How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok and @Kinophile can jump in on this one too.  So we are muddying up some stuff here, so to clarify:

- The original point on MC vs DC was to point out the cultural constipation of conventional services and how they are nowhere near as innovative or open to disruptive thinking as is often sold.  Over the military generations, military doctrine becomes dogma and counter-thinking in an organization that literally exists to create uniformity in behaviour is not well accepted.  We in the west have built a democratic myth of "empowerment and gumption" but it really does not translate well into actual military reality.  We can debate this but I know what I have lived for the better part of 3.5 decades. 

- The UA is a hybrid mix of Soviet and Western schools, and for them I think this was a major advantage.  It was not because we peppered them with western doctrine and training, it was because they had both worlds to pull from.  If we had an all western force in this thing, with the same restraints/constraints and capabilities as the UA, my hypothesis is that we would have done worse because we would have tried to apply an all-western approach.  I can definitely see in Phase I where this would have gotten us into a lot of trouble.  The UA is already outside of boxes and pulling in so much from the civilian side so quickly also helped in breaking doctrinal group-think and creating whatever this has turned into.  As to which school MC or DC, that the UA employs I do not think we have a clear idea but it is also likely a hybrid - which was how the entire thing was actually designed to work.

- MC vs DC schools of thought.  Ok, this is a whole other thing.  Mission Command is a essentially (and I will just use my own descriptions, feel free to go look up others) is essentially empowered command.  It arms subordinates with context and intent, "why we are doing this and here is what we are looking for".  This, plus allowing them to exercise initiative to exploit opportunity - the alignment of circumstance, context and capability, theoretically provides a force with higher potential for tempo advantage.  The thinking goes that empowered tactical commanders can see opportunity well before formation level and as such if they exploit it without waiting to be told the entire force can OODA faster than an opponent.  This is a cornerstone of Manoeuvre Warfare which is really a strategy of Annihilation through Dislocation.  We seriously bought off on all this and drank the Kool Aid on it about 40 years ago, to the point it became so dogmatic that it left little room for counter thought.

DC is one of mission control being held at higher levels.  Subordinates are empowered to do a task (The terms are actually derived from the Germans largely because Depuy and Starry really were hot for German warfare - Auftragstaktik and Befehlstaktik, The first meaning "mission tactics" the second "detailed orders tactics").  They then wait for further direction before exploiting opportunity.  They can still execute initiative in execution of the task but not the overall mission. 

So was born the Great American Military Myth (and frankly almost every western nation jumped onboard).  We were a democratized military built on "good ol 'merican innovation and initiative."  Further this All-Yankee Doodle (sorry but we really got beat over the head on this one back in the day) approach is very economic as it yields quick nearly bloodless wars.  The Persian Gulf became the poster child for this type of warfare, but more than few put up their hands and asked if it wasn't a false-positive.  The Gulf War was highly attritional and mostly driven by air supremacy - the land battle of mission command and manoeuvre warfare was basically executed against an already beaten foe, and one crushed by far more Detailed Command approaches of the Air Force. (This brings up the other problem with the Kool Aid, it really does not work for either the Navy or Air Force - and does not work enough for SOF, kinda).  

The truth is far more complicated.  The largest problem with Mission Command is that while it is great in theory it runs into serious problems in full execution because of all those pesky enablers.  Tactical commanders can run all over the place all empowered but there is only so much ISR, artillery, engineers and logistics to go around.  So what really happens is far more control in practice.  The Main Effort gets a lot more empowerment but if you are on a side gig, well you might very well get held back because the boss simply does not have the stuff to support you if you go all manouvrey.  Detail Command it far to restrictive and you get into micromanagement, so in reality neither systems works in extremes.

The future.  Well the problem was seen coming way back during the RMA days.  "What happens when a higher level commander knows more than a tactical one?"  I suspect if the UA has created a sort of ad hoc JADC2 system then this has already happened.  If a higher formation commander knows more than the tactical level, then DC starts to make a lot more sense.  And then what does Manoeuvre Warfare turn into? Well a form of Corrosive Warfare is one option apparently.  There is a lot of sense to this, we already do it with unmanned systems, which are going to expand in use not contract.  Detail Command that controls the battlespace like a production line and not a jazz band is not totally out of the question.  

So at one end we have "lets go all DC because higher can see all".  While at the other end we have "remove higher command entirely."  This is hyper-Mission Command, or self-synchronization.  Here tactical units are loaded up and basically command themselves with their peers - this gets a lot of traction in SOF circles. They then share enablers in a hand-off system where "higher" is really coordination and not command and control.  Here we get into military effects clouds and inverted command systems.  This also makes some sense but many are shy as to human nature.  How are enablers going to be shared?  This is always a friction point, and higher commanders are the referees.  What happens if we get rid of them.  Some have suggested AI does the job as it can calculate requirements far faster than a human can, or a human AI pairing because human can do context.

So in the end there is no "answer".  We should continue to try both, and maybe have a C2 system that can swing wildly from one to the other based on good ol human art of war.  But service cultures and equities already get in the way.  This is way tanks got resisted, the machine gun and even unmanned systems.  We make idols of our history and sometimes it gets in the way of evolution.  Experimentation and paying attention to wars like these are absolutely critical as we can start to get some idea of where things are going and then plan to adapt at a better rate than an opponent.      

Lots of good stuff here.  Obviously I'm not in uniform and never gone to those fancy finishing schools you officers go to, but here's my take on some of the subtle nuances of the two schools of thought.

As with almost everything in life, extremes are prone to failure.  Sometimes switching to the opposite approach is the best course of action.  For example, a maneuver minded force finds itself in a situation where a subordinate unit has to hold a fixed position no matter what because that's what the larger plan calls for.  It could also involve the subordinate unit having its normal freedom to deploy weapons systems constrained, such as being told to use all ATGMs to cover a particular section of the unit's frontage.  I think most Western trained officers can handle this sort of reduction of their normal flexibility, especially if they are provided with enough understanding of the bigger picture to see the purpose behind the constraints.

On the other hand, a force that is normally attritional in nature is going to find it hard to switch gears to conduct an intricate maneuver because it's unlikely they have the training and experience necessary to do it.  Training a force to do as it is told, where it is told, and when it is told is fairly straight forward.  They are not going to be equipped to handle themselves effectively if any of what they are told to do proves too difficult or impossible.  They are also less likely to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

The same applies for MC vs. DC.  A force that is trained for MC is more likely to be able to accept and properly execute DC constraints than a DC force suddenly finding itself in a MC environment.  Why?  Because it is far easier to convey to a complex mindset the need for simplicity than to get a simple mindset to expand to incorporate complex thinking.

All things being equal, I am sure the MC mindset based on a Maneuver Warfare philosophy is going to overall out perform a DC mentality rooted in Attritional Warfare. 

Good point about this being mostly a land force dilemma.  Navies are by their nature DC because anything other than that just doesn't work.  Having airforces conducting random missions where pilots are totally free to do what they want is really not a good idea any more (if it ever was, in fact).

Interesting topic for sure.

As it applies to Ukraine, it seems the mix of traditional DC/AW is allowing it to stand up to Russian attacks in ways that maybe a NATO force would not.  However, within that structure there is no doubt a lot of MC going on that makes the UA more effective at this than a traditional Soviet DC force. 

Steve

[Sojourner]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK, great, no reason at all to worry then. What else do you have to contribute, beyond a drive by one-liner?

Sorry, didn't think that needed further explanation, danfrodo got it though. "Fallacious" may have been too strong, "faulty" might have been a better choice. No snark intended.

I suppose though that over time, and as quantities start racking up, the cost trade-off weapon for weapon may become a factor. But I don't think it should be a primary consideration. But yeah, it should reinforce the need to develop cheaper defenses.

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Lots of good stuff here.  Obviously I'm not in uniform and never gone to those fancy finishing schools you officers go to, but here's my take on some of the subtle nuances of the two schools of thought.

As with almost everything in life, extremes are prone to failure.  Sometimes switching to the opposite approach is the best course of action.  For example, a maneuver minded force finds itself in a situation where a subordinate unit has to hold a fixed position no matter what because that's what the larger plan calls for.  It could also involve the subordinate unit having its normal freedom to deploy weapons systems constrained, such as being told to use all ATGMs to cover a particular section of the unit's frontage.  I think most Western trained officers can handle this sort of reduction of their normal flexibility, especially if they are provided with enough understanding of the bigger picture to see the purpose behind the constraints.

On the other hand, a force that is normally attritional in nature is going to find it hard to switch gears to conduct an intricate maneuver because it's unlikely they have the training and experience necessary to do it.  Training a force to do as it is told, where it is told, and when it is told is fairly straight forward.  They are not going to be equipped to handle themselves effectively if any of what they are told to do proves too difficult or impossible.  They are also less likely to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

The same applies for MC vs. DC.  A force that is trained for MC is more likely to be able to accept and properly execute DC constraints than a DC force suddenly finding itself in a MC environment.  Why?  Because it is far easier to convey to a complex mindset the need for simplicity than to get a simple mindset to expand to incorporate complex thinking.

All things being equal, I am sure the MC mindset based on a Maneuver Warfare philosophy is going to overall out perform a DC mentality rooted in Attritional Warfare. 

Good point about this being mostly a land force dilemma.  Navies are by their nature DC because anything other than that just doesn't work.  Having airforces conducting random missions where pilots are totally free to do what they want is really not a good idea any more (if it ever was, in fact).

Interesting topic for sure.

As it applies to Ukraine, it seems the mix of traditional DC/AW is allowing it to stand up to Russian attacks in ways that maybe a NATO force would not.  However, within that structure there is no doubt a lot of MC going on that makes the UA more effective at this than a traditional Soviet DC force. 

Steve

How much of this discussion is because NATO simply hasn't thought seriously about defense against a serious adversary since 1989? The entire maneuver school simply assumes you have the force ratios and enablers to DO it. It is almost proceeding from the assumption you have a winning hand. Ukraine simply did not have that luxury in any way, shape, form, or fashion.

They did do an MC based corrosive defense in much of the north because Russia simply did not bring even a fraction of the infantry it needed to secure its GLOCs. So the order of the month was kill any supply truck you could catch. Since that ran the Russians out of the northern part of the country Ukraine has had a fairly DC based command system. I think it is inherent to a fairly static, attritional, and artillery based fight. I don't think we know the DC/MC balance of the Kharkiv offensive, and I don't think we will until the after war books get written.

Even operation "Defend the Baltics" ,whatever its code name is this year, seemed to assume the Russians would take a bunch of territory while we spooled up, and then we Desert Storm Part Two them back to Russia, at least until very recently that seems to have been the plan. Ukraine has proven that we probably could just stop them cold, and also that you can't let Russia seize cities for even a few weeks because industrial scale war crimes is about their only strong suite.

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, Sojourner said:

Sorry, didn't think that needed further explanation, danfrodo got it though. "Fallacious" may have been too strong, "faulty" might have been a better choice. No snark intended.

I suppose though that over time, and as quantities start racking up, the cost trade-off weapon for weapon may become a factor. But I don't think it should be a primary consideration. But yeah, it should reinforce the need to develop cheaper defenses.

This is where we get into the politics of the Military Industrial Complex.  Industry is inclined to provide solutions to the military that they can profit from by leveraging their existing investments to make something their competitors are unable to.  Buying out competitors is quite helpful

How much the military wants a particular solution is important.  If a small company came to the military with a flashlight sized device that could drop a drone out of the sky at 1000m, I don't see any non-Hollywood movie reality where the military doesn't acquire such a thing because a) it is badly needed and b) it allows the military to spend money on other things they want.  But it will likely take a small company to come up with an innovation like this because the big companies have little incentive to be that innovative.

However, it can be that there is no cheap solution to a problem.  It could be that the only way to defeat a particular threat is to spend a lot of money on systems which are individually expensive but compared to the outcome a bargain.  It could also be that this is true for now and now is important so now is the time to invest in such expensive capabilities, not hold off and hope for something cheaper to come out later on.

The BIGGER problem we have is industry selling the military on a system that costs a lot of money and really isn't what the military should be buying.  For example, I think purchasing more MBTs and heavy IFVs right now makes sense, but until UGVs are completely explored there shouldn't be much investment in new designs.  Why?  Because right now UGVs aren't ready, but they will be soon and I have a hunch that will affect the entire battlespace.  Even if UGVs don't wind up replacing heavy armor, I am absolutely and 100% convinced their presence will have an impact which current heavy armor is unlikely to be compatible with.  Or at least not optimal.  Better to figure out what that impact may be before doing anything new.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

An example of money well spent:

Looks to be the work of 155mm PGMs.  The per round cost is very high, but the value of being assured a hit on an enemy artillery piece is well worth it.  Four hits on four pieces even better

Steve

[Ithikial_AU]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The BIGGER problem we have is industry selling the military on a system that costs a lot of money and really isn't what the military should be buying.  My current thinking is that for now more MBTs and heavy IFVs should be purchased, but I don't think until UGVs are completely explored there shouldn't be any new heavy armor investments.  Why?  Because right now UGVs aren't ready, but they will be soon.

So... procurement drives the doctrine? Seems a bit back to front.

I wonder how much of this could be down to a lack of experience in fighting a large scale ground war against an opponent that isn't a third world country? The scale would be so different to the last 20 years or so for western nations. There was an interesting statement in an article here earlier in the week about a possible China vs the West. Amongst other things it asked the question if we as a society are ready for mass casualty events as a war with China would likely lead be just that. Are we ready to see 200 sailors killed as a ship goes down in an naval fight off the shores of Taiwan? An Aircraft Carrier? What about ongoing ground battles where dozens or hundred of casualties are occurring daily?

[Battlefront.com]

This is the sort of thing that needs to happen more often.  Whatever international organizations which still have Russia participating need to make it clear things have to change.  Like this fine representative of Latvia did at an OSCE meeting yesterday:

https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-64752483

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Ithikial_AU said:

So... procurement drives the doctrine? Seems a bit back to front.

Sometimes it has to.  Military says to industry "we need to shoot thousands of drones out of the sky. What do you have to offer?".  Whatever the industry has to offer is what the military gets.  Doctrine is then based around whatever that something is.

Doctrine playing catch up for procurement happens for other reasons.  A company approaches the military and says "we have a gun that can shoot around corners.  I know you didn't ask us to make one, but hey... we had an idea and ran with it.  Do you want it?".  The answer would depend on if the military saw value in it.  If it does, then adopting such a weapon would require changes to doctrine because the weapon requires it.

Very often it's a combination of the two.  Military asks for something, industry proposes a solution, military evaluates and provides feedback, industry modifies/customizes, military evaluates and provides feedback, industry modifies/customizes, etc. until a product emerges that the military decides to purchase.  If doctrine needs to be adjusted, it is adjusted.

Of course the above is optimal.  If there is one thing that the military procurement process is, it certainly isn't optimal   I'm currently looking eastward out my window towards a distant country that is currently grappling with a suboptimal procurement strategy on a large scale.

17 minutes ago, Ithikial_AU said:

I wonder how much of this could be down to a lack of experience in fighting a large scale ground war against an opponent that isn't a third world country? The scale would be so different to the last 20 years or so for western nations. There was an interesting statement in an article here earlier in the week about a possible China vs the West. Amongst other things it asked the question if we as a society are ready for mass casualty events as a war with China would likely lead be just that. Are we ready to see 200 sailors killed as a ship goes down in an naval fight off the shores of Taiwan? An Aircraft Carrier? What about ongoing ground battles where dozens or hundred of casualties are occurring daily?

I think the quick answer is no, no Western nation is ready for this.  What impact it has on the overall conflict at the time, though, is unknown.  The British were not prepared to have Exocet missiles hit their ships, that is for damned sure.  It was, in fact, the first Royal Navy ship lost to hostile action since WW2.  However, the British did not crumble and Argentina decisively lost the war.

The bigger question is not if the West is prepared for such losses, instead how many losses of this sort will it take to destroy either the will or ability to continue prosecuting a war?

Steve

[dan/california]

43 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

An example of money well spent:

Looks to be the work of 155mm PGMs.  The per round cost is very high, but the value of being assured a hit on an enemy artillery piece is well worth it.  Four hits on four pieces even better

Steve

The Ukrainians have either gotten a bunch more Excalibur, or something that is better at spotting guns and passing thru coordinates very quickly. Because they have been killing more guns recently. It is also interesting that the trucks to pull these guns are not in the frame. I am very curious if the trucks are somewhere close by? Or are the Russians so short on trucks that each gun doesn't get its own truck anymore? Because that would indicate they are in the process of having a problem.

[Ithikial_AU]

41 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Of course the above is optimal.  If there is one thing that the military procurement process is, it certainly isn't optimal   I'm currently looking eastward out my window towards a distant country that is currently grappling with a suboptimal procurement strategy on a large scale.

No idea what you could possibly be referring to here.   

Yeah this actually happened a few years ago <facepalm>...

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, Ithikial_AU said:

No idea what you could possibly be referring to here.   

Yeah this actually happened a few years ago <facepalm>...

sorry lost my train of thought there,  ummm so which one is the wrong way again?

Edited February 24, 2023 by sburke

[Sojourner]

51 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

But it will likely take a small company to come up with an innovation like this because the big companies have little incentive to be that innovative.

Right, a good case in point is the apparent cottage industry that has sprung up in Ukraine weaponizing COTS drones. I've seen them come up with some interesting and amazing grenade dispensers. Gotta wonder if/when General Atomics or Northrup Grumman starts mass producing such things.

But sometimes industry spends considerable effort trying to sell the military things they DO need, or at least they used to. Many years ago I wrote a white paper to convince the Air Force that solid state RAM was a better choice than wire core memory for the F-16 fire control computer. Generally though, the military is pretty specific in what they ask from industry, and there is some back and forth in the design process. Procurement doctrine was variable as well, for a while cost-plus-incentive contracts were standard, then they switched to firm-fixed-price, and back again, and so on. The doctrine of the day had a significant impact on the design and development process in response to an RFP.

[Aragorn2002]

9 hours ago, DesertFox said:

Tomorrow we will know more, but appears to be some Stridsvagn 122 (Leo 2A5 variant) might find their way into Ukraine.

Uppgifter: Sverige skickar stridsvagnar till Ukraina - DN.SE

Let's hope they will be there sooner that the Abrams. Not enough for USA bashing day perhaps, but very disappointing if true;

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2023/02/23/tanks-might-not-reach-ukraine-this-year-us-army-secretary-says/

 

[chrisl]

41 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The Ukrainians have either gotten a bunch more Excalibur, or something that is better at spotting guns and passing thru coordinates very quickly. Because they have been killing more guns recently. It is also interesting that the trucks to pull these guns are not in the frame. I am very curious if the trucks are somewhere close by? Or are the Russians so short on trucks that each gun doesn't get its own truck anymore? Because that would indicate they are in the process of having a problem.

If they don't have enough trucks for the guns then:

a) how are they keeping them supplied with shells?  Just piling them up next to the guns?  That's going to end rather dramatically.

b) how are they avoiding CB?  Even if Ukraine doesn't always have CB sensing capability, they're going to figure out locations pretty quickly.  See (a) for the ending.

[Der Zeitgeist]

The Russian embassy in Berlin now has a Russian T-72B in front of it, destroyed during the Battle of Kyiv. It will stay there till monday.

 

[dan/california]

Just now, chrisl said:

If they don't have enough trucks for the guns then:

a) how are they keeping them supplied with shells?  Just piling them up next to the guns?  That's going to end rather dramatically.

b) how are they avoiding CB?  Even if Ukraine doesn't always have CB sensing capability, they're going to figure out locations pretty quickly.  See (a) for the ending.

Ideally you would have one set of trucks to move the guns, and their ready ammunition load out around often enough to stay alive, and another set of trucks moving ammunition. If the trucks that should be moving guns are the only ones available to get ammunition, that is one way to get lots of videos like the one we are discussing. We haven't taken a hard look at the state of the Russian truck fleet for a while, it might be time to get back to that. In terms of moving 152mm guns around there might not be nearly as many civilian vehicle that can do that well as there are fill ins for other jobs. To move guns you probably need 4WD, high towing capacity and so on. That might be why there is a picture of a BTR-50 floating around. they are simply running out of things to do those kinds of jobs with.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

In the central Luhansk sector, it seems like the Russians are again able to use the north-south  Troitske-Svatove-Kreminna highway.

They've largely pushed the UA back to the Zherebets river line.

'UkraineVolunteer' hasn't checked in since early Feb, and his SOF group was (for those who believe in him) active in the woodlands SW of Kreminna.

Edited February 24, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

In the central Luhansk sector, it seems like the Russians are again able to use the north-south  Troitske-Svatove-Kreminna highway.

They've largely pushed the UA back to the Zherebets river line.

 

The question, always, is at what cost. Micheal Koffman, amog others makes a pretty good case that the men and ammo the Russians burned to take Siverodonetsk is the reason they lost Kharkiv, and Kherson. They just over payed beyond all reason. I have strong hunch they are doing the same thing now.

[dan/california]

One heck of a bill...

[LongLeftFlank]

22 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The question, always, is at what cost. Micheal Koffman, amog others makes a pretty good case that the men and ammo the Russians burned to take Siverodonetsk is the reason they lost Kharkiv, and Kherson. They just over payed beyond all reason. I have strong hunch they are doing the same thing now.

Not so sure about that. Opsec is tight, but  this seems like more of an even fight among infantry groups, with better Ukrainian artillery offset by RU air support (RUAF bases like Millerovo are closer to this front).

The Ivans (76th VDV) look like they've learned to fight more like the Ukes.

Due to the river lines, there's little threat of a strategic breakthrough here; worst case would be they push as far as Yampil-Liman (a vulnerable salient for them though, with one road to supply it). So UA is likely economising its force commitments here.

Topo map, though dated last week. 

"City of Light"

 

Edited February 24, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Not so sure about that. Opsec is tight, but  this seems like more of an even fight among infantry groups, with better Ukrainian artillery offset by RU air support (RUAF bases like Millerovo are closer to this front).

The Ivans (76th VDV) look like they've learned to fight more like the Ukes.

Due to the river lines, there's little threat of a strategic breakthrough here; worst case would be they push as far as Yampil-Liman (a vulnerable salient for them though, with one road to supply it). So UA is likely economising its force commitments here.

And yet Putin is burning through the 76th VDV, for gains that are not going to make a strategic difference in this war. As you just said the terrain makes a real breakout very unlikely. He will regret that by July, perhaps well before then. The massive push for Putin to have something to talk about on the one year anniversary has had huge  cost, and not produced anything even Russian propagandists could sell as a big deal.

The only thing units like the 76th VDV should be used for is training, and cadre for mobik formations. Putin is STILL looking for a one more push short cut to at least freeze the conflict. I don't think this is it.

[LongLeftFlank]

56 minutes ago, dan/california said:

And yet Putin is burning through the 76th VDV, for gains that are not going to make a strategic difference in this war. As you just said the terrain makes a real breakout very unlikely. He will regret that by July, perhaps well before then. The massive push for Putin to have something to talk about on the one year anniversary has had huge  cost, and not produced anything even Russian propagandists could sell as a big deal.

The only thing units like the 76th VDV should be used for is training, and cadre for mobik formations. Putin is STILL looking for a one more push short cut to at least freeze the conflict. I don't think this is it.

Yes, I agree with this, with the caveat that 76th is conducting live fire OJT for its mobiks.

Autocannon sieving buildings....

...Once Steve rotates Charles' brainjar back from content to features, I hope in the next CM 'bump up' we can see a lot more 'gunsmoke' and dust rising off weapon strikes, especially 12.7mm and above.

Edited February 24, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Yet]

4 hours ago, Sojourner said:

Sorry, didn't think that needed further explanation, danfrodo got it though. "Fallacious" may have been too strong, "faulty" might have been a better choice. No snark intended.

I suppose though that over time, and as quantities start racking up, the cost trade-off weapon for weapon may become a factor. But I don't think it should be a primary consideration. But yeah, it should reinforce the need to develop cheaper defenses.

yes we should develop cheaper defences... why? 

Because trade off on the target makes no sense either.

when i see a rocket incoming. i first have to identify the rocket and analyse if it still can change trajectory. Then i have to calculate where it lands, on my powerplant? then assess if the damage will be higher than the cost of the AD. will it land on the unused farmland next to the powerplant? - then let it fly (and hope we didnt miscalculate). Can the enemy possible to change the missiles course in air? then what shoot it anyway because we dont know what the damage will be?

oh and if the rocket will block of houses? what if those houses were already abandoned? will you even repair the damage? or was that block going to be demolished anyway after the war for a new plan? 

oh! I can go on.. what if a rocket is fired at a monument with low monetary-high emotional (or strategic) value? 

what if the enemy fired a pingpongball at the powerplant. shoot it down because the powerplant was targeted?

see ..  quite hard to make the trade-off on the target it hits. 

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

One heck of a bill...

True but, I'll say it again, only partially meaningful without the corresponding numbers for the Ukrainian side posted next to it.

Otherwise this is in a way like reporting "2:" as the result of a soccer match (or football or something that's more your cup of tea). Having scored 2 goals is nice, the fans had at least some fun, but you don't know for sure who won the match without knowing the other part of the result.

[chuckdyke]

Lol 

 

Edited February 24, 2023 by chuckdyke