How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

I just thought form "as if" is more corersponds to our more common equivalent, which means more wide and unpersonalized "allegedly". Because latter, I think, relates to some clear source "according to words of smbd.", when "as if" it's some sort of "rumors/many talks/some opinions talk about something". But maybe "as if" is just rare or obsolete form - I don't know such subtleties ) 

"As if" can be used for sarcasm ("as if that guy had even one good idea!") or making a statement of theory ("it was as if the guy had a good idea").  The first one implies everybody knows the guy has no ability to come up with a good idea, yet he did something that was smart by accident.  The second one is more uncertain, where there is doubts the action itself was planned, but it wound up being a good one anyway.  The difference is very subtle and tiny words and context are necessary to determine if the writer is making fun of someone. 

In fact, at one point in American English it was common to respond "As If!!" all on its own when someone said something the person thinks is wishful thinking.  A Russian might say, "we have the second most powerful army in the world!" and I would say "as if!"

I agree that "supposedly" or "allegedly" are better terms because they clearly indicate what is being repeated might not be true for some reason.  Without further context or statements neither term implies the information is incorrect or intended to deceive.  It simply says "here is some information which I can not verify is factually accurate".

Using a term like "speculation", such as "it is speculated that the guy is a civilian", makes it clear the information is definitely questionable and therefore should not be accepted as fact (yet).

Hopefully that helps

Steve

[sburke]

American english language courses courtesy of battlefront.

When I was taking Japanese classes they had the regular class, and a conversational class.  i guess we could call this the Battlefront - "how to diss the Russian military" class.

[JonS]

9 hours ago, danfrodo said:

Germany's civilian population was starving and its army was going to have to retreat, probably all the way back to germany, after the failure of its final offensive.  So it 'decided' to quit because it was basically beaten.

Right, but a generation later in 1944 they faced exactly the same decision, for the same reasons, and instead chose to continue into gotterdammerung.

But even within that, they chose to end things in May 45, which included not continuing in the alpine redoubt, and not transitioning to a decades long insurgency.

Edited May 1, 2023 by JonS

[dan/california]

The Russians seem to be shooting at apartment buildings and kindergartens all over Ukraine, in addition to the odd military target. Fill in the Kraze comment of your choice... And then write your congressperson/minister of parliament AGAIN.

[dan/california]

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, JonS said:

Right, but a generation later in 1944 they faced exactly the same decision, for the same reasons, and instead chose to continue into gotterdammerung.

But even within that, they chose to end things in May 45, which included not continuing in the alpine redoubt, and not transitioning to a decades long insurgency.

Exactly this. 

We also saw this in 2014/2015 Ukraine.  Russia had far more it wanted to do but, for various reasons, could not do it just then.  So it decided to keep the war going despite the costs.  Ukraine was supposedly defeated in the Donbas battles, yet it didn't surrender in any way.  In this case both sides decided to engage in a low intensity war for 8 years until Russia decided to change it.  If Russia had largely achieved it's military goals in Feb/March 2022 I doubt Ukraine would have stopped fighting despite Russia likely wanting the fighting to end.

Steve

[Centurian52]

Three things stand out for me in this video.

1. Trench clearing is damn dangerous work (I guess I already knew that).

2. Drones are helping to make it a bit easer in two ways. First, by providing information to the clearing parties about threats and fleeting opportunities. Second, by opening up more angles to drop grenades from.

3. Do all Russian trenches really look this bad? This isn't the first trench clearing video I've seen, and the Russian trenches always seem to be in pretty poor condition. Before I though I was just looking at a small sample size, but now I'm starting to think there's a real pattern there. Yes, this is a lot better than no trench at all, but we're hardly talking about 1917 level standards here. These are not the sort of defensive works that could pose a serious obstacle to a large and well trained mechanized force of the sort Ukraine has reportedly been preparing.

 

[Battlefront.com]

Thank you The_MonkeyKing for giving a summary of the latest Kaufman interview.  I am pleased to have Kofman on the same page as us because I do think he has very useful insights.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

On this subject of the Winter Offensive:

• In the fall, Russia barely managed to stabilize its frontlines but faced difficulties in improving its military force. The mobilization process primarily achieved increasing the number of troops rather than enhancing their capabilities. The loss of experienced leadership, high-quality equipment, and lack of ammunition further hindered the force's overall effectiveness.
• The Russian forces didn't have the ability to transition from static defense to more dynamic offensive operations. They appeared incapable of executing large-scale operations and were forced to divide efforts into four or five separate axes. In none of these sectors were they able to gain a significant advantage over the Ukrainians in terms of firepower, manpower, or equipment. 

Yup, I think that was pretty clearly on display for the past few months.  This is the very thing that Kofman should have anticipated back in the earliest part of the war, but instead he thought that somehow Russia could fix its inherent deficiencies.  You know, that the problems Russia was experiencing on the battlefield was more a reflection of trying to fight a limited war instead of this was pretty much the best Russia could do.  And now that it has suffered horrendous casualties, it can do even less than when it started.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• It's unclear why the Ukrainians hyped up the Russian winter offensive to the degree they did. 
  • Interestingly, the media bought into the Ukrainian narrative, and it took them weeks to recognize the actual situation, even after the offensive had already begun. For weeks, the media reported on a non-existent other larger army that was expected to follow up on the initial offensive.

I think we do have an answer here.  It was very much in Ukraine's narrative to overstate Russia's capabilities because it helped light a fire under Western arses' to get things moving faster.  That and Ukraine was truly losing a lot of forces, especially in Bakhmut.

The fact that the media was slow to pick up on when the Russian offensive started and how inept it was isn't a surprise.  We saw the same thing last Easter when the Russians launched a major offensive to capture places like Kramatorsk and instead wound up barely moving the front line.

In both cases we here correctly determined when the Russian offensives started and what probable objectives they had, so when weeks went by with almost on Russian gains we were able to conclude the offensive was a failure. 

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• This offensive operation showcased the limitations of Russia's offensive capabilities. On the other hand, it revealed little about their defensive capabilities, which may prove more crucial in the summer. 

This is definitely the key point we have on our minds as we move towards Ukraine's counter offensive.  It will likely decide everything for this year and perhaps for more than that.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

On the counter-offensive:

• The stakes appear to be so high because there doesn't seem to be a Plan B for this operation or any contingencies for its aftermath(from the Western coalition).
• ...
• The potential for a decisive defeat that would drive Russia to the negotiation table is unlikely, and even in the best scenarios, the conflict is likely to continue as a cross-border war with the possibility of future escalations in the far future.
   

This is the concern I know many have, including me.  Short of a strategic military collapse (possible, but should not be counted on) it is impossible to envision Ukraine taking back all of its 2022 territory this year, not to mention 2014 territory.  It is also impossible to envision Russia effectively surrendering to Ukraine even with a strategic military collapse (unless there is favorable regime collapse as well).  And yet there is no real plans evident for what follows even the most successful counter offensive.  All we can do is hope that there's some solid plans in the works and things will roll into view over the next few months.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

• Many people make the mistake of equating a long-protracted war to a stalemate. This could not be further from the truth.

Absolutely.  Long wars are fought in phases, some of which are stalemates in the sense that neither side feels offensive activity is wise at that time.  The entire period of 2015-2022 was such a time, where both sides technically had the ability to go onto the offensive BUT for various reasons decided it was best to bide their time.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• On the three goals of the US: Strategic defeat for Russia, victory for Ukraine, and escalation management. Strategic defeat for Russia has been achieved and the US is balancing between the last two goals.

It is nice to see Kofman fully acknowledge that Russia has suffered a strategic defeat and that there's nothing Russia can do to change that (other comments he made emphasized the last point).

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• Generally speaking, Russia might be able to sustain it for a couple of years. Russia's ability to produce ammunition and pull equipment out of storage will increase over time. However, the extent of this is uncertain and is still not going to equal demand even close. 

I agree that Russia can continue the war for only a couple more years, but only in a significant way if Ukraine significantly screws things up this year.  If Ukraine doesn't screw things up, then I don't know that Putin will be able to keep the three things he needs going for more than another year; regime, conventional military, and economy.  If any one of those three falters, Russia's ability to continue the war for more than another year will be significantly curtailed.  Not necessarily ended completely, but also looking to everybody that full defeat is inevitable and coming sooner rather than later.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• Mike thinks they understand the disaster it has been, but they also recognize that they have survived a lot so far. 
• They see a total economic collapse as less likely at this point.

I don't give the Russians much credit for their thinking, but I believe they've realized this for some time now.  Event he hardcore pro-war types making decisions within the regime likely understand this.  How thoroughly Putin himself grasps had bad things are... I don't know.  Kofman put it well that regimes can trick themselves into believing their own BS right up until the end.

16 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

• We have not seen these two militaries face each other before, making it impossible to accurately predict the outcome. Untested, newly-formed Ukrainian units equipped with recently introduced equipment and new tactics will be engaging with Russian-mobilized, untested troops in defenses that have not yet been put to the test.

 

This I don't agree with.  Ukraine launched it's offensives last year under similar circumstances.  Ukraine used new units with newly acquired equipment fighting in ways it had so far not fought against a force it had yet to engage in an offensive of its choosing.  This year Ukraine's got more experience and better forces to commit while Russia is significantly weaker than it was ahead of Ukraine's previous counter offensive.

The variables we've identified as more important to focus on is terrain.  That's the one that could still significantly affect the outcome.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

22 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainian-offensives-are-coming-34c

What Might Success and Failure Look Like?

 

That is a good article by Mick Ryan.  Not surprising

In his conclusions for how to measure this year's offensive he mentions the need to crush significant Russian forces in a way that is noticeable to the world, including Russia.  This was one of the things that Ukraine had difficulties with last year. 

In Kharkiv there was limited opportunities to bag large numbers of Russians because the front was so thinly populated.  However, there was an opportunity to trap perhaps several thousand in Izyum and at least many hundreds in Lyman, neither of which happened.

In Kherson the conditions were ideal to have destroyed many thousands of Russian forces, perhaps as much as 30,000.  Russia was in a really tight spot with limited avenues and means for retreat, and yet they retreated in good order with most of their equipment.

So, while Ukraine achieved major territorial gains which everybody correctly assessed as a major victory, those of us who were following the fighting closely saw where Ukraine came up short of expectations.  If we had drone footage of VDV soldiers swimming across the Dnepr that would have been probably good enough, but instead Russia conducted an en excellent fighting withdrawal.

If Ukraine achieves a similar gain of territory with a similar lack of overt Russian losses, I will still chalk it up as a major victory.  However, I'm going to be disappointed because it means Ukraine hasn't figured out one of the key elements of a maneuver war... destroy your enemy's forces.

That said, we close watchers of the war know that Russia did suffer horrendous losses in personnel and equipment last year.  Whatever Russia withdrew over the Dnepr to the left bank was significantly less than what it had positioned on the right bank.  We also know that Russia suffered significant losses between Lyman and Kreminna in particular, but also much of the force it has left to guard this area.  The problem with these losses is that they are not as easily shown as something like Russia's PR victory at Mariupol was.  Hopefully Ukraine does better this year.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

The successor to Germany's Goliath...

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Report that some PMCs are forcefully "recruiting" mobiks assigned in their sector.  Either they sign up with the PMC or they get "kneecapped" (or worse).  On the surface this would seem to be running contrary to the MoD's authority, but it is entirely possible that this is a covert way to ensure the PMCs get replacements.  Step 1 is for the MoD to conscript someone under penalty of imprisonment if he refuses.  Step 2 is to send him into the area of operations of a PMC and give him menial task, such as guarding or digging fortifications.  Step 3 is to let the PMCs do their thing.  Step 4 is to cover it up by ignoring "appeals" sent to government organs.

Rare view of a fixed wing drone bomber with most of the footage coming from a backwards facing (fixed?) observation camera.  Seems to have pretty good accuracy, which is surprising:

Steve

[womble]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

In Kherson the conditions were ideal to have destroyed many thousands of Russian forces, perhaps as much as 30,000.  Russia was in a really tight spot with limited avenues and means for retreat, and yet they retreated in good order with most of their equipment.

I've been thinking for a couple of days about this, off and on, and it's making me wonder what Kherson actually tells us about relative capabilities in the more conventional style of warfare. Russia knew the trans-Dnipro bridgehead was unsustainable, so its objective was extraction of its assets, which it handily achieved. In the process it made UKR bleed, at least a bit.

How much pressure did the UKR forces need to exert to make the bridgehead unable to continue? They needed to make the RUS expend resources to stress the ferry supply line, and convince the enemy that they were committed to retaking the ground. And of course there's the perennial objective of killing as many Russians as possible. That was going to mean incurring losses, and burning through supplies of their own; any losses more than the minimum required to keep pushing and killing are entries on the negative side of the ledger.

On the positive side would have been any significant captures of troops and/or materiel, but those largely didn't materialise. It doesn't seem like a stretch to wonder whether Kherson demonstrates some of the limitations of UKR warfighting capability, for all their courage, creativity and tenacity.

Large encirclements do require the ability to apply immense pressure in a short timeframe. Traditionally (which pretty much means WW2), this has been achieved with the assistance of lots of artillery, including aerial and tracked, providing firepower advantage to permit the maneuver elements the opportunity to advance faster than the to-be-encircled formations can withdraw. Even with western assistance, perhaps that's something UKR needs to work on.

[poesel]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Seems to have pretty good accuracy, which is surprising:

Guessing from the drop time, that is about 50 m above the ground. Not that high.
GPS & barometric sensor will give the pilot a good measure for current altitude. Add an accelerometer and you know your angle vs ground.
With a fixed forward down looking cam and a little bit of software, you got yourself a working bomb sight.

The plane itself is likely styrofoam reinforced with some carbon fiber struts. That is quite durable.

I guess this thing costs less than a quadcopter and carries twice the load at three times the range. But it is of course as susceptible to jamming as the copters are. So I guess they will rather max out the load.

I should not be surprised what you can do with hobby level electronic skills in a modern war, but I am. Kudos to Ukraine to be that resourceful and to enable their soldiers to try out these wacky things.

[poesel]

7 minutes ago, womble said:

I've been thinking for a couple of days about this, off and on, and it's making me wonder what Kherson actually tells us about relative capabilities in the more conventional style of warfare.

I remember that we speculated at the time that the successful retreat from Kherson of the RA was largely due to the fact that Ukraine didn't want to fight over the city and risk high civilian casualties. A special situation which is unlikely to repeat.

So I don't think Kherson tells us much about either capability on the attack or defense.

[womble]

4 minutes ago, poesel said:

I remember that we speculated at the time that the successful retreat from Kherson of the RA was largely due to the fact that Ukraine didn't want to fight over the city and risk high civilian casualties. A special situation which is unlikely to repeat.

So I don't think Kherson tells us much about either capability on the attack or defense.

There were 30-50km of more open terrain where city fighting wasn't a consideration. But I don't disagree at all about its predictive value for future actions. Russia wanted to run away, primarily, with inflicting casualties being secondary, so it would be hard to pin the elements you're trying to encircle, a bit like nailing jelly to a wall.

[Bulletpoint]

18 hours ago, akd said:

Terra Unit gets into the (very) close air support business for 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (cont. from previous video):

 

At 00:10 he throws a grenade into a foxhole and the Russian reaches out to throw the grenade out again, but the clip then for some reason cuts and there's an explosion but it seems to be in a different place? Lots of trickery going on in some of these videos.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

In Kherson the conditions were ideal to have destroyed many thousands of Russian forces, perhaps as much as 30,000.  Russia was in a really tight spot with limited avenues and means for retreat, and yet they retreated in good order with most of their equipment.

So, while Ukraine achieved major territorial gains which everybody correctly assessed as a major victory, those of us who were following the fighting closely saw where Ukraine came up short of expectations.  If we had drone footage of VDV soldiers swimming across the Dnepr that would have been probably good enough, but instead Russia conducted an en excellent fighting withdrawal.

I think the problem with this sort of point of view is that it still assumes that annihilation through manoeuvre was possible. And even if it was, would it have been worth the costs at that point in the war? 

Russia got itself out of Kherson; however, 1) we do not know the full scope of attritional losses over time - how much critical equipment did they leave behind? and 2) how do those stack up with Ukrainian gains compared to their loses?  This point of view mirrors more than a few western pundits as “lost opportunity = loss”, but skips over the cost-benefit equation on retaking a regional capital essentially unopposed.  I strongly suspect that the UA looking to a longer game was not interested in bagging whatever was left of the RA at Kherson because the cost was too high for the gains.  Worst scenario for Kherson was a large urban battle that would still be raging.  If Ukraine had boxed the RA up into that city that is what likely would have happened.  Instead Ukraine left the back door open so the RA would simply leave - it was less about killing Russians there and more about liberating Ukrainians.

We keep making the error of looking for a western style victory in this thing.  I have seen more bold offensive arrows, both red and blue, being drawn all over the place.  What we have seen though is bold arrows of red collapse, with a blue follow up.  This is a war of Russian collapses and contractions, some better controlled than others.  This is what victory looks like, yet we keep demanding a Gulf War metric as an indicator of success, which does not track in this environment.  The losses are over time, erosion, not fast forced crushing.  It is the environment that drives this - death of surprise, mass dilemmas, long range and precision.   We are talking about a war where both sides have had to relegate their armor to indirect fire roles - something is happening in a fundamental way.

So what?  Well this does not mean that the 30k prisoner haul is impossible in this war, or the bold strokes we all want to see.  However, I strongly suspect that they are going to be a finishing stroke/final note at the end as a result of corrosive warfare, not the cause of the end itself.  The core warfare principle we in the west adhere to will become a punctuation mark, not the primary means of delivery of victory.  We should not hold Ukraine to a standard of success that I am not sure even exists anymore in this sort of operating environment.  This war is still about killing Russians, but it is all over the place, all the time, not in a single concentrated area.  Why, because concentration kills in this environment unless you have already eroded an opponent into collapse - be it slow or fast.

In the end Kherson along with Kharkiv were major corrosive warfare victories.  At Kherson the UA with nearly 1:1 force ratio pushed the RA across a major river because they made their position untenable.  They retook a provincial capital of 300k taking very few losses which was a major strategic blow to Russia - no one could call this war for Russia after Kharkiv and Kherson (or at least no one credible).  We should not apply our own western experience to this war because we have not fought one like this since Korea, and the rules of the game have shifted dramatically since then.

I for one am surprised that Kherson did not turn into a protracted bloodbath, there was a lost RA opportunity that speaks to an idea that perhaps Russian Will is not made of steel.  Now if Russia is finally so badly beat up that the old rules of warfare apply - a la Iraqi Army - then yippee!  But that 1) does not validate our western doctrines as “right all along” because that final stroke took a year of broad scope high speed attrition pruning ops and 2) will be a signpost, not a decisive point.  The result of months of shaping and eroding that has already occurred over the winter. 

[Offshoot]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

At 00:10 he throws a grenade into a foxhole and the Russian reaches out to throw the grenade out again, but the clip then for some reason cuts and there's an explosion but it seems to be in a different place? Lots of trickery going on in some of these videos.

That was just the beginning "trailer", which shows some very short clips from the longer video. The actual sequence of events is shown clearly later with an explanation.

[Grossman]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I think the problem with this sort of point of view is that it still assumes that annihilation through manoeuvre was possible. And even if it was, would it have been worth the costs at that point in the war? 

Russia got itself out of Kherson; however, 1) we do not know the full scope of attritional losses over time - how much critical equipment did they leave behind? and 2) how do those stack up with Ukrainian gains compared to their loses?  This point of view mirrors more than a few western pundits as “lost opportunity = loss”, but skips over the cost-benefit equation on retaking a regional capital essentially unopposed.  I strongly suspect that the UA looking to a longer game was not interested in bagging whatever was left of the RA at Kherson because the cost was too high for the gains.  Worst scenario for Kherson was a large urban battle that would still be raging.  If Ukraine had boxed the RA up into that city that is what likely would have happened.  Instead Ukraine left the back door open so the RA would simply leave - it was less about killing Russians there and more about liberating Ukrainians.

We keep making the error of looking for a western style victory in this thing.  I have seen more bold offensive arrows, both red and blue, being drawn all over the place.  What we have seen though is bold arrows of red collapse, with a blue follow up.  This is a war of Russian collapses and contractions, some better controlled than others.  This is what victory looks like, yet we keep demanding a Gulf War metric as an indicator of success, which does not track in this environment.  The losses are over time, erosion, not fast forced crushing.  It is the environment that drives this - death of surprise, mass dilemmas, long range and precision.   We are talking about a war where both sides have had to relegate their armor to indirect fire roles - something is happening in a fundamental way.

So what?  Well this does not mean that the 30k prisoner haul is impossible in this war, or the bold strokes we all want to see.  However, I strongly suspect that they are going to be a finishing stroke/final note at the end as a result of corrosive warfare, not the cause of the end itself.  The core warfare principle we in the west adhere to will become a punctuation mark, not the primary means of delivery of victory.  We should not hold Ukraine to a standard of success that I am not sure even exists anymore in this sort of operating environment.  This war is still about killing Russians, but it is all over the place, all the time, not in a single concentrated area.  Why, because concentration kills in this environment unless you have already eroded an opponent into collapse - be it slow or fast.

In the end Kherson along with Kharkiv were major corrosive warfare victories.  At Kherson the UA with nearly 1:1 force ratio pushed the RA across a major river because they made their position untenable.  They retook a provincial capital of 300k taking very few losses which was a major strategic blow to Russia - no one could call this war for Russia after Kharkiv and Kherson (or at least no one credible).  We should not apply our own western experience to this war because we have not fought one like this since Korea, and the rules of the game have shifted dramatically since then.

I for one am surprised that Kherson did not turn into a protracted bloodbath, there was a lost RA opportunity that speaks to an idea that perhaps Russian Will is not made of steel.  Now if Russia is finally so badly beat up that the old rules of warfare apply - a la Iraqi Army - then yippee!  But that 1) does not validate our western doctrines as “right all along” because that final stroke took a year of broad scope high speed attrition pruning ops and 2) will be a signpost, not a decisive point.  The result of months of shaping and eroding that has already occurred over the winter. 

UK Ministry of Defence.

Since last summer Russia has built “some of the most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world for many decades” in the areas it controls in Ukraine as well as in its own border regions, the UK’s Ministry of Defence has written in its latest intelligence update on the conflict.

Imagery shows that Russia has made a particular effort to fortify the northern border of occupied Crimea, it said, adding that Russia had also dug “hundreds of miles of trenches well inside internationally recognised Russian territory including in the Belgorod and Kursk regions”.

The defences “highlight Russian leaders’ deep concern that Ukraine could achieve a major breakthrough,” the MoD said, although it added that “some works have likely been ordered by local commanders and civil leaders in attempts to promote the official narrative that Russia is ‘threatened’ by Ukraine and NATO”.

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

 bloodbath, (A) there was a lost RA opportunity that speaks to an idea that perhaps Russian Will is not made of steel.  Now if Russia is finally so badly beat up that the old rules of warfare apply - a la Iraqi Army - then yippee!  But that 1) does not validate our western doctrines as “right all along” because that final stroke took a year of broad scope high speed attrition pruning ops and 2) will be a signpost, not a decisive point. (B) The result of months of shaping and eroding that has already occurred over the winter. 

Discussing 

(A) The lack of resolution could be affected not just by operational considerations but mil-factional. We've touched on these internal tensions within the Russian war machine before,  and ISW did a superb job laying it out yesterday. 

(B) I'm curious how much of this is a new form of an old warfare,  versus a form dictated by necessity (UKR lack of Air parity/dominance),  i.e. You fight however you can with what you have.

There's obviously a new approach going on here that utilizes new tech and mentalities,  but I'm curious if that would still dominate as the chosen approach if UKR had better control of the skies.

I assume using the best of both approaches (Western-type punctuative high altitude, long range airborne rampage +UKR low altitude, incessant & personal corrosive ****ery) is what Ukraine is working towards. 

At the moment,  the Russians in theory have the systems for the former (but has stagnated)  while Ukraine has the latter and is rapidly developing. Whichever of the two sides can tie the two extremes together will have a war winning advantage. 

The end balance between the two will be fascinating to watch.  

Edited May 1, 2023 by Kinophile

[Seedorf81]

12 hours ago, JonS said:

Right, but a generation later in 1944 they faced exactly the same decision, for the same reasons, and instead chose to continue into gotterdammerung.

But even within that, they chose to end things in May 45, which included not continuing in the alpine redoubt, and not transitioning to a decades long insurgency.

Yes, the Germans gave up, but only after Hitler killed himself.

Question is if that would have been the case if Hitler had gone to the Alps (or in hiding like Saddam Hoessein).

It shows to me that getting rid of The Big Guy on the Top (Putin) is vital for any peace-possibilty between Russia-Ukraine.

[Seedorf81]

"Bryansk, Russian train derailed after explosion". Rumours of saboteurs.

 

Edited May 1, 2023 by Seedorf81
picture

[Centurian52]

On 4/29/2023 at 8:47 AM, kevinkin said:

But the lead time would not put A10s in combat anytime soon. 

A-10s? As much as I want us to send anything and everything we can to help Ukraine out, I really hope we aren't sending A-10s. Those things will not survive in a modern airspace. I know we're ground warfare nerds here, so it may not be obvious, but the "low and slow" philosophy that the A-10 was designed around is an outdated concept. Maybe a bunch of the things getting wrecked will finally break the spell it seems to have over the public, but it's not worth the loss of good Ukrainian pilots. F-16s will perform much better in ground attack missions, and will actually have a chance of surviving.

[TheVulture]

18 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

A-10s? As much as I want us to send anything and everything we can to help Ukraine out, I really hope we aren't sending A-10s. Those things will not survive in a modern airspace. I know we're ground warfare nerds here, so it may not be obvious, but the "low and slow" philosophy that the A-10 was designed around is an outdated concept. Maybe a bunch of the things getting wrecked will finally break the spell it seems to have over the public, but it's not worth the loss of good Ukrainian pilots. F-16s will perform much better in ground attack missions, and will actually have a chance of surviving.

I can see why the A-10 is great in situations like afghanistan, where air supremacy is assured, there is virtually no meaningful anti-air threat, and the targets are mostly infantry and unarmoured (essentially civilian) vehicles - an A-10 can wreck any target it can see, with enough ammo load to provide support for an extended period, and do so pretty cheaply. An F-16 lobbing JDAMs against a pickup carrying 4 insurgents is a very expensive way of achieving the same effect.

In Ukraine, where anti-air is dominant, Ukraine is certainly behind Russia in air force anyway, and there are a lot more hardened targets and infrastructure targets - yeah, an A-10 is toast before it gets close to a target, while e.g. an F-16 can succesfully hit an armoured vehicle or a command center and live to tell the tale.

[Centurian52]

On 4/30/2023 at 5:00 AM, poesel said:

Personally, I think that all the talk of the probable limited success of the coming offensive is just a mind game. Lowering the expectations will make any success look the bigger. May also let the Russians feel a wrong sense of security.

My guess is we will see Ukrainian soldiers skinny-dipping in the Azov sea this year.

I think the talk of the probable limited success is emphasizing that the offensive won't be a knockout blow. The war will still be raging and there will still be Ukrainian territory left to liberate. I think this aligns with my expectations. I expect this offensive to accomplish a lot, but it will almost certainly need to be followed up by another offensive, and possibly another after that, in order to finish driving the Russians out completely. So I'm disappointed to hear that we only seem to be equipping the Ukrainians with this offensive in mind, and aren't building them up with multiple successive offensives in mind. One offensive every six months is not a very efficient way to win a war.