How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

Unconfirmed post on Reddit:

In Iran, Colonel Javad Kikh of the IRGC, who was responsible for the supply of Iranian drones to the russian Federation, was killed, Iranian media reported

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/

Another post says that Iranian news made the announcement.  There is a picture that apparently shows Colonel Kikh having been shot dead while riding in a car.  This could be in Crimea so it would be the work of partisans.

This MIGHT be related to this announcement from Ukraine 4 days ago:

https://news.yahoo.com/iranian-instructors-killed-ukraine-israeli-180100905.html

Steve

[evilcommie]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

With Russia, it doesn't have to be believable for me to think it could be true

I wouldn't put it past Wagner to fake these things.  Concrete is expensive on this scale.  I just found an article that said that Russia managed to find a source that was willing to sell them enough to last until 2024, but it's unclear if they've taken delivery.

In any case, these things are utterly useless.  I already posted my observations about them being easily moved (I move things like this every so often, and it isn't difficult even with 1 person), so they are there for show only.  For sure they aren't dug in and I doubt they used rebar.

Refreshing my memory about Siegfried Line's dragon teeth reminded me that after the war they had to be blown up because extracting them was too difficult.  And some remain as nobody got around to it.  So, the Germans built them correctly and we know that didn't stop the Allies.  Russia's pointy ones are pretty pointless

Steve

One thing for sure is a invoice for lots of concrete , sand and rebar for construction of these anti vehicle obstacles was issued and settled.. 

[Fenris]

Pretty intense recovering a wounded comrade under fire

 

[Battlefront.com]

Oh, this is just too funny to not post (note slight typo in the translation should read "Bombed Donbas" instead of "Dombed Bonbas")

Oh, and absolutely check out the channel this is on.  Even though most don't have captions that can be translated, it's pretty funny stuff.  Like this gem:

 

[JonS]

Was this:

A) A good idea, or

b) Dumb as a box of rocks

Edited October 26, 2022 by JonS

[sross112]

4 hours ago, OldSarge said:

Well done, sir! Assuming the photo is authentic, the great Wagner line, the mighty AT barrier made from styrofoam! Next we will see the mighty Lego wall. None shall pass!

I believe I can chime in on this as I am a qualified test subject for these sorts of anti personnel obstacles (raised 2 boys). If the RA can somehow manage to steal all the footwear from the UA, then scattered Legos would definitely be a very effective obstacle to the infantry!! 

[chrisl]

9 hours ago, JonS said:

In principle, yeah, that should work. The trick with sound ranging is sensitive timing, and accurate survey of the sensors. That's so you know that all the sensors are hearing the same 'bang!', and then triangulate accurately based on the minute time differences of sound wave arrival at each sensor. A good gps chip in each drone would solve both problems. Oh, a pretty decent microphone would help a lot too.

The other tricks would relate to networking the sensors/drones, and accurate sound wave identification ("is that a D-30 firing, or the cannon on a T-62?"), but both of those are - I believe - largely solved problems, even if not in this specific application. And neither of them need to be solved on the drone - it could be handled at a remote datacentre in  say, Utah.

The drones themselves would be transmitting fairly constantly, which is inherently risky for the drones, but ... eh. War is a dangerous business.

A modern smartphone has enough horsepower that you can probably compute direction on board pretty easily if it has two microphones.  It can use the delay plus doppler shift to get direction.  

Two sets of mics (ground or airborne) would let  you pinpoint it at the crossing point of the lines.  They wouldn't even have to transmit continuously - just when triggered, and they could send their own position, velocity, and a recording of the sound, along with a precision time stamp to the home base that could verify it's the same sound and compute the position pretty quickly.  

A whole network would let you cover a large area accurately - it's basically how MLAT for ADS-B works, except you'd use the sound characteristics instead of a hex code to know it's the same object. And the same network could track Shahed buzz-bombs, too.

Or if you have some control of the air you could fly a Globalhawk at 65K feet with IR imagers and look for the hot spots to pop up.

[Bulletpoint]

10 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Pilots suffocated. Likely either mistake of personnel, which charged much more nitrogen into breathing system or system failure. Reportedly two Su-30SM have conducted test flights (one sources claim after repair works, otehr that were new produces jets.) - one landed, but other didn't get in touch. First jet was took off again, and approached to second jet - pilots have seen that crew of second Su-30 sat with heads down withough any reaction. After second Su-30 wasted fuel, it fell on the city. 

@sburke

I don't know if it worth to include crew of this Su-30 in your list, because Orix doesn't include it for now yet in Russian losses, because this happened far from theater of operations. Both pilots were test-pilots:

- Maksim Konyushin - rank unknown, was employee of Irkutsk aircraft factory, civil aviation rank - honored test-pilot.

- Viktor Kryukov, major, civil aviation rank - 3rd class test-pilot

 

   Also:

Lt.colonel Vladimir Strelchenko, deputy commander of flying training of 487th separate helicopter regiment (Budyonovsk airfield, Stavropol' region) of 4th AF/AD Army. Got lost on 14th of April. The writing on rocket in memory of his name appeared on 23rd of April, now it confirmed

 

Lt.colonel Grigoriy Khudik, battalion commander of 237th air-assault regiment of 76th air-assaulr division, Western military district. Was killed on 6th of Sep after command post near Bilohorka, Kherson oblast was hit during the battle.

 

In the video of the crash, it doesn't sound like the jet has run out of fuel. The engines are still going, as far as I can hear.

[The_Capt]

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

All four of these nations adopted fairly similar approaches.

1. do not bunch up along the border where Russian artillery and air can strike before anybody can react
2. create unconventional units (in Ukraine's case TD, but I'm also very familiar with Estonia's Defense League) that can be mobilized locally within hours.  That includes weapon caches, chains of command, and communications channels
3. use forests and ambush tactics to bog down Russian advances and buy time to mount a formal conventional challenge
4. use key urban areas (logistics hubs) to frustrate Russia's logistics and tie up troops that otherwise would be moving forward
5. wait for Russia to demonstrate what it's objectives are and commit forces only when it's clear (Ukraine had the advantage of the entire Russian war plan in their hands a few days before the invasion, at the least)

Ok, but these are also all strategies adopted by weaker sides of a confrontation, some straight out of Mao’s playbook - who he ‘borrowed’ from others.  I have no doubt the UA was planning an unconventional resistance and if we recall the early days of this war, they were kinda scrambling.  I think what surprised everyone one was just how well it worked.  It morphed from a resistance to a new form of defence/corrosive warfare that I am not sure anyone was ready for.  Further when Phase I collapsed, recall the RA did withdraw back to the border.  Even with all the abandoned gear they were not driven there by any conventional offensive waged by the UA.

I am not sure the Ukrainians knew the true state of the Russian military well in advance; I am not even sure the west did to be honest.  We could see it here on the forum about 72 hours in (I still have a copy of some of those posts).

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK... trying to sum up.  I think Russia sucks and that is the primary reason they have flubbed this war so badly.  I think NATO, against the same exact challenges, would do far better BUT would eventually lose because NATO has not figured out how to fight an unconventional war and win.  Or at least hasn't demonstrated that it can.  On the other hand, if Russia didn't suck so badly and Ukraine stumbled more than it did (losing the fight above Crimea was a HUGE blunder) we'd be seeing an entirely different war.  Maybe Kyiv under siege for months, Kharkiv starved into submission, etc. 10s of thousands more Ukrainian casualties and 10s of thousands fewer Cargo 200 for the Russians.  Russia was simply not up to the task, despite them and the Western experts telling us they were.

Jumping to the end - ok, I think we agree on more than we disagree on these points.  One area that I do think the Russians did entirely get in their own way and frankly even with the force they have could have done much better, maybe even pulled off what they were looking for, was in the arena of military strategy.

They had several strategic COAs going into this from which everything that followed was a direct result.  They chose - typically Russian - a strategy of overwhelmtion (yep, it is a word that I did not just totally make up).  5-6 operational axis of advance and massively deep penetration requirements was ridiculous overreach for both the size of the force and the enablers they had available to them. NATO would be really stretched to pull off such a fight - if I recall correctly we only had 3 axis of advance in CMSF.  The Russian way overestimated their forces and way underestimated what modern equipped defence could do (they were not alone in that).  All of this was exacerbated by very poor operational level targeting and logistics, and as you not abysmal tactical C2 - frankly I am not even sure how the managed the road move, let alone contact.  And to your point, this over reach may still have failed if the UA was less capable - I say may because it would have been a much closer run thing, as you note straight up mass and speed still count for something.

Now if the Russian military had done two strategic things, this war may have turned out differently.  1) Establish preconditions.  This costs time but hitting key transportation and communication/information infrastructure and power production and distribution.  Economic/finance systems.  And finally actually tried something nuanced in the diplomatic space other than “lie, lie, still lying..and now I am going to prove I was lying…”. To this add build a competitive C4ISR architecture that feeds a joint targeting enterprise and then get some unity of command going to control the whole thing.  All this and keeping the political level - with zero military expertise - from micro managing.

2) Isolate Ukraine.  Once you make the nation go dark and even with everything Ukraine already had, you focus on cutting them off from all support.  I find it baffling that Russia not only did not do this in the diplomatic space, they did not do it as part of military strategy…here Russia sucking was a definitive factor.  Put the main effort on a drive to Lviv and cut the western corridor approaches.  Reduce the axis of advance to Lviv, Kherson and Kyiv, which is still very ambitious.

If they did that from Day 1, I am still not sure they would have achieved success, best case they are fighting an historic insurgency-from-hell fully backed by the west.  But this clown show they are in might have had a few less acts.

Military strategy is clearly the one area where Russia “sucking” is all on them.  Operationally and tactically I think it gets a lot more complicated and frankly the Ukrainian defence (and then offensives) will be studied for years to fully understand what just happened.  I am not sure anyone could solve for the Ukrainian resistance to be honest.  The fact that the RA itself was a key factor in them failing faster, I totally agree with.

I personally think that warfare has changed - the needle has moved - I think it has shifted much farther and faster than we ever expected, which is actually normal.  I think things as basic as force ratios and principles need to be revisited (Surprise, for example…what does one do with that?). 

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

That sounds familiar to me

Seriously, you guys should, start thinking about the Op Research game.  Training Cbt Tm commanders is cool, but I think there is going to be a serious market for OR - of course you will need to make CM massively bloated, less user friendly and cost over a billion dollars in order for western militaries to buy in.

[Haiduk]

Something large is expoloded this night on Kinburn spit, Kherson oblast (long peninsula oppose to Ochakiv), probably in area of Pokrovske village

 

 

Edited October 26, 2022 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

13 hours ago, dan/california said:

The truly epic failure of the Russian air force needs to figure more prominently than it has. The fact that Ukraine has trains running, planes flying, and an integrated air defense system of some sort is utterly in defiance of pre war expectations. I don't think that would be the case against the U.S./NATO, not unless we posit more tech than Ukraine has. Would this difference be sufficient, probably not. but it would be large.

This and cyber.  What the hell happened with cyber?  They were supposed to be able to crawl thru my wifi into my house and wreck up the place - tilting pictures on the wall, dipping my toothbrush in the toilet etc.  Instead we got some weak disjointed DDoS stuff.

[The_Capt]

11 hours ago, JonS said:

We did?

Oh dear, looks like one of the forum old ones has gone off his meds again.  

“It ok, no the nurse is not here to steal your fillings.  No, you and The_Capt are fine…no duelling is against the law now.  There you go, now we can watch the tele…hey look Dallas is on.” 

[Huba]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This and cyber.  What the hell happened with cyber?  They were supposed to be able to crawl thru my wifi into my house and wreck up the place - tilting pictures on the wall, dipping my toothbrush in the toilet etc.  Instead we got some weak disjointed DDoS stuff.

I was thinking of that, and my private, unsupported by any evidence conclusion is that some more or less formal deal was struck on that - they don't crawl out of our WiFi and West/ Ukraine is not crawling out of theirs. Or from  CNC machines in crucial factories. Or from oil drilling equipment.

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Huba said:

Even if these are indeed made of concrete, on every available picture this blocks just sit there on the ground without being fixed to it. Somebody in the comments made some beer mat math that showed that these weigh less than 500kg - all you need to get the out of the way is a couple guys with a crowbar and some rope some lifting experience, or a car with towing bar.

Ok let’s get some knowledge on this whole Wagner Line thing.  I will caveat that 1) I am not even sure a complex obstacle belt will work against how the UA has been fighting this war and 2) I have no idea how long this Wagner line is, or whether it ties into natural obstacles nor what the fire plans are around it.

That said, be very wary of the internet.  I see a lot of people talking about stuff they have no idea about, particularly in the “Russia sux camp”.  I do not go into my professional background too much for many reasons but I will say that one of my military incarcerations over a 34 year career is a military engineer, so take that into account if you like.

First, I doubt the veracity of the styrofoam claim very much.  Why?  Because it would take more time and resources to make a fake dragons tooth than to simply pour some concrete over steel bars.  I have heard nothing about Russia suffering a concrete shortage and this whole styrofoam theory sound like complete BS.

Second, efficacy of the Wagner line dragons teeth.  Dragons teeth need not be fixed or footed, particularly not the pyramidal ones I am seeing in this pictures.  They are designed to roll and catch the ground on their points as they do.  In doing so they can either belly up a tracked vehicle or de-track it.  Either way they act as caltrops for tracked IFVs and armor, looking for mobility kills but these are just the appetizer.

Third, these are clearly part of a complex obstacle.  The sorts of obstacles are designed to pull combat engineering and key armoured resources forward and expose them the fires.  If you can kill them then bull-rushing such a complex obstacle will likely yield in and around 70-80% casualties.  It isn’t how large the dragons teeth are, or how much they weigh, it is their placement.  I have heard a lot of “well we can just go in and tow them out” or “bring in a dozer and simply push them”.  Sure, but you are doing that in the middle of a 400m deep minefield while having ATGMs and artillery dropped on your head.  In fact the dragons teeth I have seen in that double row are likely the horizontal safelane markers as well.  As you would expect dismounting in the middle of a minefield with crowbars and chains is a good way to turn trained sappers into names on a memorial.

Finally, stuff like dragons teeth are hell on mine plows and rollers.  The get in between them and mess up the tank.  So this means engineers have to bring up technical vehicles like dozer tanks..which are very rare on the battlefield.  I have seen pics of these dragons teeth next to railways and embankments, which is really smart as that makes the mechanical clearing job that much harder.  About the only expedient way for this is explosive clearing - which I am not sure the UA even have - dragons teeth then should be fixed to avoid being blown aside.  But when combined with an AT ditch and some decent sighting that can even stump an explosive breach.

So no, there is nothing wrong with those Dragons Teeth as is at least as far as I can see from a picture, maybe not the most awesome I have ever seen but as part of a larger complex obstacle they will do exactly what they were designed to so long as that obstacle is covered by fire and observation.  The Russians are going to need about 100kms of these in a triple belt with KZs pre-sighted to get the effect I think they are looking for, which I do not think they can do and shame on the UA if they give them time and space to do this.

Remember that diagram I did up a while back, look both left towards effect and right towards capability when seeing stuff like this and always keep in mind the entire picture.  And avoid groups who are just seeing what they want to see at this point.

[hcrof]

36 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

First, I doubt the veracity of the styrofoam claim very much.  Why?  Because it would take more time and resources to make a fake dragons tooth than to simply pour some concrete over steel bars.  I have heard nothing about Russia suffering a concrete shortage and this whole styrofoam theory sound like complete BS.

The styrofoam is almost certainly being used as formwork to shape the dragons teeth and a bit just stuck to the concrete as they pulled it out.

Thanks for the explanation btw, that was well put

[TheVulture]

59 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

one of my military incarcerations over a 34 year career

I'm going to hazard a guess that you meant "incarnations". Unless you've been a very naughty boy...

But as to your main point, as has been said before, and obstacle is only and obstacle if it is covered by fire. If Ukraine has the opportunity to dismantle it at leisure, rather than in combat, then it doesn't make much difference whether it is styrofoam of the tip of a buried concrete iceberg: it's an inconvenience, not a barrier.

And as you say, if it is covered by fire and artillery, combined with mines and other types of obstacles, then you're probably not moving it during combat regardless, so it's doing its job of cutting off lines of approach for defenders.

[Beleg85]

Normally it would be for domestic consumption, but since TASS translated it...whole notion pretty well aligns with Kadyrov's call to jihad. There are already hundreds of satanists sects in Ukraine now, apparently.

 

Edited October 26, 2022 by Beleg85

[Zeleban]

The new post of Mashovets tells us about the situation in the Kherson direction.

[Bulletpoint]

From The Guardian:

Report: Russia is recruiting Afghan commandos to fight in Ukraine

Russia is purportedly recruiting members of Afghanistan’s national army commando corps to fight in Ukraine, Foreign Policy is reporting.

These are the commandos that were trained by US navy seals and British armed forces. About 20,000 to 30,000 of the volunteer commandos were left behind when the US left Afghanistan in Taliban control in August 2021.

According to FP, only a few hundred senior officers were evacuated before the republic collapsed. While thousands escaped to neighbouring countries as the Taliban hunted and executed collaborators with the collapsed government, many more remain in Afghanistan, in hiding.

The US spent $90bn building the Afghan national defence and security forces.

[Zeleban]

The command of the enemy troops continues to make significant efforts to hold the right-bank bridgehead in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, in the region of Kherson and Berislav. Including, by moving additional forces and means to this operational direction. So, over the past 5–6 days, the command of the enemy troops has increased the total number of battalion-level units in this zone by 6. And now, in general, at least 39 enemy BTGr operate on both banks of the Dnieper in the Kherson direction, of which up to 21–22 BTG on brigehead.

In this direction, units and subunits from the composition are involved:

8th CAA South military district

49th CAA South MD

22nd AK South MD

35th CAA East MD

36th CAA East MD

7th dshd

76th airborne infantry division

98th Airborne Division

11th airborne brigade In addition, this enemy GV included separate subunits and units:

90th Guards. TD CMD

810th Separate Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet

3rd AK WMD

1st AK South MD (4th "mobilization reserve rifle regiment" - 11th, 103rd, 109th, 127th)...

Also, as part of the enemy grouping operating in the Kherson direction, there is a separate operational-tactical grouping of rosgvardia troops, which consists of 8 consolidated tactical groups - the 12th separate detachment of the Ural Special Forces, the 146th "Crimean" SMP, 94- th operational regiment (Urus-Martan), 96th OR (Gudermes) - both are part of the 46th separate operational brigade (Chechnya) and the 50th SOBr (Rostov region).

Artillery support for this grouping, is provided by artillery tactical groups of cannon and rocket artillery from the composition of:

944th SAP of the 20th Motor Rifle Division of the 8th CAA,

227th Abr 49th CAA,

8th AR 22nd AK,

439th, rocket artillery brigade South.MD,

1141st ap 7th dshd,

1140th AR of the 76th Air Assault Division,

165th Abr 35th CAA.

 

[Zeleban]

Over the past two days, the enemy in the Kherson direction, in addition to regrouping and improving the system of its defense on the bridgehead, continued to prepare for counterattacks in order to tactically improve its positions.

In particular, for this purpose, the command of the enemy troops is regrouping to the area south of Pervomaisky (where 2 BTGr from the 33rd and 255th MRRs of the 20th Motor Rifle Division are currently operating) forces from the 35th CAA (probably, we are talking about units of the 64th and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, with a total volume of also somewhere up to 2 BTGr).

At least at night, through Muzykovka, the enemy is actively pushing personnel and weapons and military equipment to the north. Equipment also goes through Aleksandrovka on the Ingulets River.

The most likely direction of enemy counterattacks in this sector will be Lyubomirovka - Novogrigorovka (north of Ternovy Podi) or Blagodatnoye - Partizanskoye, or both. The Chkalovo-Kostromka-Schastlivoe-Bruskinskoye area became another area of application of the main efforts of the enemy.

It is not surprising that this area, in fact, covers the enemy tactical grouping concentrated in the northern part of the bridgehead from the left flank. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine advance in this area, the likelihood that the units of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division, which are now defending between the southern outskirts of Dudchan and Pyatikhatki, together with the remnants of one of the battalions of the 126th Motorized Rifle Brigade and scattered units one of the regiments of the "mobilization reserve" of the 1st AK, will be pressed against the Dnieper, or even surrounded, will increase sharply.

Therefore, it is obvious that in the near future the command of the enemy troops will try, under any circumstances, to cover this flank with additional forces and means. And by the way, this process has already begun. At least 1 BTGr from the 69th Brigade of the 35th CAA has already approached this area, and apparently, it, in turn, will be reinforced by units (possibly up to two companies) of the 104th Airborne Battalion from the 76th th Airborne Assault Division.

It should also be emphasized that in order to respond to "suddenly emerging" situations, the command of the enemy troops in this direction even managed to send a certain operational reserve. At the moment, it consists of 3 BTGr, allocated from the 37th Guards. mrb of the 36th CAA, the 104th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 76th Airborne Assault Division and the 239th Tank Regiment of the 90th Guards tank division.

[Zeleban]

These subunits have a fairly high manpower and armored equipment ratio and are in a high degree of readiness for combat (from 2 to 4 hours).

And in conclusion, two more interesting messages regarding the current development of the situation in the Kherson direction.

 

The occupation administration of the Kherson region, together with the Russian military command in this direction, announced the beginning of the formation of the so-called "Territorial Defense of the Kherson region" (in Russian and affiliated media, these formations are called "people's militia")

Today it is more of a PR project than an event of military importance. But one military nuance is still present here. Thanks to the "people's militias" it becomes quite possible, without any "partial-compulsory mobilizations", to understaff the LDNR formations with "local material".

I very much doubt that among the inhabitants of the Kherson region there will be a large number of people who are almost guaranteed to "close their eyes" for the fact that the Russian tricolor fluttered over Kherson. However, the Russian command now has a formal reason to drive a small handful of local collaborators into the ranks of “Russians converted from Ukrainians”.

 

And the second news is that the Russian command continues to play on the bridgehead with the Internet and cellular communications, turning them on and off. Obviously, in this way it tries either to hide information about something, or vice versa, to promote its dissemination.

 

For example, during the regrouping of enemy troops a couple of days ago, the Internet and cellular communications were almost “lying” along the entire length of the bridgehead and even partially on the left bank of the Dnieper (the enemy was clearly trying to make it impossible to transmit information about the movement of his troops). But then, they were turned on and flooded with “almost reliable information” about some kind of waste, detours and evacuation.

Therefore, dear readers, my advice would be this. Take any information from the combat zone critically enough. Even if the source of it is trustworthy, this information can be distributed by the enemy "in the dark", through second or even third hands.

[acrashb]

8 hours ago, evilcommie said:

One thing for sure is a invoice for lots of concrete , sand and rebar for construction of these anti vehicle obstacles was issued and settled.. 

Russia sucks.  Or they are decoys like inflatable S-300s.  Or Russia sucks.  Or both.

[acrashb]

18 hours ago, JonS said:

The problem with this cunning plan is that artillery propellant charges are designed to burn completely before the round leaves the muzzle, making them flashless.

And yet we see pictures like this all over the place (granted not at high noon):

 

I expect there is a difference between "flashless" and "low-flash".  Just like "smokeless" powder actually does create smoke, just a lot less than black powder.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, TheVulture said:

I'm going to hazard a guess that you meant "incarnations". Unless you've been a very naughty boy...

But as to your main point, as has been said before, and obstacle is only and obstacle if it is covered by fire. If Ukraine has the opportunity to dismantle it at leisure, rather than in combat, then it doesn't make much difference whether it is styrofoam of the tip of a buried concrete iceberg: it's an inconvenience, not a barrier.

And as you say, if it is covered by fire and artillery, combined with mines and other types of obstacles, then you're probably not moving it during combat regardless, so it's doing its job of cutting off lines of approach for defenders.

Damn autocorrect, well there many days it did feel like a prison sentence so incarceration is not too far off the mark.

Ah you see our thinking has already shifted.  A modern breaching operation could easily be penetration by light infantry and hammering of logistics and support by PGM.  A full on combat breach may not even be required which points to Russia continuing to employ the old playbook rather than re-write one.  Russia may all sighted in ready to cover the obstacle when stuff behind them starts exploding and supplies get cut off. They then abandon the position in a reenactment of the Maginot Line and the UA dismantles it administratively.  But by the old playbook I see nothing inherently wrong with how they did it.