How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup.  The theory is pretty well established, the problem is pulling it off.  It requires, first and foremost, an overall view and control of a large sector of front.  Ukraine has very clear chains of command which, although imperfect, are reasonably well coordinated with each other and within each sector.  Russia?  Meh... apparently chains of command are so bourgeois!

Steve

And a lot of people... Would 100k do? Maybe... 

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

If they get through the Russian AD, I'd say catastrophic. These are guided by a IR camera during the final approach and can easily hit exactly where you want them to hit. Say a support column, pylon, or main cable that the bridge span hangs from. The warhead weighs 500 kg and is two-staged: first is a shaped charge that blows hole in the targeted structure, through which the secondary charge enters and explodes. It's much more effective than a brute force HE charge.

Thanks for info. So they can theoretically cut the traffic along the bridge, at least civilian one.

Curious if they will be urged to modify them to their taste:

[Kinophile]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Right, but this is not what happened.  Ukraine set the conditions which caused the shift of forces and they were prepared to take advantage of opportunities this caused.  To quote some much smart people about this sort of thing...

1. “You make your own luck.” – Ernest Hemingway
2. “Chance favors the prepared mind.“ – Louis Pasteur
3. “Diligence is the mother of good luck.“ – Benjamin Franklin

I think we're seeing the tip of an iceberg.  The stuff just posted above makes me think this even more.

Ukraine knows better than anybody other than the Russians how f'd up their lack of central command is.  Even we here have talked about the importance of smashing Russian units in the south according to where their "seams" are.  This is a classic form of warfare, therefore those mentioning it were just being astute military historians.  But in this war, the seams are incredibly important. 

The Russian volunteer quoted above states that because of egos and power games there is minimal direct communications between Russian and Wagner forces.  It's long known that Russian chains of command for higher level assets, such as artillery, are horribly inefficient and prone to failure.  Then there's the lack of concern units have for each others' well being.  The extreme of this is Wagner and DPR sending out units to man positions or conduct attacks without any communications gear and nobody bothers to check in on them.  We've also seen plenty of examples of Russian positions that seem to be located without interlinking support.  Etc.

I am sure that Ukraine is using these known weaknesses to their advantage, just as the Russian volunteer has surmised.

It could be that 3rd Assault Brigade (UA) came up with this attack plan all on its own, but I lean towards thinking they were tasked with this from theater command.  They seem to have been given plenty of resources for this attack BEFORE it took place, which has been seriously lacking for much of the Bakhmut struggle.

The evidence for this is that the Ukrainian attack was large scale (relatively speaking) and coordinated with what looks to have been a distraction attack to draw Wagner forces away from the 72nd Separate MRB (RU).  The main target was likely the 72nd because UA was aware of combat exhaustion and the reliance of Wagner protecting its flank.  Unlike other efforts we've seen, it would appear that Ukrainian ISR was explicitly deployed to ensure the Russian frontline units were isolated in depth.  Artillery was assigned to exploit anything ISR uncovered.  And it all worked very well.

Here's a summary of the battle from Task and Purpose:

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/ukraine-russian-72nd-separate-motorized-rifle-brigade/

And it seems from Haiduk's last post tonight that more has happened since.  Iceberg analogy applies

Steve

Certainly hope so.  If we see another instance of a well executed, combined arms assault into the joints between forces then we definitely have something in the works. I'm sure we'll see something,  but personally I'll wait for it first. 

Many months ago I pondered the dangers of RUS suddenly attacking a ZSU force that was over-formatted into defence.  I obviously gave far too much credence to Russian offensive abilities above brigade level. 

Now,  it seems possible that the reverse is through - the Bakhmut assault forces might be postured too heavily into attack, with little rear tactical resilience or organization (both physical &  command) and its the ZSU that has the above-brigade capabilities. 

The Russian stupidity of making Bahkmut so important on the attack (enormously wasteful for little gain)  could cut a second time, on the defense. The built out defense lines elsewhere don't exist in as coherent a manner in Bahkmut. The morale loss of being driven back or surrounded inside a city they've spent so much to gain could be very damaging.

Putin might feel obligated to pour yet more men into defending his "gain",  providing a second round of attrition on the Ivans. 

Plus they destroyed so much cover. This isn't WW2,  fighting in ruins doesnt give the same protection  - modern weapons are far more destructive and accurate, and of course there's Drones. Once you've kettled a force,  why send in the crunchies? Just drone the ****ers into oblivion. They're not going anywhere. 

If this battle does shape up into ZSU local counteroffensive then,  as you suggested earlier,  we should probably look away and watch what else those clever Ukies are doing,  and where... 

Edited May 11, 2023 by Kinophile

[Bearstronaut]

4 hours ago, Offshoot said:

Zelensky is pouring cold water on this or dissimulating - https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65550427

"Speaking at his headquarters in Kyiv, President Zelensky described combat brigades, some of which were trained by Nato countries, as being "ready" but said the army still needed "some things", including armoured vehicles that were "arriving in batches".

"With [what we already have] we can go forward, and, I think, be successful," he said in an interview for public service broadcasters who are members of Eurovision News, like the BBC. "But we'd lose a lot of people. I think that's unacceptable. So we need to wait. We still need a bit more time.""

I don't know when the Ukrainian counter-offensive will kick off but I wouldn't put too much stock in what Zelensky has to say about it. The Ukrainians have to maintain OPSEC so it's not like Zelensky is gonna go around saying "Our forces are fully ready and the offensive is imminent."

[Taranis]

38 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Thanks for info. So they can theoretically cut the traffic along the bridge, at least civilian one.

Curious if they will be urged to modify them to their taste:

Personally, I would not have seen a Kinzhal with a cope cage on it for the news, than the ERA-Storm Shadow... 

[The_Capt]

42 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Plus they destroyed so much cover. This isn't WW2,  fighting in ruins doesnt give the same protection  - modern weapons are far more destructive and accurate, and of course there's Drones. Once you've kettled a force,  why send in the crunchies? Just drone the ****ers into oblivion. They're not going anywhere. 

Exactly.  So right now the simple gravity drop grenades will make living in rubble a death sentence.  Next we will see UAS with horizontal GL capability so even in buildings the little bastards buzzing around will make a defenders life hell.  And then someone is going to put a single grenade loitering munition into a building and fly it room to room.

[Kinophile]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

Exactly.  So right now the simple gravity drop grenades will make living in rubble a death sentence.  Next we will see UAS with horizontal GL capability so even in buildings the little bastards buzzing around will make a defenders life hell.  And then someone is going to put a single grenade loitering munition into a building and fly it room to room.

And then, all this will become autonomous within a defined kill box. 

 

[Haiduk]

4 hours ago, DesertFox said:

Finally!

 

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

I do wonder what these systems can achieve. Supply for Ukraine might be a couple hundred to start with and another couple hundred per year in the future.

In the past, we have seen around a hundred cruise missiles strike an airfield and fail to achieve the desired impact. (Syria)

I would be interested in seeing a relevant expert's analysis of these systems potential in Ukraine. 

[Kinophile]

 

[akd]

Terra Unit deep dive into weaponizing their commercial drones:

 

[akd]

 

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

And then, all this will become autonomous within a defined kill box. 

 

The room to room version will already have to be autonomous to deal with terrible RF reception.  Even if there aren't people working on this, there are people working on this, because there are peaceful applications for it other than blowing up Russians.

[dan/california]

 

 

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I for one do not know this to be true.  In fact, I know it to be completely false.  When I watch these videos I am looking for things which I can not get from ISW, AP, or any other source.  Even niche military themed reporting by people like Perun.

Each video shows something useful.  Every.  Single.  One.  The best way to understand something novel is through repeated experimentation and/or observation.  It's a basic tenant of the scientific method. Even seeing the same thing repeatedly has value.

The more videos I watch, the better I get at understanding the range of actions, limitations, effects, outcomes, etc.  If I see 1000 videos of grenades getting dropped right onto people's heads, I'm going to form a different opinion than watching 1000 videos where it only happens once.

For sure few people reading this thread have as much reason to watch everything posted as I do.  However, few people also have a reason to follow the daily details of politics, economics, military procurement, technology, or any of the other topics raised here.  They are all "keyholes" in their own ways.  Even ISW's reports are keyholes as each day's report is nothing more than a tiny window on the war and, taken on its own, largely meaningless.  It is only by reading ISW every day that one starts to build up a bigger picture.

For sure there are some people like that, as can be easily seen looking at the comments section where the videos are posted.  However, I do not think that's the sort of crowd we have here.  I know I don't giggle when I see a head blown off.  In fact, I rather not see anybody die at all.  But since dying is a pretty central part of warfare, it really is hard to avoid when studying it.

Steve

 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So not to pile on and beat up.  I get the position, video after video of Russian saps getting blown up may seem excessive and masturbatory, and for some it is. However, every video gives off information. Some is just noise, or repetitive.  While others are gold and constitute key indicators which when confirmed by other observations can point to trends.  Trends lead to broader deductions and assessments - this is not a single “keyhole” it is thousands of them.  In most keyholes the milk maid is bathing, but then you start to notice the copy of Karl Marx next to the tub.

ISW and other OS intelligence analysts are doing exactly what professional military are doing.  Looking at all the “war porn” and pulling out trends and indicators that tell a larger story.  Oryx is not counting blow up vehicles because people get their jollies seeing blown up Russian tanks.  They are doing it because individual losses sum up to larger attrition trend which chart the course of a conflict.

This is micro-analysis and has pretty much set this group apart - or did, other groups have caught up.  Example: back in the early days of the war the majority of open source assessment (and frankly military as well) were expecting this war to take a predictable course.  A rapid overwhelming Russian invasion, shock and collapse of the UA, and a drawn out insurgency against a puppet Ukrainian political regime.  It was places like this forum where micro-observation first challenged a lot of macro assumptions.  We saw war porn, but it added up to something going very wrong for the RA.  In fact it pointed to something even more fundamental shifting in warfare itself.

This was not a one-shot deal.  Micro-analysis backed up be expertise has kept us well ahead of the pack in all phases of this war.  Phase II did not become a protracted set of urban sieges - the RA logistical losses and Ukrainian resistance demonstrated that.  Phase III did not see an RA “cauldron” despite their use of WW1 levels of massed fires.  Phase IV the UA counter offensive did shock us at its scope but one could see that this was indeed a collapse of the RA operationally on two fronts (one slow, one fast).  Phase V - Op Russian Leg Humping: was going nowhere - one need only follow the famous “battle of the T” to see why.  And we will use it for Phase VI to try and understand how the UA offensive is unfolding.

So while some may only see Russian sods getting blown up.   I see: poor basic field craft in poorly constructed trench lines which suggest basic training shortfalls.  No effective C-UAS counter measures on the RA side.    The evolution of drone warfare throughout.  The big fact that Russia has still not been able to create information denial (let alone control) in the battle space. HVT losses within the Russian operational system - C2 nodes, A2AD platforms, engineering and logistics.  Failures in RA C4ISR…the list goes on.  I do not see this through a single war porn keyhole, I see them through thousands of them.

Are these view’s skewed?  Definitely.  But the fact that we do not see thousand of videos of Russian UAS blowing off UA heads is telling in itself (does anyone think the Russian info sphere would show any restraint in this?).  Open source is “open”.  In the end it is about filtering noise and trying to hear signal - and again, this is exactly what ISW or any other public analysis platform is doing, along with professional military.  We are just doing it in house - this is how the sausage is made.  What bakes my noodle is that in my lifetime a large virtual collective is able to conduct this sort of work, and demonstrate accurate assessments (more than just a lucky once or twice) is game changing.  

In twenty years we will all be old, senile or dead. However an another group of young(ish) folks will do this for another war but they will likely have AI support (we have already seen it here in its infancy).  They will have access to even more raw information but will have a better ability to use it - they may very well be directly involved in the prosecution of the war and not just sitting in chairs on the sideline.  We are at the beginning of an age of Open Source Warfare - all those keyholes are “pixels” in reality.

So, speaking of over analyzing key hole observations. We have seen two videos in the last week or less of drones harassing Russian soldiers to point where they offed themselves. Now that is only two videos, but it the first two I recall seeing in the whole war. And as been pointed out, it is the kind of video that tends to spread widely. I think I am obsessed enough to know if there were a bunch of these floating around from earlier in the war. So how many off these unpleasant keyhole vignettes would it take to qualify as a trend, and a real indicator of the state of Russian morale, or lack thereof?

[chrisl]

51 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I do wonder what these systems can achieve. Supply for Ukraine might be a couple hundred to start with and another couple hundred per year in the future.

In the past, we have seen around a hundred cruise missiles strike an airfield and fail to achieve the desired impact. (Syria)

I would be interested in seeing a relevant expert's analysis of these systems potential in Ukraine. 

It's hard to render airfields inoperable - all you need is a long flattish spot, and to do that all you need is a bulldozer or a bunch of conscripts with shovels and rakes.  For all the things the RA does wrong, one thing they've historically done well is make aircraft that aren't very picky about runway quality.

If you're bombing an airfield, you need to either hit the aircraft directly (or indirectly, as we saw in the airfield bombing that took a while to decide what actually happened on the ground), or hit the infrastructure that makes it more valuable than a bare flat spot: fuel storage tanks, fuel trucks, ammo dumps.  

IIRC, in the Syrian cruise missile attack, they were mostly targeting aircraft directly through hangar roofs or doors.  

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, JonS said:

There have been some pretty terrible videos linked here. By terrible I mean things like splicing together entirely unrelated - in time, space, or even war - pieces from various places to ... tell a narrative? Of something? I guess?

For sure not all videos posted here are as interesting as the one before it.  And yes, the horribly edited, disjointed, confusing ones are frustrating.  However, that doesn't necessarily make them pointless as individual components may yield some information that is valuable in some way.

6 hours ago, JonS said:

It's happened often enough that, by and large, I don't bother with any of them. IMO, at least some of the folks posting links here are - at best - entirely undiscriminating in what they chose to watch and link. Either that or they're addicted to giggling.

I think our standards are higher than other places.  Case in point... nobody posted this one despite it making the rounds:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/13dqso3/soldiers_of_the_72nd_brigade_storm_the_positions/

And it's been a while since someone posted anything as uninteresting as this:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/13dzx7i/ua_city_battles_in_bakhmut_a_machine_gunner_of/

Still, each of these videos does have information that can be gleaned for a larger analysis.  However, in these two cases I didn't see anything that was interesting enough to warrant posting.  Which is why I posted them

6 hours ago, JonS said:

This thread might be the single best piece of crowd-sourced OS analysis of the war available, but that doesn't mean that everyone posting here is contributing to that value.

For sure.  But whether it is a link to a news story, an analysis, or a video the same applies.  And since nobody has put forward the notion that everything here posted is pure gold, I don't know why you felt compelled to point out the obvious.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

And a lot of people... Would 100k do? Maybe... 

It's all about scaled to the situation.  In the fight between the 3rd Assault Brigade and 72nd Separate MRB it appears Ukraine had both superiority of numbers (though likely not wildly so), but it was the quality of both the attacking force and the plan that made the difference.  So if you want to blow open a sector held by two weak companies, maybe 200 good attackers backed by sound leadership and resources is enough to affect a positive change.  It doesn't take too many of these within a larger slice of the battlefield to offer the possibility of a dramatic outcome.

This is why people who add up the forces on both sides and apply some sort of 2:1 or 3:1 rule are doing the math wrong.  At the strategic level Ukraine has done pretty well for itself when the odds were far less favorable than they are now.

The big challenge Ukraine has with its manpower is sustaining large advances.  Bad roads, mines, blow bridges, pockets of resistance, etc. slow things down.  One way to counter this is to have more breakthroughs with more forces pouring through than the Russians can handle.  Maneuver warfare, in other words.  However, to make it practical the attacker must have sufficient forces to confront what is in front as well as "drive around" problems.

I am positive Ukraine has enough forces of sufficient quantity to break through whatever sector of front they choose to smash into.  I am also positive they have enough forces to take back large areas of territory relatively quickly.  What I am unsure of is how much territory they can retake before manpower and other resources are tapped out.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I do wonder what these systems can achieve. Supply for Ukraine might be a couple hundred to start with and another couple hundred per year in the future.

This is akin to the discussion had about 155 artillery and HIMARS when it first started being used.  Some thought the number of platforms was insufficient to make much of a difference.  Ukraine very wisely used these assets against strategic targets instead of trying to blow up a bunch of mobiks.  Over time Ukraine was able to broaden the scope of its targets because it had successfully addressed the more important ones (destroying or obligating to move out of range).  Storm Shadow is going to likely be used in the same way.

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

In the past, we have seen around a hundred cruise missiles strike an airfield and fail to achieve the desired impact. (Syria)

I doubt Ukraine will waste them on targets that have a low probability of being significant degraded.  Plus, most of Russia's aviation is already based outside of Storm Shadow's range.  The exception being Crimea, which of course is a very tempting target.

It appears that Storm Shadow is well suited for taking on Russian style airfields.  Target the hardened bunkers and see what happens.  Destroy any command/control facilities.  Figure out what Russia's pattern is for readying aircraft for missions is and strike while they are out on the tarmac.  That sort of thing.  Any successful hits on any of this will degrade Russia's capabilities at a time when it can't afford it.

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I would be interested in seeing a relevant expert's analysis of these systems potential in Ukraine. 

I'd like to see that too!

Steve

[MSBoxer]

Personally, it is extremely hard for me to watch some of these videos.  No matter how much I detest Russian actions, the death of any individual is traumatic.  Yes, I fully acknowledge that some of them "deserve" to die based upon atrocities they have committed, and some of them need to die to protect Ukraine.   That is when I must put on my analyst hat and try to compartmentalize my emotions.

With that said, what I got most out of two recent videos, the drone surrender and the grenade/suicide is the utter physical, emotional and psychological isolation. 

In so many videos we have seen excessively small groups manning relatively large expanses of defensive lines, but in both of these videos the individuals were ALONE for all intents and purposes.  You don't surrender individually if you have companions, and you don't kill yourself if you have hope of aide.  The pure desperation in both cases, while perhaps isolated instances, leads me to wonder about the overall mental health of the RU forces.  If this is indicative of an overall sense of despair and futility, then it perhaps lends credence to the brittle shell theory of the RU.  Application of minimal pressure at the proper point may create multiple fault lines.

Edited May 11, 2023 by MSBoxer

[Artkin]

1 hour ago, akd said:

 

Ok I'm in for CMBS2.

Sick. 

Whats the weight on this baby?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Certainly hope so.  If we see another instance of a well executed, combined arms assault into the joints between forces then we definitely have something in the works. I'm sure we'll see something,  but personally I'll wait for it first. 

It could be that we won't see another one for a while.  It is apparent that Ukraine properly resourced the 3rd Assault Brigade's attack we are discussing, but that doesn't mean it is going to resource other such attacks in the near term.  For all we know this was nothing more than Ukraine testing out a theory to see how it played out.

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Many months ago I pondered the dangers of RUS suddenly attacking a ZSU force that was over-formatted into defence.  I obviously gave far too much credence to Russian offensive abilities above brigade level. 

Now,  it seems possible that the reverse is through - the Bakhmut assault forces might be postured too heavily into attack, with little rear tactical resilience or organization (both physical &  command) and its the ZSU that has the above-brigade capabilities. 

The Russian stupidity of making Bahkmut so important on the attack (enormously wasteful for little gain)  could cut a second time, on the defense. The built out defense lines elsewhere don't exist in as coherent a manner in Bahkmut. The morale loss of being driven back or surrounded inside a city they've spent so much to gain could be very damaging.

Putin might feel obligated to pour yet more men into defending his "gain",  providing a second round of attrition on the Ivans.

Months ago when we first pondered Ukraine's strategic options I made arguments in favor of staying away from Donbas as the primary effort.  It's complicated and potentially draining for Ukraine to retake any significant part of it.  However, nearly 4 solid months of Russian stupidity ("leg humping" as The_Capt calls it) has left Russian forces far, far, FAR weaker than they otherwise could have been if Russia had gone on the defensive over the winter.  Or at least cranked back on how much it attacked.

The situation, therefore, is a little different than I imagined months ago.  Russia's forces in Donbas are, by and large, exhausted.  DLPR forces are effectively out of the war offensively and I question how much fight they have left in them defensively due to having tapped out their domestic manpower.  Russian MoD units in the Donbas seem to be a mixed bag of totally spent forces that weren't all that good to begin with (like the 72nd Separate MRB) and units that were at one point decent and now are weakened in terms of both quality and quantity (VDV).

I think Ukraine will take advantage of Russia's Donbas weakness to straighten things out a bit, but not try to retake large swaths.  There are several areas that are pretty obvious and could yield fairly quick results for Ukraine without requiring extensive investment.  Again, provided that the expectations are about relieving pressure rather than eliminating it.

Steve

[kevinkin]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

What I am unsure of is how much territory they can retake before manpower and other resources are tapped out.

"ay, there's the rub"

 

3 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

Application of minimal pressure at the proper point may create multiple fault lines.

I agree. But would just make point plural. The UA has to retain enough combat strength to exploit those fault lines and defend what they have or obtain economically. 

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, Artkin said:

 

Whats the weight on this baby?

If you have to ask...

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

And then, all this will become autonomous within a defined kill box. 

 

Only the Chinese ones because lawyers.

[dan/california]

Russians aren't getting Bakmuht, this decade, or century for that matter.