How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

I have been in the US over there you don't discuss politics, religion, or guns. The only thing out of three we can talk about is guns. Everything else is too sensitive. 

Over here politics and religion are considered bad topics for small talk. But what else is there to discuss apart from politics, religion and philosophy?! I mean, you usually start with politics and arrive at philosophy (progress being dependent on time and alcohol...).

[chuckdyke]

23 minutes ago, Butschi said:

But what else is there to discuss apart from politics, religion and philosophy?!

I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. Problem it is accredited to Voltaire but he never said it. But it seems to have some authority if you use his name. Beatrice Hall an English woman wrote it. Nevertheless some think it is hogwash like putin does. Don't dare to say a Heckler and Koch is a better gun than a Glock. Mmmm Clocks were made in Austria.

Edited January 31, 2023 by chuckdyke

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Unnütze Esser...

Who's denazifying who again?

Im sorry, I don't speak Spanish... 

[billbindc]

9 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Sure, and that's been the party line here, just be patient, quote Hemingway, etc.  And may you all be correct, and soon.

But to repeat: Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.  Russia doesn't just crumble, it has to be pushed.

But if they can't pull off that offensive with the Western wunderwaffen, then Putin eventually wins by default. There will be no coup, and no revolution.

To date, it looks to me like Russia's ability to defend territory has *increased*, not decreased, on aggregate, since Feb 2022, even with regression to a (rocket-enhanced) 1940s infantry-centered army.

Their frontline formations now seem adequately manned and far less AFV-tied, which was their fatal flaw for most of 2022. And as I and others predicted a year ago, they've ditched BTGs, and moved to a VDV grenadiers-and-mortars model, with 152mm (enough so that the Ukies have to assume it will arrive) on call. 

All in all, it seems they are getting better, not worse, at killing Ukrainians although that data is foggy, by design. It's only their jawdroppingly costly offensives that are clouding that.

My read is that with a little quiet help from China on the basic tech side (already happening), they can keep this game up for another year. 

Unless Ukraine can transform the ground game again, but I don't think it's NATO mech that does that.

IMHO.

 

I don't disagree that Ukraine needs to push Russia to win but it's not at all a given that either the former wins in some dramatic fashion or the latter wins by default. Russia is a politically and economically fragile entity that inadvertently set itself against the resources of the West and the national will of the Ukrainian state. It has also lost some 50% of the territory that it initially conquered. Does that mean it has greater density of troops on the ground? Sure. Does that mean it is getting "better" at this? If you ask me, that's a strange definition of success.

[Zeleban]

 

[FancyCat]

 

 

[Taranis]

France to supply 12 Caesar guns to Ukraine

Quote

France will provide 12 additional Caesar guns to Ukraine to deal with the Russian invasion, announced Tuesday the Minister of Armies, Sébastien Lecornu. “They will be financed within the framework of the support fund of 200 million euros which was opened by the Parliament” , he specified during a press conference in Paris with his Ukrainian counterpart, Oleksi Reznikov.

Source : Le Monde

[FancyCat]

47 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I don't disagree that Ukraine needs to push Russia to win but it's not at all a given that either the former wins in some dramatic fashion or the latter wins by default. Russia is a politically and economically fragile entity that inadvertently set itself against the resources of the West and the national will of the Ukrainian state. It has also lost some 50% of the territory that it initially conquered. Does that mean it has greater density of troops on the ground? Sure. Does that mean it is getting "better" at this? If you ask me, that's a strange definition of success.

Any scenario where Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders is a loss for Ukraine, and a loss for the West. Any scenario where Ukraine is economically crippled, is unable to ensure security for the country and its people, is also a loss for the West. If Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders, it is quite low the chances for Ukraine to be successful security wise to gain economic growth. Also quite low for EU and NATO membership with the spectre of Russian involvement to continue UNLESS Ukraine regains at least pre-invasion territory. (and frankly, i doubt NATO will accept Ukraine with still Crimea and Donbas lost, and i dont see Ukraine giving up the land de jure)

If Russia can drag Ukraine down, it wins. If Russia can cause a long-term cancer to the West in the form of a unstable, war torn Ukraine, it wins. Also unsure we can define Russia as a "politically and economically fragile entity" at this point. Its war making ability continues. Politically, it looks pretty secure. Economically? Still working.  

[billbindc]

10 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Any scenario where Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders is a loss for Ukraine, and a loss for the West. Any scenario where Ukraine is economically crippled, is unable to ensure security for the country and its people, is also a loss for the West. If Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders, it is quite low the chances for Ukraine to be successful security wise to gain economic growth. Also quite low for EU and NATO membership with the spectre of Russian involvement to continue UNLESS Ukraine regains at least pre-invasion territory. (and frankly, i doubt NATO will accept Ukraine with still Crimea and Donbas lost, and i dont see Ukraine giving up the land de jure)

If Russia can drag Ukraine down, it wins. If Russia can cause a long-term cancer to the West in the form of a unstable, war torn Ukraine, it wins. Also unsure we can define Russia as a "politically and economically fragile entity" at this point. Its war making ability continues. Politically, it looks pretty secure. Economically? Still working.  

A Ukraine that takes back Crimea and everything but DNR/LNR has lost? And if it did just that, do you really imagine there would not be fairly serious repercussions in Russia? As for war making ability, it's hard to square the hard data in the attached with the idea that Russia can maintain a longer term ability to fight this war on anything like equal terms with Ukraine backed by the West.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-how-sanctions-will-further-squeeze-the-russian-economy-in-2023/

[danfrodo]

Wow, LLF making some really good points about the current situation, bringing in to question a lot of the assumptions that many of us believe.  Well done, LLF.  Time will tell whether UKR is running Bakhmut this way on purpose, meaning conserving forces for elsewhere, later, in exchange for high RU losses and expenditures of arty shells --   Or whether there's some fundamental weakness in UKR forces.  

We won't know for a while it seems.  There's a cold front coming late this week, but it takes a few days for the ground to get really solid, so the freeze has to last long enough to allow time for some useful operations, at least a week I'd think.

I certainly agree w LLF on the point that UKR is going to have to grind the RU forces out of their holes.  It's going to require hard ground fighting, hopefully against poorly supplied unmotivated mobiks, but still will require ground combat.  

[Twisk]

3 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

This, and the unspoken assumption, that because of losses and economic crises Russian governement will be under political pressure from the electorate. Except that Russia is a dictatorship and there are no meaningful elections there, so the major usual source of that pressure does not exist. Actually, pretty much the only remaining  kind of pressure from Russians on Putin's governement is threat of armed rebellion, and things need to be far worse for people to contemplate that. It took 3 years of constant hammering at the front, acute economic crisis and loss what was then considered Russian territory to rebel against the Tzar in 1917. Lowered living standards because of sanctions are not going to cause that.

I may be off base but I think the tension point for the Putin regime and the population is likely heavy call ups from Moscow and other core Russian cities. So far Russia has done numerous call ups but they seem to be focused on hinterland and prisons.

@LongLeftFlank

I appreciate your devils advocate.


As others have said we don't have good information of losses but I would expect Ukraine to have some sort of force dividend from Kherson relief and no one has informed me differently but last I heard Ukraine had more men available to call up than capable of training. Is this second part still true? I guess what I am getting at is the Russian attacks while forceful and costly don't seem geographically widespread enough to attrition Ukrainian forces out of manpower. We're talking about forceful Russian attacks across 30-40 kilometers of frontage at best.

An aside do we know what is happening around Kreminna?

Edited January 31, 2023 by Twisk

[The_Capt]

40 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Any scenario where Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders is a loss for Ukraine, and a loss for the West.

So that is simply not true.

41 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Any scenario where Ukraine is economically crippled, is unable to ensure security for the country and its people, is also a loss for the West.

Now that part is true.

41 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

If Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders, it is quite low the chances for Ukraine to be successful security wise to gain economic growth.

No, doesn’t really track.  Country went from zero to sixty in the 8 years after it lost a large chunk of Donbas and Crimea.  In fact where the lines on the map are finally drawn really are not critically linked to either security or economic recovery at this point in the war.

43 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Also quite low for EU and NATO membership with the spectre of Russian involvement to continue UNLESS Ukraine regains at least pre-invasion territory. (and frankly, i doubt NATO will accept Ukraine with still Crimea and Donbas lost, and i dont see Ukraine giving up the land de jure)

Seriously, you are painting this entire thing into a pretty bleak (and maximalist) corner with this line of thinking.  I would have hoped nearly 2000 pages of in depth discussion and counter-points would have done something but apparently we are still at “it is all about the map!”

So what are we going to do if Ukraine retakes all it wonderful land - filled with people who actively supported Russia by the way - and magically Russia does not cease to exist, nor does it recognize an end to the conflict?  A new more nationalist Russia with some other nut job in charge - they have more in the back- who refuses to accept the lot of the “poor downtrodden true-Russians in occupied Crimea and Donbas”?  Based on your absolutist criteria we basically have to win WW3 in order to fully secure Ukraine…pointe finale!

49 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

If Russia can drag Ukraine down, it wins. If Russia can cause a long-term cancer to the West in the form of an unstable, war torn Ukraine, it wins. Also unsure we can define Russia as a "politically and economically fragile entity" at this point. Its war making ability continues. Politically, it looks pretty secure. Economically? Still working.

And here is why what you are pitching is such a bad idea.  If we ain’t absolutely winning…we are losing!  Like war is some sort of digital experience like being pregnant.  Based on your underlying strategic requirements as outlined by this narrative, the only way Ukraine and the West can win is through the complete destruction of Russia.  This is not only a terrible idea, it is a dangerous oversimplification of the situation.

I am glad to see we are still on schedule for our monthly “crisis of faith” because the war is not meeting these highly unrealistic goals and timelines.  Based on these metrics we may just have to accept the loss then, I think over on the MacGregor channel they are already talking about pushing Ukraine into negotiations.

Why don’t we just stick with the “a secure western facing free and sovereign Ukraine with a functioning democracy while well supported in economic recovery”.  And work backwards from that?  A lot of scenarios between here and there, and I am pretty sure the grown ups are working through them all.  

Strategy is not a choice between Good and Bad, it is a choice between Bad and Worse.  We are living Bad right now.  We are all looking for something other than Worse.

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, panzermartin said:

I remember one basic argument of Russian military collapse a few months ago was that Russia was running out of micro chips essential for manufacturing precision weapons. And China would be too afraid to provide these because of West's reaction. Well neither happened, there is a surge of chip imports and China was more than willing to provide these.

I wonder where those chip numbers are coming from.  I have no doubts that Russia is getting illicit chips from China, but those wouldn't be showing up in some sort of chart.

What we can be assured of is that Russia's production capacity is harmed but is recovering to some extent.  Much of the discussion we had early on was more about the near term running out of stuff and the longer term implications for their economy generally.  No matter how much sanctions dodging that goes on, there's no way it will compare to what there was before.  If for no other reasons than the increased costs likely associated with their alternatively sourced materials.

5 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think the "Russia will collapse due to losses" argument is basically due to the Western mentality where we can't stand losing our guys. If Americans lose just a single Blackhawk, they'll make a movie about it.

For sure we in the West have a very difficult time picturing the attitude Russians have towards their quality of life.  But as we've discussed many times already, Russia has previously pushed its people too far in the wrong direction and collapse was the result.  That's historical fact.  It is also fact that the Russian Federation has never been in this tight and costly of a spot in its fairly short time in charge of the Russian people.  It also exceeds the costs that pushed the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse.

The problem is... nobody can predict when the line is crossed and change comes about.  I had hoped that the more modernized nature of the Russian economy and information systems would tip the Russian population's attitudes towards the West's mentality enough to lower the bar for revolt.  In a way I was not wrong to have such hope, but it seems the most likely to revolt and/or cause problems for Putin's regime fled the country instead.  Which is probably why Russia didn't do anything to stop them fleeing.

Sadly, it does seem that hopes of a near term collapse of Russia is not panning out.  Russia, however, will collapse sooner rather than later.  Sooner defined as within a few years, later defined as decades.

5 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Also, I'd assume that most of the human wave losses in recent months were prison inmates, intended to keep the Ukrainians busy and expend ammo while most of the actual conscripts were sent through basic training.

This we do know something about.  For sure tens of thousands of mobiks went straight to the front without training.  Plenty of evidence of that.  Many of them died quick and pointless (per man) deaths.  However, their collective weight allowed Kherson to grind on and eventually led to the stabilization of the front in Luhansk.  The rest of the mobiks are being trained to some extent.  The proportion that got fed into the fight without training vs. currently being trained is unknown, but I'd guess maybe 50k went straight to the front and 250k have been held back.

As for the prisoners, the only place we know they've been used in large numbers is in the DLPR.  In particular Wagner.  They have served a useful purpose for Russia despite the massive losses.  How useful?  We don't know yet, but it could be that it forestalled a Ukrainian offensive action this winter and/or disrupted plans for the Summer.  Too soon to tell.

Steve

[TheVulture]

Only tangentially related, but a leaked memo from USAF General Mike Minehan has predicted that war between the USA and China is likely by 2025.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-air-force-general-predicts-war-china-2025-memo-rcna67967

Its relevance in the immediate future is what it implies about the US's willingness to commit weapon systems to Ukraine versus maintaining its own capabilities (which are largely unrelated - equipment that the US would use in a peer conflict with China is emphatically not the stuff they are sending to Ukraine now), with a side helping out ramping up ordinance production and testing out new doctrines with drones etc. Again, of dubious direct relevance since a war with China would be overwhelmingly naval and air power, not ground forces.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

Interesting, but let's keep in mind that Rybar is an extension of Wagner.  Taking pot shots at Russia's traditional "elite" military formations is, therefore, something to be suspicious of.  Personally, I think the claims of losses is probably more-or-less accurate.  Not because Rybar says so, but because of all that we've seen throughout the war combined.

Steve

[billbindc]

4 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

This, and the unspoken assumption, that because of losses and economic crises Russian governement will be under political pressure from the electorate. Except that Russia is a dictatorship and there are no meaningful elections there, so the major usual source of that pressure does not exist. Actually, pretty much the only remaining  kind of pressure from Russians on Putin's governement is threat of armed rebellion, and things need to be far worse for people to contemplate that. It took 3 years of constant hammering at the front, acute economic crisis and loss what was then considered Russian territory to rebel against the Tzar in 1917. Lowered living standards because of sanctions are not going to cause that.

Putin and his government are *not* Tsarist Russia. They have far less accumulated political capital and the elites that make up the ruling class are extraordinarily lupine in nature. Russia probably has one more big offensive left in the tank. Then we’ll see.

Edited January 31, 2023 by billbindc

[dan/california]

Ghirkin remains unimpressed with the Russian war effort.

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Any scenario where Ukraine cannot regain her pre-invasion borders is a loss for Ukraine, and a loss for the West. Any scenario where Ukraine is economically crippled, is unable to ensure security for the country and its people, is also a loss for the West.

Adding to what others have said already: Ukraine and the West are not the same thing. Yes, we are currently in this together but don't doubt for a moment that the West is there for its own reasons and our goals align only partially with those of Ukraine. Hell, our goals only partially align with our goals, so to speak. There are a number of outcomes that would work for the West but not for Ukraine.

Nasty truth: NATO doesn't need Ukraine and EU doesn't need Ukraine as a member. If a stable peace can somehow be ensured, that can be sold to the various electorates, the West will be ok with it.

Edited January 31, 2023 by Butschi

[Battlefront.com]

Bring this back around to the insurgent post from LLF

14 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

UA may simply be in a defensive pause cuz regearing or cuz training or cuz mud or wev and then unleash their next stunning surprise. But an alternate thesis is that their best formations are getting badly hammered right now and cycling through. Even if Ivan is faring much worse.

This is absolutely a concern.  I expressed it a couple of weeks ago to some extent when the Ukrainian casualty counts started to spike and no relief operation seemed imminent.  It is a legitimate concern, though we shouldn't forget that "we've been here before" and then something happened to lift the doom and gloom from our discussions.

The last major sense of doom and gloom was the concern that Ukraine didn't have the capacity to fight a prolonged offensive fight for any duration.  Concerns about logistics, coordination of staffs and assets, etc. were all cited with no small amount of legitimate reasons.  Then Ukraine embarked on TWO major offensives concurrently.  Both of which were ultimately successful, one more so (Kharkiv) and one less so (Kherson).

What we learned from these offensives is that Ukraine has come a long way since the war started, but there is ample room for improvement.  We've also learned that Russia is getting better at fighting defensively, but is still hopelessly sucky offensively.  All the while Ukraine continues to accumulate new equipment and knowledge of how to fight, Russia is going in the opposite direction.

In a way I think Russia is now fighting a more traditional Russian style of warfare.  The strategic level seems to have largely recovered from it's horrific performance at the start of this war.  There are signs that it has improved some of its tactical capabilities, but wildly unevenly.  Operationally it seems that whatever improvements Russia has made have been defensive in nature, which does diverge from its traditional strength a bit.

The challenge for Russia is that this traditional way of waging war is extremely costly to men and material.  All evidence indicates that Russia's ability to expend men and material are both constrained by a host of long term factors which Russia is unlikely able to remedy within a timeframe that matters for this war.  If ever.

I will remind everybody that the person that has informed us the most about the limitations of manpower is Putin himself.  Putting off mobilization for as long as he did was certainly due to concerns he had about pushing the population over the edge of discontentment to rebellion.  The WAY mobilization happened, including "stealth mobilization", reinforces the notion that Putin is afraid there isn't a lot of margin for error.  The use of prisoners is also indicative that Putin is concerned.  If Putin is concerned that Russian manpower is sensitive and delicate, what grounds do we have to come to the opposite conclusion?

Then there is the expenditure of material.  No nation, not even the US, can crank out the means of war as fast as was possible back in WW2.  Therefore, Russia has had to rely upon existing stocks to replace losses.  New production is also hindered by a host of complications, including sanctions and labor shortages.  There is ample evidence that Russia is running out of its plentiful stocks of the means to fight.  Not OUT of them, just running out of the volume it needs to support its traditional doctrine.  What this will lead to is anybody's guess, but if Russia doesn't figure out how to fight without losing so much stuff in the process then it will be defeated on the battlefield.  No amount of mobiks and prisoners will likely be able to compensate.

Steve

[Kinophile]

35 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Only tangentially related, but a leaked memo from USAF General Mike Minehan has predicted that war between the USA and China is likely by 2025.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-air-force-general-predicts-war-china-2025-memo-rcna67967

Its relevance in the immediate future is what it implies about the US's willingness to commit weapon systems to Ukraine versus maintaining its own capabilities (which are largely unrelated - equipment that the US would use in a peer conflict with China is emphatically not the stuff they are sending to Ukraine now), with a side helping out ramping up ordinance production and testing out new doctrines with drones etc. Again, of dubious direct relevance since a war with China would be overwhelmingly naval and air power, not ground forces.

If there's one service that has consistently trumpeted harder than anyone about imminent war (with the bogeyman of the day), it's the USAF. 

In a way its quite rational - keep the civvies focused and aware,  as losing the air war is the death of US military strategy. 

But a blow hard,  Romperstomper Air General is a very limited view and mindset. He's a "hard charger", which is fine,  good to have. But his analysis will always be subject to his emotions. 

[kevinkin]

14 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Both sides are fighting Russia's war right now. While on the static fronts (land bridge), Ivan just keeps on digging and mining, (I'd guess) planning  some kind of Zitadelle rematch to absorb  a straight punch by the Western heavies.

Thanks for the report. Trying to get caught up. I don't think the UA will repeat Zitadelle and any offensive would be directed to area less dug-in. But that means time is closing in short medium term. Russia might being developing armed camps as springboards for operation solidifying any gains they have made on the ground. As below, I think the UA would be best served to draw the RA out in the open right now and counterattack them. Mobile blocking positions to observe and rain artillery on advancing trains. At all times, the UA must retain its advantage in ISR. But it can't allow its artillery to be pushed back too. 

[danfrodo]

5 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

If there's one service that has consistently trumpeted harder than anyone about imminent war (with the bogeyman of the day), it's the USAF. 

In a way its quite rational - keep the civvies focused and aware,  as losing the air war is the death of US military strategy. 

But a blow hard,  Romperstomper Air General is a very limited view and mindset. He's a "hard charger", which is fine,  good to have. But his analysis will always be subject to his emotions. 

Maybe China will decide that peace and prosperity is just stupid and they should start a big war to accomplish almost nothing except to wreck the world economy, most signficantly their own.  "Oh, we've got an island!  Completely wrecked everything of value on the island but at least it's ours!  Now we will have the respect of everyone and have fulfilled our national destiny!  -- what's that, unemployment 15%?  Geez, so ungrateful"   We've seen this kind of stupidity before, but I would hope they are not that stupid.  Xi's belligerance and bad management have already caused many companies to start to divest out of China.  dumb dumb dumb.  

[Harmon Rabb]

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1620435396890099714?cxt=HHwWhIDU0Y7a-PwsAAAA

The governments of Hungary and Austria never fail to disappoint since this war started.

By the way last a checked Ukraine is on the European continent, but now I'm being nit picky. I know when people speak of Europe these days they often mean EU members.

 

 

 

Edited January 31, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Bulletpoint]

52 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Only tangentially related, but a leaked memo from USAF General Mike Minehan has predicted that war between the USA and China is likely by 2025.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-air-force-general-predicts-war-china-2025-memo-rcna67967

Its relevance in the immediate future is what it implies about the US's willingness to commit weapon systems to Ukraine versus maintaining its own capabilities (which are largely unrelated - equipment that the US would use in a peer conflict with China is emphatically not the stuff they are sending to Ukraine now), with a side helping out ramping up ordinance production and testing out new doctrines with drones etc. Again, of dubious direct relevance since a war with China would be overwhelmingly naval and air power, not ground forces.

Is it just me, or does this read a bit comical?

 

A four-star Air Force general sent a memo on Friday to the officers he commands that predicts the U.S. will be at war with China in two years and tells them to get ready to prep by firing "a clip" at a target, and "aim for the head."

In the memo sent Friday and obtained by NBC News, Gen. Mike Minihan, head of Air Mobility Command, said, “I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me will fight in 2025.”

[Butschi]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I will remind everybody that the person that has informed us the most about the limitations of manpower is Putin himself.  Putting off mobilization for as long as he did was certainly due to concerns he had about pushing the population over the edge of discontentment to rebellion. 

While that is still a very plausible explanation, it could be that it was more about saving face than an actual fear of rebellion. If propaganda tells 24/7 that it is only a special military operation you can't very well call for mass mobilization. That would mean war and a war that isn't going all that well. I admit losing face may, for a dictator, be an actual danger that in the short or long run may lead to rebellion but it isn't the same as directly fearing that mobilization = rebellion because people don't want to be soldiers.