How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[paxromana]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Allow me to again suggest the strategic target for the counter offensive is Minsk. Oh and that man really needs to meet his lamp post.

Or a Cask of Amontillado as Fortunato did ....

Edited July 18, 2023 by paxromana

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Let's see comes of this over night - if anything. Hard to believe we are just hearing about a major concentration just now. 

We aren't.  It's was mentioned over a month ago around the time the Russian Liberation guys went into Russia.  It's been mentioned more recently by Mashovets.  Clearly Russia's intention is to distract Ukraine from the south while at the same time making moves to fulfill Putin's war aims of capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.

The question I've raised is if Ukrainian sources are overstating the headcount of Russians committed to this action.  It seems that they are, unless they are including Russian forces along the entire eastern line.  Which I should think 100,000 is probably close to what it's been for quite a while.

I'm baffled by the number only.  Everything else checks out.

Steve

[Maciej Zwolinski]

27 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Clearly Russia's intention is to distract Ukraine from the south while at the same time making moves to fulfill Putin's war aims of capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.

It is after all the classic Kursk scenario, with the 1st GTA et consortes in place of the Steppe Front. And without the south prong of the counterattack, because of the sea. 

[Bulletpoint]

On 7/17/2023 at 8:42 AM, Sojourner said:

Russian Soldiers Held In Pits And Cellars For Refusing To Fight In Ukraine

https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-soldiers-punished-refusing-fight-ukraine/32505035.html

They don't exactly look like mutiny prisoners thrown into a cellar to me.

[Kinophile]

That large counter-counter attack (I can see this getting very fractal very quickly) could possibly be stripping reserves and men from the rear lines down south. There are several notes floating around that the "Main"  lines are essentially unmanned in significant parts. 

If this is the case,  then Gerasimov is maybe gambling that his southern front can hold long enough for a Luhansk hard right to suck away UKR reserves intended for the South.

In theory,  this would spoil the UKR initiative and thus stabilize the entire line.

In theory. 

Perhaps he's encouraged by the slow pace of the UKR counter-attack and thinks that the current approach of insane mining + meeting the ZSU head-on at the contact lines is working, force sustainable and won't be countered anytime soon. 

Maybe. 

[Kinophile]

Absolutely listen, I shall. 

[The_MonkeyKing]

16 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Absolutely listen, I shall. 

The full interview is coming on Friday on the Urban Warfare Project Podcast podcast

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/category/podcasts/urban-warfare-project-podcasts/

[Monty's Mighty Moustache]

What if the Ukrainians basically have baited the Russians into counterattacking in the north by attacking the south, and have forces built up and waiting to launch a spoiling attack to destroy them when they push? They of all people know the Russians love to attack and don't like to sit and defend.

That would be epic (although probably pretty unlikely but one can hope)!

[kevinkin]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Clearly Russia's intention is to distract Ukraine from the south

Any reason to think the monkey business in Belarus is part of this type of distraction? Even if in a smallish way? 

[panzermartin]

That concentration of force makes me wonder if russians really do feel that confident about their forces holding in the South, or the opposite, and they are trying to scream loudly in the North to distract the momentum of UKR just the right moment.

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

(the tweeter is a Ukrainian officer)

This recent Luhansk scare has as little to do with reality as the winter scare of "new 500k Russian army" starting a major reinvasion at the beginning of this year had. 

I am just going to say, a couple of months ago Ukraine did its damnedest to get Russia to commit forces up north. 

[kevinkin]

6 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

and they are trying to scream loudly in the North to distract the momentum of UKR just the right moment.

If the RA chooses to make a demonstration and leave positions fainting an attack, doing so against thinner UA lines would be less costly. However, to your point, the RA might feel confident thinking the south will hold long enough to bring troops to the rescue. A lot of movement, a lot of fuel, and and lot of exposure to UA deep strikes. 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Great general wrap-up of the situation according to Rob Lee, Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka "crew"

unroll the tweet(s): https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html

Quote

New: @konrad_muzyka , @RALee85 , @KofmanMichael,& I spent some time this month visiting the frontlines in Ukraine to gain new insights into the ongoing counteroffensive & the war overall. Here are some general observations.
Image
(Note: More detailed analysis will be coming out by all of us in the coming weeks.)

First off, we spoke to NCOs, officers, a number of brigade commanders (national guard & regular army) in the field plus senior intel & defense officials in Kyiv (alongside @DAlperovitch). 
Counteroffensive:

1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon & company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications: 1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility. 
2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc. 
2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress. 
3.) forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. 
4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. 
Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. 
5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. 
Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks & months. 
6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage. 
Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks.There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind re. any potential tac. impact of delivery of ATACMs.) 
Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline. 
7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine. 
8.) Russian artillery rationing is real & happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses. 
9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration. 
Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the s IMO). 
10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale. 
(Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.)

Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st minefield. 
11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines. 
12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks. 
13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying & tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian C2. 
14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent & morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied & older men called up for service now. 
15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline. 
16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition & hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. (Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains.) 
But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance. 

 

[kevinkin]

14 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. 
Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks & months. 

Interesting that a detailed first person account does not go further into the geostrategic ramifications of "bloody attritional fighting for months." For example, is it sustainable? Which side benefits. What would it take for the west to go all in to prevent said months long attritional fighting? Waiting for a sudden collapse while feeding reserves into the fight lacks a lot of imagination on NATO's part if they really want to kick Russia out of Ukraine soon. If they want this to be a forever war (Korea/Middle east) then fess up.   

[Butschi]

17 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Great general wrap-up of the situation according to Rob Lee, Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka "crew"

unroll the tweet(s): https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html

 

Thanks for sharing. Can't tell if accurate but from my arm chair general's point of view this fits the observations better than "these are just probes, the real counter offensive hasn't begun yet" or "this is all part of some genius Ukrainian master plan to lure Russians into doing X". Also nice touch saying how difficult this is to pull off and how many NATO armies would struggle even more.

Re Western AFVs and combined arms, I think @The_Capt had a lengthy discussion with someone (@holoween ?) a some months ago about training an individual crew to manage a tank vs training crews to work effectively in a combined arms environment. I think he predicted just this.

[Butschi]

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So sure NATO could play politics or lawyer with article 5 - "well technically, and so forth".  At which point how fast do you think NATO will evaporate?  "Oh welcome to NATO Ukraine but we are not really going to do anything about a NATO nation being hammered by an adversary illegally...oh look Russia is firing missiles at Latvia...well technically".   Deterrence only works if one can clearly demonstrate that you intend to follow through with either punishment or denial.

So "yes" basically if you illegally attack a member "we all declare war and march against you".  That or NATO stands for nothing really and then it all falls apart.  This reality is likely why we are avoiding an Article 5 about as hard as Russia is at any given moment.  They do not want it coming back at them as in their current state we are talking very rapid escalation, possibly out of control.  And we don't want it because it might fail and the Emperor's doodle is out.

All true. To clarify, I wasn't suggesting to play a-holes here but wondering if Ukraine still being in this conflict necessarily has to be a complete show stopper for joining NATO. Kind of like with many insurances that exclude covering ongoing issues.

[kevinkin]

Devolution of Russian hybrid warfare:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-russias-hybrid-warfare-changing

Long with a scholarly essay.

On the other hand, Russia’s best theory of war for much of its history was to use terrain and fight defensively. That is still available, assuming Russia can develop leaders that can motivate the people with nationalism rather than Russkiy Mir (Slavic Union) concepts, which perhaps reach too far and require offensive capability. And yet, it still has a massive nuclear arsenal, meant as a deterrent but in the current environment with the current leadership often referred to in offensive terms. Russia needs to step away from this methodology and return to its hybrid warfare approach, where its military capability is primarily focused on defensive measures. Under the current government, this seems unlikely, and avoiding a wider-scale European war is becoming a significant challenge. [YUCK]

The change in Russia's approach to waging the war in Ukraine may only happen when significant shifts in state authority are established, either through civil unrest or a military coup. History has demonstrated that Russia has experienced such changes on numerous occasions. We can only hope that if such a situation arises now, the new ruling elites will possess the means and strategies to put an end to this bloody and endless war. [Double YUCK]

Are seeing we seeing the worm turn with commentators? Either Russia collapses or negotiations are coming this winter? 

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

(the tweeter is a Ukrainian officer)

Yup, this is what I said above.  Someone seems to be exaggerating the Russian forces in the northern part of the eastern theater.  100,000 is a scary number without context, but the context appears to be that it's mostly what they had before with some new forces added to the mix.  But those forces should be in the south...

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

This recent Luhansk scare has as little to do with reality as the winter scare of "new 500k Russian army" starting a major reinvasion at the beginning of this year had. 

Exactly!  Let's say for the sake of argument that Russia added 20,000 to the Luhansk area.  That is, for sure, a significant increase in combat power for that area.  But where did they all come from?  The south, either directly or as a result of the diversion of new units.  Which is why we're seeing mounting evidence that the south is undermanned.

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I am just going to say, a couple of months ago Ukraine did its damnedest to get Russia to commit forces up north. 

It seems pretty apparent that Russia made a calculation that they could cut the southern force down to the bone in order to increase its potential elsewhere.  This is almost exactly what they did last year when the stole everything from Kharkiv/Luhansk to beef up Kherson.  The difference is that they didn't build up massive fortified lines in Kherson thus allowing Ukraine's rather modest forces to take back huge amounts of territory very quickly with relatively light losses (initially).  It seems Russia is thinking minefields and trenches are enough to avoid a repeat this year of what happened last year.

I agree that Russia's fortifying the south has successfully precluded a repeat of Kharkiv/Luhansk for Ukraine.  No easy victory in the south vs. easy victory last year in the north (we anticipated that months ago).  However, Russia doesn't appear to have learned that it kinda sucks on the offense and Ukraine is a real nasty opponent on the defense.  The attack in Luhansk is likely to stall out and wind up being very costly without much to show for it (reminder that I even predicted this would happen to Ukraine if it went on the offensive there).  Meanwhile in the south, Ukraine is showing that it is very good on offense and Russia's has so far only shown itself capable of  bleeding out behind minefields.

Eventually the south will change character into something resembling Kharkiv/Kherson more so than it does now.  As we've been saying for eons... minefields are only effective when they are defended.  Russia seems headed towards not being able to do that.

Steve

[Seedorf81]

Dutch ministry of defense, just now:

Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg will donate more APC's, upgraded M113's, to Ukraine.

No numbers yet.

[RandomCommenter]

Here's hoping that the Ukrainians already have cluster munitions deployed in quantity in the North for those 100,000 Russian mobiks. They would make good sunflower fertiliser (although I wouldn't like to try to harvest the oil amongst the left over cluster bomblets).

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

minefields are only effective when they are defended. 

They don't have to be defended directly however. As long as it remains costly to demine avenues of advance or avenues of advance are channeled, theoretically the main defense can come via counterattacking any forces that make it through the minefields. These might just come through in drib and drabs and defeated piecemeal. The idea of minefields is economy of force. The UA knows this flexible defense of layered positions is a possible tactic. So they won't fall into the trap. Could this RA troop movement be related to September elections? I don't think the RA will attack west with them. But they could be positioned to attack south to defend those positions indirectly if a breakthrough occurs. Of course that would require some minimum of operational competency. 

[kimbosbread]

So if you were the Russian commander, and you have to go on offense for political reasons, how far is even feasible, and how much of your army do you burn? Presumably you want Kupyansk, but I gotta imagine Russian logistics + equipment will get trashed in the advance or sustainment phases.

If I were the general, it’d be a lightning push, and then mine the **** out of everything and fortify with the goal of freezing the conflict and making the bet that the US will not escalate by giving Ukraine longer range missiles or jets.

[Carolus]

Quote

I wish this picture was from a Ukrainian drone factory. Unfortunately this is Russian. This is why we need to continue to build and innovate with drones.

Google reverse image search leads to this Weibo link.

https://weibo.com/2657073157/N9YhiEvWG

Quote

2023/7/14, Battle of Donbass, Udon——【Huaqiangbei incoming materials assembly, large batches】One of the FPV suicide UAVs used by the Russian military

November 2022, a company in St. Petersburg assembled the first batch of FPV suicide UAVs" "Hydrangea" then started mass production, and more than 2,000 have been delivered to the front line.

Current production capacity:

120 pieces per day, 3,000 pieces delivered per month, with

a payload of 2kg

and a payload stay in the air for 6-8 minutes.

Effective combat radius of 3km+

Original source of the text/post seems to be a Wagner associated telegram channel.

Also the "Oktagon School" in Russia, which offers drone pilot courses, uses this image and more. Cannot link because the website address is in cyrillic and it breaks whenever I copy.

But there are lots of pictures, a quote from Putin which endorses the course and it shows the certificate you get when you finish the course.

 

 

Edited July 18, 2023 by Carolus

[The_MonkeyKing]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, this is what I said above.  Someone seems to be exaggerating the Russian forces in the northern part of the eastern theater.  100,000 is a scary number without context, but the context appears to be that it's mostly what they had before with some new forces added to the mix.  But those forces should be in the south...

Exactly!  Let's say for the sake of argument that Russia added 20,000 to the Luhansk area.  That is, for sure, a significant increase in combat power for that area.  But where did they all come from?  The south, either directly or as a result of the diversion of new units.  Which is why we're seeing mounting evidence that the south is undermanned.

It seems pretty apparent that Russia made a calculation that they could cut the southern force down to the bone in order to increase its potential elsewhere.  This is almost exactly what they did last year when the stole everything from Kharkiv/Luhansk to beef up Kherson.  The difference is that they didn't build up massive fortified lines in Kherson thus allowing Ukraine's rather modest forces to take back huge amounts of territory very quickly with relatively light losses (initially).  It seems Russia is thinking minefields and trenches are enough to avoid a repeat this year of what happened last year.

I agree that Russia's fortifying the south has successfully precluded a repeat of Kharkiv/Luhansk for Ukraine.  No easy victory in the south vs. easy victory last year in the north (we anticipated that months ago).  However, Russia doesn't appear to have learned that it kinda sucks on the offense and Ukraine is a real nasty opponent on the defense.  The attack in Luhansk is likely to stall out and wind up being very costly without much to show for it (reminder that I even predicted this would happen to Ukraine if it went on the offensive there).  Meanwhile in the south, Ukraine is showing that it is very good on offense and Russia's has so far only shown itself capable of  bleeding out behind minefields.

Eventually the south will change character into something resembling Kharkiv/Kherson more so than it does now.  As we've been saying for eons... minefields are only effective when they are defended.  Russia seems headed towards not being able to do that.

Steve

Yeah, indeed

This war is becoming less exciting to follow by the day. Especially in daily/weekly bases.

Strong trends are forming and the uncertainties are disappearing, leaving mostly "known unknowns".

This is a good sign.

[Kinophile]

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3737241-ukrainian-military-testing-mine-scanning-drones-received-from-denmark.html