the only way to slog through a competent in-depth defense (which certainly describes what Russia is doing).  Russia has apparently already tried to do an Operation Kutuzov (the Orel counter offensive) in the north towards Kupyansk and it's failed to do much of anything, so now it comes down to who can attrit the other faster and more thoroughly.  It is unclear that Ukraine has enough artillery capacity to keep pushing, but it is also unclear if Russia has enough resources to continue meaningfully contesting the whole front.

To get back to your question... it seems we have entered a period of military history where well prepared defense has, at least, gained parity with well prepared offense.  However, I still maintain that we can't conclude too much from this counter offensive because unless NATO's air forces come in and directly support Ukraine's ground attacks we don't have a good analogy to what NATO could achieve if it were in Ukraine's position.

Steve

[Haiduk]

Russian milblogger "13th" claimed recon group of 16 men, led by major Tomov, disappeared approx in 4km west from UKR landing point near Kozachi Laheri village  (presumable point of missing of group is a white point on the map). "13th" criticized TG channel RuVesna, which refuted his disaapearing and issued video, filmed by this major, where he says his unut has engaged the enemy and conducts close fighting. "13th" says he knows, indeed neither major, nor anybody of his group didn't get in touch at the stipulated time, so he thinks, the phone of major was captured (maybe with major himself) and this video is old, probably of late spring. So, this is a trick of UKR SOF to lure out and ambush one more recon group.

Probably UKR raid on Kozachi Laheri is not for bridgehead establishing, but for important POWs capturing and C&C disruption. Because there were rumors so far, not only major Tomov missed, but somebody other hi-ranked.

  

Edited August 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Jwk said:

It's just like Steve was saying: Ukraine surviving is more than enough for US interests. On the other hand, Ukraine getting big, attention catching wins is dangerous for Russia's stability. Russia must remain stable for European (and US) security.

Welcome to the Forum!

It is a delicate balancing act for the West and China, the two other power blocs that have the most to gain/lose from this war.  I personally think that the West is blowing some opportunities that could end the war sooner without appreciably increasing the risk of destabilizing Russia.  For example, ATACMS and getting ammo production cranked up.  I also think F-16s is not a step too far, though there's far more practical issues surrounding those than something like ATACMS.

21 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I'm just curious what your idea of an attention seeking Ukrainian win would be. I think we have already seen more than a few of those last year, the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive definitely comes to mind.

Yeah, this is where I think the West is being too cautious.  Russia's position vis-a-vis its neighbors is already rock bottom.  With few exceptions, nobody is looking at Russia as reliable partner because of this war and its outcome so far.  A formal defeat for Russia wouldn't change that much, if at all, at this point.

21 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Also what do you mean by Russia's stability? I remember during Prigozhin's failed rebellion plenty of folks on this forum  hoping this could be the end of Putin's regime, and being disappointed that it ended so soon

Well, it was the end of Putin's regime as we previous knew it to be.  The only reason why Putin is still in power is because he negotiated his way into keeping it.  It seems everybody within the Kremlin knows this, which is problematic for a regime that has long since dispensed with the capacity to share power successfully.  So, Putin's "it's my way or the window" rule is over.  What comes next is still a work in progress.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Russian milblogger "13th" claimed recon group of 16 men, led by major Tomov, disappeared approx in 4km west from UKR landing point near Kozachi Laheri village  (presumable point of missing of group is a white point on the map). "13th" criticized TG channel RuVesna, which refuted his disaapearing and issued video, filmed by this major, where he says his unut has engaged the enemy and conducts close fighting. "13th" says he knows, indeed neither major, nor anybody of his group didn't get in touch at the stipulated time, so he thinks, the phone of major was captured (maybe with major himself) and this video is old, probably of late spring. So, this is a trick of UKR SOF to lure out and ambush one more recon group.

Probably UKR raid on Kozachi Laheri is not for bridgehead establishing, but for important POWs capturing and C&C disruption. Because there were rumors so far, not only major Tomov missed, but somebody other hi-ranked.

  

This might have been a very targeted special forces raid operation, not anything else?  Very interesting possibility, but it could just be Ukraine sensed an opportunity to cause a distraction and they got a few extra special prisoners by accident.

Steve

[Haiduk]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This might have been a very targeted special forces raid operation, not anything else?

It will be known tomorrow. Several hours ago Russians reported UKR still present near Kozachi Laheri and have a fire contact with Russian troops in the village. If this just a raid, UKR troops have to withdraw soon. In first message Romanov92 told UKR troops advanced on 800 m deep. So, seizing of positions near Kozachi Laheri is either support action to attract Russian troops until SOF will busy on other place or... maybe this attempt of next bridgehead.

[Vet 0369]

12 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Training and more training until the unit is full of potential energy and fired like cannon into the enemy. The unit sees the the horrors or war and those that survive think they are either lucky, really good, blessed by God or a combination of those. To reassemble said unit then add in replacements and assume the survivors will not be cocky goes against human nature. I think the Band of Brothers has several scenes related to this. But what is in human nature that produces that cockiness. Individualism. What militaries do is take the best foot soldiers and promote them after heavy action. For good reason -  that way they tow the company line with a higher shield of authority over the replacements. But some can't take the difference between squad and company leader. They just rather return to the familiarity of how they survived. It's sort of simple: no one who has little experienced in what I went through is going to train me. Ukraine does not have the luxury to let combat vets completely reset and come back with an open mind.    

I must take exception to most of this. It just isn’t true except in an extremely small number of circumstances. Most of the issues with replacements isn’t that they are not trained or inexperienced, but that most units train as a unit and are very familiar with how each operates. Replacements are new members of the unit, and as such are “unknowns.” It is a matter of “trust.” The reason the WW2 “vets” appeared to “shun” replacements is much more related to the the causality rate of the replacements themselves. Almost no one wanted to “get to know” or “befriend” a replacement who was likely to become a major casualty in the next fight and be gone. After surviving the first fight, the replacement had shown that he had either the “luck” or “skill” to survive and was accepted.

[Battlefront.com]

1.  Reports of some more deep strikes in Crimea.  From several hours ago:

 

2.  Khodakovsky seeming to indicate that Russian positions in/around Urozhaine have been compromised.

3.  Ben Hodges talks about what Ukraine liberating Crimea might mean for Putin's regime:

 

4.  Indications that Ukraine's senior command is not ignoring the Kupyansk front:

Steve

[Haiduk]

Several days ago Russians have trown into the battle probably in Robotyne - Verbove area 56th air-assault regiment of 7th air-assault division. Recently this unit was deployed either on Vasylivka direction in reserve or belonged to Troops Groupment "Dnepr", guarding Kherson oblast. Locals say after several days of fightning to Feodosia in Cremea were delivered bodies of three officers - major Dmitriy Degtyariov, chief of staff of air-assault battalion and two company commanders - captains Vladimir Guryanov and Andrey Lefterov

56th air-assault regiment before a war was deployed in Kamyshyn, Volgograd oblast as 56th air-assault brigade (it was experimental brigade, having UAZ Patriot as a transport), but was moved to Feodosia, re-formed to regiment and  included in composition of 7th air-assau;t division (mountain) as regiment.   

Probably by the forces of 56th regiment Russians tried to push off in fierce counter -attacks UKR troops between Robotyne and Verbove and partially they could achive some results near Verbove.

 

Edited August 8, 2023 by Haiduk