How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The big question Ukraine needs to figure out is the state of Russia's ability to defend itself in Kherson.  Yes, yes, yes... this is generally what an attacker wants to know, but in this case it's far more important for Ukraine because they have spent considerable time and resources on weakening Russia's cohesion, morale, supplies, and ability to reinforce.  This seems to be the first time to "stick a fork in and see if the turkey is done".

Because Ukraine is inherently cautious, I think it is a real possibility that if Ukraine determines "the turkey needs more time in the oven" that they will hold back the ground portion of the offensive and instead continue to hit positions with artillery for a while longer with periodic probes attacks here and there.

What I'm saying is that the offensive seems to be "on", but that the ground offensive portion might not happen for a while.  Depends on what the Russians do and don't do.

Steve

A bit of a resource game at this point too. Given the supply situation, pushing Russian frontline units to expend ammunition at a much higher rate even without significant initial breakthroughs is going to shape things quite nicely in a couple of days/weeks.

[photon]

8 minutes ago, Grigb said:

As per Huba post Girkin claims UKR are pushing toward Bruskinse and that it breakthrough. However neck is still narrow.

 

These maps are really helpful understanding what's going on. Thanks for making them.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

The problem is we don't really even know what current power blocks are. And if they really exists, how coherent they are. We know FSB is here, but how powerful and independent of Kremlin they really are? Do intra-service loyalty is stronger than differences between its various departments? Can we talk about FSB as separate entity pursuing one, coherent political vector? Hard to say.

Military? A lot of voices of discontent against Shoigu, to the point of Putin directly giving orders to separate corpses. And we have undoubtedly various groups inside military itself, that may fight between for example different branches. So again, institution may be too divided to present one block. Which probably suits Putin himself- it was designed that way, probably.

Even worse is the case with oligarchs- they never were a bunch of guys that could direct any coherent political actions; rather, they should be viewed as galactic of various competing random business interests. Almost nothing joins for example Prigozin-types and Abramovich, except being in the same room as their master and taking his orders.

I don't think there are unified "blocs".  Putin has seen to it that each one of them has been kept disunified, either by allowing them to fight with each other or by selectively applying pressure (sacking, blackmail, assassination, etc.) towards individuals within each.  However, this is not a good long term solution.

The history of organized crime (which is applicable to Putin's regime) is that there's as much to fear from dispersed threats as there is from concentrated ones.  Strong lieutenants tend to weed out individuals with too much personal ambition because they are the most likely targets, not the boss at the top.  But when there's weak lieutenants, or worse... none, then the ambitious might now set their sights on the top position as the middle position isn't all that attractive.  Worse still, without someone breathing down their neck and trying to keep them in line, the ambitious underlings are more able to form new alliances.  Perhaps outside of their normal blocs.  This creates new dynamics which the boss at the top is now even less aware of because there's no strong middle management to keep tabs on it.

The same holds true in businesses.  Middle management serves a very important function.  Mess with it unwisely and you likely put the whole operation at risk.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Taranis said:

So it could be from 5th Armored Brigade. UAWarData and JominiW state it's in the northern part of the Kherson bridgehead. (It was previously said that 5th AB recieved YPR-765)

I've said for more than a month now... keep our eyes out for the 5th Tank Brigade.  When we confirm it is in action we can confirm the attack is underway.

Seems confirmed!

Steve

[sburke]

meanwhile Putin's big friend seems to be facing a crisis of their own.  Hopefully Xi doesn't view military adventurism as a way of deflecting attention as well.  That may be one additional benefit of the western response to Russia, unity and action as a deterrence.

China’s dim prospects turn disastrous (msn.com)

[danfrodo]

22 minutes ago, akd said:

Said to be from offensive ops in the Kherson direction (YPR-765s):

Can't wait for this view to be in CMBS, Kherson campaign.  Sometime in 2023 I hope.  Can switch out the YPRs for BMPs if necessary.  

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, billbindc said:

A bit of a resource game at this point too. Given the supply situation, pushing Russian frontline units to expend ammunition at a much higher rate even without significant initial breakthroughs is going to shape things quite nicely in a couple of days/weeks.

Yup, that too.  Russia's ability to react is finite because of the supply choke, so every round of ammo flung at Ukraine now is one that won't be available later.  Russia knows it has to stop any breaches before they get serious, so I doubt they will hold back against the probe attacks.  If Ukraine gauges the response as weak, more evidence that the weeks of prep work had a serious impact.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

26 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

I don't think Shoigu was ever a threat to Putin as a non-ethnic Russian. Shoigu has no military experience (neither does Putin for that matter) so I think Putin just feels confident enough to just bypass him, especially given the failures.

For sure Shoigu was put into that position because he could be controlled.  The point many have raised since this war started is that Putin has not replaced him with someone more capable, despite the war going so horribly bad.  Now Putin is apparently bypassing the military chain of command completely.  This is exactly the opposite of what he should be doing if he wants to have a better shot at winning the war, but it is a prudent move if he fears the military is getting "funny ideas" into their heads.

Steve

[billbindc]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, that too.  Russia's ability to react is finite because of the supply choke, so every round of ammo flung at Ukraine now is one that won't be available later.  Russia knows it has to stop any breaches before they get serious, so I doubt they will hold back against the probe attacks.  If Ukraine gauges the response as weak, more evidence that the weeks of prep work had a serious impact.

Steve

I think the term is "on the horns of a dilemma". 

[kevinkin]

A couple of interesting links in this article today:

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/08/russias-defense-industry-is-in-serious-trouble-due-to-sanctions/

[billbindc]

29 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think there are unified "blocs".  Putin has seen to it that each one of them has been kept disunified, either by allowing them to fight with each other or by selectively applying pressure (sacking, blackmail, assassination, etc.) towards individuals within each.  However, this is not a good long term solution.

 

I agree that there are not unified blocs. Putin's apparatus for the last quarter century successfully devoted vast energies to forestall that exact situation. But that's also what makes a dramatic, immediate overthrow unlikely until stresses on the system both weaken Putin's ability to enforce disunity and the various factions are put under stresses that make joining together worthwhile. That will take some serious shocks and an exhaustion of the state. It can/will happen eventually but we aren't there yet.

Edited August 29, 2022 by billbindc

[FancyCat]

Movement of vehicles via ferries. Long thread. I hope Ukraine turns the ferries into submarines. 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, billbindc said:

I agree that there not unified blocs. Putin's apparatus for the last quarter century successfully devoted vast energies to forestall that exact situation. But that's also what makes a dramatic, immediate overthrow unlikely until stresses on the system both weaken Putin's ability to enforce disunity and the various factions are put under stresses that make joining together worthwhile. That will take some serious shocks and an exhaustion of the state. it can/will happen eventually but we aren't there yet.

Agreed.  Historically this is what we see in politics, business, organized crime, etc.  If the primary objective of the leader is to keep threats from bubbling up, and he/she survives the initial turmoil it causes, then the leader's chances of remaining in power are significantly higher than they would otherwise be.  However, over time this creates management problems and that itself causes instability which in turn increases the chances that there will be a challenge to the ultimate power. 

The problem for Putin right now is he's removed incentives for playing along with his regime.  He's made the ambitious have less to risk because they have less to lose and more to gain if they conspire against him.

I have no doubt that a lot of people have already made the decision to challenge Putin's authority.  I have no doubts that they are at least informally organized as well.  They are just waiting for the right opportunity and they'll gauge that based on the notion that they want to act before anybody else does.

A significant defeat in Kherson might do it on its own.  A defeat at Kherson might do it all on its own.  That plus nothing to show for the 3rd Corps is even surer to tip the balance.  A defeat at Kherson and an embarrassing defeat of the 3rd Corps is almost definitely enough to get things in motion.

Steve

[FancyCat]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

For sure Shoigu was put into that position because he could be controlled.  The point many have raised since this war started is that Putin has not replaced him with someone more capable, despite the war going so horribly bad.  Now Putin is apparently bypassing the military chain of command completely.  This is exactly the opposite of what he should be doing if he wants to have a better shot at winning the war, but it is a prudent move if he fears the military is getting "funny ideas" into their heads.

Steve

Could be simple arrogance and micromanaging tbf. Combine it with a military that cannot or isn't willing to pushback to preserve their (i dunno what to call it) vs angering Putin, and we have a scenario where Shoigu is bypassed. 

Edited August 29, 2022 by FancyCat

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Agreed.  Historically this is what we see in politics, business, organized crime, etc.  If the primary objective of the leader is to keep threats from bubbling up, and he/she survives the initial turmoil it causes, then the leader's chances of remaining in power are significantly higher than they would otherwise be.  However, over time this creates management problems and that itself causes instability which in turn increases the chances that there will be a challenge to the ultimate power. 

The problem for Putin right now is he's removed incentives for playing along with his regime.  He's made the ambitious have less to risk because they have less to lose and more to gain if they conspire against him.

I have no doubt that a lot of people have already made the decision to challenge Putin's authority.  I have no doubts that they are at least informally organized as well.  They are just waiting for the right opportunity and they'll gauge that based on the notion that they want to act before anybody else does.

A significant defeat in Kherson might do it on its own.  A defeat at Kherson might do it all on its own.  That plus nothing to show for the 3rd Corps is even surer to tip the balance.  A defeat at Kherson and an embarrassing defeat of the 3rd Corps is almost definitely enough to get things in motion.

Steve

I think our only point of disagreement is on what level of stress is going to allow space for change to happen and provide enough incentive for blocs to form relative to the risk they take in doing so. Russian political culture is highly tolerant of badly run regimes and even badly run regimes like this one have pretty powerful coercive levers to pull. I don't think getting stuffed in Kherson will do it, nor will the coming debacle of the 3AC. It will take those events, more battlefield defeats and slow economic suffocation tied to sanctions. And even then...we'll see.

[Grigb]

Girkin summary of Battle of Bridgeheads

 

[dan/california]

23 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I think our only point of disagreement is on what level of stress is going to allow space for change to happen and provide enough incentive for blocs to form relative to the risk they take in doing so. Russian political culture is highly tolerant of badly run regimes and even badly run regimes like this one have pretty powerful coercive levers to pull. I don't think getting stuffed in Kherson will do it, nor will the coming debacle of the 3AC. It will take those events, more battlefield defeats and slow economic suffocation tied to sanctions. And even then...we'll see.

We just don't have good visibility into the regime dynamics. The Russian state is pretty clearly at the point where more or less everyone goes to work every day knowing that the boss has lost both his marbles and his mojo. The breaking point is when they decide he is going to get a large number of them killed. And by them I don't means Buryat privates in Kherson, but the upper middle management in Moscow. Saddam Hussein survived a hideous military defeat in the 1991 because the upper middle never thought it was safer to kill him than not. But that was very different regime. Remember the highest risk for top level figures in Moscow is other top level people in Moscow. If one faction  thinks another faction is moving it might cause multiple factions to make their play because they are afraid of being late to the party. This was after all a key dynamic in the beginning of the First World War, everybody mobilized because they were afraid of being caught unmobilized, then the whole avalanche just rolled down hill. We won't know anything about a SUCCESSFUL coup until Russian state TV starts playing swan lake for 48 hours straight. 

Edited August 29, 2022 by dan/california

[Grigb]

15 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Girkin summary of Battle of Bridgeheads

 

[UPDATE] Shallow penetration may be because UKR wants to meet RU regular reserves on defense. It looks like DPR Mobiks were holding the line and they ran away. RU obviously is bringing regulars now to plug the hole. 

[UPDATE] UKR captured outskirts of Blagodativka

Edited August 29, 2022 by Grigb

[Kinophile]

Another possible driver if the attack is to "kick the nest and see how the ants react". This would have the advantages of revealing any hidden RU groupings, their axis of advance/retreat,  which forces stay put and also how well the RU adjust the defence.  

Doesn't need a huge attack, and as Steve noted UKR are cautious. 

An additional benefit is these initial attacks will also reveal UKR weaknesses to their command,  in processes, procedures and personnel. 

[Haiduk]

Russians tried to hit the bridge in Mykolaiv through Inhulets river, but missed. Maybe Smerch/Tornado-S 

 

[danfrodo]

14 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Another possible driver if the attack is to "kick the nest and see how the ants react". This would have the advantages of revealing any hidden RU groupings, their axis of advance/retreat,  which forces stay put and also how well the RU adjust the defence.  

Doesn't need a huge attack, and as Steve noted UKR are cautious. 

An additional benefit is these initial attacks will also reveal UKR weaknesses to their command,  in processes, procedures and personnel. 

So far it seems folks here are concluding that UKR is doing a series of probes to stress-test RU defenses.  And as was stated earlier, they probably would have forces available to exploit if any of the probed sectors collapse.

[Haiduk]

RUMINT

UKR forces liberated Pravdyne village. There are well-fortified Russian positions on this line Pravdyne - Soldatske - M14 road

 

[Haiduk]

Snizhne, Donetsk oblast (occupied since 2014). Likely the vehicle sign of 3rd Army Corps

Edited August 29, 2022 by Haiduk

[Grigb]

Mashkovets now

Quote

Something tells me (apparently, some "inner voice") that the 3rd Army Corps of the ZVO [West Military District] will be put into battle clearly not in accordance with the original plans of the General Staff...

At least, everything will become clear... in the coming days.

 

[Seedorf81]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

For sure Shoigu was put into that position because he could be controlled.  The point many have raised since this war started is that Putin has not replaced him with someone more capable, despite the war going so horribly bad.  Now Putin is apparently bypassing the military chain of command completely.  This is exactly the opposite of what he should be doing if he wants to have a better shot at winning the war, but it is a prudent move if he fears the military is getting "funny ideas" into their heads.

Steve

This move from Putin does remind me of Hitler taking personal command of the German Army in december 1941, when he believed he could do better than his generals.

It didn't work out very well for the germans, and I don't think that Putin will do better for the Russians.