How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

 

The moment of knocking out the t-90m. The reverse speed of the second t-90m is noteworthy - no more than 10 km / h. And after that they continue to call him a modern tank. According to the Ukrainian tanker Shawshank Redemption, an AT-4 shot hit the gun mantlet

Edited January 16, 2023 by Zeleban

[Huba]

Back to the subject of new equipment being built for Ukraine  16 more are on order. 

 

Edited January 16, 2023 by Huba

[pintere]

How hard would it be to install systems like the Trophy APS onto Ukrainian tanks (western or Soviet made)? A reliable hard kill system for anti-tank missiles (which are responsible for most tank KOs it seems) could be a pretty game changing thing if introduced in sufficient numbers.

After all, maybe you guys have had different experiences in CMBS, but while playing that game I’d rather have 5 Bradleys with APS than 10 Bradleys without. Being able to move armour into contested terrain knowing that it is relatively safe against most threats could provide Ukraine with a huge advantage. Even if they couldn’t use it on all their systems, slap a reliable APS on all the tanks at the Schwerpunkt of their first major 2023 offensive and now you have much better odds of a breakthrough.

Trophy in particular would be an excellent choice to send, as it’s got a very good track record at defeating almost every type of Russian made AT missile from RPGs to Kornets.

Edited January 16, 2023 by pintere

[Haiduk]

Just now, Zeleban said:

as well as Ukrainian tanks. They will shoot from closed positions.

 

How many videos of the destruction of Ukrainian tanks with the help of anti-tank systems have you seen

There were several videos. Most weird was filmed with car dashcamera in first weeks of war -  when the driver passed UKR tank, which stood on the road close to town limit and aquired either ammo or fuel from truck. Russian ATGM team came very close, some about 200-300 m, deployed own launcher in bushes aside the road and launched missile. 

[Bil Hardenberger]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I am sure tanks still have a role on the battlefield, but it is likely far more niche (e.g. breakout battles as opposed too break in) and definitely more supporting.

...and this is exactly how they should be used in an environment like this. The Ukrainians have thus far been pretty adept at setting up the environment for a breakout battle.. best seen in the offensive around Kharkhiv in September-October.  Brilliant use of armor.. it was not on the front line but was used for penetration and breakout once the light infantry had prepped the battle-space.

There is definitely a place in my mind for the Ukrainian Army to use western MBTs and IFVs to immediate and startling effect.. will they lose some? Of course... but there will then be a mismatch that the Russian army, even with their ATGMs will find very hard to deal with... as long as we give them enough to actually be effective.. 20 or even 50 of one type will not be sufficient. they need hundreds.

Bil

[chrisl]

If I were at a U.S. defense contractor, I’d be digging through old designs to find hybrid guided munitions that fire from tank barrels and looking at modifying them to fire from a T-72 and putting updated electronics in them.  Two flavors would be interesting- heat seeking and third-party laser guided.  They would only have limited adjustability due to size and velocity, but that’s ok.  The tankers would be firing from OTH, directed by drone operators and the guidance would just make up for the error so it’s still first-shot hit/kill.  They’d be much higher velocity than typical ATGMs and have longer effective range as long as they’re shaped charge rather than kinetic.

[Huba]

So UK announced it's latest arms package to Ukraine. Some comment:

- There are only 8 AS90 on the list, more is to follow but not immediately
- Wallace mentioned that he'll review how many Challengers are to be upgraded, but he's thinking about more than previously announced. This is kinda disappointing, meaning that pool of vehicles that can be potentially sent to UA will shrink still, while UK retains this old, no longer produced platform for the foreseeable future. Let's hope they'll reconsider...

 

[Beleg85]

Wagnerites taking photo at Station of Silj, 2 km NW of Soledar- it seems town could be already taken. Settlement directly touches the Bakmutovka river, so some suggest Russians are inside second line of Ukrainain defence after Soledar' fall. It depends where the line really was of course; it is possible AFU simply left area for better prepared positions.

What worse, it seems UA could also lost Klishchiivka today.

2 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I have the feeling that Putin might just be waiting for a declaration of Western tanks to Ukraine before announcing more mobilisation to "counter the Western aggression".

On the other hand, Germany might be waiting for him to annnounce mobilisation before announcing the tanks in response.

Could be, however judging by last missile strikes Russians does not care that much about Western opinion anymore. They probably have their own clock for everything and it is dictated by internal dynamics within regime.

 

On bright side, USA just announced they will send more liquid gas at much lowered prices- clearly to amend European fears for the future of the market. So Russia is definitelly loosing this levarage.

[Bulletpoint]

5 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Could be, however judging by last missile strikes Russians does not care that much about Western opinion anymore. They probably have their own clock for everything and it is dictated by internal dynamics within regime.

I didn't mean that Putin cared about Western opinion, but that he would use it as propaganda inside Russia. Nothing like being attacked by outside enemies to justify war.

[Huba]

2 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Wagnerites taking photo at Station of Silj, 2 km NW of Soledar- it seems town could be already taken. Settlement directly touches the Bakmutovka river, so some suggest Russians are inside second line of Ukrainain defence after Soledar' fall. It depends where the line really was of course; it is possible AFU simply left area for better prepared positions.

What worse, it seems UA could also lost Klishchiivka today.

Heard about Klishchiivka too. To really endanger Bakhmut RU will have to take the UA positions on the hills a bit west from where they are now - but if they manage that, then the city can be surrounded and will fall. The we'll see a titanic push towards Seviersk, or Konstantynivka or wherever. At this rate reaching the borders of Donetsk oblast will take them few years...
But efficiency of these attacks aside, can we say that Russians have regained the initiative? It looks like that for me. Ukrainians stopped mentioning any offensive actions and are screaming for more weapons, fearing big RU offensive and don't signal readiness to continue their counteroffensive, at least for the time being. I'd say RU is dealing the cards again, at least temporarily.
But perhaps soon we'll see another big UA push out of the blue, like it was in Kharkiv? All these UA reserves are somewhere, preparing...

[Zeleban]

1 minute ago, Huba said:

But efficiency of these attacks aside, can we say that Russians have regained the initiative?

It is obvious that this is so. The results of the mobilization of September 2022 make themselves felt

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, pintere said:

How hard would it be to install systems like the Trophy APS onto Ukrainian tanks (western or Soviet made)?

Probably quite difficult and not done quickly.  Those systems take up a lot of room and the Soviet vehicles are by design quite small and relatively light.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

52 minutes ago, Huba said:

But efficiency of these attacks aside, can we say that Russians have regained the initiative? It looks like that for me. Ukrainians stopped mentioning any offensive actions and are screaming for more weapons, fearing big RU offensive and don't signal readiness to continue their counteroffensive, at least for the time being. I'd say RU is dealing the cards again, at least temporarily.

Temporarily?  Yes.  But we don't know how much of what we're seeing now is "voluntary" on Ukraine's part.  We know that Bakhmut is not strategically important for Ukraine to hold.  Hell, is isn't even militarily strategic for Russia to take!  It could be that Ukraine has simply calculated that the cost for holding specific points on this defensive line aren't worth it.  Or it could be that Ukraine doesn't want to divert forces to this sector because it is planning something in another sector.  Of course it could also be that Ukraine lost this territory despite wanting to keep it and investing the resources to do so.  Too much fog of war at the moment.

If a couple of weeks pass with more Russian gains and no appreciable Ukrainian gains, then we might say (retroactively) that Russia has regained the initiative.  Personally, I doubt Russia can keep grinding on like this if Ukraine continues to mount costly defensive actions. 

Steve

[dan/california]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Temporarily?  Yes.  But we don't know how much of what we're seeing now is "voluntary" on Ukraine's part.  We know that Bakhmut is not strategically important for Ukraine to hold.  Hell, is isn't even militarily strategic for Russia to take!  It could be that Ukraine has simply calculated that the cost for holding specific points on this defensive line aren't worth it.  Or it could be that Ukraine doesn't want to divert forces to this sector because it is planning something in another sector.  Of course it could also be that Ukraine lost this territory despite wanting to keep it and investing the resources to do so.  Too much fog of war at the moment.

If a couple of weeks pass with more Russian gains and no appreciable Ukrainian gains, then we might say (retroactively) that Russia has regained the initiative.  Personally, I doubt Russia can keep grinding on like this if Ukraine continues to mount costly defensive actions. 

Steve

Getting the remnants of Russia's semi competent pre war infantry to grind themselves to powder for territory that will have no meaningful effect on the outcome of this war is either military genius, or a sign of divine favor. I lean harder every day into the theory that the AFU are following Napoleon's maxim about not interrupting your enemy while he is making a mistake.

A competent Russian command would go entirely to defensive and use every single one of those experienced paratroopers as trainers and cadre for the mobiks

[Bulletpoint]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

But efficiency of these attacks aside, can we say that Russians have regained the initiative? It looks like that for me. Ukrainians stopped mentioning any offensive actions and are screaming for more weapons, fearing big RU offensive and don't signal readiness to continue their counteroffensive, at least for the time being. I'd say RU is dealing the cards again, at least temporarily.

I wouldn't say so. The recent Russian gains are absolutely tiny when compared to the size of Ukraine. There's no way they could take the rest of the country at he same snail's pace and with the same losses. It wouldn't be sustainable.

However, I do think that the reason it seems surprising that Russia can even advance is that we probably already started to consider them beaten. And they are clearly not.

[dan/california]

Another data point for the theory that the Russians own the Swiss outright.

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

What worse, it seems UA could also lost Klishchiivka today.

Wagner milblogger says in the text in red frame  that news about Klishchiivka turned out premature. Wagner wages heavy fights for it, using own arty and aviation 

Edited January 16, 2023 by Haiduk

[Eddy]

9 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Another data point for the theory that the Russians own the Swiss outright.

That said .... (although tbf the article is behind a paywall so I haven't actually read it!)

 

[Battlefront.com]

Here's something different for you guys to contemplate...

I am about to have a private in person meeting with a senior US policy maker on a matter unrelated to Ukraine. Unfortunately, the circumstances of our meeting do not allow for me to have a detailed conversation about this war, however I was invited to submit something in writing with a conversation follow up with policy staffers. 

A few of us have been working together offline (some not participating here) on recommendations from our perspective outside of the "Beltway".  I have no expectations about what might come from this other than us offering our 2 cents worth of advice that may be somewhat different than what is commonly circulating.  I do not expect to be flown on a private jet to DC to testify

What follows are the "headlines" from the document, not the content.  A cover letter explains where all this good stuff came from, so you can now consider yourselves policy advisors as well as gamers   Since the origins of this came straight from our conversations here your suggestions are already incorporated, but I'm curious to hear any additional thoughts before this gets handed over.

Recommendations for United States legislative action
1.     Clearly define Objectives and Desired Outcomes – TOP PRIORITY
2.     Form a Blue-Ribbon Commission to examine lessons learned and recommend changes based on that
3.     Officially designate Russia a State Sponsor Of Terrorism
4.     Establish the legislative framework for a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine
5.     Work with the EU and Ukraine on reform roadmap that will gain it EU Membership
 
Recommendations For Military Aid To Ukraine
1.     Intelligence sharing - TOP PRIORITY
2.     Artillery, artillery, and more artillery
3.     Expand Deep Strike capabilities
4.     Procure and deliver Soviet era replacements until stocks are exhausted
5.     Help Ukraine destroy Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
6.     Provide heavy AFVs
7.     Increase logistics capabilities
8.     Increase scope of training to include all US schools
9.     Expand long term professionalization
10.   Plan for needs of the future Ukraine Armed Forces
 
Recommendations for US foreign and national security policies
1.     Ensure Ukraine Wins the peace – TOP PRIORITY
2.     Ukraine must win
3.     Russia must lose, but not converted into ashes
4.     Ukraine needs justice, not vengeance
5.     Provide Russia with a roadmap to better relations
6.     Prepare for Russia continuing hybrid warfare
7.     Be ready to take advantage of Russia’s short term weakness
8.    Devote significant resources to reinforcing the “Western Order”
9.    Undertake a full review of US military preparedness

 

 

[Kraft]

There was a video of a UA POW in Russian hands about to be blinded with a knife, they released the afterwards picture to I guess document it.

I know there are some here who like to cry large tears for conscripts killed by drones because the conscripts only kill because they have to (instead of surrendering), they are the ones who enable this scum to commit these things

Edited January 16, 2023 by Kraft

[Tux]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's something different for you guys to contemplate...

I am about to have a private in person meeting with a senior US policy maker on a matter unrelated to Ukraine. Unfortunately, the circumstances of our meeting do not allow for me to have a detailed conversation about this war, however I was invited to submit something in writing with a conversation follow up with policy staffers. 

A few of us have been working together offline (some not participating here) on recommendations from our perspective outside of the "Beltway".  I have no expectations about what might come from this other than us offering our 2 cents worth of advice that may be somewhat different than what is commonly circulating.  I do not expect to be flown on a private jet to DC to testify

What follows are the "headlines" from the document, not the content.  A cover letter explains where all this good stuff came from, so you can now consider yourselves policy advisors as well as gamers   Since the origins of this came straight from our conversations here your suggestions are already incorporated, but I'm curious to hear any additional thoughts before this gets handed over.

Recommendations for United States legislative action
1.     Clearly define Objectives and Desired Outcomes – TOP PRIORITY
2.     Form a Blue-Ribbon Commission to examine lessons learned and recommend changes based on that
3.     Officially designate Russia a State Sponsor Of Terrorism
4.     Establish the legislative framework for a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine
5.     Work with the EU and Ukraine on reform roadmap that will gain it EU Membership
 
Recommendations For Military Aid To Ukraine
1.     Intelligence sharing - TOP PRIORITY
2.     Artillery, artillery, and more artillery
3.     Expand Deep Strike capabilities
4.     Procure and deliver Soviet era replacements until stocks are exhausted
5.     Help Ukraine destroy Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
6.     Provide heavy AFVs
7.     Increase logistics capabilities
8.     Increase scope of training to include all US schools
9.     Expand long term professionalization
10.   Plan for needs of the future Ukraine Armed Forces
 
Recommendations for US foreign and national security policies
1.     Ensure Ukraine Wins the peace – TOP PRIORITY
2.     Ukraine must win
3.     Russia must lose, but not converted into ashes
4.     Ukraine needs justice, not vengeance
5.     Provide Russia with a roadmap to better relations
6.     Prepare for Russia continuing hybrid warfare
7.     Be ready to take advantage of Russia’s short term weakness
8.    Devote significant resources to reinforcing the “Western Order”
9.    Undertake a full review of US military preparedness

 

 

In the “Recommendations for Military Aid” category I’d have thought a key takeaway from this thread would have been the importance of winning the ‘drone war’ (‘dominating the dronesphere’?). I assume that’s covered somewhere in numbers 1 and 10, maybe?

[Eddy]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Artillery, artillery, and more artillery

Just to be specific, is that more ammo, more tubes or both?

Also did see a couple of tweets from Ukrainians asking for cluster munitions - is that doable from a US perspective?

[Haiduk]

There are many Russian videos how Lancets hit UKR vehcles, but we don't know real ratio of successful attacks vs. intercepted/failed/crashed-when-didn't-find-targets

This tweet tells how AD resqued 2S7 gun from Lancet attack, when it already was on combat course

 

[OldSarge]

NVM, PEBKAC!

Edited January 16, 2023 by OldSarge

[Chibot Mk IX]

Bakhmut is just like the campaign of Malaya Zemlya (Little land). Irrelevant to the Eastern Front, but to the great leader Brezhnev's reputation that is everything. 

 

 

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Every tank goes pop when hit correctly. 

RUS ATGMs are no joke and if used correctly can totally take out any Western tank, super-duper OP God Mode Abrams included. Western armor is probably better but it's not invincible. 

I guess the two factors affecting the kill rate are 1) Quantity  and 2) Usage. 

RUS does not appear to have enough units in use,  in comparison to UKR. I've seen this noted in some OSINT circles, and it's odd.  They're not hard to make,  the electronics did use some Western stuff but nothing irreplaceable and they must have had a large pre-war stockpile. 

One interesting idea I read was the state of RUS training -  because their infantry wasn't strong after training,  the churn was high and dedicated contrakti not very numerous. So perhaps the smarter higher ups put emphasis on  aggressive armored mech attacks, with vehicles providing the hitting power to the spotting infantry, who were emphasized to urban assault, support and not long range tank sniping. This created an officer corp and mindset that focusses on mech,  ie vehicle formations. 

This used the plethora of barrels available without the onerous actual training of infantry.  Like with all corrupt organizations,  the easiest way wins out, every time. 

Of course,  that was while RUS was on the attack. I suspect we'll see a lot more ATGM use when UKR starts assaulting prepared RUS lines. 

I'm also curious about ATGM usage during the defense of Kherson...

 

Russian is hurt by lacking a new generation ATGM that can be assigned/reinforced to Platoon and Squad level. On UKR side, they have Javelin at Company, NLAW at Platoon, then mixed with RPG-7, Panzerfaust and disposable AT rocket launchers that is a lot of "pikes" in their ranks.   Any "Caverly charge" won't end well in the wall of pikes like this

With all the available video, it gives people an impression that Russian used their ATGMs just like how UKR used their Stugna-P, engaged in long range hunting kills mission. It might effectively build some pressure on UKR side, prevent UKR to deploy the AFV too forward.  In some other infantry skirmisher video, I remember saw several cases that the overrun RUS position have one ATGM. So, it is likely the Russian's forward defense position can be reinforced with a 9M111 or 9K115.

Overall it seems that during the Kherson campaign, most of the UKR AFV lose was caused by mines and artillery. When the nimble UKR tank raid team (1-2 tanks + some armored cars) infiltrated the Russian position,   Russian ATGM had a hard time to catch them.   

 

 

Regarding the training. Hundreds pages ago, someone (maybe it was Grigb?) mentioned that it will be very hard to get the trained radiomen and ATGM operators into the frontline. That was discussed before Sept mobilization. 

 

 

BTW, where are the mobile ATGM platforms like Khrizantema-S and Shturm-S? So far I only saw one BRDM anti tank version fired its 9M113. Even MT-12 Anti-tank guns have more video on them.