How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

Something to note, we don't want oil prices to rise, removing Russian supply of oil can lead it to oil prices rising. While we want to limit money flowing to Russia, its counterproductive for Western economies relying on cheap energy to stop the flow. It also has knock on effects on the world economy. Recall the fear of shortages from grain from Ukraine and Russia causing prices to rise? 

[fireship4]

3 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

but in turn I put the cross on War in Ukraine channel long time ago- creator displayed rather limited knowledge of country and its people.

I also wanted to made "black list" of accounts  that are often cited but are not believeable

I like the WiU channel, he seems to know the towns and cities in Russia and Ukraine pretty well from what I've seen, and will often deliver interesting asides.  He has his idiosyncrasies, but I like him as another perspective.

I forgot to mention Perun (it was just a list of what I use regularly, by no means exhaustive or the only places worth visiting).  He is very good in general and popular enough that I'm sure no-one here is unaware of him.  Not perfect of course - he makes the odd shaky argument or doesn't get at an underlying system or ideology well enough, perhaps releasing a video without enough of a useful conceptual model, but certainly worth watching, and he obviously does his research.  Quite impressive that someone with apparently no background in the subject can produce such work via making contacts and reading papers.

A blacklist (with reasons) is an idea, it would be more useful in cases where the outlet or individual is evidenced to be propagandising for the other side.  A source thread might be nice, here posts are lost in time, like tears in rain.

[Battlefront.com]

A slightly better argued case for throwing in the towel and selling Ukraine out by obligating them to succumb to Russian gains and end efforts to reclaim their territory:

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/01/29/talks-between-russia-and-ukraine-would-save-lives-argues-christopher-chivvis

An unfortunate flaw in this case is clearly stated by the author himself:

Quote

Yes, it would be nice if Ukraine clawed back some more territory. But at what cost and for what strategic gain? Even in the unlikely event that the West were to back Ukraine to the hilt for many years and were eventually to force Russia out of all Ukrainian territory, Russia would probably restart the war at some point to salvage its lost gains and its reputation. A regime-change operation in Moscow might prevent this, but it would be wildly risky.

Er, so he is saying that if the war ends this year in a negotiated peace where Ukraine gives up the territory Russia currently occupies that Russia would NOT "probably restart the war at some point to salvage its lost gains and its reputation"?  You know, just like it did with Minsk 1 and Minsk 2?

Gahr.

Look, I get that this war sucks at all levels for everybody, not just the Ukrainians who certainly have done far more suffering than everybody else combined.  I get it that Russia could get to the point where tossing a nuke (likely into Ukraine) seems like a good idea.  I get that it might be impractical for Ukraine to retake Donbas and Crimea back to internationally recognized boundaries.  Yup, I understand all that... but I also understand that unless there's a negotiated settlement that is designed to ensure Ukraine is the one that is able to restart this war at an advantage, then negotiating should not be contemplated until Ukraine says it wants to negotiate.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

On 1/16/2023 at 12:49 PM, Chibot Mk IX said:

BTW, where are the mobile ATGM platforms like Khrizantema-S and Shturm-S? So far I only saw one BRDM anti tank version fired its 9M113.

Found one.

[NamEndedAllen]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

unless there's a negotiated settlement that is designed to ensure Ukraine is the one that is able to restart this war at an advantage, then negotiating should not be contemplated until Ukraine says it wants to negotiate.

Steve, I wish you would pin this statement so that it displays at the top of every page here!

[Grossman]

Russians tortured and shot Ukrainians. 

Painful reading

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64470092

[panzermartin]

12 hours ago, Zeleban said:

But this is already interesting, if you do not trust ORYX statistics, then you have more reliable resources where you get your information. Could you share your source with us.

And about the relationship between the loss of equipment and personal. Do you really think that equipment fights on its own, without a crew?

Wiki is also providing various estimates from different sources that can help, but it's hard to fully trust anything especially as the war goes on. Vehicles losses are more reliable, as there is usually visual evidence. On the crew losses you refer its a good point but even if the Russians have lost 3000 tanks for example with all their 3 man crews that would be only 9000 casualties. Painful casualties of specialized troops but still in cold numbers not a difference. And we know many of these tanks were just abandoned, stuck in the mud, damaged and even in the destroyed ones crews could get away. So I don't think vehicle crew add that much to the total casualties. Destroyed BMPs with squads inside could be multiplying losses but how common were those we don't know. 

[panzermartin]

13 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Its my impression that at least for Mariupol is that withdrawal from favorable urban terrain is not recommended, and served as the best ground for Ukraine to sap Russian strength with the best chance of maintaining Ukraine's strength. In the summer, the defenses in urban terrain best keep Russian artillery and combined arms from annihilating Ukrainian forces.

 

Yes its true that in some cases they had no other options. Also in the beginning of the war they had no APCs to safely escape the battle zone. But there are voices from the front lines that indicate that sometimes they are left to their fate under fierce TOS, arty and airforce bombardment. 

[JonS]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Even Mariupol, for all its horror and loss of Ukrainian military personnel, was a critical element in Russia losing its strategic initiative in the Spring of 2022.  We do not know precise casualty figures, but we know that Russia's forces engaged in the battle were decimated.  We also know that Russia's efforts elsewhere were hampered for nearly THREE MONTHS because Mariupol was like a thorn in its side.

While I don't disagree with the facts here, it does feel like an a-historical retcon to invert cause and effect.

I very much doubt that the Ukrainian high command deliberately allowed those forces to be cut off and isolated in Mariupol, even less with the intent that they'd turn the city into a meat grinder and hold the Rooskies up for three months.

I suspect that the Ukrainian high command was a little distracted by the concurrent knife thrust to Kyiv, and by the time they freed some headspace for other fronts it was too late to get them out of Mariupol. That they then went on to conduct the defence they did is little short of breathtaking, but I don't believe it was a 'gotta break a few eggs to make an omelette' deliberate sacrifice.

Edited February 2, 2023 by JonS

[Maciej Zwolinski]

8 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Considering stance of Israel, always worth to remember that Russian aliyah is largest in the country:

This has to be read in the context of the seriously fragmented Israeli political scene. They have a very low threshold of votes allowing a party to put its representatives in the Kneset (3,25%) which results in the parliament of 120 members having 10 political parties on board. Their governements are always coalitions. Any large group of voters which can swing on a single issue, like supporting UKR vs RUS, has a very big influence on how that issue is going to be decided.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

5 minutes ago, JonS said:

I suspect that the Ukrainian high command was a little distracted by the concurrent knife thrust to Kyiv, and by the time they freed some headspace for other fronts it was too late to get out of Mariupol.

There is also the fact, that Mariupol was defended mostly by Azov, Border Guards and Marines, units which have different chain of command that the usual Ukrainian Army forces. They might have gotten more leeway because of that, and Azov was particularly keen on defending Mariupol to the last.

[panzermartin]

9 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

There's been some good responses to your post already, but I think it's worth one more

We've seen some raging debates here, and elsewhere, over the years between "Manueverists" and "Attritionists".  The Maneuverists have an attitude that you can always use maneuver to achieve success.  Something gets too tough to handle?  Maneuver around it, pull back, or do something other than stay and fight.  Attritionists trash this argument by saying this only works for the attacker and only if it has multiple physical paths to whatever is trying to be secured.  On the defensive, you can't just pick up and move every time the going gets tough.  If you do that you forfeit the advantages of the defender and open your forces up to being caught on the move and slaughtered.

Therefore, the basic premise of your post is on very unsteady ground.

The second part of your premise is wrong as well, which is that Ukraine has been caught repeatedly in situations where it needlessly sacrificed troops it could have otherwise pulled out.  Mariupol is the only engagement where significant sized Ukrainian forces were surrounded and destroyed.  Every other instance Ukraine has withdrawn in good order when it was ready to or, with only a few small scale exceptions (I'm thinking of Popasna).  No military in the history of warfare has fought, at any scale, perfectly so I don't think it is fair to put to much emphasis on such failures.

Now, what Ukraine has done is what *ANY* military defending their homes should do... fight and fight hard until the situation becomes unfavorable.  Unfortunately in war, "unfavorable" does not necessarily mean losing men and material.

Even Mariupol, for all its horror and loss of Ukrainian military personnel, was a critical element in Russia losing its strategic initiative in the Spring of 2022.  We do not know precise casualty figures, but we know that Russia's forces engaged in the battle were decimated.  We also know that Russia's efforts elsewhere were hampered for nearly THREE MONTHS because Mariupol was like a thorn in its side.

The battles for Sievierodonetsk area, as costly as it was for Ukraine, was a big success for Ukraine's larger war effort.  The DLPR and Russian forces that fought in these battles were laid waste.  The Kharkiv offensive would not have been as successful, or perhaps even possible, without out the sacrifices made by Ukrainian forces fighting there.

To summarize... by all tangible and militarily relevant assessments, I think it's pretty clear that Ukraine fought intelligently and effectively, while Russia did the exact opposite.  Not perfect, but compared to Russia's train wreck performance, pretty close to perfect.

Steve

Yes I don't doubt they have been fighting in a more coherent compared to Russians in a situation of overwhelming enemy firepower that could otherwise lead to chaos and panic. And let's accept that last stands like Mariupol were probably not in vain. Bakhmut probably will be a case study in this depending on the outcome and the strategy Ukraine will follow till the end. 

But in general I doubt the losses estimates and the ratio with Russians is right. @MikeyDs 1 to 6,5 seems extreme. 1/2 to 1/3 as @The_Captnoted could be closer to the truth.

But even in this ratio and if we take the most pessimistic numbers and the UKR losses are over 100.000, Russians will have lost more than the whole original invasion force at best and at worse close to half a million troops. 

Anyway, the main point of my post was, there is a chance Russia could finally exhaust Ukraines effective manpower and maybe we will see less WW1 defenses from the high command as the war goes on. Ukraine will be more mobile with the new hardware anyway, we will see. 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

4 hours ago, fireship4 said:

I like the WiU channel, he seems to know the towns and cities in Russia and Ukraine pretty well from what I've seen, and will often deliver interesting asides.  He has his idiosyncrasies, but I like him as another perspective

I think he is a massive Poroshenko fan or some kind of libertarian, anyway he dislikes the current UKR government and gives off that "lions led by donkeys" vibe. If you correct for this, his front updates are quite useful. For the fighting in Kherson and the Izyum region he seemed to have the best information.

Also, he comes up with interesting tactical theories from time to time, like the Russian artillery being particularly effective due to close integration between artillery batteries and Orlan drone operators embedded at the battery level, or about Wagner fighting techniques. 

[Zeleban]

47 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

On the crew losses you refer its a good point but even if the Russians have lost 3000 tanks for example with all their 3 man crews that would be only 9000 casualties.

Okay, then add armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, specialized engineering equipment, ships, air defense systems, aircraft, helicopters, conventional trucks to the tanks and recalculate. 

Let me remind you that this is only part of the losses confirmed by the pictures. Real losses are greater, they cannot be less than those confirmed by photographic evidence

50 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

And we know many of these tanks were just abandoned, stuck in the mud, damaged and even in the destroyed ones crews could get away. So I don't think vehicle crew add that much to the total casualties.

Quite right, most of the Russian losses are infantry. The losses shown on the ORYX website are only a small part.

[Butschi]

8 hours ago, paxromana said:

It doesn't matter if they can't buy much of anything they really really need with it (not a new wing for Putin's palace, for example) ... they might as well have huge reserves of Chocolate Coins or Monopoly Money.

What makes everyone think they can't? We seem to forget that the West ist not the world. Literally half the world isn't on board with the sanctions. They may not be best friends forever with the Russians but still happily do business with them.

[Bulletpoint]

Russian army officer admits: 'Our troops tortured Ukrainians'

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64470092

 

What does Mr Yefremov think about those Russians - and there are many - who express support for Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine?

"I don't know what's going on in their heads," he says. "How could they allow themselves to be fooled? When they go to market, they know they could be short-changed. They don't trust their wives, their husbands.

"But the man who has been deceiving them for 20 years, he only has to give the word and these people are ready to go and kill and die. I can't understand it".

 

 

[paxromana]

2 hours ago, Butschi said:

What makes everyone think they can't? We seem to forget that the West ist not the world. Literally half the world isn't on board with the sanctions. They may not be best friends forever with the Russians but still happily do business with them.

There are a limited number oif places that produce the things that Russia really really needs ... like, oh, say, advanced electronics components ... and the majority of those are in the West ... sure. there'll be some sanction busting arseholes who'll sell to them regardless, but not in the quantities they want or need. That's why the number of Missiles in attacks and the frequency of missile attacks has gone way way down ... the Russians can't replace them as fast as they're expending them.

And the cost of the contraband they do manage to import is going to go way way up ...

Then, of course, remember how they got Al Capone ... they followed the money ... I'd guess the FBI, CIA, NSA, US Customs and a whole lot of other alphabet soup agencies in the US and, indeed, overseas, are looking at anything even vaguely suspicious.

ISTR an old Russian proverb about conspiracies ... 'In any conspiracy of three, two are fools and one is a Police Spy ...'

North Korea can't help and, in reality, neither can Iran all that much ... the Shahed's are mostly neutered now and they have much the same problem that Russia does ... sanctions.

China? Yeah, well, small scale stuff for sure ... but anything too big and I'm pretty sure Xi understands that China could be hit with even more sanctions than is already the case,

The Russians would be better off with a stash of chocoloate coins ... at least they could eat them ... 'Let them eat Chocolate Coins ...'

Edited February 2, 2023 by paxromana

[Seminole]

35 minutes ago, paxromana said:

There are a limited number oif places that produce the things that Russia really really needs ... like, oh, say, advanced electronics components ... and the majority of those are in the West ... sure. there'll be some sanction busting arseholes who'll sell to them regardless, but not in the quantities they want or need.

Last year, the Russian Federation significantly increased the import of microchips, exceeding the pre-war level.

This was reported by Forbes with reference to Elina Rybakova, an economist with the Institute of International Finance, according to Ukrinform.

"Russia significantly increased the import of microchips in 2022 - the figures exceeded the pre-war level. The value of microchip imports increased from $1.8 billion for January - September 2021 to $2.45 billion for the same period last year," the report says.

35 minutes ago, paxromana said:

China? Yeah, well, small scale stuff for sure ... but anything too big and I'm pretty sure Xi understands that China could be hit with even more sanctions than is already the case,

China in 2022 isn't North Korea or Iraq.

Who gets hurt the most if we throw up trade barriers with China? 

Who actually has the leverage?

 

Edited February 2, 2023 by Seminole

[kevinkin]

Call for the gloves to come off as a forever war would not be ideal at all:

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/11382

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3839349-will-logistics-become-ukraines-achilles-heel/

Should we be surprised that the media is banking that a small transfer of AFVs will make a battlefield difference in the coming months? Russia's base of operations - Russia itself - is outside the ROE and that must change. It would be risky but definitely upset the status quo on the ground in Ukraine's favor. Some don't think there is time enough to wait for large maneuver formations to be trained and assembled for offensives. Those offensive will require new ROE anyway. So why doesn't the UA start taking some limited sucker punches at deep RA logistics hubs and see what their reaction is. 

[The_Capt]

11 hours ago, Seminole said:

This is from 9 months ago.

I'd be interested in an update from him since Russian foreign reserves bottomed in September, and have been growing since.

You can't 'run them out of their foreign reserves' if they're building them.

Economics is not my area of expertise but from what I can gather large economies do not move and shift in timescales that most humans operate within with respect to personal finances.  9 months is a blink of an eye when one is talking about a large economy - the fact that almost every voter in every democracy is completely ignorant of this fact is a significant problem.

Economies do dramatic things like collapsing but the pressures to create these dramas take years to build.  A large economy has a weight and momentum all it own, so major shifts and trends take a long time to manifest.

 A micro-example, I lose my job.  Well ok, I do not lose my house the next day.  In fact if I use my credit cards I can actually look like I have more money than I did when I was working.  I can cut spending, sell off stuff from the basement and even do some light stealing.  I can do odd jobs on the side, some of them less than pleasant.  But to my neighbours the lights stay on and I look like I am doing fine.  6 months to a year later the bottom does fall out and I run out of credit, bank shows up and there is a lot of drama. That is just personal finances. Unlike a country I cannot print money or manipulate interest rates.

So Russia is making bank, but the economic damage being done to it is deep and broad in scope.  For example, given that they just basically stole a lot of western corporate assets, how long will it be before Russia sees western investment?

https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/russia/foreign-direct-investment

It is still selling oil and gas but it has severely damaged its major market - Europe.  So what?  Well the Russian strategy was for this war to be over well before now.  Well before economic impacts could fully set in.  Western resolve was supposed to split and fade because who wants to take the economic risks in protest of an already lost Ukraine?  But it did not turn out that way.  Russia made some terrible assumptions and bet the farm (literally) on them.  Someone mentioned that the “West is not the whole world” true, we are about 2/3rds of it when it comes to money:

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-94-trillion-world-economy-in-one-chart/

Russia can and will continue to “make things work” but wars are ridiculously expensive and on one side we have the richest countries in the world all making relatively pretty modest donations while Russia has had to go “all in”.  This is one of the most one-sided proxy wars in history based on economic power. Russia is extremely isolated and vulnerable, getting worse everyday.  So it can prop up the ruble, sell oil and gas on the cheap, cut standards of living and social services - and it will make it work for some time. But the bottom will fall out. This is not sustainable in the long term.  And with every warcrime and day this war drags on Russia is digging a deeper hole for itself.  We are talking years, possibly decades before renormalization with the West is possible.  China and India are not invested in Ukraine, they could care less.  So they are going to take advantage of the situation and milk Russia until it bleeds.

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD

So before we start freaking out because the ruble is up, let’s just make sure we understand what is really going on with the Russian economy on a macro scale.  And finally, even if Russia doesn’t suffer one bit.  All the sanctions do not work and it can sell oil and gas to the Mole People for diamonds.  Russia has an economy the same size as Canada which is not small but is not large enough to wage a war of this scale in glorious economic isolation indefinitely.  And even if it did, our pockets are so much deeper - the only thing in question is “how deep is our willpower?”

[Yet]

21 hours ago, Grossman said:

US preparing $2.2bn package

The US is readying a $2.2bn package of military aid for Ukraine that is expected to include longer-range rockets for the first time, and other munitions and weapons, two US officials briefed on the matter told Reuters on Tuesday.  

150km GLSDB. smart. Double the range, and keep the other doubling up behind in case a 3th main offensive is needed. 24feb RU will start offence (in the mud?) and 2 months later you have trained tankees, destroyed ru logistics and are good to go. 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, JonS said:

While I don't disagree with the facts here, it does feel like an a-historical retcon to invert cause and effect.

I very much doubt that the Ukrainian high command deliberately allowed those forces to be cut off and isolated in Mariupol, even less with the intent that they'd turn the city into a meat grinder and hold the Rooskies up for three months.

No disagreement here.  Ukraine's options were very limited.  However, they could have evacuated significant numbers of forces as Russia advanced or not made herculean efforts to resupply them after they were cut off.  They could also have negotiated a surrender sooner.

The point isn't so much that the sacrifice at Mariupol was directed by Kyiv as part of some master plan (it wasn't), but that such sacrifices sometimes are necessary in order to improve the big picture.

5 hours ago, JonS said:

I suspect that the Ukrainian high command was a little distracted by the concurrent knife thrust to Kyiv, and by the time they freed some headspace for other fronts it was too late to get them out of Mariupol. That they then went on to conduct the defence they did is little short of breathtaking, but I don't believe it was a 'gotta break a few eggs to make an omelette' deliberate sacrifice.

Yup, though I know for sure this is what wound up happening after they were cut off.  I can say that with 100% confidence because I was watching it every day from afar and it wasn't lost on anybody here what their sacrifice was doing to improve Ukraine's overall war effort.

Steve

[Maciej Zwolinski]

37 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 This is one of the most one-sided proxy wars in history based on economic power. Russia is extremely isolated and vulnerable, getting worse everyday.  So it can prop up the ruble, sell oil and gas on the cheap, cut standards of living and social services - and it will make it work for some time. But the bottom will fall out.

Can you define or give an example of what you consider a bottom falling out event for Russia? I would like to make sure that we are not confusing an event which will damage the Russian economic growth prospects, competitiveness, standard of living etc. even for a long/indefinite time with an event which will cause Russia to drop out of the current war with the Ukraine . They are not the same.

For example, let's assume that Russia has a choice of A.  continuing war and incurring an economic crisis effectively regressing Russia to the 1980s Soviet Union planned economy and standard of living; or B. suing for peace and coming back to 23 Feb 2022 borders.  I see a distinct possibilty that Putin will take option A. because option B. carries a high risk of him being deposed and/or kliled and he prefers tanking the RUS economy to suicide. Therefore, I do not think that regressing to 1980 economy is the bottom falling out event for Russia. 

And what do you think?

Edited February 2, 2023 by Maciej Zwolinski
to add a missing word

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, panzermartin said:

But in general I doubt the losses estimates and the ratio with Russians is right. @MikeyDs 1 to 6,5 seems extreme. 1/2 to 1/3 as @The_Captnoted could be closer to the truth.

The 1:6.5 is just a snapshot ratio for what is going on now, not the rate for the entire war.  The numbers are all over the place for any given period of time and sector of front.  Right now it does seem that Russia at Bakhmut is losing upwards of 1:6.5.  There's all kinds of anecdotal evidence of this being the case, but it also conforms to the fact that rushing untrained prisoners at well prepared defenders is going to make a huge body count inevitable.

Overall yes, it would appear that it's more 1:3 or 1:2.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

For example, let's assume that Russia has a choice of A.  continuing war and incurring an economic crisis effectively regressing Russia to the 1980s Soviet Union planned economy and standard of living; or B. suing for peace and coming back to 23 Feb 2022 borders.  I see a distinct possibilty that Putin will take option A. because option B. carries a high risk of him being deposed and/or kliled and he prefers tanking the RUS economy to suicide. Therefore, I do not think that regressing to 1980 economy is the bottom falling out event for Russia. 

And what do you think?

Putin is in power largely on a "social contract" with the Russian people and power centers that Russia would not go back to the way it was in the 1990s, not to mention 1980s.  By going with Option A he risks that happening.  If it happens it could be just as deadly for him personally as Option B.

Russia is not in a position to change the equation in any significant way.  A or B, Russia's economy is not designed to provide for its people even when times were better, with a weaker economy it is more than likely going to break down.

And let's not forget, that regressing to 1980s economy puts the Putin regime in a similar position as the Soviet regime at the time.  And we know how that ended.

Steve