How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, akd said:

Battle for Position “Cyclops,” part 2:

 

Thanks for that.

Anybody else notice at least 3 bodies inbetween the Ukrainian and Russian positions?  No indications as to which side they belonged to.  It also unclear how many of the ~8 Russians in the trench at the beginning were hit.  Looks to have been 2 for sure, likely more.  The third video might inform us better, but it's possible some of the Russians buggered out (though I would expect that to be shown).  And once again plenty examples of how the berm trench system greatly increases the accuracy and lethality of drone bomb drops.  I didn't bother counting, but I'd say the majority relied upon hitting the inside of the berm to get the bomb into the trench or dugout.

This is really incredible to watch.  Even though none of this is surprising to us (we've seen it before), but these videos show us in detail a lot of the things we're learning about where warfare is headed.  It is a new type of combined arms heavily based on what I'm now thinking of is Combined Certainty™ (I'm trademarking this in case it catches on )

The concept of Combined Certainty is that you move into an area only after you are certain you have shaped it to a favorable degree.  This breaks down into 5 rough phases done in sequence:

1. understand the enemy's defensive positions in exceptional detail.  Not just "trench over in those trees", but right down to the size and position of every single feature of the defenses.
2. monitor the positions in real time using drones.
3. if the opportunity presents itself, direct artillery onto the positions or LOCs as artillery is the quickest way to have a big impact.
4. use drone bombers to attack individual points and/or soldiers.  Do this as many times as necessary to effectively neutralize meaningful defense.
5. when it appears nearly certain that the defenders can not offer effective resistance, send in an infantry unit to secure the position.  All squad members should be briefed IN DETAIL about the positions, including where the possible hiding spots might be.  Again, not just "trench over in those trees" but the shape, best entrance points, and where there might still be resistance.
6. while the assault is taking place feed the unit real time information from drones so that if any defender tries to do something the assaulting infantry know about it and, most importantly, know where it is coming from.
7. no chances are taken by the infantry.  Grenades and/or small arms fire gets dumped into each fighting position that can't be easily observed.  Since they should know about the significant ones well ahead of time, extra attention can be paid to those as part of the assault plan.  And the assault group should remember that there could be someone else outside of the immediate area paying attention to them, so overwatch should not be neglected.

The overall characterization of this is infantry is committed only when the outcome is certain and low risk.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, akd said:

Spetsnaz brigades are likely just assault infantry now.  Can’t remember if it was posted here, but there was a report on two of the brigades being effectively destroyed over the last year, with approx. 75% losses.  No way they regain much of their specialist capabilities for a very long time.

Yes, that was posted here.  One source (forget which) went into some detail about how long the peacetime training is for members of a Spetsnaz unit.  Something like 4 years.  Which means every loss they took since the start of the war has not been replaced by a comparably trained replacement.  Further, the high losses have reduced the percentage of new members gaining experience through combat and surviving longer term.

I suspect experienced soldiers from other units are siphoned from other units into Spetsnaz and VDV, as is commonplace in other conflicts.  They also most likely get the "pick of the litter" when it comes to contract volunteers.  Still not a substitute for the prewar training, but it likely means the Spetsnaz units contain a higher percentage of experienced and fit replacements than other units.  Thus Spetsnaz is retaining their higher quality relative to the rest of the Russian units, not by an objective standard (even Russia's prewar standard).

Steve

[kevinkin]

Reading the tea leaves, troop densities are just part of the equation. I always think about effective firepower. That is a comparison of your outgoing firepower vs the enemies incoming firepower. This ratio depends on factors other than sheer numbers. It depends on the old term force multipliers. C3ISR plays a huge role. Troop densities give a partial picture. Sometimes that’s all we have to go by. However, if the densities look reasonable for Ukraine and we know that their force multipliers are vastly superior to Russia, then the counter offensive should proceed well unless UA troop strength drops unacceptably so their advantages simply can’t overcome the low number of hands on deck e.g. intel identifies more juicy targets than can be engaged. Here is a report from today comparing UA vs RA targeting:

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/artillery-paradox-how-ukraine-does-more-damage-with-fewer-rounds-than-russia/

The pattern is consistent. Ukraine is rolling out drone-guided indirect fire at every level as rapidly as possible and to significant effect. Russian forces are also using drone-directed fire, but suffer from a comparative shortage of drones, and, until now, a lack of support from senior commanders. While artillery units have long operated Orlan-10 drones, these are in short supply and only at battery level or above. 

It currently looks as though big data may be more powerful than big guns, and future conflicts may be determined more by the available drone fleet and its supporting software than the number of artillery barrels. But the current conflict may still have much more to teach us.

 

[kimbosbread]

15 hours ago, BlackMoria said:

Lots of ways.  Counter Battery/Mortar Radars.   Drones.  Satellites (if your C3 system is fast enough).  Sound Ranging (don't know if that is still a thing).  Crater Analysis. Recon/SF assets  Humint from locals.  Etc.

I meant more in the sense of you have all of those resources, and you have 1000 sqkm to search. How do you prioritize where to look first? Do you do Bayesian search, or some something more basic?

Edit: Let’s say you want to prioritize where to search. Do you look near previous firing positions, or places where there is a known road, or places where artillery has been seen stopped before?

Edited April 24, 2023 by kimbosbread

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Seedorf81 said:

Dutch newssite quotes Washington Post:

'Ukraine was planning to attack Moscow on 24th of Februari, to "bring the war closer to the Russians", but didn't after US disapproved.'

 

I think it is safe to say that Ukraine has been holding back on what it is capable of doing within Russian territory.  And it is likely equally safe to say it is because the US (in particular) is discouraging such attacks.  I think this is wise, because the more Ukraine engages in attacks within Russia that are not explicitly military in nature, the greater the risk that they will do something that does more harm than good.  For example, accidentally hitting a movie theater full of civilians because a munition went off course or was shot down and crashed.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Bit of a fluff piece on the Neptune ASM (it is the Kyiv Post after all). 

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/16061

But there's a very nice tidbit inside:

They knew how bad was training, command and control.  In an older ship you need very well trained crews to cover for its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Good training requires good command and lets just say that sticking the Moskva with no escorts, on a repetitive course near a hostile coast was pretty indicative... 

The Moskva sinking is, in a way, an allegory for everything Russian.  It looks better than it is, it functions worse than anybody imagined, and it can be counted upon to amplify any stress applied to it from the outside.  Anybody seeking to weaken Russia has a wide array of targets to go after that can produce a much bigger impact than the attack itself.

For example, the sanctions imposed upon Russia were good "attacks", however the Kremlin belief that everything done to it must be retaliated against no matter what meant that Russia would likely take actions which harm Russia more than others.  Russia's weaponizing energy is a great example of something Russia did that backfired spectacularly.

The blast on the Kerch bridge is a great example too.  The attack took into account that the Russian logistics system was overly reliant upon this one bit of infrastructure.  They could count on insufficient engineering to amplify the effect of the bomb.  Further, Russia rushing repairs means more opportunity for corner cutting and detrimental effects of corruption.  This increases the chances of an accident during reconstruction that slows things down and/or creating something that might fail without an attack and/or presenting an even more vulnerable target for a later time.

Steve

[akd]

lol

 

[Kinophile]

Tucker Carlson is out. 

https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/media/tucker-carlson-fox-news/index.html

I guess he wasn't worth the $700,000,000 price tag...

Edited April 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

Totally off topic, so let's not go there.

Steve

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ukraine needs a big win and Russian defence sector collapse again as a min (they pulled off two last fall).

I agree they need a big win.  What I've been wondering is whether they go all-out in May/June or do more local stuff initially.  There's ~5 months of good weather so UKR might not want to risk everything on big initial push until they have punched around a bit to see what RU has & how it responds, attriting when RU moves stuff. 

And the other side, RU will probably be throwing more mobiks into the line so UKR may want to win before those troops show up.

[sross112]

3 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I agree they need a big win.  What I've been wondering is whether they go all-out in May/June or do more local stuff initially.  There's ~5 months of good weather so UKR might not want to risk everything on big initial push until they have punched around a bit to see what RU has & how it responds, attriting when RU moves stuff. 

And the other side, RU will probably be throwing more mobiks into the line so UKR may want to win before those troops show up.

I think one of the big factors that will come into that decision is whether or not the UA feels that they have a solution to the Russian air power. Back during Kherson it was said that the main thing that hurt and stopped the UA was Russian air. Granted we don't have a lot of information on that, but it was widely reported. So if it is a big factor, recent build up of airframes by the RuAF would point to them thinking that heavy air interdiction will be their card to stop any break throughs. 

If the UA is confident that they can provide an air denial bubble over any rampaging columns then I'd bet we see them try the break through and exploit option. If they aren't then the bet is on the corrosive/attritional approach. 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

The Ukies do have a predilection for doublling up attacks. It would be very important to interdiction around Melitopol,  prevent it becoming a Fortress city and attractive rallying point. 

I would respectfully disagree about Melitopol. If Ukraine could cut the Crimean land connections, and then sever the land bride at any spot east of Melitopol, the city is is just a trap for Russian forces. It is exactly the kind of place you attack last, when it is under a tight and hopeless siege, and every Russian soldier in the place knows that the only two possible endings are a POW camp or a bulldozed over ditch.

[BlackMoria]

2 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

I meant more in the sense of you have all of those resources, and you have 1000 sqkm to search. How do you prioritize where to look first? Do you do Bayesian search, or some something more basic?

Edit: Let’s say you want to prioritize where to search. Do you look near previous firing positions, or places where there is a known road, or places where artillery has been seen stopped before?

Most of that will be handled by the various S2 staffs of all levels.   S2 is the intel people.  Their job is to get a handle of understanding enemy intents and dispositions.  Armies operate according to doctrines and understanding your enemy's doctrine of how he uses and deploys his artillery assets gives you the ability to 'predict'  where and how he will deploy his artillery assets in a given area.   That is the start point of your intel gathering plan and where you deploy your drones, position your counter artillery radars, etc.    

It may seem like 'black box' stuff but a good S2 staff can seem like they are reading the mind of the enemy.   I have worked in the past as the BAIO (Brigade Artillery Intelligence Officer) in a Bde S2 shop and every exercise with opfor forces, I have been able to predict where they would deploy their artillery and I have been accurate to within 1.5 kilometers on my assessment and having some intel sensor / humint discover where the opfor guns were deployed with enough accuracy to counterbattery them.

1000 sqkm is not an issue for a real good and well trained S2 staff.  It might seem like 'black box' stuff but good S2 staff can nail down enemy locations and intents with a high degree of accuracy.

An edit just to clarify.  The 1000 sqkm is not one S2 staff.  A number of divisions and their subunits is responsible for that large an area.   There will a Corp S2, a number of Div S2s and numerous Bde S2s all talking with each other.  Each step down is more and more focused on a particular smaller parcel of ground.  Didn't want to give the impression that a single S2 shop is looking after 1000sqkm.  There is potentially dozens of S2 shops working that problem.

Edited April 24, 2023 by BlackMoria

[Jiggathebauce]

Newsweek with a very vague article talking about MOD and Wagner in Red on Red firefight, not finding much else about it though

https://www.newsweek.com/russian-soldiers-wagner-mercenaries-start-fighting-each-other-report-1796146

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Based on their assessments of RA line strength Russia has pretty much burned itself out over the winter.  If the UA is sitting on 9 fresh and fully gunned up Bdes this spring offensive could be a real barn burner.  Looking at the map I am honestly wondering if the UA is not going to go for the Dnipro river crossing assault. Risky and tough to secure but the RA is extremely thin and broken on that front.  This is likely due to risk-creep around the river obstacle.  The RA looks pretty weak on the far east of that line too.

Every sector of the front has opportunities for an attack.  ISW's comprehensive assessment from yesterday helps understand what they are.  Using their work as a basis, here is what I see as the pros/cons of each of the seven identified axis:

• Luhansk North (Kupyansk Axis)
  • Pros - Russian units present appear to be skeletal remains of units that have previously been soundly trashed.  Lack of meaningful offensive activity during the winter seems to confirm that this sector is not a priority for Russia.  Busting through the lines could result in a sizeable liberation of 2022 territory.
  • Cons - terrain is tough and a successful breakthrough will be difficult to maintain given the road network.  Certain scenarios will complicate Russian logistics further south, but only that... complicate. 
• Luhansk South (Svatove/Kreminna Axis)
  • Pros - defending units are a hodgepodge of disorganized, decentralized units of varying degrees of competency and strength.  A strong hit would likely find there is no cohesive defense.  Some relatively high profile urban areas that, if retaken, would be recognizable.  Also, Ukraine could unhinge a pretty good chunk of the defenses on the west side of the Donets river by advancing southward on the eastern side.
  • Cons - again, terrain is difficult.  The prize areas are also urban, which is likely to produce slow and costly fighting at the expense of larger gains.  However, because it could unhinge the sector to the south it could indirectly achieve more.
• Donetsk North (Bakhmut Axis)
  • Pros - defenders are likely pretty well spent and the fractured command structure (MoD, Wagner, DLPR, and various rabble) would make a coordinated defense more difficult and easier to break.  There are a couple of salients that could be pressured into retreat or surrender.   Any reversal of Russian positions here would be huge propaganda victory.
  • Cons - Russia has a large chunk of its combat power located here, likely making progress slow and costly for Ukraine.  Any advance would quickly run into positions Russia has occupied since 2014, which could present unique problems.
• Donetsk Center (Avdiivka-Donetsk City Axis)
  • Pros - the same story as elsewhere with spent Russian forces.  Some high profile names that if retaken would have good PR value.
  • Cons - very, very limited opportunities for Ukraine here.  2022 seized territory is minimal and very quickly Ukraine would find itself butting into urban fighting on a grand scale.
• Donetsk South (Southern Donetsk/Eastern Zaporizhia Axis)
  • Pros - Russians are in particularly bad shape here with the remains of the units chewed up trying to take Vuhledar.  Reinforcements aren't anything to crow about.  Driving south to Mariupol and the Azov Sea would be huge.
  • Cons - a deep strike would mean going to the coast of Azov, which would expose Ukrainians to flank attacks.  Driving south only makes sense if there's a second offensive in the adjacent Zaporizhia front.
• Zaporizhia Front (Zaporizhia Oblast)
  • Pros - Russian forces here have not been subjected to serious combat, which is not not necessarily a good thing.  Intense combat may come as a rude shock.  The front is huge which means Ukraine has quite a lot of choice as to where to attack.  If there's a major breakthrough it would quickly result in fragmented response due to the command seam that's separates it from the neighboring Donetsk South front.  Driving to coast would cut off a large amount of territory to the west which would, in turn, likely obligate Russia to withdraw there instead of fighting.  Huge PR boost if they get all the way to Crimea.
  • Cons - it's a lot of territory and Russia has invested heavily in establishing defenses.  It is also closest to the air bases in Crimea.
• Kherson Front - (Kherson Axis)
  • Pros - likely the thinnest held and most difficult positions for Russia to maintain.  Forces currently there appear to be some of the worst on the whole front.  Cutting through this area to Crimea will make the Zaporizhia Front largely untenable, causing either a mass withdrawal or surrender.
  • Cons - getting over the Dnepr River is going to be very difficult unless the sector is already under stress.  Aviation based in Crimea and Black Sea Fleet capabilities theoretically give Russia some ways to make a crossing very risky.

Steve

[AlsatianFelix]

Cartoons for draftees are helpful if you they are polyglot, poorly educated and have significant rates of illiteracy.

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Totally off topic, so let's not go there.

Steve

Well,  not quite off topic. He's anti Ukraine involvement and we've commented on that with other figures,  and how this can affect the coming elections,  which could very directly affect Ukraines war effort. Whatever my personal opinion,  he's one less very prominent opponent (for now), which is a good thing for Ukraine. 

I meant it more in that international affairs framing, rather than USA domestic. 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[NamEndedAllen]

China backpedals - and puts itself into the awkward position of officially recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty. https://www.reuters.com/world/some-eu-ministers-say-china-envoys-remarks-ukraine-sovereignty-unacceptable-2023-04-24/

LUXEMBOURG, April 24 (Reuters) - China respects the status of former Soviet member states as sovereign nations, its foreign ministry said on Monday, distancing itself from comments by its envoy to Paris that triggered an uproar among European capitals. 

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

I would respectfully disagree about Melitopol. If Ukraine could cut the Crimean land connections, and then sever the land bride at any spot east of Melitopol, the city is is just a trap for Russian forces. It is exactly the kind of place you attack last, when it is under a tight and hopeless siege, and every Russian soldier in the place knows that the only two possible endings are a POW camp or a bulldozed over ditch.

And a hell hole for its population. It's not empty. Russia has absolutely no qualms holding a civilian population hostage or as human shields. Plus,  the very last thing collapsing Russian forces should be given is a built up safe haven. They should be kept "out in the open",  with two choices: surrender or die. 

And Sure a nominal operational trap (filled with women and children) but it still becomes an ulcer the ZSU must deal with, sucking away forces and worse -  time. 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Jiggathebauce said:

Newsweek with a very vague article talking about MOD and Wagner in Red on Red firefight, not finding much else about it though

https://www.newsweek.com/russian-soldiers-wagner-mercenaries-start-fighting-each-other-report-1796146

I saw it also somewhere else 

 Local scrap about who's to blame got tactical failures. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

 

[Kinophile]

Good timing. 

[Kinophile]

But more on today's Sebastopol attack. 

 

[Haiduk]

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Let's do the math.  This is roughly 125km of frontage, which means the following per KM:

• 700 men
• 3 tanks
• 10 APC/IFV
• 6 artillery over 100mm
• 1.7 MLRS

Excluding support personnel and presuming everything is at the front it basically means that per KM of front there's roughly:

• 1x Rifle Company (dismounted)
• 1x Rifle Company (APC/IFV)
• 1x Tank Platoon
• 1x Artillery Battery

This is not a bad sized force for a 1km section of frontage, especially given the rough terrain.

Steve

I didn't translate all, what wrote Mashovets, but he counts in other way

On his opinion zone of responsibility of FG "East" is about 175 km in a straight line. And if we take into account all curves of frontline this lenght inreases to 250 km. I doub't he is right about 250 km, because according DeepState map frontline from Shcherbaky to Slavne is 190 km. But well. Further he says most of capable troops deployed now on Vuhledar direction (and this is much more, than Vuhledar town itself - approx from Velyka Novosilka to Slavne).

So on Vuhledar direction now involved 8 brigades (motor-rifle, air-assault, naval infantry), 4 regiments (motor-rifle, tank), 5 motor-rifle regiments of Territorial Troops (TT, most of them actually "motor-rifle on papaer only"), 4 rifle regiments (likely LDPR), 2 rifle battalions of DPR TD, 3 separate rifle battalions, 2 BARS battalions. In reserve: 1 tank regiment of TT, 2 motor-rifle battalions of TT

On Orikhiv direction they have: 4 brigades (tank, motor-rifle, air-assault, naval infantry), 7 regiments (motor-rifle, naval infantry), 2 tank battalions (regular, TT), 1 air-assault battalion, 7 motor-rifle regiments of TT, 1 rifle regiment of  LDPR,  4 rifle battalions (LDPR, TT), 12 separate battalions and combined detachments (Rosgvardiya, Wagner, BARS). In reserve: 1 motor-rifle regiment of TT

So he says it's about one "FULL conditional battalion" for 4,5 km of front. BUT. This is for one-echelone defense! As I wrote in previous post, Russians now are regrouping own defense in two echelones. So they will be forced either to expand responsibility zone of theese "conditional battalions", but not full so far more that appointed 5 km, or build focal defense, having hope on own artillery, aviation and "Tsar-ditch" 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Haiduk

[Jiggathebauce]

Not too much mainstream reporting on this, but far right admiral is apparently wanting to run for president of Russia in 2024. Strelkov is not a fan of this individual. https://romania.postsen.com/trends/215931/Who-is-the-navy-captain-proposed-by-Russian-officers-to-replace-Putin-The-oligarchs-drink-the-blood-of-the-people-VIDEO.html#lgv8dlaquho39tq6euh