How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Bulletpoint]

3 minutes ago, JonS said:

Cool. Extra-judicial assassinations of random and irrelevant people we dont like. Long term peace /definitely/ lies down that road.

"Are we the good guys?"

[FancyCat]

CIA director Burns (who was previously a diplomat who served in Russia) has travelled to Turkey to meet Russian government officials and spymasters to convey messages and have discussions, no reason for a convicted smuggler to be the messenger.

 

[danfrodo]

21 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Poo-tler is a real thing, is my bet. 

 

So the idiots admitted he fell down the stairs.  Unbelievably incompetent messaging.  

Poo-tler:  I was stuck on calling him Rat Czar but how have to reconsider.

[sburke]

The Ukrainian 6th Separate Rifle Battalion Lost Its First Battle. Then It Got Javelin Missiles. (msn.com)

[womble]

4 hours ago, billbindc said:

Putin is of course entirely untrustworthy but that doesn't mean his statements are not indicative of Russian policy. Remember he's not just talking to us. India, China, Brazil have all been highly concerned with the prospect of nuclear escalation and clearly Russia felt compelled to calm them down. That's good.

Is that the same calming down he did when he asserted that Russia would not invade Ukraine?

I mean, it is possible to argue that he's not invading anywhere, because Ukraine is Russia really, and I'm sure that's at least a part of the internal monologue of the arch-Kleptocrat, so if he can turn that sort of mental pike somersault with half twist, how hard is it for him to create some sort of internal delusion that his first-use of nukes isn't really a first use; it's just a test in battlefield conditions (or some other nauseatingly insupportable twaddle)?

I should be clear that I don't think we're actually any closer to nukes getting detonated than we were, it's just that Putin's words don't in any way indicate that we're any further away either. And those other BRIC countries have people at least as cynical about the Russians as I am on their payroll, being paid to employ that cynicism; realpolitik is not a uniquely Western approach to international relations. So, Putin is just flapping his gums for his own benefit, since his putative fellow-travellers trust him no more than we do.

[dan/california]

14 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

How about just picking up the phone? They have a direct hotline. Well, these days it's a special encrypted email link.

It is not at all clear to me that Putin is getting unfiltered information. Maybe it has gotten better recently, maybe not. Not much to lose by giving Bout a message to relay if he is in the same room for any length of time.

[Beleg85]

Thread trying to sum up Surovikin command till now. I am not sure if she is too much on positive side (from RU perspective, of course):

1.Lack of mentioning what is his real position within power structures- can he for example oppose Prigozhin? If answer is yes, then Bakhmut assaults are on him.

2. Logistical situation of many units is still terrible to difficult.

3. Quality of leadership on various levels seem to be improving here and there, but hard to tell how much of it is simply darwinian mechanism and how much due to intervention of Russian High Command.

4.No mentioning of warcrimes- we know how attitude to these things stand in AFRF (hardly better than Bolschevik hordes 100 years ago), but still would be worth to mention them nonetheless.

 

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, womble said:

Is that the same calming down he did when he asserted that Russia would not invade Ukraine?

I mean, it is possible to argue that he's not invading anywhere, because Ukraine is Russia really, and I'm sure that's at least a part of the internal monologue of the arch-Kleptocrat, so if he can turn that sort of mental pike somersault with half twist, how hard is it for him to create some sort of internal delusion that his first-use of nukes isn't really a first use; it's just a test in battlefield conditions (or some other nauseatingly insupportable twaddle)?

I should be clear that I don't think we're actually any closer to nukes getting detonated than we were, it's just that Putin's words don't in any way indicate that we're any further away either. And those other BRIC countries have people at least as cynical about the Russians as I am on their payroll, being paid to employ that cynicism; realpolitik is not a uniquely Western approach to international relations. So, Putin is just flapping his gums for his own benefit, since his putative fellow-travellers trust him no more than we do.

https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/09/europe/russia-putin-nuclear-weapons-intl/index.html

I would strongly suggest a close reading of what Putin said. He is concocting a scenario where the US attempts a disabling strike and Russia must launch before the missile land to preserve strike back capability. That's a fantasy scenario. He knows it, the BRICs know it and we know it. But, it makes good 'look how dangerous I am' propaganda without actually changing Russian use doctrine and acts as a messaging corrective for the fairly sober statements he made earlier that he intended his reluctant cooperators to hear. 

This is how the Russians play the game.

[FancyCat]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

It is not at all clear to me that Putin is getting unfiltered information. Maybe it has gotten better recently, maybe not. Not much to lose by giving Bout a message to relay if he is in the same room for any length of time.

I suppose it's possible. Maybe. Not really? There's a chance he never meets Putin. What if he spills the beans before Putin? What possible message would Putin be getting that would cause others to try and intercept it? He's losing? He knows he's losing. Even if the military and inner circle is keeping information from him, what info could be given from the west that would allow Putin to believe and act on it?

[Kinophile]

Man, I have so many questions re Wagner/Prigozhin within the Russian internal power structure.

From ISW today:

Quote

The Russian State Duma tried—and failed—to clarify the purpose and operations of the territorial defense battalions in Belgorod Oblast on December 9. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov stated that these battalions are not formally part of the Russian Armed Forces, and thus will not receive supplies or armaments from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[72] Kartapolov stated that these battalions are composed of civilians that will follow objectives “related to the Russian MoD.” Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin previously indirectly implied that Wagner forces will train Belgorod Oblast's “people’s militia” in the oblast “to defend the borders of the oblast.”[73] The battalions’ independent status from the Russian MoD and Prigozhin’s involvement with Belgorod Oblast officials may indicate the battalions’ affiliation with the Wagner Group.[74] Prigozhin, however, denied Wagner’s involvement in training the Belgorod Oblast militia, noting only the presence of some Wagner former servicemen in the area.[75]

So, 

A. This, "Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin previously indirectly implied that Wagner forces will train Belgorod Oblast's “people’s militia” in the oblast “to defend the borders of the oblast.” means they will become a future reserve of the WG.

B. This, "The battalions’ independent status from the Russian MoD and Prigozhin’s involvement with Belgorod Oblast officials may indicate the battalions’ affiliation with the Wagner Group" is not a "may", the WG are setting up , funding and training this militia.

C. This, "Prigozhin, however, denied Wagner’s involvement in training the Belgorod Oblast militia", is obviously an irrelevant  lie because -

D. this "the presence of some Wagner former servicemen in the area" - there are numerous articles and anecdotes that no one "leaves" the WG. You could get wounded and discharged, but you never actually leave. It's a mafia, a criminal gang with a tank park; you're member for life, no term limits. "former servicemen" means active/latent agents of the WG. Once you're in you never leave.

Questions...

1. Why the hell is there a major military formation within Russia that is not beholden to Putin personally, directly?
2. Why does that formation have access to divisional level assets and theater level strike aircraft? 
3. Why does that formation have its own, separate & independent R&D facility?
4. Why is it allowed to train its own militia and co-opt the local government within a critical province

Russia is an autocracy that has a fully-fledged military, extensive and diverse internal security formations and complete control of the media. The WG seems to be setting up just like the Iranian IRGC - a separate military force with its own economic, political, military & industrial base. The KGB did build up to something similar but more of a politico-military aspect, not so much the economic side. Maybe if they had, they'd have come out of the fall as much more overtly coherent organisation. 

Is Prig building a literal power base for after Putin? Putin lets him construct his internal power base, with the agreement that Prig will protect Pootler after he steps aside? Prig is far ahead of anyone else except Kadyrov, who has already achieved his own fiefdom.

If Ukraine actively breaks the WG, as a functioning military force (full-on HIMARSes its leadership structures, bombs its internal facilities, turns its elites on each other with betrayals/assassinations, etc) then how does that affect Russian internal power politics? How does that affect Pootlers execution of the war, if his "crack" formation is wasted? Is he safe with the MoD? Is the WG a blocking force on the MoD writ large? That is, the MoD cant leave Ukraine if the WG is locked in battle?

I've been thinking about this a lot, that the end state of the war is not dependent on battlefield success, but a combination of  specific victories against specific Russian formations/power structures.

UKR can kill hundreds of thousands of Russians but it simply doesn't matter, because Pootler and his gang simply dont care about Russians. He/They can lie and say anything, crush anyone, with utter impunity, so large numbers of dead Russians is irrelevant. What is relevant is who comes after Putin. I wonder if that's the real game already being played out right now in Russia, and how will it be determined by results in Ukraine.

Edited December 10, 2022 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Is Prig building a literal power base for after Putin? Putin lets him construct his internal power base, with the agreement that Prig will protect Pootler after he steps aside?

Bingo, I think we have our answer.  Or at least you've likely hit upon this being Plan B.  There is, I think, a Plan A.  Which is to not get deposed or murdered.

First, let's all recognize that Prigozhin is not a threat to Putin.  He is bought and paid for by Putin to do what Putin wants. Everything that is being done, including sorta looking like a rival, is all with Putin's full blessing.  If it wasn't that way, then Wagner would go the way of the Nazi SA and not the way of the Nazi SS.  Therefore, this enlargement of Wagner's responsibilities and the promotion of their brutal ethos (hammer time) is absolutely planned by Putin.

Putin is not stupid.  He knows the war is going poorly and Russia itself is a sinking ship.  He also knows that others see this too and some of them might act against him sooner rather than later.  Even we have already seen visible signs of opposition, though still nothing we've seen amounts to much.  He has no doubt been directly involved in the unusual numbers of heart attacks, accidents, suicides, and murder-suicides since the war started.  Putin's got to be thinking that he needs a better insurance policy than the traditional levers.  Something that's inherently his to control.

What he needs is a modern day NKVD.  A force powerful enough that both the traditional security apparatus and the military live in fear of.  At the very least viewed as a disincentive to take action against Putin.  Wagner seems to be rapidly headed in that direction.  Therefore, first order of business is for Wagner to deter anybody trying to take action against him as long as Putin heads the Russian government.  That's Plan A.

The failure of Plan A could come in one of three forms:

1. Coup - loss of power through covert means
2. Civil War - loss of power through overt means
3. Retirement - loss of power through personal choice (possibly because of health problems)

The first one is rather obvious.  If he survives a coup he'll have to worry about retaliation, which might even include being sent to the Hague by his own countrymen (certainly happened to Milosevic!).  In a civil war situation things are likely to be super chaotic and violent.  In a retirement situation he's got to worry that the traditional Russian arrangement where the old Premier/President gets to live if he doesn't interfere with the new Premier/President is not going to be honored.  Again, the pending raft of war crimes is going to make it very "interesting" for him even in the most rosy scenario.  Therefore, he need someone to ensure he's protected if he is no longer in direct control of state protections.  Wagner seems to be exactly what he needs to do that.

Now that Grigb is able to spend some time with us again (not too much, though, as RL is way more important) hopefully he can weigh in on this theory.  Which leads me to conclude with a welcome back to Grigb.  You were missed!

Steve

[billbindc]

5 hours ago, billbindc said:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/09/europe/russia-putin-nuclear-weapons-intl/index.html

I would strongly suggest a close reading of what Putin said. He is concocting a scenario where the US attempts a disabling strike and Russia must launch before the missile land to preserve strike back capability. That's a fantasy scenario. He knows it, the BRICs know it and we know it. But, it makes good 'look how dangerous I am' propaganda without actually changing Russian use doctrine and acts as a messaging corrective for the fairly sober statements he made earlier that he intended his reluctant cooperators to hear. 

This is how the Russians play the game.

Notable: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-09/modi-to-skip-annual-summit-with-putin-over-ukraine-nuke-threats

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Man, I have so many questions re Wagner/Prigozhin within the Russian internal power structure.

From ISW today:

So, 

A. This, "Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin previously indirectly implied that Wagner forces will train Belgorod Oblast's “people’s militia” in the oblast “to defend the borders of the oblast.” means they will become a future reserve of the WG.

B. This, "The battalions’ independent status from the Russian MoD and Prigozhin’s involvement with Belgorod Oblast officials may indicate the battalions’ affiliation with the Wagner Group" is not a "may", the WG are setting up , funding and training this militia.

C. This, "Prigozhin, however, denied Wagner’s involvement in training the Belgorod Oblast militia", is obviously an irrelevant  lie because -

D. this "the presence of some Wagner former servicemen in the area" - there are numerous articles and anecdotes that no one "leaves" the WG. You could get wounded and discharged, but you never actually leave. It's a mafia, a criminal gang with a tank park; you're member for life, no term limits. "former servicemen" means active/latent agents of the WG. Once you're in you never leave.

Questions...

1. Why the hell is there a major military formation within Russia that is not beholden to Putin personally, directly?
2. Why does that formation have access to divisional level assets and theater level strike aircraft? 
3. Why does that formation have its own, separate & independent R&D facility?
4. Why is it allowed to train its own militia and co-opt the local government within a critical province

Russia is an autocracy that has a fully-fledged military, extensive and diverse internal security formations and complete control of the media. The WG seems to be setting up just like the Iranian IRGC - a separate military force with its own economic, political, military & industrial base. The KGB did build up to something similar but more of a politico-military aspect, not so much the economic side. Maybe if they had, they'd have come out of the fall as much more overtly coherent organisation. 

Is Prig building a literal power base for after Putin? Putin lets him construct his internal power base, with the agreement that Prig will protect Pootler after he steps aside? Prig is far ahead of anyone else except Kadyrov, who has already achieved his own fiefdom.

If Ukraine actively breaks the WG, as a functioning military force (full-on HIMARSes its leadership structures, bombs its internal facilities, turns its elites on each other with betrayals/assassinations, etc) then how does that affect Russian internal power politics? How does that affect Pootlers execution of the war, if his "crack" formation is wasted? Is he safe with the MoD? Is the WG a blocking force on the MoD writ large? That is, the MoD cant leave Ukraine if the WG is locked in battle?

I've been thinking about this a lot, that the end state of the war is not dependent on battlefield success, but a combination of  specific victories against specific Russian formations/power structures.

UKR can kill hundreds of thousands of Russians but it simply doesn't matter, because Pootler and his gang simply dont care about Russians. He/They can lie and say anything, crush anyone, with utter impunity, so large numbers of dead Russians is irrelevant. What is relevant is who comes after Putin. I wonder if that's the real game already being played out right now in Russia, and how will it be determined by results in Ukraine.

I think Kinophile answered his own question. Putin is trying to create his own version the IRGC. The primary job of the IRGC is to defend the regime against its own army, and its own people. It has a strong sideline in overseas dirty work. Wagner has long had one of those jobs, and Putin urgently needs it to take up the other two. Because he has utterly bleeped the actual military in this war, and now he wants to stick them with the blame, too. It is entirely possible that what is left of the Russian Army's officer corps might not like that very much.

[kevinkin]

Someone is up late studying a thread near you:

"If we're going to do this, let's do it right, and let's get it over as fast as we can, McCaul added.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/incoming-house-foreign-affairs-chairman-michael-mccaul-favors-heavily-arming-ukraine/

[JonS]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

Someone is up late studying a thread near you:

Not exactly. From that interview;

Quote

He wants more information on how U.S. funds are being spent.

"We are going to have oversight," McCaul said, and "transparency and accountability." 

"It's the American taxpayer dollars at stake here," McCaul said. "And they deserve to know where their money is going." 

He also said the Republican-led Congress won't be a "rubber stamp" for spending on military equipment for Ukraine. 

"In the Republican majority, when we appropriates monies, we're going to put language in there that basically predicates what weapons systems we think needs to go in."

That sounds like a very clear statement of intent to slow-roll, nickel-and-dime, and send Ukraine more surplus MRAPs and Gavins while pretending those things are God's gift to modern war.

Edited December 10, 2022 by JonS

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

"transparency and accountability." 

Just inside the beltway speak. I recognize it from a mile away. Nothing to worry about from a legislative POV until support is actually throttled or the support becomes blankets and MREs and stuff that fails to go boom. First time a member of congress mentions speed i.e. "let's get it over as fast as we can" that I recall. It would be a shame if congress does not heed those words. The press is now picking up on the cannon fodder angle. Bad PR for the West if that continues. But a few months next year will tell us a lot. 

[Grossman]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Bingo, I think we have our answer.  Or at least you've likely hit upon this being Plan B.  There is, I think, a Plan A.  Which is to not get deposed or murdered.

First, let's all recognize that Prigozhin is not a threat to Putin.  He is bought and paid for by Putin to do what Putin wants. Everything that is being done, including sorta looking like a rival, is all with Putin's full blessing.  If it wasn't that way, then Wagner would go the way of the Nazi SA and not the way of the Nazi SS.  Therefore, this enlargement of Wagner's responsibilities and the promotion of their brutal ethos (hammer time) is absolutely planned by Putin.

Putin is not stupid.  He knows the war is going poorly and Russia itself is a sinking ship.  He also knows that others see this too and some of them might act against him sooner rather than later.  Even we have already seen visible signs of opposition, though still nothing we've seen amounts to much.  He has no doubt been directly involved in the unusual numbers of heart attacks, accidents, suicides, and murder-suicides since the war started.  Putin's got to be thinking that he needs a better insurance policy than the traditional levers.  Something that's inherently his to control.

What he needs is a modern day NKVD.  A force powerful enough that both the traditional security apparatus and the military live in fear of.  At the very least viewed as a disincentive to take action against Putin.  Wagner seems to be rapidly headed in that direction.  Therefore, first order of business is for Wagner to deter anybody trying to take action against him as long as Putin heads the Russian government.  That's Plan A.

The failure of Plan A could come in one of three forms:

1. Coup - loss of power through covert means
2. Civil War - loss of power through overt means
3. Retirement - loss of power through personal choice (possibly because of health problems)

The first one is rather obvious.  If he survives a coup he'll have to worry about retaliation, which might even include being sent to the Hague by his own countrymen (certainly happened to Milosevic!).  In a civil war situation things are likely to be super chaotic and violent.  In a retirement situation he's got to worry that the traditional Russian arrangement where the old Premier/President gets to live if he doesn't interfere with the new Premier/President is not going to be honored.  Again, the pending raft of war crimes is going to make it very "interesting" for him even in the most rosy scenario.  Therefore, he need someone to ensure he's protected if he is no longer in direct control of state protections.  Wagner seems to be exactly what he needs to do that.

Now that Grigb is able to spend some time with us again (not too much, though, as RL is way more important) hopefully he can weigh in on this theory.  Which leads me to conclude with a welcome back to Grigb.  You were missed!

Steve

CIA director Burns was in Turkey meeting Russian government officials and spymasters to convey messages and have discussions, no doubt making things clear to the governing class. (messages to Putin may not filter down). When military force fails, there are often seismic repercussions. For Russia it was the Civil War 1917-23, and more recently the collapse of the Soviet Union.  One can be sure the apparatchiks, who Burns were talking to, are aware of the risks. 

 

[Grossman]

 

More on the subject

https://insightnews.media/russia-collapse-or-coup-against-putin-what-is-more-likely/

[Haiduk]

13 hours ago, sburke said:

The Ukrainian 6th Separate Rifle Battalion Lost Its First Battle. Then It Got Javelin Missiles. (msn.com)

In mid-July, former members of the battalion recorded a video blaming Zelensky for their losses. “We as fighters of the territorial defense were illegally sent to the fornt lines,” their spokesman said.

Bright example of incompetence of all level - from battalion command to privates. Soldiers say about "we as fighters of TD", but in real 6th SRB is Army Reserve Corps unit , not Territorial Defense Command. SRBs are attached to mech./motorized brigades. So, they even didn't know where they served. Or this is misunderstanding of journalists

Also they say "we were illegally sent to frontline", but indeed as far as on 6th of May Parliament ammended the law about National Resistance, were was directly pointed that TD units can be involved in frontline actions. Before this the law has some unclear provisions.

With this SRBs and TD units we had a double picture. On the one hand many people enlisted to TD with a hope they will stand on checkpoints, receiving army salary and will not be sent to war (especially this actual about western Ukraine TD units). But if TD units mostly were formed from volunteers, that SRBs and 11x th mech brigades of Rserve corps - from mobilized citizens, many of which had only almost useless conscript service in past or never served in army. Officers to theese units also were mostly mobilized with Soviet of 90th-2000th years Ukraine army experience. And this borned other hand problem - they often couldn't adequately make decisions, they maintained poor training to own personnel. So, not very high motivation of mostly village and small town guys, which often turned out in army in some similar way like this was in Donetsk, supplemented by "old school" command incompetence and too short time for training. Alas, the time demanded many infantry and in most cases they got only basic training in 2-3 weeks. 

But when they came to fronline they often didn't understand what to do. So, they expected Zelenskiy personnally must give an order to dig positions to them instead take the shovel and dig it themselves. Unit commanders in own turn gave them stupid orders and couldn't maintain communications with neighbour units and support. And this much more decreased a morale, so many soldiers desertred and filmed a videos "we are betrayed, command threw us to cannon fodder" 

Additionally commanders of mech.brigades sent attached SRBs to hardest defense positions in order to save own "veterans"

So from May to mid of autumn in such conditions with bloody "natural selection" have been forming and hardening enough part of UKR army of 2022 enlistment...  

Edited December 10, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

On 12/7/2022 at 2:21 PM, kevinkin said:

More speculation re: yesterday's deep strike:

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/12/explosions-russian-air-bases-may-change-several-nations-calculations/380521/

In 2014, Ukraine had some 68 of the decades-old Tu-144 drones, which function much more like a missile than a modern reconnaissance drone such as a Reaper. As Robert Beckhusen noted at the time, “With its powerful KR-17A turbojet, it zips over a target at a height of nearly 20,000 feet and a top speed of more than 600 miles per hour—all while snapping pictures.” The landing was choppy, requiring a parachute. Why land when you can crash?

Back in the day, that was considered real time intel by the Reds. Today, it's time on target with explosives for the Blues. Nice.

Tu-141 and other this family of jet recon UAVs didn't have real-time tracking capabilities. UAV just activated own photo and cine-cameras in some points, made a shots and returned back. Then the film was developed, photos/cine was made and tnen whoile team of image decoders tried to understand what they see on theese images, before all this was painted on the maps for generals. So, this "real-time" indeed had at leasdt one day of delay

Ukrianan forces used Tu-141/143 during 2014-2015 as recons. Some were shot down.

Concerning airfield strikes, Financial Times says according to soem sources in UKR MoD, that this was neither upgraded Tu-141, nor new secret Ukroboronprom concern strike UAV with 1000 km range. As if this was completely new model, designed and built by private company. On other hand Politico, again, referring on Ukrainian sources (particularly on Defense Express representatives) confirmed this was upgraded Tu-141

Here a launch process of Tu-141

 

Edited December 10, 2022 by Haiduk

[_Morpheus_]

How the field hospital near Bakhmut operates:

Google subtitles working fine.

Edited December 10, 2022 by _Morpheus_

[FancyCat]

It is reported that Morocco is now providing spare parts to Ukraine for the T-72 per the United States.

So here is the interesting part about potential spots for a Ukrainian offensive. One, the urban Donbas is pretty nil. Two, Svatove is possible. But I think a offensive into Melitopol is most likely. Once you cut the land bridge, any transfer of Russian forces from Donbas to Crimea, or Crimea to Donbas will take a significant amount of time. Meanwhile, Ukraine will be able to transfer units with superior interior lines.

Russian air power, Russian artillery is the biggest issue right now, the continued supplies of anti air and counter battery artillery by the west attests to that. Remove Russian air power from striking at a Ukrainian mechanized push, and silence Russian artillery and we may see a gun run down to Melitopol.

I definitely think invading Crimea is possible, and more importantly, the ability to launch a offensive into Crimea will absolutely force Russia to juggle both defending the Donbas and Crimea via one very at risk bridge and a very long supply tail. That will open up new possibilities for Ukraine to choose where to push.

 

[Battlefront.com]

Question about riding on top of BMPs, BTRs, M113s, and other similar APC/IFV type vehicles in this war... is there ever a time when they ride INSIDE the vehicles?  Seems to me, based on the amount of personal gear and supplies seen in knocked out vehicles, my thinking is "no".

I've been curious about since the war started, but I don't recall discussing this specific question.  Why they ride on top has been discussed, and kinda easily answered with all the drone videos of vehicles hitting mines and the passengers seemingly uninjured.

Steve

[keas66]

17 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

"Are we the good guys?"

What century are you living in ?

[kevinkin]

3 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Crimea via one very at risk bridge and a very long supply tail.

I read that some of the overall supply to Crimea could come via sea. Look out Novorossiysk. That would make for interesting operations. Ukraine has been training for this possibility I believe. One ship a day might be easier to interdict vs. dozens over road. But initially, Russian might try both. And we know what happens when Russia tries to chew gum and eat it. But to relieve pressure on the front and fight in better weather, an attack on Crimea could be a possibility. Many thought leaving it to whither on the vine was the way. But with the combat up in the  Bakhmut sector being so costly ...