How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, Twisk said:

I've read this repeatedly but no one actually has a good answer for where the new line is to be drawn. Looking at a map of Ukraine and they'd have to retreat past Kramatorsk to really get into open ground. The UAF could retreat 20KM and still be in the same terrain dealing with the same problems its not until they go 60KM+ that things really start to open up. Russians are also gaining the most ground in the areas 5-10km outside of Bahkmut. So is the dense urban terrain of the city itself actually more difficult to advance through than the valleys and small villages surrounding it?

Also I've asked this before but the Bahkmut direction (D2 in my image) is 50 simple KM long. While the Kherson front was 200 simple KM long. So I'd be much more inclined to agree with you if anyone could tell me where the UAF troops from that 200 KM of frontage went to? The whole fight around Bahkmut right now remindes me a lot of Izyum or Lyschansk last summer. You have UAF forces in dire straights in a small section of the front and the news from those areas sounding very bad but that didn't reflect the situation on the whole 1,000KM long front.

A number of pages ago I addressed this same point with the same poster (IIRC).  Maneuverists always struggle to describe when it's a good time to engage the enemy.  Every time you try and pin them down on it they will say, "nope, just maneuver around it".

Steve

[FancyCat]

Fighting in urban areas has served Ukraine well. Not sure why anyone wants them to favor open terrain against numerically superior artillery.

[Zeleban]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Fighting in urban areas has served Ukraine well. Not sure why anyone wants them to favor open terrain against numerically superior artillery.

 

That's right, why some people think it's easier to defend in open country than in a city. There are much more shelters in the city where you can hide your manpower and even equipment, which cannot be said about open areas.

[Zeleban]

3 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Do any of the Ukrainians here have an opinion on the decision to replace your defense minister?

I don’t know anything about the new Minister of Defense, but to me Budanov looks like a young, self-confident dude (remember the story of cutting the cake in the form of a map of Russia), which can play a negative role for Ukraine

[CHEqTRO]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

A number of pages ago I addressed this same point with the same poster (IIRC).  Maneuverists always struggle to describe when it's a good time to engage the enemy.  Every time you try and pin them down on it they will say, "nope, just maneuver around it".

Steve

I mean, the place to do the "maneuvering" around the Donbass area is Kharkiv. The failure of the 1st GTA to punch throught Kharkiv was probably the most important ocurrence of the first week of the war (Probably even more than the failure at Gostomel), and marked the whole conflict since. Does Russia has the strenght to try a general offensive to take the city and breaktrhought towards the open plains of Poltava and Dnipro? I actually think that they probably do, atleast they surely will by the spring. At what cost, and what final gain, thats another question, in which the ukranian army surely would love to put their input into the answer.

[The_MonkeyKing]

very good "episode": 

 

and today I learned pallet dropped cruise missiles are a thing: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/special-ops-c-130-tests-pallet-dropped-cruise-missiles-in-the-arctic

Edited February 6, 2023 by The_MonkeyKing

[Bulletpoint]

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

 

I think Perun is highly intelligent and generally knows what he's talking about, but in my opinion, he didn't really think things through when it comes to escalation. Maybe exactly because Perun is such a rational and analytical guy, he tends to see the world exclusively through the lens of facts and logic.

He's basically arguing that Russia can't escalate because the only thing they haven't yet done is to use nuclear weapons. And since that would be crazy, Perun concludes that they won't do that.

But the real risk of escalation is not that Putin will wake up tomorrow and say "Ok, they are sending tanks now? Nuke Berlin".

The escalation risk is that providing enough weapons to Ukraine will eventually make it possible for Ukraine to decisively push Russia out of all occupied territories, including Crimea, and that this complete and undeniable humiliation of Russia and Putin personally might cause an irrational response and/or cause the Russian state to fracture with unpredictable consequences.

In theory and in practice, nuclear states can and have lost wars without triggering WW3. But at the end of the day, a lot of this hinges not on game theory, but on the psychology of Putin and his inner circle.

Edited February 6, 2023 by Bulletpoint

[Ultradave]

Article in The Times this morning speculating about a hard-line overthrow of Putin. But the interesting part after all here speculation about factions is the last paragraph, which maybe they should have expanded on a bit more. 

There's a paywall (I subscribe), but I think you get a certain number of free views? If not I'll see if I can figure something out.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/pro-war-ultra-patriots-may-overthrow-president-putin-djd8j32gw

Dave

[Zeleban]

22 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

 

I think Perun is highly intelligent and generally knows what he's talking about, but in my opinion, he didn't really think things through when it comes to escalation. Maybe exactly because Perun is such a rational and analytical guy, he tends to see the world exclusively through the lens of facts and logic.

He's basically arguing that Russia can't escalate because the only thing they haven't yet done is to use nuclear weapons. And since that would be crazy, Perun concludes that they won't do that.

But the real risk of escalation is not that Putin will wake up tomorrow and say "Ok, they are sending tanks now? Nuke Berlin".

The escalation risk is that providing enough weapons to Ukraine will eventually make it possible for Ukraine to decisively push Russia out of all occupied territories, including Crimea, and that this complete and undeniable humiliation of Russia and Putin personally might cause an irrational response and/or cause the Russian state to fracture with unpredictable consequences.

In theory and in practice, nuclear states can and have lost wars without triggering WW3. But at the end of the day, a lot of this hinges not on game theory, but on the psychology of Putin and his inner circle.

Based on your words, we must give Putin whatever he wants. He's an idiot with a nuclear weapon and can push a button feeling humiliated. After Ukraine, Putin Invades Poland and NATO is forced to retreat because pushing Putin's troops out of Poland could humiliate him and lead to a nuclear war. After that, Putin repeats this cycle many times and achieves the capture of the world.

I'm a genius, I came up with a way to take over the world.

[The_MonkeyKing]

32 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think Perun is highly intelligent and generally knows what he's talking about, but in my opinion, he didn't really think things through when it comes to escalation. Maybe exactly because Perun is such a rational and analytical guy, he tends to see the world exclusively through the lens of facts and logic.

He's basically arguing that Russia can't escalate because the only thing they haven't yet done is to use nuclear weapons. And since that would be crazy, Perun concludes that they won't do that.

But the real risk of escalation is not that Putin will wake up tomorrow and say "Ok, they are sending tanks now? Nuke Berlin".

The escalation risk is that providing enough weapons to Ukraine will eventually make it possible for Ukraine to decisively push Russia out of all occupied territories, including Crimea, and that this complete and undeniable humiliation of Russia and Putin personally might cause an irrational response and/or cause the Russian state to fracture with unpredictable consequences.

In theory and in practice, nuclear states can and have lost wars without triggering WW3. But at the end of the day, a lot of this hinges not on game theory, but on the psychology of Putin and his inner circle.

There is very little that can be done to accommodate the psychology of Putin and his inner circle. That is a pandora's box that I would prefer to keep closed. Also very bad precedent case to set. Examples and counterexamples are so easy to make, one can justify anything by appealing to Putin's personal irrational responses. One says do nothing not to anger him and another one says to show dominance and go all-in, the third says something about creating personal relationship.

West is afraid of the unknown and changing the status quo that has been so very beneficial to them. Leading european states were very afraid and hesitant against dividing Yugoslavia, and also Soviet union. 

 

He also didn't mention one of my favorite overlooked escalation risks, what would happen if UKR starts to lose the conventional war?

The risk of direct military intervention(s) rises dramatically. All sorts of very hasty, unilateral and risky moves would be made by the western countries.

[Bulletpoint]

1 hour ago, Zeleban said:

Based on your words, we must give Putin whatever he wants. He's an idiot with a nuclear weapon and can push a button feeling humiliated. After Ukraine, Putin Invades Poland and NATO is forced to retreat because pushing Putin's troops out of Poland could humiliate him and lead to a nuclear war. After that, Putin repeats this cycle many times and achieves the capture of the world.

I'm a genius, I came up with a way to take over the world.

I'm not saying we should all just bend the knee to Putin. I'm saying that Perun seems to misunderstand what people generally are afraid of when they talk about escalation. In the video, it sounds like he is a bit baffled about this.

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

 

I think Perun is highly intelligent and generally knows what he's talking about, but in my opinion, he didn't really think things through when it comes to escalation. Maybe exactly because Perun is such a rational and analytical guy, he tends to see the world exclusively through the lens of facts and logic.

He's basically arguing that Russia can't escalate because the only thing they haven't yet done is to use nuclear weapons. And since that would be crazy, Perun concludes that they won't do that.

But the real risk of escalation is not that Putin will wake up tomorrow and say "Ok, they are sending tanks now? Nuke Berlin".

The escalation risk is that providing enough weapons to Ukraine will eventually make it possible for Ukraine to decisively push Russia out of all occupied territories, including Crimea, and that this complete and undeniable humiliation of Russia and Putin personally might cause an irrational response and/or cause the Russian state to fracture with unpredictable consequences.

In theory and in practice, nuclear states can and have lost wars without triggering WW3. But at the end of the day, a lot of this hinges not on game theory, but on the psychology of Putin and his inner circle.

I wouldn't even say it has to be an irrational response. IMO it is frequently overlooked that the response can be totally rational according to Putins metrics. It doesn't matter if it makes sense to us because we are not the ones sitting in front of the big red button.

As to nuclear powers having lost without triggering WW3, how often has a nuclear power lost on (what they consider) their own turf?

[Zeleban]

12 minutes ago, Butschi said:

As to nuclear powers having lost without triggering WW3, how often has a nuclear power lost on (what they consider) their own turf?

Russia in 1996, the first Chechen war

The first thing that came to mind

[The_MonkeyKing]

52 minutes ago, Butschi said:

As to nuclear powers having lost without triggering WW3, how often has a nuclear power lost on (what they consider) their own turf?

For example any colonial war Britain or France has lost sense becoming a nuclear power.

All the wars modern Russia has been fighting have been colonial wars. Russia just a land power so it doesn't colonize overseas. This is what the west is very blind towards.

[Butschi]

1 minute ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

For example any colonial war Britain or France has lost sense becoming a nuclear power.

All the wars modern Russia has been fighting have been colonial wars. Russia just a land power so it doesn't colonize overseas. This is what the west is very blind towards.

By 'own turf' I was referring to homeland or what is considered as such, not colonies.

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

As to nuclear powers having lost without triggering WW3, how often has a nuclear power lost on (what they consider) their own turf?

1st Chechnya, Algeria (by 1962 France was already nuclear power), we could argue about Yom Kippur (they were victorious in the end, but very close to defeat).

Btw. Russians do not consider Ukraine their own turf in strict sense of the word, rather "kin and client; a younger stupid brother who got deceived", if you prefer. Kremlin probably never intended to join conquered  lands into Russia, it was awkward Cortez move on behalf of Putin administration. Equally hard to tell how it was really recepted by the people- probably they are ok with it, but don't largely care. Of course Crimea is separate case.

Edited February 6, 2023 by Beleg85

[Zeleban]

Just now, Butschi said:

By 'own turf' I was referring to homeland or what is considered as such, not colonies.

And what do you think is the homeland for Russia? Far East? Siberia? Ural? Kaliningrad?

[Butschi]

4 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Btw. Russians do not consider Ukraine their own turf

But they certainly consider Russia their home turf. Maybe Crimea.

[The_MonkeyKing]

9 minutes ago, Butschi said:

By 'own turf' I was referring to homeland or what is considered as such, not colonies.

Depending on who you ask absolutely majority of Russian current recognized territories are colonized.

As I said this is a blind spot to us westerners who have mostly only colonized overseas and now are blind to other types of colonization.

[Beleg85]

38 minutes ago, Butschi said:

But they certainly consider Russia their home turf. Maybe Crimea.

Yes, as I wrote before Crimea is separate case, as it occupies very important place both in Kremlin imperial ideology and actuall sentiments of Russians. Muscovite-controlled Donbas perhaps too, but rather for hardcore nationalist than Russians populace as a whole.

As to newly annexed lands it's very doubtful larger Russian population cares about Zaporizhia as much as Putin would like. Even puting awkwardness of internaitonal situation created by this theoretical anschluss aside, these things need time to settle in national psyche. Reality may be very different than administrative acts, which leads into typical Russian schizophrenia when comes to where Russia actually ends.

 

Kofman trying to summarize situation now; seems like pretty balanced view:

 

Edited February 6, 2023 by Beleg85

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Yes, as I wrote before Crimea is separate case, as it occupies very important place both in Kremlin imperial ideology and actuall sentiments of Russians. Muscovite-controlled Donbas perhaps too, but rather for hardcore nationalist than Russians populace as a whole.

As to newly annexed lands it's very doubtful larger Russian population cares about Zaporizhia as much as Putin would like. Even puting awkwardness of internaitonal situation created by this theoretical anschluss aside, these things need time to settle in national psyche. Reality may be very different than administrative acts, which leads into typical Russian schizophrenia when comes to where Russia actually ends.

 

Kofman trying to summarize situation now; seems like pretty balanced view:

 

It's pretty important to note...as commentators with a lot of experience in Russia always remind us...is that there is a virtually bottomless well of cynicism in modern Russian culture. Will Russians say that Crimea is an unbreakable part of the Russia soul? Sure...when they think somebody is listening. What most of them really think is that this is way above their heads, that they can't control it and that they aren't going to be like those fools who got arrested protesting it.

Edited February 6, 2023 by billbindc

[The_Capt]

13 hours ago, Khalerick said:

Russian GDP contracted immediately due to the sanctions in 2014. It was a clear and obvious economic shock. Tomato, tomatoe.

If you are going to start throwing statements like these around you need to put out the facts:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_financial_crisis_(2014–2016)
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS/russia/gdp-gross-domestic-product

GDP contraction in 2015 (post sanctions) was somewhere in neighbourhood of 2-2.5%.  It was around 3-3.5% contraction in 2022:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-economy-end-2022-deeper-troubles

Inflation.  In 2015 inflation increased to about 13%  (see Wikipedia page on Russian Financial Crisis 2014-2016).  In 2022 annual inflation in Russia - 13.7%

https://www.rateinflation.com/inflation-rate/russia-inflation-rate/

Russia’s capital market has taken a serious hit, dropping by 1/3 and has not recovered (see Impact-sanctions-Russian-economy on the consilium site).

So the reality is that beyond some Ruble propping which comes with some risks as I understand, your central premise is not backed up by facts.  The Russian economy, based on some central indicators like GDP growth, inflation and capital markets has take hits equal to or worse than “the immediate shock of 2014”…and this is without the drop in oil prices that occurred then.  

The entire argument falls apart out of the gate at this point.

13 hours ago, Khalerick said:

As for strategic aims... I'm not sure if people in here just don't understand reality or what. Russia occupies 1/5th of Ukraine. They now have access to the shale reserves cutting northwest. They have ensured the safeguarding of natural gas in Crimea and the waters around it. They now have in the ballpark of 8-10m more people behind their borders.

Ok, another big statement “we all know” without any foundations in facts.

First off Russia is currently holding about 87 thousand sq kms of Ukraine right now…about 18%.  So on the surface, “oh my that is scary”.  Well it skims over the fact that within that 87 thousand sq kms is the original occupied territories in the Donbas and Crimea, which come to about 42 thousand square km…which they have occupied since 2014.  So in reality the gains in this war come to about 45 thousand sq kms or roughly 7.5% actual gains within Ukraine that they did not have before this war.  Based on 350k dead or wounded, that is about 46k per percentage gained, or 6k sq kms.  I do not know where the Russian finish line is but it had better be close at those loss rates.

I have posted the economic realities of the Donbas, which was one of the lowest economically performing areas of Ukraine pre-war and realities of the Crimea so many times that you can do the work to go dig them out.  But essentially we have debunked the entire “it is all about oil and gas” more than once.  Russia did not need those reserves, or in the case of the Black Sea, already had control of them.  And the costs of accessing them are going to exceed any gains for a very long time, maybe never at this rate.

”The reality” is a lot of people with a quick finger on their favourite Reddit or wherever get these “facts” and then repeat them so that they become “known”.  Few of these people actually put in some time on research and get enough facts to create context.  So a lot of your initial premises are in fact flawed, which unfortunately means that your deductions have got some problems too.  I would respectfully suggest that you need to revisit some of this and then come back to the discussion.

[cesmonkey]

 

[Kraft]

Just because Putin declared they consider some parts of Ukraine as Russian doesnt mean he will start ww3 for it.

In fact, there is ongoing and daily proof that Russia does not Nuke anyone even though they have lost and abandoned major parts of their "homeland".

Im pretty sure by now Putin has seen enough reality despite the initial poor information to conclude for himself that his army is not going to grind itself back into Kherson.

The only chance for ww3 that I wager is if he perceives certain losses to be his personal downfall. Given the complete lack of hostile response from anyone in Russia to anything concerning the war, except getting drafted themselfs in which case people just leave, I dont reasonably see how losing even crimea would suddenly change the usual apathetic Russian reaction.

Even now de-jure Russian border towns and cities are getting shelled, his response? Ignore and carry on.

 

Edited February 6, 2023 by Kraft

[kevinkin]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Maneuverists always struggle to describe when it's a good time to engage the enemy.  Every time you try and pin them down on it they will say, "nope, just maneuver around it".

Then they are not really proponents of maneuver warfare. Attrition and maneuver warfare are both viable means to defeat your enemy. They are just tools in the general's kit. We all know what attrition looks like, its basically arithmetic. But it's not the Bogeyman. In maneuver warfare, friendly forces use recon (ISR) to find and strike at the enemy's critical vulnerability to produce psychological defeat - not necessarily a numbers defeat. This technique is applied anywhere the conflict takes place: air, sea, ground, space, cyber, politics, the media, the boardroom etc.. It's about not fighting fair by lining up on the battlefield like chess pieces everything neat and the rules known. Maneuver recognizes three primary "Means of Defeat": Preemption, Dislocation, Disruption. It uses one of more of these means and then accelerates "mass" at the enemy's critical vulnerability. Mass is an abstract term since its hard to envision mass being used in space or in the cyber domains rather than on the ground. But if I can slow down the enemy's networks, I am applying drag to their system which can be thought of as applying a force to disrupt and dislocate a potential vulnerability. Time is part of the technique in that F=m*v^2 and time is a component of velocity. If I hold a 10 to 1 troop advantage over the enemy and all else is equal, attrition might turn out to be the best approach since determining the enemy's critical vulnerability takes time and might turn out to be incorrect - intel being an inexact science. You might use attrition to quickly defeat side A and then use interior lines to defeat a larger side B by striking at their supply lines. Maneuverists know that the time to engage is now. But across all vulnerable domains and the result may look murky since it is not recognizable on a neat map of the battlefield having colored arrows going back and forth. To defeat the enemy efficiently, you need an open mind. Sometimes it's best to suck it up and use attrition. Maneuver today means much more than the movement of forces around flanks seeking the famed battle of annihilation aka Cannae. People tend to fall back on Hart's book on the indirect approach when thinking about maneuver warfare. His book is just a subset of what maneuver warfare it thought of today. To avoid attrition warfare, the UA must be constructed and used differently than the RA. As a whole, Ukraine must strive to defeat Russia psychologically and give them no option other than 100% withdrawal. Otherwise, toe to toe, the battles will just come down to numbers and staying power. I believe NATO knows this and it will be interesting to see how asymmetry manifests itself in equipment and techniques this year and ends the bloodshed. 

OK, RAND is at it again:

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/rand-experts-fear-stalemate-frozen-conflict-in-ukraine/

“The bumper sticker is … heat and freeze,” said Barry Pavel, head of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute. “I think we’re going see a very intense battle… in the next two to three months.” But after that furious “heat and friction,” he went on, the frontline is likely to “freeze” again.

“That means the industrial battle is really important,” Pavel emphasized. Some crucial questions: Can the West supply Ukraine with weapons and ammunition faster than the conflict burns them up? Can Russia, its oil-driven economy still largely unhurt by sanctions, resurrect rusty stockpiles of Soviet weapons and buy new technology from Iran, faster than the West can arm Ukraine?

There is also the battle of will — and sheer attrition. “The Russians are better at suffering than any people on Earth,” Pavel said, “from centuries of history.”

Let's keep it that way for a while.