How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another sign of Russian problems with supplying its forces with current weaponry:

I am sure the fuses timing is very consistent. 

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

What air defense doing?  Underscores the problem of relying upon air defenses not designed to detect or engage small drones:

 

Even if they didn't kill it, there is no guarantee the radar still works. Pretty sure crew morale is that much worse, too.

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another excellent use for small drones is micromanaging attacks on smaller assets that are important to a relatively small sector of frontage.  In this case a Russian remote sensor:

This is an excellent example one side's ISR cloud attacking the other sides cloud. We have been discussing this for thousands of pages, but it is tarting to actually happen. 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Murz (not sure which one) is not sounding very upbeat after the ICC announcement:

Hopefully things are even less upbeat in the Kremlin.

 

Edited March 18, 2023 by dan/california

[kevinkin]

8 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

We love our tourists,

On our first trip to Ireland we stopped on a hot weekend day and the line was so long we just made our way to Kenmare. 

If you get tired of the car w/o air conditioning and driving on the left, go to a local pub. When you cool off, things will be better and driving on the left will become second nature. 

[kevinkin]

On quantitative vs qualitative:

Quantitative (i.e. number of troops) only matters when the opposing forces are armed the same way. Quantitative must account for the volume of destructive fire on-going vs in-coming. I don't need vastly superior numbers if I can achieve vastly superior firepower with much fewer number of troops. That's where quality in equipment and troops using the equipment comes in.  And when those troops can use ISR and precision as force multipliers - watch out. If the enemy has to fight in three dimensions (not just a ground war) - watch out. If winning in any one domain is decisive - watch out. Quality forces the enemy into a Boyd cycle they can't win. A one armed juggler needs to change careers. 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Because this is too close for comfort IMHO.

Exactly, we will always wonder the number lives saved if NATO stepped up last year in decisive ways. Never let a defeated team hang on. This applies to all sports. Bad things happen when they can hang around waiting for a few Hail Mary's. 

[LongLeftFlank]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

There is a subtle, but critical, difference between "time is not on anybody's side" concept.  One is that it means time is equally bad for both sides in equal ways, the other is that it is equally bad for both sides but in unequal ways.

Think about it this way.  Let's say two guys fall overboard from a boat.  The water is cold.  Both have to keep their heads above water until the boat comes back.  If the boat doesn't come back soon enough, they will both drown.  But, if one is a better swimmer than the other and the boat is coming back, then it could be that one drowns and the other does not.  Time matters for both, but not equally so.

This is the situation of this war since the start.  Time is running out for both sides, but it is running out far faster for Russia than Ukraine.  It is important for Ukraine to understand that.  I think Russia knows this as well, which is why it is willing to trade 10s of thousands of lives and decades of war material to "buy time".

Sorry Steve, your analogy is more confused than helpful here.

Nobody has claimed the passage of time had to be net bad, or good, or that it had to be evenly bad (or good) for both sides.

Both sides are using that time, in their own way, not simply 'buying' (or spending) time.

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Incorrect by a wide margin.  The evidence is clear to see from the first year of the war.  Even when Ukraine was dwarfed by Russia's resources it won battles and caused catastrophic losses on Russian forces. 

Russia is weaker now than at any point in this war in everything other than bodies at the front.  Pretty much everything the Russians have is at the front and they are losing.

Ukraine doesn't have to have "Very Large resource dominance" to win big victories.  Has needed it so far, so why all of a sudden is this the deciding factor?  Especially when it is arguable that Ukraine is stronger in many ways than at any point in this war so far. 

Nice strawman you're ripping to bits there. Does it taste nice? 

Nobody at all claimed Russia is stronger today than it was on day 1. 

But UKR = stronger + RUS = weaker does not allow us to conclude "The Russian is finished." It's an empty proposition, implying rates of change without defining or relating terms.

Nor does the course of the first year dictate what happens in the second. That is the mother of all logical fallacies (and leadership self-owns all through history).

So you are wayyyyy premature in saying 'losing', unless you insist on defining it as 'achieve the original goals of Putin's SMO', or some other goal that the Kremlin does not now care much about.

These guys who have 'already lost' are still sitting on 20% of Ukraine and aren't going to 'Lose' themselves out of it on their own unless shoved, very hard.

I am not seeing a collapsed or failed army or nation state here, not yet. You are extrapolating a long expected and hoped-for collapse in the future, saying here are the reasons, and 'banking it' today. And smugly talking down to those who want to question that.

Here are the facts on the ground, today.

1. Russia still holds the south Kherson land bridge, which permanently menaces all of southern Ukraine (c.1/3 of Ukraine's population and economy). The UA has no credible option to reinvade across the Dnepr.

2. Russia is slowly retaking northern Luhansk (Kupyansk-Torske), which is a defensible zone of complex terrain. The reason it lost it last time was because the UA hit (brilliantly) with light mobile forces while its army was pulling out. Don't rely on that mistake being made again.

3. Russia is also dismantling the last fortress towns in the 2014 UA fortified line (Bakhmut, Adiivka). We can certainly ask, 'is getting Donetsk airport out of shell range worth that carpet of shattered flesh?', but to Putin that isn't Losing. Not yet. 

We can certainly ask 'how long can they keep this up?'  Longer than we thought, it seems. But simply sitting and assuming current trajectories and rates of change are set and unchangeable is... folly of a type all too common in history.

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yesh.  Way off the mark again.  If Russia was simply holding the line while it figured out how to smash Ukraine to pieces a different way, maybe. 

Instead it is frittering away 10s of thousands of men every month and is now running out of equipment and munitions to fight with.  What's the good in learning how to win if you don't have anything left to win with?

They are losing their habit of clustering around their AFVs because they don't have hardly any AFVs left to cluster behind

Their fieldcraft isn't improving faster than capacity to use it is being lost.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is learning and has the ability to leverage what it is learning.  Seen plenty of that in the first year of this war.

Strawmen again, with a thick coating of 'all or nothing' absolutes which also happen to be false.

And as you yourself agree, the most important thing the Russians have to do to help themselves is stop losing men, especially trained specialists, by the bushel each month. They haven't yet, but there's nothing that says they can't stop (see hypothesis above).

Improving RU fieldcraft is widely noted in Ukrainian field reports. You can denigrate these as unscientific all you like, but this is simply not the roadbound, vehicle tied, not enough rifles to pull security or patrol army it used to be. Its missions are also less ambitious today.  Is this 1940s+ army actually 'stronger' at defending fixed positions than it was a year ago? It definitely has more bodies now, and hasn't replaced them. And seems to be killing a worrying number of Ukrainians, with far fewer shells. What else might they shore up if they get a breathing space? Do we want to find out?

Skilled cadre and modern equipment and a host of other resources were squandered in 2022, and there's a massive price to that, impossible to replace in kind, and very possibly too great to overcome. You prefer to argue, fallaciously, that I deny that, just because I haven't joined you in declaring inevitable victory, why worry, lie back and think of England. Here's some more dead mobiks.

...But that's what we call 'sunk cost' in business. You can't change the past. You evaluate, move on and find workarounds and replacements.  Maybe you can, maybe you can't. But if the enemy leaves you time (and you quit slicing off your own digits), your chances can improve.

That was my main point, and it didn't need this kind of highhanded reply. You could really use a little less collegiate smug and a little more good faith in your debating style, Steve. We're not exactly morons here in your community.

Edited March 18, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

2. Russia is slowly retaking northern Luhansk (Kupyansk-Torske), which is a defensible zone of complex terrain. The reason it lost it last time was because the UA hit (brilliantly) with light mobile forces while its army was pulling out. Don't rely on that mistake being made again.

 

At what rate and at what cost?

Quote

3. Russia is also dismantling the last fortress towns in the 2014 UA fortified line (Bakhmut, Adiivka). We can certainly ask, 'is getting Donetsk airport out of shell range worth that carpet of shattered flesh?', but to Putin that isn't Losing. Not yet. 

Suppose Russia actually takes Bakhmut and Avdiivka.  How long is Donetsk airport actually out of shell range?  Will the west suddenly supply ordnance that can still reach it?  And with the diffusion of Russian forces out of other areas to take Bakhmut, how well can Russia defend against an attack somewhere else into its lines?  Multiple attacks at relatively large distances from each other that force commitment of reserves to back one or the other?

Quote

Skilled cadre and modern equipment and a host of other resources were squandered in 2022, and there's a massive price to that, impossible to replace in kind, and very possibly too great to overcome. You prefer to argue, fallaciously, that I deny that, just because I haven't joined you in declaring inevitable victory, why worry, lie back and think of England. Here's some more dead mobiks.

...But that's what we call 'sunk cost' in business. You can't change the past. You evaluate, move on and find workarounds and replacements.  Maybe you can, maybe you can't. But if the enemy leaves you time (and you quit slicing off your own digits), your chances can improve.

Unless China comes in with strong military support for Russia, Russian forces are on a downward trajectory. They not only don't have the manufacturing base, they don't have the technology base required to make the manufacturing equipment to develop the manufacturing base.  And they don't have the economy or skilled workforce to support a ramp up of anything beyond late Soviet era equipment, if even that.  Much of their skilled and educated workforce can sell their skills for a more comfortable lifestyle outside of Russia and have been doing so for years, with a recent acceleration.

I don't think it's in China's interest to provide much more than small arms and strong words of encouragement. Russia is a nice gas station, and they might even sell decent snack chips and lottery tickets, but it's a lousy market for Chinese goods compared to Ukraine's backers.  edit: China also has almost a billion and a half mouths to feed, with about 35% of its food being imported.  Russia is far down on the list of suppliers of grain to China.  The only major supplier of food to China that isn't backing Ukraine is Brazil.

Ukraine has to pick a spot and sever the land bridge to Crimea, and then take out the Kerch bridge again.  I suspect they've already got their eye on a few approaches to cutting the land bridge and the shaping operations are already ramping up.  

Edited March 18, 2023 by chrisl

[_Morpheus_]

Another good video from 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (Azov). 
At the beginning they are talking about communication/leadership problems:

- Brigade HQ show the maps with the situation/positions on the map as X for the new arrived Company
- HQ show the maps with the situation/positions on the map as Y, that is different form X
- Company that on positions explain the real situation as Z that is different from X and Y.

Also a lot of details about russian tactics during assaults.

PS: sorry, no english subtitles 

 

Edited March 18, 2023 by _Morpheus_

[Pete Wenman]

Insight into the helicopter flights into the Azovstal plant last year - from the Times (paywall)

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/9cab48a4-c340-11ed-89bb-9ee8b04f3f4c?shareToken=485065bad0587c0638b43e5df3a6992e

Quote

Inside Ukraine’s ‘impossible’ military intelligence raid on Azovstal
Over nine weeks special forces officers carried out daring helicopter missions

Maxim Tucker
Dnipro
Wednesday March 15 2023, 4.40pm GMT, The Times

The men of the Azov regiment boarded each helicopter in the knowledge that none of them would be coming back. Their last flight would be an uncomfortable one — both aircraft were packed full of anti-tank weapons, ammunition and medicine.

Ginger, a young, blue-eyed special forces officer from Ukraine’s military intelligence, the GUR, adjusted his night vision goggles, grabbed his rifle and clambered in after them.

His command had told him they would fly low in the dark to the Russian lines and cross at dawn just as Ukrainian artillery began firing. The enemy should be too distracted to deal with a pair of unmarked Soviet-era helicopters.

Then, a dash to the sea at ground level, dodging the air defence systems. Along the coast to Mariupol, drop the 15 paratroopers and their cargo at the Azovstal steel works, besieged by Russian assault forces and cut off from the rest of Ukraine. Pick up the most severely wounded of the plant’s defenders. Hope the Russian guns would not be waiting for them on the way back.

The GUR planners intended the mission to be so audacious, so suicidal, that the Russians would not realise the helicopters were Ukrainian and assume they were their own. If it worked, they would do it again. They wanted the crews to make it back but everyone knew there would be no return for the Azov soldiers.

“They were very impressive,” Ginger, 24, recalled. Even he, a special forces officer who once took his team into Kabul to rescue Americans from the Taliban, was inspired by their courage. “They understood the risk they were taking but they joked among themselves, they sang songs, they cheered each other up.”

Ginger, along with one of the surviving pilots, the squadron commander and the GUR officer that helped plan the mission, have, for the first time, revealed the details of the operation to The Times. Each wanted to pay tribute to those who did not survive before the anniversary of their deaths. All are still fighting President Putin’s forces and recognise they may not have another chance to tell their story.

On that morning of March 28 last year, Russian tanks were advancing on Ginger’s home city, Kyiv, and had surrounded Ukrainian forces making a stand in Azovstal. The battle held Russian forces in the southern city for 12 weeks, wearing them down and preventing a drive north to the major industrial city of Zaporizhzhya.

Stretched by Russian assaults on multiple fronts, Ukrainian soldiers could not break through to relieve the remaining force of several thousand marines and Azov fighters, hunkered down in concrete beneath the sprawling steel plant. They were taking heavy casualties as their perimeter was hammered by Russian artillery. It was clear the most badly wounded would not survive captivity.

Through information supplied by the US and their own field agents, Ukraine’s military intelligence had a good idea of where the Russian anti-aircraft defences, mostly Pantsir and Buk missile systems, were located.

They shared the information with Colonel Hryhorii, a squadron leader in the 12th Brigade of Army Aviation, who plotted a route to avoid them. They would need every drop of fuel to get there and back. “Everything that was unnecessary was unloaded from the aircraft to make way for the cargo, even the machineguns,” he said. “The pilots saw their task and understood it was dangerous to the point of impossible. But no one refused.”

Ginger’s flight of two helicopters was supported by another pair of helicopters, standing by for a rescue mission if anything went wrong. His was the last to make it to Azovstal and back before the Russians realised what was happening. They dropped four tonnes of supplies and came back with the wounded.

Even before the Russians started shooting, the flight was a nightmare, Vitaliy, 51, one of the pilots, said. “They gave us our orders and there was no panic at that moment,” he said. “I just thought, I have to work with this and survive. It was only when they said, now go and have a cup of tea and wait for the signal, I thought — please God, let this not be today but tomorrow.”

Vitaliy and his wingman, Vyacheslav, both from the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, left their base in Dnipro at 250km per hour and 3m from the ground. At one point they buzzed through a Russian tent camp. Ginger remembers watching with amazement as they careered past Russian soldiers brushing their teeth in the morning light. “There were Russians everywhere along the route,” he said. “They were just swarming.”

Electricity pylons on the approach to Mariupol forced Vitaliy to drag his aircraft up and down as he sped towards them. In the back of Vyacheslav’s aircraft, Ginger was sick. Vitaliy said: “I kept asking, where is the sea? Where is the sea? What is the distance to the sea?”

He counted down every minute of the 40 they were within range of Russian anti-aircraft missiles. Once they reached the sea, they were confronted by two Russian warships. Somehow, neither opened fire as the aircraft skimmed the waves in front of them. Then Mariupol came into sight.

At this point Vitaliy, a hulking great man with a Cossack top knot, beard and handlebar moustache, started to weep. “We saw this apocalyptic landscape of Mariupol, completely and utterly destroyed and on fire,” he said. “And there was Azovstal, almost obliterated.”

They established contact with the Azov commander, Denys Prokopenko, and landed, unloading the equipment and collecting the wounded within seven minutes. “It was very, very fast,” Vitaliy recalled. “At one point I saw the Azov guys sprinting so hard with the cargo I had to signal to their commander — calm down, we will stay here as long as you need.”

Vitaliy and Vyacheslav flew back to their rendezvous point, embracing when they were out of their aircraft. Vitaliy was overjoyed they had survived. But it was the last time he would fly with Vyacheslav.

The Azovstal defenders were still fighting hard, pinning down the Russians, who could not leave to support other advances toward Odesa, Zaporizhzhya or in the Donbas. The defenders had severely wounded casualties.

So the GUR sent in more ammunition and medical equipment. Between March 21 and May 11 last year a total of 15 helicopters and 45 aircrew made nearly 30 rescue missions to Azovstal, delivering Starlink communications devices, ammunition and medicine, as well as evacuating the wounded. Six flights were successful. More than 20 were not.

“The next flights looked like impudence on our part,” Ginger said. “They were waiting for us. Every helicopter was fired upon, many of them taking damage.”

Two helicopters returned on March 29 pockmarked with bullet holes. On March 31, four Mi-8s went out with a Hind Mi-24 attack helicopter for cover, engaging Russian forces around Azovstal to distract fire from the transports. They were hit with MANPAD rockets. “One was shot down and the other returned with only one engine,” he said. “But he brought 22 wounded back.”

By April 5 the Russians had closed the noose around Azovstal. But the Ukrainians kept flying the missions despite their losses, and despite having to land so close to the Russians. “We made the decision that each pilot would only fly once,” Colonel Hryhorii said. “We understood that after one flight he would have experience, know the route, know the approaches. But we also knew that a big part of it was luck.”

Ginger woke that morning with a knot in his stomach and a feeling their luck was running out. He boarded one of the standby Mi-8s on hand should anything go wrong. At the controls of the other sat Vyacheslav. As the two main helicopters headed towards them from Azovstal with the wounded, they lost contact with one. It was only 7km away.

Vyacheslav went to look for survivors, taking Ginger’s commander. They were touching down at the crash site when a rocket-propelled grenade soared out of the treeline, smashing into the helicopter. Vyacheslav was killed but the special forces commander and some of the crew managed to escape. He was later captured and placed in a Russian infantry fighting vehicle.

Ginger said 23 people died in the initial crash. “We were told by locals that our other guys survived but they are in hiding somewhere,” he added.

That was the last successful flight.

“Until May 11, we made more than 20 attempts, some of them getting 40km deep behind the front line. But they were already waiting for us there,” Ginger said. “They strengthened the line and saturated it with troops, they illuminated us with searchlights and rockets. Fighter jets were patrolling over us.

“Our pilots would fly, see the launch of two missiles, turn away, try to enter again after 5km, but again missile launches and the pilot understands there is no chance to get there.”

Once the Ukrainians realised they could not get through, they stopped the flights, resulting in the order to surrender Azovstal on May 20. From the 15 aircraft that took part, three were shot down.

The pilots Yuriy, 34, Borys, 38, and Vyacheslav, 52, never made it home. Like his wingman Vitaliy, Vyacheslav had retired from the military and spent a decade as a civilian helicopter pilot before volunteering to rejoin the armed forces after Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine last year.

“I am very grateful to everyone who took part and proud, proud of every special forces soldier who participated in the operational escort of these aircraft,” said Pavel, who co-ordinated the operation conceived by General Kyrylo Budanov. “It seemed impossible but we showed we do not leave anyone behind, we will fight to the last for every Ukrainian.”

“These are truly heroic people. Their example showed the whole country how real men should act. And believe me, we will avenge everyone, we will fight and we will definitely free our land from the invaders.”

P

[GAZ NZ]

Hi everyone 

What's the Russian vehicle at 2.22 on the video

An armoured car with cannon? 

Seemed a bit different 

Trying to identify all the improvised armour lol

Cheers 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, chrisl said:

At what rate and at what cost?

Suppose Russia actually takes Bakhmut and Avdiivka.  How long is Donetsk airport actually out of shell range?  Will the west suddenly supply ordnance that can still reach it?  And with the diffusion of Russian forces out of other areas to take Bakhmut, how well can Russia defend against an attack somewhere else into its lines?  Multiple attacks at relatively large distances from each other that force commitment of reserves to back one or the other?

Unless China comes in with strong military support for Russia, Russian forces are on a downward trajectory. They not only don't have the manufacturing base, they don't have the technology base required to make the manufacturing equipment to develop the manufacturing base.  And they don't have the economy or skilled workforce to support a ramp up of anything beyond late Soviet era equipment, if even that.  Much of their skilled and educated workforce can sell their skills for a more comfortable lifestyle outside of Russia and have been doing so for years, with a recent acceleration.

I don't think it's in China's interest to provide much more than small arms and strong words of encouragement. Russia is a nice gas station, and they might even sell decent snack chips and lottery tickets, but it's a lousy market for Chinese goods compared to Ukraine's backers.  edit: China also has almost a billion and a half mouths to feed, with about 35% of its food being imported.  Russia is far down on the list of suppliers of grain to China.  The only major supplier of food to China that isn't backing Ukraine is Brazil.

Ukraine has to pick a spot and sever the land bridge to Crimea, and then take out the Kerch bridge again.  I suspect they've already got their eye on a few approaches to cutting the land bridge and the shaping operations are already ramping up.  

I don't disagree with any of that, except for Western will to sanction China and thereby put their own shaky economies into a tailspin. Even if the world's workshop is obviously (but deniably) shipping kit to Russia by the trainload, for reasons of either policy or profit.

...Unless China itself does something overtly aggressive in its own 'sphere' (which is Taiwan/South China Sea).

But I guess we'll have to see, won't we?

P.S. Where I live in Southeast Asia (I travel a LOT), all the shops are FILLED with all kinds processed/packaged foods Made In China.  Just like at Walmart, you can play a game: find something NOT Made in China?  Not staples (rice or meats), but pretty much anything that comes in a package.  So please put away any notion you might possibly entertain about starving the Chicoms out.  Not a thing.

Edited March 18, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Yet]

when we hear 'mass is dead' or more specifically 'dumb mass of militairy physical assets' is dead, i assume it is only 'dead' because the enemy has 'a lot of anti-dumb-mass-of-militairy-assets weapons'. 

first question is: is a large scale offensive by UA really 'dumb-mass'? 

(with large scale offensive i mean in this sense - like attacking per company on a defensive position, and not just 8 guys and a AFV)

second question is: does RU have the weapons (ISR, precision, weapons, ammunition, trained operators) to defeat a UA dumb- or not-so-dumb mass.

 

Edited March 18, 2023 by Yet
clarification

[Haiduk]

12 hours ago, DesertFox said:

Nope. Jaeger is the ordinary infantry man. A non mechanised, foot slogger. The poor bastards, who have to fight without IFVs like Marders, Pumas etc. If lucky they have a GTK Boxer available.

Jäger erhalten „Kampfboxer“ (esut.de)

@chuckdyke

In Ukarine Jager units appeared in 2020-21. Initially it was one brigade which was appointed to fighting in forest/marsh terrains. It wasn't "foot soldiers", they had MTLBs and D-30 howitzers. Now we have several yager brigades with complete zoo in equipmnet. One brigade is under Air-Assault Command, other in Ground Forces. They some sort of motorized (not mechanized) infantry brigades in Ground Forces, but more specialized for hard/obstacle terrain 

[Haiduk]

6 hours ago, _Morpheus_ said:

Another good video from 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (Azov). 
At the beginning they are talking about communication/leadership problems:

- Brigade HQ show the maps with the situation/positions on the map as X for the new arrived Company
- HQ show the maps with the situation/positions on the map as Y, that is different form X
- Company that on positions explain the real situation as Z that is different from X and Y.

Also a lot of details about russian tactics during assaults.

PS: sorry, no english subtitles 

 

Yes, very sad video w/o Eng subs. It's alot of information about Wagners tactic in close fighting from "first hands"

 - Wagners are attacking continously, not with "human waves", but sending sqaud+ / platoon+ assault groups one by one with intervals in 40-50 minutes after failed attempt. Such assaults can last from several hours to several days without a break and almost all this time is a contact rifle/grenade fighting from 100 to 15..20 meters. This heavily exhausting for defenders psyhology (and this says the guy of extreme motivated unit, so what you can expect from usual UKR soldier of usual rifle battalion with his symbolic training?) Also these protracted assaults eat ammunition very fast, which create additional load on logistic and caused often jams of weapon, because soldiers, repelling endless attacks, often hadn't a time to maintain it properly. 

- Wagners usually try to attack in joint areas between units. Coordination between neighbours on their flanks always was weak place, because units often havn't clear sectors of responsibilities on their edges and when enemy attack, each unit usually thinks that developments in neighbours sector.

- Wagners often attack in the night or at least tried to sneak very close to positions, using features of terrain around Bakhmut - dense tree-palnts and bushes, multiple ravins ets. 

- if positions of enemies too close each from other, Wagners rare support their troops with artillery, but instead they have unlimited access to heavy infantry weapon support lilke mortars, AGS, SPG, HMGs. Often our positions are showered with AGS/ 82 mm mortar fire and while next salvo incoming and  UKR troops taking cover, in theese moment, assaulters make their decisive burst to trenches and try to seize it. 

- one of methods of Wagners spotting if drones are busy or not available - they send in the night groups of spotters (usually 2 mens) with one NV/thermal. They can sneak too close to our positions - even on 20-30 m and adjust arty/ mortar/ AGS fire. If group is eleminated, next one comes immediately. 

- despite Wagner commanders used "smart mob" tactic, controlling plan of attacks own "live pixeltruppen" via tabs with special soft, but anyway their movements also are formulaic. Soldier told assault groups, which changed each other always met in one point and some time had talks. Even after they were hit several times in this area, thet didn't change own routes. Likely commander decided this is shortest way to support tempo of pressure, and exactly this matter, not lives of convicts. 

- convicts really act like zombie, because they havn't way back without order or because of wound. Among goods of killed Wagners soldiers found some unknown pills, which probably are some drugs or psychotrops, which suppress fear and even some feels. Our soldiers told - Wagners can lay three hours on the cold ground and then to rise and attack. PS - among Russian TG talks about this told almost in open, that Wagners drink special "coctails", whith similar effect.     

 

Edited March 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Almost full-battalion set

 

[masc]

Don't know if I've seen this posted here:

https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf

Really interesting write-up.  Definitely covers a lot of conclusions I've seen drawn here but also provides some new (to me) things:

"Early strikes on Ukrainian airfields, for example, destroyed many hangars. By photographing this damage and printing the resulting pattern on to sheets, it became possible to clear the rubble and erect covers for aircraft to return to the site, sheltering in positions that the Russians would confirm as destroyed. This led – somewhat amusingly – to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters at several sites."

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So you are wayyyyy premature in saying 'losing', unless you insist on defining it as 'achieve the original goals of Putin's SMO', or some other goal that the Kremlin does not now care much about.

Ok, it is Saturday.  End of a busy week and I just don’t have have the energy to beat on poor or Lefty Longshanks again.  If this is your assessment well then so be it.

I for one do not share it and would argue it has very large blind spots.  I am going to pull on that one up there.  So how is Russia “winning”?  Right now?    What political and/military strategic goals are they achieving or look like they can achieve?  The original goals of the SMO, both stated and unstated are long gone.  So what does winning look like for Russia right now?  Find me a scenario where Russia comes out ahead.  And before you point to the current lines on the ground, I will even cede hypothetically Russia does not move one more step back.  Sitting where we are on the ground today, conflict frozen, tell us exactly how this is a “win” for Russia…over to you.

[Haiduk]

Reality of war...

In some village in close rear from Bakhmut serviceman-driver has seen a boy with toy replica of AK and asks him "Hi! Are you going to the war?" And the boy answers him like an adult: "I'm already at the war"

 

Edited March 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[danfrodo]

16 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Almost full-battalion set

 

I wonder what those are up to?  And what they would be paired with in an attack?

There's been a lot of back & forth here about UKR capabilities, losses, etc, and I've been trying to step back from each and every report.  Guy does a driveby of front lines and says losses 10:1.  Another guy does same thing in different location and says 1:1.  Small UKR force, like platoon, gets hit on southern front, and we wonder whether UKR can actually do offensive operation -- seems like a small sample size from which to conclude much.  Maybe UKR can't do offensive, but really we have no idea.  Maybe UKR loss ratio is not good, we don't know. 

But if we think about the whole front the preponderance of evidence says loss ratios are greatly in UKR favor -- we know RU has been throwing men & machines into the grinder in attack, which leads to higher losses unless defenders are overrun, for which we have very little evidence.  Also RU attacks are lessening in number and strength across the front, and they can't seem to close the last few kilometers to cut off off Bakhmut.  If the losses were 1:1 wouldn't we expect RU to be more successful considering they have massed so much at Bakmut?

As far as offensives go, UKR hasn't even really tried as far as we can tell unless they actually have and we couldn't tell because they have no strength.  I think TheCapt is right, that there will be a lot of corrosion before UKR makes any big move, and why would they do this while RU can focus defenses on just the roads due to mud?

Another point that came up was overall strength b/w the sides.  But it's not the overall that matters so much. If UKR can defend w economy of force across the front while achieving significant local superiority, that's what matters.  Meanwhile, RU has a much greater fear UKR breakthrough because it's much more vulnerable -- only ~70-100km from sourthern front to the coast, and don't need to even go that far to cut off everything west of a deep salient on that front.  There were times on the WW2 russian front where there was relative parity in numbers while RU was able to build significant local superiority.  Part of this was because they weren't concerned w German attacks across most of the front -- infantry dominant areas weren't going to do anything offensively that would really matter, so RU could hold w minimum force.  

So sadly I can say I don't really know much right now.  I have my wishful thinking/bias, which is at least based on some evidence, but certainly I could be wrong and UKR is weaker than I think.

 

[kevinkin]

Another look from a mile high. And its cloudy with some turbulence:

https://americanmind.org/salvo/the-new-great-game/

---

The Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely seen as a sign of a reinvigorated alliance of democracies against authoritarianism. Even historically anti-war publications like the Guardian speak volubly about the West’s heroic “defense of liberty.” Raising concerns about petty issues like a potential nuclear war over Ukraine leads one now to be dismissed as a Putinist stooge, both by those who habitually back wars, like neoconservatives and defense contractors, and those who almost always oppose them, or used to, anyway.

India, for example, has capitalized on the low cost of fuel brought forth by the sanctions imposed on Russia by buying up to 33 times more Russian oil in 2022 than in the years prior to the war, and despite canceling a summit with Vladimir Putin over his disagreement with the war, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has not yet officially condemned the invasion of Ukraine.

The lack of solidarity can be seen as fecklessness or rank opportunism. But it also reflects the alienation of the developing world from the Western neoliberal world. In large part, this is driven by basic needs. Countries with growing populations face more immediate challenges than whether or not Greta Thunberg approves of them. Youth unemployment, a key marker of underdevelopment, according to the World Bank is 27% in Iran, 31.9% in India, 64.2% in South Africa, 31.9% in Brazil, and 16% in Indonesia.

 the West, despite occasional bravado, is rapidly deindustrializing, nowhere more obviously than in the birthplace of industry, Great Britain, while working to stifle both energy and food production across the West. America’s working class is in decline, and life expectancy has gone down for the first time in peace time as upward mobility has stalled, which presents a less than inspiring model. The fact that the shift to renewables is “normalizing” blackouts across the West so that even energy rich places like Alberta now experience power outages can’t be too impressive to developing nations.

The much ballyhooed “green” apocalyptic drive to wipe out fossil fuels plays into China’s existing strengths while weakening Western economies. China dominates both the emerging solar and battery markets, and, through alliances with African countries and Asian nations like Indonesia, maintains a strong grip on the world’s supplies of rare-earth elements, critical for wind turbines, solar panels, and electric vehicles.

The West’s response to Ukraine has been justified but also solipsistic. Politicians in Washington, Brussels, Berlin, and London may feel better about themselves even as they thoughtlessly drive an ever deeper wedge from the parts of the world that represent the demographic future of humanity. In the next 50 years, according to the United Nations, the world will see less growth, at 2.7 billion, compared to the previous half century’s 4.1 billion. But all of that growth will be in the less developed world, generally in areas with low literacy, high fertility, and sadly no electricity. Between 2022 and 2050, United Nations projections indicate most of the world population growth will occur in sub-Saharan Africa, where fertility rates are still relatively high even as populations plummet elsewhere.

Instead of the inevitable global progress toward liberal democracy and market capitalism, the surviving democracies now struggle to find allies against autocratic regimes in China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These autocratic countries often see themselves as the proud inheritors of past imperial regimes, whether Tsarist, Ottoman, Chinese, Arab, or Persian. China today is no more likely to become a constitutional democracy than it was under the Mongols or their fourteenth century Ming successors. It has evolved into a highly nationalistic autocracy, fortified by a system of semi-permanent caste privilege and technology-enhanced social control.

Until Western democracies develop practical ways to build sustainable economies unhampered by draconian approaches to the often exaggerated climate apocalypse, the Russo-Ukraine War could end up accelerating the appeal of autocracy in much of the world. Nations do not live solely on ideals, press conferences, and non-profit moralizing. They must first feed their people and provide them with at least a whisper of hope. Until the West wakes up from its self-referential slumbers, the tide of history may be turn out less friendly to Ukraine’s loyal friends than to those who either abet aggression or maintain a steady indifference.

---

In a nutshell, the writers are forwarding: The west was suffering from self imposed internal bleeding before the war, and now the bleeding is happening externally on the battlefields of Ukraine. The developing world is watching, which is why Ukraine's victory has to be assured quickly. None of this "we will fight on for years". Distracted by war and other nonsense, the West risks growing areas of the world falling into China's orbit completely.  Sure the south to north migration will slow if China's infrastructure initiatives make places livable. But there goes the liberal democracy's appeal and with that its standard of living. 

Edited March 18, 2023 by kevinkin

[poesel]

19 hours ago, Butschi said:

defence secretary always was a position that supposedly was a career step on your way to becoming chancellor ("supposedly" because I can't remember the last time one actually became chancellor...).

Helmut Schmidt was defense minister from '69-'72 and then chancellor from '74-'82 - AFAIK the only one. Strauss tried...

[chrisl]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I don't disagree with any of that, except for Western will to sanction China and thereby put their own shaky economies into a tailspin. Even if the world's workshop is obviously (but deniably) shipping kit to Russia by the trainload, for reasons of either policy or profit.

...Unless China itself does something overtly aggressive in its own 'sphere' (which is Taiwan/South China Sea).

But I guess we'll have to see, won't we?

P.S. Where I live in Southeast Asia (I travel a LOT), all the shops are FILLED with all kinds processed/packaged foods Made In China.  Just like at Walmart, you can play a game: find something NOT Made in China?  Not staples (rice or meats), but pretty much anything that comes in a package.  So please put away any notion you might possibly entertain about starving the Chicoms out.  Not a thing.

It's essentially economic MAD.  Neither China nor the west can afford to tank their economies.

But don't be so sure about Chinese food independence:

https://www.cfr.org/article/china-increasingly-relies-imported-food-thats-problem 

https://chinapower.csis.org/china-food-security/

The imports/exports are given in dollars, but based on your observations the exports are probably more high-markup processed foods, while the imports are staples, so the caloric ratio is probably higher than the economic ratio. The country could probably weather a major reduction in imports, but it would mean a major (and possibly healthier) lifestyle change for the middle class, with corresponding risk to the political leadership.

[The_Capt]

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've said it before and I'll say it again... lots of people are drawing conclusions from this war that can not be made with certainty.  They fail to keep in mind the knowns of wars past and are still trying to understand the war we are in now.

To me it seems few are remembering the lessons from both Iraq Wars.  Masses of weaponry were not needed by the Western forces because the war was over and done with because the qualitative difference decided the war, not quantitative.  The mistake many experts made going into this war is they thought Russia had both quantity and quality.  In fact, it was just about as capable as Saddam's military.  A little better, but a short person can't dunk a basketball much better than a dwarf even though he is a little taller.

What do people think would happen right now if NATO went "all in" and used its conventional forces against Russia?  Does anybody seriously think the Russian airforce would survive more than a couple of days, at most?  Does anybody think Russia's air defenses would hold up in any meaningful way?  How about Russia's naval forces?  Does anybody think a B2 Bomber wouldn't wipe out various strategic supply points on the first day?  How fast does anybody think Russia could adapt to ATACMS raining down on logistics and control points 100km+ in the rear?  What sort of artillery would Russia have left after the first week?  Would Russia's soldiers really want to sit there and have Western IFVs and MBTs slugging away at thier forward positions without much of anything to hit back?  And what of Russia's mobile assets trying to conduct supply or combat roles being exposed to NATO air attacks and artillery in one day worse than months of fighting with Ukraine?

The list goes on and on and on.  Russia would get slaughtered and fold up its tent in a very short period of time with plenty of munitions and platforms to spare. 

If NATO went into this from the beginning, it would be more costly for NATO but it would end up the same... Russia knocked out of the war before NATO's capacity was worn out.

Those who think it is different than what I just described are likely the same ones that didn't understand before this war started that Russia was going to lose and why.

Now, what we HAVE learned from this war is that if the West is going to let a proxy fight a war of attrition on its behalf, without direct intervention, and not run down its own stocks of weaponry and platforms to unacceptable levels, well then the West had better adjust its procurement strategy.  Because this is too close for comfort IMHO.

Steve

Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, massed precision beats everything.  

When it comes to the NATO/western way of warfare question, in this war if NATO showed up and fought Russia, totally agree.  Would have been bloodier, likely much bloodier than the Gulf War but outcome would have been pretty much as you describe.  This is because NATO has both quantitative and qualitative overmatch on the Russian military.

The UA only has qualitative overmatch, so its road to success is much longer.  What is blowing minds is just how impactful qualitative overmatch is on the modern battlefield.  By all conventional metrics this thing should have ended in favour of Russia in the first month.

For the west the concern is not fighting an opponent who fights like Russia, it is fighting one who fights like Ukraine.  So we need to do a military intervention op in country X.  But they are supported by China, so a lot of the same stuff we gave Ukraine - NLAWs are pointed at us.  They have ISR we cannot blind.  They have unmanned all over the place. That is the scenario that worries me.

Right from the start is changes things.  We could not send in the same force size we would have a decade ago.  We would need much higher levels of overmatch, which takes time to build and project, which in turn gives more time for China to put in deeper support.  We go in and the opponent fights like fog - hybrid distributed on a civilian backbone IT network.  We target that network, and then get told by the lawyers we can’t because it is what they use for their entire civilian commercial and medical systems.  So now we have to do precision cyber and EW to try and only hit the military support sub-networks (which keep re-wiring themselves because everything is a freaking hotspot because the entire nation is on Chinese built 5G) and then China gives them a sat backbone we cannot touch because it basically means war in space, which the lawyers also remind us is out of bounds.

So while all that is going on, our F echelon is getting mauled by distributed light infantry, SOF and uncons armed with the Chinese knock off Javelins (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HJ-12), along with IEDs and mines because classic rock never dies.  They have UAS all over the place, dropping shaped charges and playing merry hell in our rear areas - we basically lose air superiority below 2000 feet.  Our LOCs are hot, long and visible, so now we have to roll a lot of combat power just keeping other combat power fueled…and we need a lot of fuel (see larger force requirement to start with).  They keep hitting us in the a$$ while ghosting us in the front.  They are a lot harder to see because they are in small fast moving dispersed teams while we are in big fat western formations.

We now need to worry about every tree line for 4kms out, so that is going to slow us down.  Hard to “shock and dislocate” when you are moving at a crawl while trying to secure 4kms either side of your advance.  We have APS but not mounted on every vehicle.  We try EW to jam UAS but the damn things are fully autonomous with no direct link to a human operator because no one in China wailed about “killbots = landmines” for the last 10 freaking years.  So we have to go with direct kills on something the size of a seagull flying in the trees.  We are shooting all over the place, which of course lights us up in the process.  Ammo expenditures go through the roof putting more strain on our LOCs.

We still advance deep into this country, taking a lot of hits as we do.  We get to urban areas and the politicians say “nope” when we give them the cost estimates for fighting in that terrain, and then say “nope again” when we suggest using firepower.  Arguments within the coalition ensue as half the force plays the national caveat card because “there is an election next year”.  So we bog down some more.

We sit outside major urban areas, while watching out multi-million dollar aircraft getting downed by cheap Chinese next-gen AD, mounted on some UCAVs.  We get told to go attack their AD infrastructure, but find out it is basically in garages and barns all over the place…enter lawyers and a “proof of righteousness” targeting requirement for the ages.  

And then China flies in whatever knock off HIMARs system they have developed into a neighbouring “neutral” country.  These systems are given to our opponent but are directly linked into Chinese ISR.  They drive them just over their border and fire a missile with a 400km range that goes up 120,000 feet and comes down at Mach 5.  They then dip across the border to reload, we go to engage…but lawyers.  That missile is about 24 inches across and we simply cannot hit them easily…stuff starts blowing up way back on our LOCs, they hit airfields and sea SLOC nodes.  They of course employ good old terrorism as well.

So there we are in all of that and suddenly this guy shows up with a 40mm AGL on its back:

Not so freakin cute now.  This all blows up all over social media because soldiers are on Tik Tok telling it as it is, and our opponents are blasting gory evidence of our losses all over the place.  We have bad shoots and now dead children are on the news. China scolding us at the UN while inflicted trade pain and punishment.

So how long do we think the deep resilient western will is going to last in all this?  How quickly is this going to get turned off, or worse we do the math and are told to not even bother with the mission in the first place, the entry costs are too high.  Outcome, Chinese influence in Nation X solidifies, nation X regional power grows - while we sit around and blame each other.

That is the emerging 21st century military problem.

Edited March 18, 2023 by The_Capt

[Haiduk]

Probably initial episode of video, where UKR soldiers seizing Russian blindage. UKR group suddenly encountered on Wagners position in tree-plant. Three minutes of FPV skirmish. Also you can see how hard to move in tree-plant, littered by fallen branches. Even in intact tree-plants it's hard, because its often overgrown with dense bushes. 

PS. Yesterday I mistakingly identified unit "Dyke Pole" ("Wild Fields") like a battalion of 1st Sp.purpose brigade. Indeed this is a company with the same name, but belonging to 1st mech.battalion "Da Vinci Wolfs" of 67th mech.brigade, which was formed on the base of Volunteer Ukrainian Corps of Dmytro Yarosh

 

Edited March 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

 

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So how long do we think the deep resilient western will is going to last in all this?  How quickly is this going to get turned off, or worse we do the math and are told to not even bother with the mission in the first place, the entry costs are too high.  Outcome, Chinese influence in Nation X solidifies, nation X regional power grows - while we sit around and blame each other.

Absolute agreement with everything you said.  When you boil everything down there's the following scenarios for future opponents:

1. high mass, low quality
2. low mass, high quality
3. high mass, high quality
4. low mass, low quality

And of course variations in between (medium mass, medium quality, etc).

Russia started this war in the #1 slot and I'd argue is now edging towards #4 in many categories.  Ukraine started the war more-or-less #2 and is bumped up a bit but still basically still within that range.

China... well, we don't really know where it falls.  For sure it is high mass.  No question about it.  But what is its real world quality level?  Nobody knows because the Chinese do not have any direct combat experience to examine and they don't export their best stuff.  Russia, on the other hand, gave us ample evidence to sift through.  Granted many experts got it wrong, but the evidence at least was there to be reviewed.

There is also the question of how much China has built up in terms of depth of its mass.  Does it have 1000s of PGMs sitting ready to use, 10s of thousands, millions?  I for sure don't know and I'm not confident anybody in the West has a solid grip on that information.  And this is important because...

It is entirely plausible that China is as unprepared for large scale losses of equipment and munitions as the West is.  I've seen some reports that China never built up the sorts of conventional dumb munition stockpiles as the Soviet Union because it didn't see the need for it.  China is inherently slave to the same economic factors of building up reserves as any other country and it is probable they made similar risk:reward calculations the West did for the past 30 years.  Meaning, they plowed their money into quality instead of quantity.  If so, they may face the same replacement problems as would the West.

There is also the possibility that China's underlying structures are weaker than their component pieces.  This may make them closer to Russia's performance which was significantly worse than its theoretical capabilities because of systemic flaws in critical areas (logistics, intel analysis, political interference, corruption, etc.).

None of this is intended to give the West comfort and cover for not making major systemic changes to how it prepares for the next war.  We need to do better in a number of areas.  However, I am not convinced that the sky has fallen.

Steve

P.S.  I'm not even touching upon national will.  If the West were to get into a conventional war with China, it had better go "all in" with WW2 type support and enthusiasm or it will likely lose.  Losses will be high enough under even ideal conditions that any waffling on the cause of the war will likely prove fatal to it.

 

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

 

From what I remember this was posted quite a long time ago, but IIRC it was only screen captures from the video.  I remember this because it made my list of CM relevant notes   If this is brand new then it is eerily similar to the one I noted, including picking up the remains of the ERA block.

Steve