How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

25 minutes ago, womble said:

They really don't like being surrounded, do they?

 

So there are approximately fifty miles/85kms between Ukraine's two primary pushes. How deep do they have to get before all the Russians in between have to bug out or risk being caught in a  huge pocket, with either very limited seaborne supplies, or none at all depending on how Ukraines exploitation works out?

Edited July 28, 2023 by dan/california

[danfrodo]

20 minutes ago, dan/california said:

So there are approximately fifty miles/85kms between Ukraine's two primary pushes. How deep do they have to get before all the Russians in between have to bug out or risk being caught in a  huge pocket, with either very limited seaborne supplies, or none at all depending on how Ukraines exploitation works out?

Going to be an interesting time if UKR starts to break thru in these two sectors.  The RU troops in between might be sent to stop the two pushes, leaving center then relatively undefended.  That's what happens when you burn up all your mobile reserves trying to hold every inch of ground and launching pointless offensives that can't change anything.

[Jr Buck Private]

Seems like Ukraine is using a lot of those cluster munitions.   I wonder if it's more of a game changer than we originally thought?

[Twisk]

I found this from 2005

 

Quote

The report details a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions

 

This is from 2021

Quote

According to a 2017 Department of Defense letter, the US has destroyed approximately 3.7 million cluster munitions, containing 406.7 million submunitions, from its stocks since 2008

Both from Human Rights Watch but that would mean that the U.S. has almost 2 million rounds in storage. The game changer might be that Ukraine has suddenly found itself flush with ammunition and no longer needing to worry about running dry.

 

 

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/cluster0705/2.htm#:~:text=The report details a stockpile of 5.5,million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.10 This

 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/29/us-defense-contractor-distances-itself-cluster-munitions

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, womble said:

They really don't like being surrounded, do they?

 

They most definitely do not   In past discussions about Ukraine's possible strategies, I pointed out that they only have to threaten, not even to succeed, in cutting off Russian forces for them to withdraw.  Given their forward defense mentality with no backup and suffering heavy attrition while at the same time not having reliable logistics... I think we'll see more withdrawals soon.  With some luck, collapse.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Haiduk said:

But price is high. It's example why idea of initial involvemnt of tough Bradleys was right. New brigade, which should develop success lost seven vehicles on battlefield abandoned and destroyed close to main enemy trenches. This is 2,6 km from eastern outskirt of Robotyne. BMP-1 detanated after ATGM or RPG hit in side hull

Looks like a bunch of vehicles that were disabled and abandoned due to mines and ATGM fire, then targeted with artillery and Lancet (there is definitely one hit) to finish them off.  The video shows none of the vehicles moving and I saw evidence of only one soldier running around.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, akd said:

This is RPG-7.  You are seeing the booster rocket kick in after launching charge.

I was hoping you'd come here and give us something to chew on

Yup, booster and minimum arm range look to be about right.  11m from launch to boost, another 5m to arm... yeah, that looks correct.  If the gunner had held his fire any longer I don't think it would have armed.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Twisk said:

I found this from 2005

 

 

This is from 2021

Both from Human Rights Watch but that would mean that the U.S. has almost 2 million rounds in storage. The game changer might be that Ukraine has suddenly found itself flush with ammunition and no longer needing to worry about running dry.

 

 

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/cluster0705/2.htm#:~:text=The report details a stockpile of 5.5,million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.10 This

 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/29/us-defense-contractor-distances-itself-cluster-munitions

If Ukrainians start moving forward right after the cluster munitions show up, whether it is due to volume of fire or effectiveness, the decision to withhold them for more than a year is going to look even worse. 

Edit: it will mean the ban on them gets rather shaky, too.

 

Edited July 28, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Seedorf81 said:

Some of the interesting observations in this vid:

 

- Drones make Javelin obsolete

- Russians use Kornets in stead of tanks for defense (which makes life even harder for Ukraine -attackers, unfortunately)

 

Yeah, kinda obvious that the kamikaze drones are giving all other AT systems a serious run for their money (literally).  However, the current drones being used to take out tanks lack some significant features that the Javelin has:

1.  Fire and forget - a drone must maintain its signal with its operator or it is useless.  EW and natural circumstances make this uncertain.  Javelin has no such problems.

2.  Thermal imaging - cheap kamikaze drones aren't able to see at night and even the more expensive commercial drones with night capabilities don't have the same capabilities as a Javelin's CLU.

3.  Ease of use - I bet it is easier to train a soldier how to effectively use a Javelin than an FPV.  This means either having to spend a lot more on training to get the same flexibility as Javelin, or it means having less capabilities to simultaneously engage targets.

4.  Electronic signature - theoretically a drone operator can be located based on its electronic signature, thereby making the operators vulnerable to counter measures.  Not so with Javelin which allows the operators to displace while the Javelin is still in flight.

5.  Impact - when a Jav hits something it's dead.  If it near misses, it's also likely at least a mobility kill.  Kamikaze drones have to hit to cause any damage at all, with a kill requiring a precise hit. 

 

Now, I am NOT saying that these benefits of Javelin justify the huge price differential.  I'm also not saying that kamikaze drones won't overcome some of their limitations and still be very affordable compared to Javelin.  What I am saying is the video is wrong to say that cheap kamikaze drones could replace the Javelin right now.

As for Russia using Kornets... not only is it a sign that they've burned through so much of their armor, but also a sign that they are clearly on the defensive.  Soviet doctrine going back to before WW2 emphasized using AT Rifles and AT Guns for defensive operations, not tanks.  So this really isn't anything new.

Steve

[Fenris]

Quote

In this video, we see wounded Akhmat retreating from Andriivka south of Bakhmut.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1684600303532769288

The clip is restricted so you have to click it to watch - is nothing gruesome.  Some beat up Chechen's moving away from a tiny village called Andriivka, south of Bakhmut according to this linked post.  Same vicinity that has had pressure on it for weeks.  Haven't really seen or heard much at all relating Kadyrovites since the mutiny (remember that?)

 

Edited July 28, 2023 by Fenris

[Battlefront.com]

African Union requests that Russia restart the grain deal:

https://www.politico.eu/article/african-union-calls-to-reinstate-the-ukrainian-grain-deal/

Putin says to group of African leaders in St. Petersburg, no.  However, it will provide stolen Ukrainian grain this year instead.

https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-black-sea-grain-deal-withdrawal-africa-russia-ukraine-war/

Seems Putin is determined to further reduce Russia's international political standing until only North Korea and Iran are openly willing to side with him about anything.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

An OpEd piece from Politico making the case that Putin's regime has undergone an adjustment, rather than the start of disintegration:

https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-kremlin-ukraine-igor-girkin-vladimir-kvachkov-sergei-shoigu-yevgeny-prigozhin/

I don't buy it.  Here's one of his reasons for thinking things aren't falling apart:

Quote

For all the talk of purges, there’s been no mass repression of ultranationalists, army personnel or security officials. The jails aren’t filling up with them — they’re brimming with pro-democracy opposition leaders and anti-war activists instead.

What he's saying here isn't wrong, it's just not really looking at the big picture.  The Russian system, as with other mafia based organizations, believe that they can intimidate their way out of tough spots.  Arresting thousands is a difficult thing to do.  It stretches resources and can trigger sympathetic responses in favor of those who are arrested.  Instead, it's much more useful to go after proxies whose targeting sends a clear message to the rank and file that they need to stay in line.

What the author misses is that the reason he's gone after Girkin (finally) is because other attempts to head off the ultra nationalists have apparently failed.  Failure to keep a group in line is not a sign of regime strength.  Especially when some of that group take over cities and shoot down Russian aircraft.

The author also doesn't seem to consider the possibility that Putin's restraint is not because he feels his regime is strong, but because he feels it is weak.  If we assume there is a significant threat to his regime in the form of 10s of thousands of ultra nationalists and potentially 10s of thousands of military and security personnel, it seems Putin either has to choose between intimidating them or going all Stalin on them.  Either of these might work, at least for a while, but something in the middle is likely to fail because those not retaliated against will think they're next and might decide to act instead of waiting around to be taken down.

What I do agree with is that the regime doesn't seem to be in imminent risk of collapse at the moment.  However, history shows that situations can change unexpectedly and/or quickly.  There is no law of the Universe that says Putin's regime is immune to that possibility.

I also take issue with this:

Quote

Admittedly, these protocols didn’t prevent the dispute between Prigozhin and Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov from momentarily getting out of hand. But Illarionov emphasized the word “mutiny,” avoiding describing the paramilitary leader’s self-styled “march for justice” as an insurrection or rebellion. “That’s when you saw Putin panic for a day and threaten to punish Prigozhin and Wagner,” he said.

But then the protocols kicked in, preventing the mutiny from developing into something much bigger and more dangerous. In the end, the corporation sorted it out. And Illarionov predicts many of the generals now being questioned will soon reappear, and that there won’t be any wholesale repression of the ultranatioanlists — just an insistence that they play within the rules, observe the codes of behavior and tone down their criticisms. In short, the siloviki are carefully shoring up their system.

What he is arguing here is that Putin is somehow stronger now (a few paragraphs up from this he said so directly) even though he's been humiliated and the silvoiki forced concessions out of him.  That is contradictory logic and it is baffling to me.  I can see an argument that the regime, of which Putin is an important part of, is now stronger because Putin's single handed ability to wreck it might have greater checks/balances in place.  But Putin himself stronger?  No, I just don't see how that is possible.  In Kremlin politics it's always a zero sum game.  If the silvoiki gained something, Putin by definition lost something.  Generally speaking, one does not become more powerful by losing powers.

Steve

[FancyCat]

Tbf to Russia....does anyone like being surrounded?

[dan/california]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

An OpEd piece from Politico making the case that Putin's regime has undergone an adjustment, rather than the start of disintegration:

https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-kremlin-ukraine-igor-girkin-vladimir-kvachkov-sergei-shoigu-yevgeny-prigozhin/

I don't buy it.  Here's one of his reasons for thinking things aren't falling apart:

What he's saying here isn't wrong, it's just not really looking at the big picture.  The Russian system, as with other mafia based organizations, believe that they can intimidate their way out of tough spots.  Arresting thousands is a difficult thing to do.  It stretches resources and can trigger sympathetic responses in favor of those who are arrested.  Instead, it's much more useful to go after proxies whose targeting sends a clear message to the rank and file that they need to stay in line.

What the author misses is that the reason he's gone after Girkin (finally) is because other attempts to head off the ultra nationalists have apparently failed.  Failure to keep a group in line is not a sign of regime strength.  Especially when some of that group take over cities and shoot down Russian aircraft.

The author also doesn't seem to consider the possibility that Putin's restraint is not because he feels his regime is strong, but because he feels it is weak.  If we assume there is a significant threat to his regime in the form of 10s of thousands of ultra nationalists and potentially 10s of thousands of military and security personnel, it seems Putin either has to choose between intimidating them or going all Stalin on them.  Either of these might work, at least for a while, but something in the middle is likely to fail because those not retaliated against will think they're next and might decide to act instead of waiting around to be taken down.

What I do agree with is that the regime doesn't seem to be in imminent risk of collapse at the moment.  However, history shows that situations can change unexpectedly and/or quickly.  There is no law of the Universe that says Putin's regime is immune to that possibility.

I also take issue with this:

What he is arguing here is that Putin is somehow stronger now (a few paragraphs up from this he said so directly) even though he's been humiliated and the silvoiki forced concessions out of him.  That is contradictory logic and it is baffling to me.  I can see an argument that the regime, of which Putin is an important part of, is now stronger because Putin's single handed ability to wreck it might have greater checks/balances in place.  But Putin himself stronger?  No, I just don't see how that is possible.  In Kremlin politics it's always a zero sum game.  If the silvoiki gained something, Putin by definition lost something.  Generally speaking, one does not become more powerful by losing powers.

Steve

We can check back on Putin's position in a month. Ukraine will either have made major gains in the south or not. That leads to two very different situations in Moscow. 

[JonS]

 

[Butschi]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

They most definitely do not   In past discussions about Ukraine's possible strategies, I pointed out that they only have to threaten, not even to succeed, in cutting off Russian forces for them to withdraw.  Given their forward defense mentality with no backup and suffering heavy attrition while at the same time not having reliable logistics... I think we'll see more withdrawals soon.  With some luck, collapse.

Steve

Who actually likes being surrounded? And if you don't like being surrounded it is kind of of a smart move to withdraw when the enemy threatens to surround you and not after they succeeded, right? Because, well, you are surrounded then and can't simply withdraw... no?

Sorry, not to ridicule you, I think you meant something else but the statement sounds really weird to me.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://cristiandorobantu.substack.com/p/why-does-putin-keep-fighting

Why does Putin keep fighting?

 

CRISTIAN DOROBANTU

 

Five hundred plus days into the war, “the three-day war” from the dreams of Putin and many have, including myself, stated that it has been already lost by Russia from a strategic point of view.

 

Long and very good article about Putin's situation relative to the war. Writer is a Romanian with goverment experience and connections.

[akd]

Interesting. Ground-launched APKWS being used for very close indirect support:

 

[womble]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Tbf to Russia....does anyone like being surrounded?

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

Who actually likes being surrounded?

I think the point is that the prospect of surrounding doesn't have to be quite as clearly visible to the Russians as it might need to be for other forces before "Run Away!" becomes the order of the day. Whether that's because of their lack of confidence in being relieved before being overrun or lack of confidence in being able to withdraw in an organised manner under any greater levels of pressure, or their lack of confidence in their flanks actually holding, is arguable. I don't think we can argue that it's "cowardice", just a greater level of "operational prudence".

Which makes me think that Bakhmut might currently be an exception to the general Russian rule. We've seen reports that the place is now surrounded (at least by fires) by UKR, and still the holding RUS haven't been withdrawn.

[Mattias]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Putin's restraint is not because he feels his regime is strong, but because he feels it is weak.

Both Mark Galeotti and Vlad Vexler are in agreement with you and have lately been talking extensively about the matter.

/Mattias

[Teufel]

Not as much action today, bit quiet on the reporting. It’s raining in the Robotyte direction but doesn’t mean Ukrainian forces by any means halted operations. Chatter of Russian retreating victoriously in front of Ukrainian advances on the Verbove defensive line.

Just speculation so far but interesting if true and will become more so to see how much is left between first and second. Worth noting is that distance between these lines in this direction are much more narrow than elsewhere. Normally it’s 15-20km and occasionally more, in this direction shorter distances to get within range.

Anyhow, without reliable sources nothing more than jungle telegraphs working.

Edited July 28, 2023 by Teufel

[kraze]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Quote

The jails aren’t filling up with them — they’re brimming with pro-democracy opposition leaders and anti-war activists instead.

 

A war criminal responsible for killing everyone in MH17 Girkin and his supporter/nazi Navalny I presume. Which one is pro-democracy and which one is antiwar I wonder.

Edited July 28, 2023 by kraze

[DesertFox]

Very nice. 30 Arty systems demilitarized.

https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1684847624220762112?s=20

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

5 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Tbf to Russia....does anyone like being surrounded?

Germans in WW2 did seem quite relaxed about this. Or more specifically, Hitler was and everybody else had to go along.

[Taranis]

For History :

Proclaiming that approx. 100 T-90M are actually in service with RuZZians :