How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Teufel]

47 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Now, of course Russia doesn't have infinite resources so can't stay in the war indefinitely. But neither has Ukraine. I may be wrong about Western support. After all,  we managed to stay in Afghanistan for 20 years and many of us would struggle to find that country on a map - as compared to "right next to the EU/NATO border". But there are many unknowns and my personal guess is that governments currently face enough problems of their own that they can't sell support for Ukraine for years on a scale we are seeing right now.

Interesting point actually, speaking of presenting facts when possible. Will abide by my own suggestion.

Apparently according to this study from Brown University the total cost for the Afghan war was 2.13 trillion USD spread out over approximately 20 years. We’ll round to 100 billion per year to simplify.

Support for Ukraine, pledged so far sits at around 77 billion USD but 61% or approx. 47 billion USD of that is military aid, see second link.

From these two sources we can draw the conclusion that approx 75% of the annual cost spent on Afghanistan is sent to Ukraine. And just looking at the military expenditure it’s 50%. But let’s stick to 75% as reference when comparing.

Sustainable or not, that I leave to you the reader to conclude for yourself.

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022

https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

Edited July 31, 2023 by Teufel

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, Teufel said:

There is nothing in your statements and observations that you need to apologize for. Exactly why we are here for. To share assumptions, opinions and hopefully facts without bullsh*t. We can disagree with one and other, we don’t necessarily need to like the counterparts arguments or opinions. Had this discussion already about listening to what Russians say, stand by the opinion that we don’t need to agree with one and other but proactively listen we must. We can’t end up in “group think” or echo chambers of opinions, then we are for real in trouble.

Thanks, I can very much respect that.

[kimbosbread]

43 minutes ago, Butschi said:

But that is the point, the war has to actually have ended for that to happen, right? Sure there will always be people/companies/organizations willing to invest money but a true large scale rebuilding will only happen once a stable peace is established not just some frozen conflict.

Afghanistan begs to differ. Practically speaking, rebuilding will need to happen soon enough so that the US can shift extra attention to Taiwan.

[Splinty]

53 minutes ago, Butschi said:

But that is the point, the war has to actually have ended for that to happen, right? Sure there will always be people/companies/organizations willing to invest money but a true large scale rebuilding will only happen once a stable peace is established not just some frozen conflict.

Maybe in Eastern Ukraine, but don't forget that the western part of the country has sustained a lot of damage as well. A frozen conflict (which I don't think will happen) won't have much effect on rebuilding the west of the country. In any case, even if we end up in a Korea type situation. Ukraine will become like South Korea,with a thriving Western style economy.

[Letter from Prague]

It is kinda true. I heard Rheinmetall is opening new factory for mysterious something in Ukraine. The second reason why it was the news was that they mentioned they will install their own air defense around it and private corporate air defense is cyberpunk as ****, I gotta say.

[Butschi]

2 minutes ago, Splinty said:

Maybe in Eastern Ukraine, but don't forget that the western part of the country has sustained a lot of damage as well. A frozen conflict (which I don't think will happen) won't have much effect on rebuilding the west of the country. In any case, even if we end up in a Korea type situation. Ukraine will become like South Korea,with a thriving Western style economy.

I don't think you can compare Ukraine to South Korea. While technically speaking there is no real peace between north and south, the status quo is stable because South Korea's security is guaranteed by the USA including troops on the ground in South Korea. In addition, China, while outwardly protecting North Korea, has no interest in an open conflict along the 38th parallel. North Korea is isolated and has no chance of harming South Korea (apart from some more symbolic skirmishes) without committing suicide. (Nukes may have changed that equation somewhat).

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Not going to throw stones, however, this is what happens when one adopts an extreme definition of “winning”.  It has been a problem going way back to last summer.  To even suggest a half measure of victory for Ukraine was to admit defeat…which is simply not true.  

For some, yes even on this board, victory for Ukraine is 1) regaining every inch of the pre-2014 borders, 2) a completely defeated and dismantled Russian state and 3) regional security for Ukraine from now until the end of time.  I can clearly recall this narrative being promoted here and used as justification as to why we need to give the UA every weapon under creation yesterday.

Well 1) how realistic are these criteria given realities of modern warfare?  2) items #2 and #3 on that list are in strategic tension with each other? And 3) so if Ukraine (or the West for that matter) fail to achieve these goals, does that equal Ukrainian defeat?

Grown ups do not talk in terms of absolutes.  They talk in terms of negotiation.  How can Ukraine negotiate the best outcome it can out of this war?  As to victory, Ukraine is already there because the actual core objective of remaining an independent state has been met.  The rest is negotiation; violent and bloody negotiations.

Everyone wants Ukraine to succeed as much as possible but “what winning looks like” is a moving target.  If the UA cannot break the strategic corridor and set conditions for retaking the Crimea then this conflict will likely freeze.  Ok, so what?  How does Ukraine still achieve its strategic objectives if this happens?  

Regardless of the exact lines on the map, the larger question is will Putin accept a Korean war type ending with an actual cease fire. He is trying to project that Russia can keep taking ~500 casualties a day forever to inflict a ~100 casualties on Ukraine. Now this may be pure propaganda on Putins part, that is 180,000 casualties a year, which is a LARGE number. The Russian military could fold next week, but the Vietnamese withstood those kind of numbers for a decade, as did both sides of the Iran Iraq war. Indeed Russia's position now most closely resembles Iraq after the initial stage of the Iran Iraq war. Russia like Saddam, has made some territorial gains, but utterly failed to to achieve the regime change and truly strategic victory that were the initial war aims. But the war continued for seven years until Saddam concluded his regime would fail if he kept fighting. We have to give Ukraine enough support to get Putin to that point rather more quickly.

Indeed i would argue that there a lot of parallels between Russia today and Iraq in 1982 or so, an ugly regime that had spent decades justifying itself on the basis increasing prosperity has thrown that prosperity away on a very bad bet. It has now switched entirely to a blood and soil fascist narrative as it attempts to burn off its internal opposition and out group ethnicities by forcing them to bear the brunt of the war. To repeat, the question is how do you make it fail faster than Saddam did. My two cents, worth what you paid.

[FancyCat]

Eh I disagree, if Ukraine were to retake all territory, that is a win 100% even if Russia were to lob missiles day and night at Ukraine. At that point, international pressure would be intense on Russia, as the losing party to concede and formalize a agreement. Hell, the weight of Ukraine militarily capturing and liberating it's territory would shatter Russian image internationally and domestically. It would empower a new Ukrainian image internationally, which would be powerful in shifting stances and opinions.

At that point, it's very likely parties like Iran and China probably slow their support lest the full weight of changing opinion make their support no longer beneficial.

Oh sure, missiles raining on Kiyv send a message, but the Ukrainian flag in Crimea and Luhansk is just a earth shattering message as well.

Plus, Ukraine has shown itself to be capable of inflicting pain on Russia. If Russia reaches the point of being such that it has lost (and if all territory of 1991 borders has been restored, that is a loss) and Ukraine starts bombarding Russia proper to ensure pain is occurring, I think world opinion will be conclusively pro Ukrainian. That does wonders in opening post war reconstruction.

[Astrophel]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

I don't think you can compare Ukraine to South Korea. While technically speaking there is no real peace between north and south, the status quo is stable because South Korea's security is guaranteed by the USA including troops on the ground in South Korea. In addition, China, while outwardly protecting North Korea, has no interest in an open conflict along the 38th parallel. North Korea is isolated and has no chance of harming South Korea (apart from some more symbolic skirmishes) without committing suicide. (Nukes may have changed that equation somewhat).

Maybe you should visit Seoul one day.  The situation feels anything BUT stable or safe.  The city is overshadowed by mountains in North Korea into which everybody knows North Korea has spent 50 years digging tunnels and embedding all kinds of artillery - these days including nuclear.  It is nice you see American uniforms driving around on occasion but it does not make you feel any safer.

The situation in Ukraine must be resolved or Eastern Europe in particular - Germany too - will not know any peace of mind.  The Korean model should not be seducing anybody although some propagandists are floating the idea - let's freeze the conflict like Korea and Ukraine can prosper like South Korea?

North Korea is a nightmare state to have on your borders in perpetuity.  Did you know there are still today POW's held in captivity in the North?  Ukrainian POW's have disappeared without trace, along with the children, and the deported - running into the millions of people.  Are we supposed to negotiate them away for a Korean type truce?

We need to face up to the necessity to solve the russian problem now we have the chance.  Future generations of russians will thank us for it too - as are most Europeans and Japanese thankful for the defeat of fascism.

Edited July 31, 2023 by Astrophel
legibility

[billbindc]

4 hours ago, Teufel said:

 

Can you have peace and dialogue with people of such mentality and experiences? Ukrainians are no different from us, even have roots on my fathers side from Ukraine - we are kin. Forcing peace on them as with us and results will not be different.

 

War is communication too…

[A Canadian Cat]

6 hours ago, Hapless said:

Of course, Mexico might be unable to regain it's international borders and a frozen conflict might develop... but that isn't going to make the US less crippled and Mexico less undefeated.

Correct but I think the pessimist point is that it would prevent Mexico from joining the SATO alliance and since the is the main thing they want Mexico still looses.

Personally I think the bit that @Butschi missed is that regime change is extremely likely if the the RA looses that much territory as is an RA collapse. This kid of frozen scenario is my big fear but I have had a lot less worry about that in recent weeks because the UA seems to be doing the right things and working towards eventual success.

Edited July 31, 2023 by IanL
Typo

[poesel]

I doubt that Russia could be anything like North Korea. Main reason being geography.

North Korea can pull it off because they only have one relatively small border in the south to defend. The other three sides are either ocean or China & Russia.
Russia's borders are simply too long and connected to too many other countries. A mass exodus could not be stopped. Case in point is the exodus that happened because of this war.

Ireland, UK or Florida could become like North Korea, but not Russia.

[poesel]

Picture of the damaged Chonhar bridge:

And why that is important:

 

[Carolus]

4 hours ago, panzermartin said:

 managed to bite back and hold the line so far against practically the support of 40 NATO countries and a total western blackout on their economy. That was a blow that would break any country to pieces.

I want to add a clarification here, because I do not think that is a correct representation of the situation.

There is nothing that remotely resembles a "total Western blackout" on their economy.

Maybe you were thinking of the war economy, so military or dual-use goods, but even there it is not the case.

What the sanctions have done is reduce Russian export revenue - significantly. However, that affects only money. Money, however, is not a significant resource for a war economy because Russia can just force its population to work under threat of violence or make school classes build thousands of drones (as is happening right now) as a patriotic afternoon activity.

There are sanctions which are, probably, well observed. This includes things like *ponders list* the export of exotic woods from Belarus and the import of a specific sort of champagne older than 14.6 years from France to Russia (14.5 years is okay though)

Basically the entire rest of the civilian economy of Russia outside petro industries is completely excempt from sanctions, by design. That is why Western companies are the largest tax income contributors for the Russian state through business conducted within the territory of Russia. Whichever Western companies voluntarily reduced their engagement in Russia results in their personnel and machinery in Russia being seized and production continued under local management. A disruption of sorts, but not a significant one - especially since machine maintenance and SW support by Western companies usually continues.

This, again, affects money, which, as I admitted, is of limited importance and as I said, it is possible that when you said economy you specifically meant only the military-industrial complex.

Otherwise the material conditons of Russia for the war have improved.

Let me emphasize that for effect, because it might be something many people do not realise:

The material conditions of the Russian military industrial complex have *improved* since the beginning the war.

Let me explain: What Russia does not receive are ready-to-use Western weapons or systems, which they can just point at Ukraine and push a button. That is indeed a sanction which is being observed quite well.

Everything below that level is almost entirely accessible to Russia.

Russia receives more component materials now than before the war when it comes to electronics, chips and other parts. 

Yes, the cost per unit is increased because they have to route it e.g. via the Maledives and arrange payment via Switzerland. But the flow of material dual-use goods is entirely *unimpeded*. (asterisks for special effects). This flow, albeit rerouted, is *larger* in 2023 than it was before Feb 2022.

And in addition to that, the material and electronics import from China has *skyrocketed* for Russia, including production means and machines, and add to that some know-how and stuff from Iran and other smaller rogue states.

That's why I say that, material wise, the Russian war economy has improved its conditions,  even if the monetary situation has worsened overall (which I do not think is overly significant for the Russian society in its current state), and I think this should be kept in mind when analyzing the situation.

Edited July 31, 2023 by Carolus
typos and corrections

[Bearstronaut]

1 hour ago, Astrophel said:

Maybe you should visit Seoul one day.  The situation feels anything BUT stable or safe.  The city is overshadowed by mountains in North Korea into which everybody knows North Korea has spent 50 years digging tunnels and embedding all kinds of artillery - these days including nuclear.  It is nice you see American uniforms driving around on occasion but it does not make you feel any safer.

The situation in Ukraine must be resolved or Eastern Europe in particular - Germany too - will not know any peace of mind.  The Korean model should not be seducing anybody although some propagandists are floating the idea - let's freeze the conflict like Korea and Ukraine can prosper like South Korea?

North Korea is a nightmare state to have on your borders in perpetuity.  Did you know there are still today POW's held in captivity in the North?  Ukrainian POW's have disappeared without trace, along with the children, and the deported - running into the millions of people.  Are we supposed to negotiate them away for a Korean type truce?

We need to face up to the necessity to solve the russian problem now we have the chance.  Future generations of russians will thank us for it too - as are most Europeans and Japanese thankful for the defeat of fascism.

FWIW I spent four years of the last decade stationed in South Korea and I felt safer in Seoul than in any American city. Kim Jong Un isn't stupid. He is fully aware that Korean War 2.0 will result in the destruction of his regime. The ROK armed forces are technically and tactically proficient, far more so than the KPA. USFK is just a bonus. Now, that may change in 15-20 years due to the increase in isolationist sentiment in the US and the absolutely catastrophic demographic collapse South Korea is going through.

Edited July 31, 2023 by Bearstronaut

[Carolus]

Follow-up on the civilian freighter. 

CORRECTION:

The freighter has changed course, it is heading back to Romanian or Bulgarian waters. 

It has turned around at the limit of entering the Ukrainian danube area.

Edited July 31, 2023 by Carolus
Correction added

[photon]

How has rolling stock held up in the war so far? I was reading the U.S. Army 1944 instructions on converting a boxcar to carry 500lb bombs and it struck me that a hit from even a small FPV drone would be absolutely catastrophic. How are both sides moving ammunition trains without losing them?

[Astrophel]

36 minutes ago, Bearstronaut said:

 I felt safer in Seoul than in any American city. 

I would not argue with that!

Nevertheless, militarily, Seoul is a sitting duck.  I trust you will not argue with this either.

[Astrophel]

49 minutes ago, Carolus said:

I want to add a clarification here, because I do not think that is a correct representation of the situation.

There is nothing that remotely resembles a "total Western blackout" on their economy.

Maybe you were thinking of the war economy, so military or dual-use goods, but even there it is not the case.

What the sanctions have done is reduce Russian export revenue - significantly. However, that affects only money. Money, however, is not a significant resource for a war economy because Russia can just force its population to work under threat of violence or make school classes build thousands of drones (as is happening right now) as a patriotic afternoon activity.

There are sanctions which are, probably, well observed. This includes things like *ponders list* the export of exotic woods from Belarus and the import of a specific sort of champagne older than 14.6 years from France to Russia (14.5 years is okay though)

Basically the entire rest of the civilian economy of Russia outside petro industries is completely excempt from sanctions, by design. That is why Western companies are the largest tax income contributors for the Russian state through business conducted within the territory of Russia. Whichever Western companies voluntarily reduced their engagement in Russia results in their personnel and machinery in Russia being seized and production continued under local management. A disruption of sorts, but not a significant one - especially since machine maintenance and SW support by Western companies usually continues.

This, again, affects money, which, as I admitted, is of limited importance and as I said, it is possible that when you said economy you specifically meant only the military-industrial complex.

Otherwise the material conditons of Russia for the war have improved.

Let me emphasize that for effect, because it might be something many people do not realise:

The material conditions of the Russian military industrial complex have *improved* since the beginning the war.

Let me explain: What Russia does not receive are ready-to-use Western weapons or systems, which they can just point at Ukraine and push a button. That is indeed a sanction which is being observed quite well.

Everything below that level is almost entirely accessible to Russia.

Russia receives more component materials now than before the war when it comes to electronics, chips and other parts. 

Yes, the cost per unit is increased because they have to route it e.g. via the Maledives and arrange payment via Switzerland. But the flow of material dual-use goods is entirely *unimpeded*. (asterisks for special effects). This flow, albeit rerouted, is *larger* in 2023 than it was before Feb 2022.

And in addition to that, the material and electronics import from China has *skyrocketed* for Russia, including production means and machines, and add to that some know-how and stuff from Iran and other smaller rogue states.

That's why I say that, material wise, the Russian war economy has improved its conditions,  even if the monetary situation has worsened overall (which I do not think is overly significant for the Russian society in its current state), and I think this should be kept in mind when analyzing the situation.

You are overcomplicating.

The russian economy is held together by two things:

1) They have been preparing for several years and have considerable savings in relatively hard currencies - including gold.

2) Domestically the debt/GDP ratio is very healthy.  So they can borrow money internally without crisis while their GDP is kept afloat by war production.

Probably we arrive at the same conclusion: Russia is not going down in the next 24 months thanks to the economy.  Sanctions should be focussed like a sniper on any key technologies and materials.  Personally I am still optimistic that Putin is personally vulnerable to an ice-pick in the back of the neck and so focus should also be applied to confiscating assets of powerful russians.

[CAZmaj]

The Ukrainian army commits new forces in a big southward push
After eight of weeks of slow progress, it is trying to revive its counter-offensive Ukraine's President Zelensky visits frontline positions in the Berdyansk direction.
Jul 27th 2023

After eight weeks of slow progress, Ukraine’s counter-offensive entered a new phase on July 26th when Ukraine’s army committed a big part of its reserve forces in the south. There was heavy fighting reported around the village of Robotyne. Ukrainian officials say their units are attacking in the direction of Melitopol, a city that dominates the “land bridge” linking Russia to Crimea, and Berdyansk, a port on the Sea of Azov (see map).

Ukraine’s hope is that Russia’s army, roiled by dysfunctional command and a drumbeat of Ukrainian missile attacks against its logistics, will break under the new pressure. But for that to happen, Ukraine must overcome the problems that hobbled the first phase of its offensive earlier this summer.

The counter-offensive began on June 4th when Ukraine launched attacks near Velyka Novosilka and around Bakhmut in Donetsk province, as well as a prior thrust in Zaporizhia province in the south where it is now intensifying its assault. Its new Western-equipped brigades got bogged down, sometimes in minefields, and were targeted by Russian artillery, anti-tank missiles, attack helicopters and loitering munitions. Ukraine responded by changing tactics. It held back armour and sent in smaller units of dismounted infantry, often no more than 20 soldiers, to proceed slowly and haltingly.

“The various wargames that were done ahead of time have predicted certain levels of advance,” conceded General Mark Milley, America’s top officer, on July 18th. “And that has slowed down.” In part, the slow progress reflects the scale of the task. Russian defences are 30km deep in places, bristling with tank traps and spattered with mines. Most nato armies would struggle to punch through comparable lines without complete dominance in the air, which Ukraine does not enjoy.

Another problem is that Russia has mounted a stronger defence than expected, conducting rapid, mobile counter-attacks in response to Ukrainian advances, rather than remaining confined to trenches. Rob Lee, an expert on Russia’s armed forces who recently visited the front lines, notes that they have not just executed their doctrine competently, but also innovated, for instance by stacking multiple anti-tank mines on top of one another to destroy mine-clearing vehicles.

Ukraine’s inability to breach Russian lines is partly to do with equipment—it needs demining kit, air-defence systems and anti-tank missiles capable of blunting Russian counter-attacks from a greater distance. It is also to do with tactics. Mr Lee describes an occasion when a brigade’s advance was delayed by a couple of hours, until dawn. That not only negated Ukraine’s advantage in night-vision systems, but also meant that the accompanying artillery barrage lifted hours earlier than it should have done. Russian infantry and anti-tank squads, who should have been suppressed by well-timed shellfire, were free to attack.

This lack of proficiency in co-ordinating complex attacks involving multiple units and different sorts of weapons is hardly surprising. Ukraine’s new brigades were put together in a hurry with unfamiliar equipment. Newly mobilised men were given a month of training in Germany. They have struggled with tasks like reconnaissance, says Mr Lee, with new units becoming disoriented at night time. Co-ordination has also been a problem, with confusion around where friendly units have placed mines.

Ukraine’s allies do not seem troubled by the slow progress to date. “It is far from a failure, in my view,” said General Milley, when asked whether the offensive had stalled. “I think that it’s way too early to make that kind of call.” Optimists point to three factors in Ukraine’s favour. One is that it need not fear a serious Russian counter-attack, despite minor Russian gains in northern Luhansk province in recent days. “There appears now to be little prospect of the Russian forces regaining momentum,” said Richard Moore, the head of mi6, a British spy agency, on July 19th. That may be one reason why Russia has torn up a grain deal and resumed strikes on Ukraine’s ports and grain stores.

Second, Russia’s decision to defend forward, rather than falling back to prepared defences, has slowed down Ukraine’s progress but also left Russia with little mobile reserve in the rear, a point underscored by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s unhindered march to Moscow in June.

The third factor is that Ukraine has been chipping away at Russia’s combat power. On July 11th a Ukrainian strike reportedly killed Oleg Tsokov, a Russian general, in Berdyansk, suggesting that Ukraine was successfully targeting command posts. In recent days Ukraine has also used British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike air bases and ammunition depots, including in Crimea. Meanwhile, America’s decision to provide cluster munitions, allows Ukraine to keep up the offensive for longer than originally planned—certainly beyond the summer if necessary.

These factors explain why General Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top general, decided to throw in fresh legs on July 26th. He has been forced to adapt his original plan. Brigades from Ukraine’s 9th Corps had been expected to fight their way to Russia’s main line of defence. Then the 10th Corps, in essence a second echelon, including three Western-equipped brigades, were to be deployed to fight their way through the strongest defences. Finally, light, fast-moving air-assault units were supposed to exploit any breakthrough, pouring through the hard-won breach.

In the event, 9th Corps struggled. Advances that were supposed to be completed in days ended up taking weeks. Ukraine was unable to deploy whole brigades, instead breaking them down into smaller units. Some experts worry that 10th Corps has now been thrown in prematurely. The main Russian line is still kilometres away and 10th Corps’s units might be worn down before they get there, leaving them too exhausted to punch through.

Western officials play down these concerns. “I think they timed it well,” says one. Ukraine is in a “very strong operational position”, says another, pointing to the turmoil in Russia’s senior ranks, including the decision in early July to sack General Ivan Popov, who commanded a big portion of Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Russian military bloggers have described heavy losses of Russian artillery pieces in recent weeks.

However, a fluid war of manoeuvre is likely to remain a stretch for a force cobbled together in a few months. The Russian verb peremalyvat (to grind through) is invoked on both sides. But Ukraine’s junior commanders, having seen their units gutted over the past 18 months, refuse to send their new citizen army into a meat-grinder in the way that Russia did in Bakhmut. As Ukraine has become more European, Ben Wallace, Britain’s defence minister, recently suggested, it has acquired “a Western European caution”.

Some American and European military officials argue that Ukrainian commanders have in fact been too slow to strike with their new brigades, a mistake that they think Ukraine committed last year in Kherson, when tens of thousands of Russian troops withdrew east over the Dnieper river with their equipment. Ukrainian commanders chafe at the idea that they should gamble their army in circumstances that nato generals have never faced.

The 10th Corps’s assault is a break with that hesitation. And the upside of the aversion to casualties thus far is that many Ukrainian units are in better shape than planners had assumed. Brigades that assaulted Russian positions were expected to be left with only a third of their original strength. Thanks in part to well-armoured Western vehicles, they have taken a lighter knock. Even so, the commitment of 10th Corps is a fateful moment for General Zaluzhny, a cautious commander with the weight of Ukrainian and allied expectations on his shoulders. “This is the last big decision for Zaluzhny to make this summer,” says the Western official. “The die is cast.” ■

This article appeared in the International section of the print edition under the headline "Hunting for a breakthrough"

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

Indeed i would argue that there a lot of parallels between Russia today and Iraq in 1982 or so, an ugly regime that had spent decades justifying itself on the basis increasing prosperity has thrown that prosperity away on a very bad bet. It has now switched entirely to a blood and soil fascist narrative as it attempts to burn off its internal opposition and out group ethnicities by forcing them to bear the brunt of the war. To repeat, the question is how do you make it fail faster than Saddam did. My two cents, worth what you paid.

Of course in this one the US is supporting the not-terrible-regime, so there is that.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_support_for_Iraq_during_the_Iran–Iraq_War

I dunno, I do not believe that Russia or the RA are some monolithic juggernaught that can keep taking punishment indefinitely - hell, we came within inches of a freakin coup, even if it was more likely an accidental one, in Jun.  Russia has basically torn off the steering wheel but there will be a point when economic ruin and dead Russians will stack up.

Beyond that a ZOS or some other UN BS might be an option but it won't stop the missiles or UAVs.  So to answer your question the best way to make Russia fail faster is what we did not do in the 80 - stop buying the oil and gas.  Hell we can't even agree to kick them out of the Olympics.  But in order to do any of this we would have to negotiate with a new reality ourselves.  The one where hard power and war are going to be at the forefront of diplomacy instead of sweeping up the "dust of empires".

I think it is still too soon to call the UA offensive a bust.  We have been here before, pecking and pinching, then one morning "whammie."  If it completely fails then there will definitely be some tough conversations. 

[CAZmaj]

Europe | Ukraine’s counter-offensive
The jury is still out on Ukraine’s big push south
Gains are modest so far, but the troops are confident
Jul 30th 2023 | LYMAN

“We can’t draw big conclusions yet,” said the senior Ukrainian military officer. Although Ukrainian forces had broken through heavily defended Russian lines on July 26th in the southern Zaporizhia sector (see map) and had since made modest advances in two areas, he said, it was too early to claim more than modest success. “It can’t change the big picture for the moment,” he added.

His caution looks justified. The idea that at the first breach the Russian lines would crumble, setting off a wholesale retreat of the kind that happened last September when Ukrainian forces stormed through the Kharkiv region, was never realistic. “It is fifty-fifty,” the officer said. “Sometimes we have successes and sometimes we have had to take our units back.” Having had six or seven months to prepare their lines for the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the Russians have constructed formidable barriers.

Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army general, describes the Russian obstacle design as being “much more complex, and deadly, than anything experienced by any military in nearly 80 years”. Tens of kilometres deep, it is intended to break up or slow down even the most competent combined-arms teams and separate them from their logistical support. What the Ukrainians are trying to do on the southern front—to drive south to the occupied city of Melitopol and the port of Berdiansk, aiming to cut the Russian occupation forces in two and sever Russia’s land bridge with Crimea—is incredibly hard.

Ukrainian forces are facing a lethal combination: millions of mines, fpv drones that transmit live pictures back to their operators, Lancet loitering munitions, the jamming and disabling of Ukrainian drones, long-range rockets and attack helicopters, all knit together by a dense network of sensors and data links. Even when mines are cleared, aircraft or artillery quickly re-seed the fields with scatterable munitions.

Breaking through such well-prepared defences, says Mr Ryan, requires combined-arms operational skills of the highest order. That is something the Ukrainians have not yet demonstrated at scale, says Michael Kofman, a military analyst who visited the front line earlier in July. Moreover, the techniques and the technology for breaching defences have barely evolved in 30 years. Even the best-trained nato armies enjoying air superiority might struggle to overcome such obstacles. “We need to break this combination,” says the Ukrainian military source.

On the other hand, the Russian manpower behind these lines has clearly been severely stretched by Ukraine’s strategy of attrition. Russian units, says the source, are “becoming smaller…companies that used to be 150 men are now only 20-30 and battalions of 500-600 are now 200 or 250.” If the breaches in the line that the Ukrainians have achieved can be carried farther, the Russians may have difficulty finding reinforcements.

Both sides are constantly probing for weaknesses along the 1,000km-long front. The Ukrainians are making potentially important advances around the ruined city of Bakhmut into the Klishchiivka area, where the Russian occupiers have not had time to build strong defences. For their part, the Russians still have hopes of regaining Ukrainian territory they have annexed but do not control in the Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk regions. They have found Ukrainian weak points in the north and the east.

Russia is shelling from across the border the north-eastern town of Vovchansk, forcing the evacuation of its remaining residents. On the eastern front the fortunes have been mixed. For months the Ukrainians aimed to capture Russian-held Kreminna, but in the past few weeks they have been driven back from their forward positions in a nearby pine forest. Between Lyman and Kupiansk, Ukraine lost three small villages last week and the little town of Borova is now in Russian sights. If it falls the Russians will have made considerable progress towards the Oskil river. The Ukrainians’ situation in the town of Avdiivka, 10km north of Donetsk, is also reported to be perilous.

Meanwhile, Russia struck Odessa and its ports with missiles for five consecutive days, hitting a cathedral in the city on July 23rd. Ukraine is striking back: on July 28th it appears to have hit the building of the interior ministry in the occupied city of Donetsk. An explosion in the Russian town of Taganrog, 110km from the nearest Ukrainian front line, was attributed by Vasily Golubev, the regional governor, to debris from a Ukrainian missile that was shot down. Another was reported shot down near the city of Azov, even deeper inside Russia. Several Russian Telegram channels reported heavy Ukrainian shelling of Donetsk and neighbouring Makiivka in occupied Ukraine.

For now the front line is a bloody shoving match, with both sides making small advances and retreats. Despite the lack of major successes, Ukrainian morale seems to be holding up. The troops realise that they are in for a long, hard slog, but Western officials familiar with the situation report that they remain highly motivated.

Near the town of Kupiansk, Pavlo was one of four soldiers heaving giant salamis, bottles of cola and other supplies into the back of their car. Although they had been under constant artillery attack, Pavlo said, “we kill more of them because our artillery is more precise.” Friends had already begun using cluster munitions recently supplied by America, he said, but “we don’t know the result yet.”

In Lyman a bushy-bearded commander going by the call sign “Pokémon” said his men were preparing their defences. This was a good thing, he explained: Russian troops will move forward, exposing themselves and allowing the Ukrainians to hit them with artillery and force them back. He seemed undiscouraged by the slow progress. Victory, he said, would come to whichever side was “better in deception operations”. Several Ukrainian missiles streaked overhead towards the Russian positions. “We just want to smash those ****ers!” Pokémon shouted. “Everyone is in a good mood!”

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1686076915952599044.html

[Bearstronaut]

1 hour ago, Astrophel said:

I would not argue with that!

Nevertheless, militarily, Seoul is a sitting duck.  I trust you will not argue with this either.

Sure, but so is every other city in the world.

[sburke]

1 hour ago, Astrophel said:

You are overcomplicating.

The russian economy is held together by two things:

1) They have been preparing for several years and have considerable savings in relatively hard currencies - including gold.

2) Domestically the debt/GDP ratio is very healthy.  So they can borrow money internally without crisis while their GDP is kept afloat by war production.

Probably we arrive at the same conclusion: Russia is not going down in the next 24 months thanks to the economy.  Sanctions should be focussed like a sniper on any key technologies and materials.  Personally I am still optimistic that Putin is personally vulnerable to an ice-pick in the back of the neck and so focus should also be applied to confiscating assets of powerful russians.

wow. awfully optimistic for a country that ranked below Italy in GDP.  Russia has been burning through everything it can to pay for this war.  Every economic estimate I have seen including that from Russia's own finance ministry has been more the "oh man are we fked" spectrum.