How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[panzermartin]

RU airpower is underachieving for months but it will be a difficult problem to solve when UKR will attempt to go on the offensive. 

Even gunships can safely hover in ambush positions, waiting for advancing troops to get in the kill box, while their AA assets are still lagging behind. 

 

[Grigb]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

One thing I do note, 1917 and the collapse of the Russian army, there was much, much more social discontent domestically, and right now not even the more positive scenarios envisioned at the beginning of the year, like protest movements for peace are existing.

Unlike Tsar Putin has a much more competent public suppression system. And he is actively using it. So, there will be no public show until everything "explodes". It is like USSR collapse - hardly any signs and then it just disappeared.

[Huba]

39 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

RU airpower is underachieving for months but it will be a difficult problem to solve when UKR will attempt to go on the offensive. 

Even gunships can safely hover in ambush positions, waiting for advancing troops to get in the kill box, while their AA assets are still lagging behind. 

 

It was mentioned to be the most decisive factor in stopping the Davidyv Brid counterattack, and Girkin mentioned a few times that RU relies on it in this regard.

OTOH if UA was to have a NO type mobile NASAMS as base of their AA bubble, with some Buks to supplement it, and Gepards/ Tunguskas/ tracked Starstreak on the low level, it might as well counter it. Or not - we didn't see them try yet, it's a huge unknown.

Edited July 14, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

Civilian "Girkin" (Nesmyan) regarding China interests and RU Oil prices

• China has confirmed negotiations with the United States on the price limit for Russian oil
• If negotiations are successful, then there will be a significant reduction in Russian budget revenues
• For RU the fraternal or at least partner China is an illusion

Quote

China has confirmed negotiations with the United States on the price limit for Russian oil.

This means that if negotiations are successful and China joins the project of limiting the maximum price of Russian oil, all three major markets will pursue a coordinated policy towards limiting the margins of Russian companies, which means a significant reduction in Russian budget revenues.

If someone still has illusions about fraternal or at least partner China, he can exhale. China is only interested in its own interests. And only if it fits into them, he will partner with Russia.

 

[JonS]

9 hours ago, Artkin said:

Who in the world would tell their army that they're going to be slaughtered?

In professional militaries, it's more common than you might think. US units going to NTC expect to get (virtually) slaughtered. The USMC units tagged to go across the Berm into Kuwait in 1991 were briefed to expect very very heavy casualties, and to keep on advancing. LtCol Tim Collins was very explicit on the expectation of casualties before entering Iraq in 2003. The NZ battalions going into the devil's garden in October 1942 were told, and trained, to expect heavy casualties. All the Allied units landing in Normandy on 6 June by sea or air were told to expect heavy casualties. Those are just the ones I can think of off the top of my head.

As a commander, if you /don't/ tell your soldiers realistically what they should expect, then they'll just go in to shock and freeze when the thing you knew was likely to happen happens. Not preparing the soldiers is what /bad/ commanders do.

Edited July 14, 2022 by JonS

[JonS]

10 hours ago, Artkin said:

In reality seizing the capital is a just a propaganda win. Lines of supply and communication would be cut, but every military should be prepared for a situation like this.

.mil might have a plan, but if .gov throws in the towel because the capital just got kerb stomped, then that plan is just a piece of paper forgotten in a cabinet.

"... the moral is to the physical as three is to one ..."

Some old dead guy, probably.

Edited July 14, 2022 by JonS

[Grigb]

HIMARS is really spooking RU.  Girkin advises to read the article HIMARS – just MLRS, [or] a new generation weapon, or a Doomsday machine?

• Reference to article describing HIMARS
• Confirming conclusions of the article
• Claim that current RU artillerymen are incompetent

Quote

I recommend reading the article.

HIMARS – just MLRS, a new generation weapon or a Doomsday machine?

My comment (I'm still a bit of an artilleryman) [he was mortarman] - I don't see any reason to criticize the author's statements and conclusions.

And - yes - the remark is very characteristic:
"... requires more thorough reconnaissance and target selection), logistics at least at the level of the 80s of the last century (and not the First World War)."
"Explaining on the fingers" [for dummies] - the author opaquely hints at the current general tactical level of Russian artillery. And, probably, he is generally right. Except - the Russian artillery of the 1st World War was famous for exceptionally accurate shooting (the only way it could partially compensate for the chronic shortage of ammunition and the acute shortage of heavy artillery systems) [Girkin is RU Imperial Army LARPer]. Currently, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are even significantly inferior to the enemy in this.

 

The article itself. It is just an educational article. Funny - it took them multiply HIMARS missiles to the face to realize that it is not just MLRS and to start respecting it. 

Quote

HIMARS – just MLRS, a new generation weapon or a Doomsday machine?
@atomiccherryJuly 13, 2022

American MLRS as the idea of doctrinal superiority

What could be more important in a weapon than the iron from which it is created? Idea. Concept. The doctrine within which it is created.

American multiple launch rocket systems at the project stage were radically different from their Soviet counterparts. In the USSR, MLRS were considered as a means of creating a dense firing shaft. The United States conceived its brainchild as a tool capable of breaking the prohibitive numerical superiority of the artillery of the Warsaw Pact bloc with high-speed and surgically accurate strikes.

The Soviet defense industry continued to think in terms of the Second World War, while the United States, realizing the conceptual impasse of the symmetrical arms race, relied on the creation of a new generation of weapons. This is how the M270 MLRS – installation appeared, on the basis of which HIMARS was subsequently created (it should be noted that this is de facto the same system, which has a difference only in the type of conveyor and the number of launchers). At the time of its first combat use in 1991, the M270 was a weapon of a slightly different type than its modern variants. At that time, this multiple launch rocket system performed primarily the tasks of counter–battery warfare - it was the M270 MLRS that became the main tool of the US Army in the fight against numerous, well-equipped and experienced Iraqi artillery using unguided M26 missiles. The scheme of the destruction of Iraqi batteries was, in general, simple and elegant – small mobile groups of armored vehicles provoked the Iraqis to use artillery, the positions of which were detected using mobile counter-battery radars. Further, MLRS entered the work, suppressing the enemy's positions, while being out of reach of his firepower.

By itself, from the point of view of technology, the M270 at that time did not represent something that would be an order of magnitude superior to competitors - on the contrary, the impressive results of its combat use were dictated primarily by advanced tactics and an extremely competent concept. The installation did not have a radical superiority in range over Soviet weapons (relatively speaking, 30 km versus 20 km) – its trump card was accuracy, mobility and constant work in conjunction with intelligence means.

M270 MLRS
The main advantage of American multiple launch rocket systems over competitors from other countries was the reloading of packages. If the Soviet Grad required from 30 to 50 minutes to fully reload (each rocket is loaded manually), then the M270 takes only about five minutes; at the same time, the process itself does not physically burden the installation crew.

The process of reloading is simple and fast – anyone can easily find a video and review it in detail

The combat path of American MLRS in Iraq and Afghanistan as a prologue of application in the current war

Following the results of the wars with Iraq, the United States took the path of modernization of the M270 – firstly, a lighter version of the installation was created in the person of HIMARS, and secondly, emphasis was placed on the development of the key qualities of the system - its range and accuracy.

America completely stopped the production of unguided missiles – they were replaced by heavy guided missiles M30 / M31, which significantly increased the potential of the system, making it extremely accurate and long-range.

Due to their [tactical] evolution, the M270 and HIMARS have occupied a niche of tactical aviation in terms of combat capabilities – to confirm this, it is enough to track the history of the vehicles during the conflicts against the Taliban and ISIS. MLRS were actively used in conjunction with raid groups, striking both targets identified by intelligence (warehouses, barracks, communication and control points, drug laboratories) and as a tool for direct fire support of Special Operations Forces units or the Marine Corps. The high speed of deployment and course correction of missiles using GPS made it possible to strike less than 100 meters from American positions within 5-7 minutes after the request of ground forces for fire support.

During the fighting against the forces of the Islamic State, American Special Operations Forces stormed the cities of Iraq, relying primarily on HIMARS. Small groups of SF infiltrated through the militants' defense lines, identifying the positions of the latter, after which they transmitted the coordinates to the MLRS calculations. Such tactics made it possible to deliver targeted strikes in an urban environment, achieving maximum effect in the destruction of militants, while significantly minimizing civilian casualties.

Why are we even interested in the combat path of HIMARS and its progenitor in Middle Eastern conflicts? Because it is directly related to the use of the system by the army of Ukraine. To be more precise, we are talking about embedding this MLRS into the staff and organizational structure of the AFU. Judging by a number of signs, the HIMARS transferred to Ukraine are used precisely based on the experience of their use in Iraq and Afghanistan – the installations are at the disposal of the Special Operations Forces and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. This, in turn, determines the choice of targets for which HIMARS is used – these are headquarters, ammunition depots of the divisional level and above, as well as air defense systems.

The pattern of actions is more than transparent – after careful reconnaissance, installations strike at the most vulnerable places of any army – command and supply, in the long term paralyzing its actions and preventing it from conducting offensive operations.

As the Ukrainian army becomes saturated with the M270 MLRS and HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, it is expected that a significant part of the installations will be transferred to the subordination of the army command (as a brigade–level fire weapon) and will begin to be used as a means of counter-battery warfare in the most dangerous areas - that is, to do what they were originally created for: to suppress numerically superior, but much less technologically advanced Soviet-style artillery.

As a counter–battery asset, the HIMARS in their current form are practically invulnerable weapons - they can quickly change positions and fire beyond the reach of almost the entire Russian rocket and artillery arsenal (with the exception of the OTRK [operational-tactical missile systems such as 9K720 Iskander]).
Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have training for the implementation of American counter-battery tactics and appropriate equipment: network-centric command and control systems, mass digital radio communications, mobile radars and unmanned reconnaissance systems.

All this will have a very strong impact on the combat work of the Russian artillery – it will be forced to resort to the tactics of "hit and run", abandoning its usual tactics of massing and over-concentration of firepower in narrow sections of the front. This will require a completely different level of organization quality and competencies – for the implementation of "hit and run", a functioning reconnaissance circuit is needed (a smaller number of released ammunition requires more thorough reconnaissance and target selection), logistics at least at the level of the 80s of the last century (and not the First World War), high qualification and initiative of personnel (in conditions of constant threat from the enemy's CB-means it is necessary to carefully equip firing positions, knowledge of camouflage techniques, covert movement and deployment, the ability to deploy quickly and leave positions even faster).

HIMARS – what's next?

Separately, it is worth noting that HIMARS is an extremely unpleasant target for intelligence. It is extremely difficult to find the complex using data from satellite images, aerial reconnaissance (and sometimes ground) because of the visual similarity with a conventional army truck - and this is a very useful property for a system that can fire, including using MGM–146 tactical missiles at a range of more than 300 km (as and the "younger" M30/31, this rocket has a GPS correction and can fly several hundred kilometers, landing, say, in a house. Or a bunker. Or an ammunition depot. Or... continue by yourself).

HIMARS with MGM-146 rocket
Ukraine currently does not have this type of ammunition, but it is probably only a matter of time. Most likely, they will be transferred by the Americans upon reaching a certain threshold of losses of the Russian air defense – ballistic missiles, due to their easily calculated trajectory, are a fairly vulnerable target for SAMs, however, with a general decrease in the density of the Russian air defense, they can be used with a much higher probability of success.

In fact, the strikes of the Ukrainian army against the positions of the Russian air defense were also more than predictable and understandable – and the point here is not even the high priority of the air defense system as, without a doubt, an important goal, but the fact that HIMARS over the past few years have been considered by the Pentagon precisely as a means of breaking through Russian restricted access zones [A2/AD]  and the subsequent implementation of an air-ground offensive: ground forces pave the way for aviation, destroying dangerous enemy assets, and aviation, in turn, does the same for ground forces. We are seeing something similar in Ukraine – most of the HIMARS strikes are accompanied by the active work of Ukrainian tactical aviation.

Frankly speaking, calling HIMARS "just MLRS" is stupidity of the highest standard. This is by no means an ordinary weapon system, which, even at the dawn of its appearance in the face of the M270, surpassed everything that the Soviet Union created (whose weapons make up the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation). It is no less a mistake to consider it a miracle weapon - no, like any weapon, HIMARS is good exactly within the framework of the doctrine and concept for which it was created. Its value is determined primarily by the qualifications and competence of the army that uses the system in combat.
 

 

[Grigb]

20 minutes ago, JonS said:

As a commander, if you /don't/ tell your soldiers realistically what they should expect, then they'll just go in to shock and freeze when the thing you knew was likely to happen happens. Not preparing the soldiers is what /bad/ commanders do.

That's exactly what RU command does and that's exactly what happens with inexperienced RU soldiers and junior officers.  That is one of the main reasons you saw so many lapses of command on RU side at the beginning of the war. 

[kraze]

30 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Unlike Tsar Putin has a much more competent public suppression system. And he is actively using it. So, there will be no public show until everything "explodes". It is like USSR collapse - hardly any signs and then it just disappeared.

Hardly any signs to the outside maybe. It wasn't an information age so no way of knowing for anyone outside (and many inside) about the non-stop local wars and uprisings that were going back and forth through that former russian empire.

This time it's different however because the return to the old days of barbaric ideology of Muscovy mixed with 20th century Nazism found very strong support and response among the russian populace. Because soviet ideology was built on lies about the bright future and everybody in the world living in poverty, while a "soviet citizen" was living the best life ever - and that didn't fly because it wasn't true. Current russian ideology, founded by Yeltsin, offers brutal truth: yes we are poor af and there's no freedom - but who cares - let's invade everything, rob, rape, whole world is there for the taking, it's all free - we got nukes and nobody will ever stop us. And thus you see an absolute unity among russians in favor of all the wars since 1991.

[Grigb]

Just now, kraze said:

Hardly any signs to the outside maybe. It wasn't an information age so no way of knowing for anyone outside (and many inside) about the non-stop local wars and uprisings that were going back and forth through that former russian empire.

[1.]This time it's different however because the return to the old days of barbaric ideology of Muscovy mixed with 20th century Nazism found very strong support and response among the russian populace. Because soviet ideology was built on lies about the bright future and everybody in the world living in poverty, while a "soviet citizen" was living the best life ever - and that didn't fly because it wasn't true. [2.]Current russian ideology, founded by Yeltsin, [3.]offers brutal truth: yes we are poor af and there's no freedom - but who cares - let's invade everything, rob, rape, whole world is there for the taking, it's all free - we got nukes and nobody will ever stop us. [4.]And thus you see an absolute unity among russians in favor of all the wars since 1991.

1. No
2. No
3. No
4. No

[kraze]

4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

1. No
2. No
3. No
4. No

Those are great counter-arguments but since 1991 Russia invaded a dozen of countries, committed countless warcrimes, Yeltsin in particular was a humongous warmonger, starting a new war or two EVERY year - and had an insane support among russians up until Russia lost the war in Chechnya. In fact if it didn't - Yeltsin wouldn't have lost people's support, wouldn't have been poisoned, stayed a Tsar and you'd be blaming him for the war in Ukraine today and putin would've stayed a nobody.

[Huba]

17 minutes ago, Grigb said:

As the Ukrainian army becomes saturated with the M270 MLRS and HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, it is expected that a significant part of the installations will be transferred to the subordination of the army command (as a brigade–level fire weapon) and will begin to be used as a means of counter-battery warfare in the most dangerous areas - that is, to do what they were originally created for: to suppress numerically superior, but much less technologically advanced Soviet-style artillery.

That's exactly what's going to happen. Add to this more and more numerous tube launched PGMs - PGK corrected fuze costs less than $10K. Used en masse against tactical targets, I can't imagine the carnage it will create.

[poesel]

The PzH should be able to shoot Excalibur rounds. I haven't read anything about abilities being stripped from that vehicle.
Not that many PzHs in the theater, but then probably not that many Excalibur rounds either.

Does anyone know what happened to these AA systems:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_(missile)

Should still be some in stock. Not the most modern system but IMHO better than nothing.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

So I have a thought regarding @The_Capt search for the mass on the UA battlefield. We saw different attempts at that fail rather miserably during last months. One that succeeded was good old WW1 type artillery mas, which finally managed to slowly push the Ukrainian forces. It probably got countered already (we shall see soon) by UA deep precision strike, which I think will compromise RU ability to amass it's artillery to the Severodonetsk level in the future.

The Russian approach of massing dumb artillery and obliterating everything to make any progress is rather inaccessible to UA, and in many cases they wouldn't choose it even if it was (can't just level their own cities). So perhaps the one way UA could amass similar, or possibly even greater firepower is by the use of PGMs and superior ISR? It wasn't on the table till a week or two ago. but since GMLRS arrived, it's use become the most spectacular success. What I'm thinking is that to achieve any breakthrough, best tool UA has/ will have are the tube/ rocket guided munitions. They have guns capable of launching Excaliburs to great range, and fast. They have  1000 rounds from the last package, and more to come. They have proven capability with GMLRS, and the number of launchers will soon triple. They have superior ISR. Finally, with the SMart/ BONUS shells they even have limited ability to target moving targets at great ranges - like SPGs on the move in the rear of the battle zone. At the moment most of this is still on the way, and what is in theater is used piecemeal against high value targets. I imagine it will change if UA was ever to commit to attack. All this "smart" firepower, concentrated in relatively small sector and used for preliminary bombardment, and then in combination with advancing forces/ drone reckon in support might have an interesting effect. Especially it might allow for dealing with RU artillery in a very fast and brutal manner - untill PGMs and drones are not exhausted of course, but this whole idea rests on the assumptions of having 3 smart rounds for every Russian gun in the vicinity. From numbers perspective it seems quite achievable.

What's worth noting is that this type of mass PGM use was historically never available to any army advancing in conventional setting - even during initial phases of Iraqi Freedom, most of PGMs were air dropped and not GPS guided to allow for massed fire-and-forget launch, the way that will become available for UA very soon.

One thing that idea doesn't solve is of course RU airpower, that needs a technical solution on it's own, but it seems to be worked on. 

Does it sound plausible at all?

My addendum to Arquilla’s three new rules of modern warfare:

Mass beats isolation; connected precision beats mass; Integrated mass precision beats everything.  

My sense drawing from both this war and the Nargono-Karabahk is that we have entered into an age of Firepower dominant warfare, not unlike where we found ourselves in WW1.  The ability to Find and Fix has far exceeded abilities to counter, combined with the ability to Finish at trending 1:1 kill ratio capability rates, is transforming our concepts of mass on the modern battlefield.  The only forms that have worked so far in this war have been overmatch-mass of the Russians in a very small area at Severodonetsk, which was extremely costly and slow.  And the distributed mass we saw employed by the UA in Phase 1, which was highly effective in defence/denial but we have not yet seen it effective at scale in the offence.

Integrated mass PGMs/Unmanned swarms on the offence employed at an operational level would be a revolutionary moment in the history of warfare.  We can see it from here in this war but we will have to wait and see if it actually happens.

[Billy Ringo]

And the Academy Award for Music Score in the Short Version Film category goes to the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade.

( I realize this adds nothing to the informative and intellectual discourse in this thread, which I truly appreciate, but damn---this may be the most awesome clip I've seen in the entire war.)

[Grigb]

4 hours ago, kraze said:

Those are great counter-arguments 

Not going to waste my time disproving an initial extremely inaccurate assessment. 

What I am going to do is to put several quotes:

1. Pro-war Nat Girkin: RU population will stop supporting the war because they do not really understand why RU started the war
2. Pro-war Nat military expert Maxim Klimov (42:46) : ...Regional high-ranking officials discussed the drain [loss] in Ukraine
3. Anti-war RU Na Nesmyan: ...only 3 percent of respondents said they would be happy to unite the territories in any form...the goals of the entire event [SMO] are perceived distantly and indirectly by the absolute majority of the population.

It is very clear that there is no deep public support for the war. There is shallow and fragile support of convenience. 

Edited July 14, 2022 by Grigb

[Grigb]

Civilian "Girkin" (Nesmyan) regarding RU bank practice

• Raiffeisenbank [large RU bank] significantly increases negative interest rates on deposits
• Reason is bank unable to earn on loans will now earn on commissions

Quote

Raiffeisenbank [large RU bank] significantly increases negative interest rates on deposits. They are called "commission", but this does not change the essence: you will now have to pay to store currency.

From the amount above 5 thousand conventional units [RU euphemism for dollars], the commission will be 0.5% per month instead of 0.2%. Over 50 thousand [you] will have to pay twice as much as before - 1% commission percentage of the amount. The commission for the purchase of currency to the brokerage account will be 3% of the purchase amount - this is 10 times more than under the previous conditions.

The reason is the same. The currency has ceased to be a means of payment. So, of course, it remains full-fledged money, but for Russian citizens it is now just glass, beads, and pebbles. Banks unable to earn on loans will now earn on commissions. It's [that] simple for these guys.

 

[akd]

17 hours ago, akd said:

Major Alexey Kalmykov, deputy commander of a Spetsnaz unit (22nd Spetsnaz Brigade detachment?)

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Kalmykov was Deputy Commander - Chief of Staff for the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade.

Further confirmation that 106th Guards Airborne Division HQ took a serious hit.  Colonel Maksim Kudrin, Deputy Commander for Armaments:

 

Edited July 14, 2022 by akd

[Grigb]

RU targeting decision making regarding recent Vinnitsa strike according to RU propagandist Symonyan

Quote

I asked MO [D] where they hit in Vinnitsa. Answer: 'To the Officers' House, there was a temporary accommodation point for the Nazis.'

And the photo was sent.

I publish it as sent.

If you click on the provided photo, you will see that the proof is several of men in military uniform helping with wounded + policeman with AK and several young men. These RU morons considers occasionally passing by uniformed man or man with AK is reason enough to destroy any civilian building. 

Edited July 14, 2022 by Grigb

[Grigb]

Girkin post quotes from article regarding drone development programs in Post-USSR countries. Basically, RU is facing significant delays in drone production. Then as usual he rants about Shoigu: 

Quote

My comment: if the delay in the development of the most up-to-date modern weapons (for the absence of which our troops are now paying with heavy losses) is considered a "small delay" for 15 years, then, of course, the Plywood Marshal [Shoigu] is the best (after Serdyukov or Grachev) Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. And there really is no alternative to it.
But in China (for some reason I think so) for such a "small delay" the culprit "would have been shortened a little." For example, on the head. Of course, such ministers do need it - "they eat in it"[RU joke], but is it worth considering the interests of "protoplasm [that only is] eating and multiplying" (S. A. and B. Strugatsky [Cult RU sci-fi writers])?

Shoigu is a dead man if nationalists take power.

[Grigb]

Fun fact - currently RU Nats are discussing that commanders of UKR HIMARS are Americans.

[dan/california]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

So I have a thought regarding @The_Capt search for the mass on the UA battlefield. We saw different attempts at that fail rather miserably during last months. One that succeeded was good old WW1 type artillery mas, which finally managed to slowly push the Ukrainian forces. It probably got countered already (we shall see soon) by UA deep precision strike, which I think will compromise RU ability to amass it's artillery to the Severodonetsk level in the future.

The Russian approach of massing dumb artillery and obliterating everything to make any progress is rather inaccessible to UA, and in many cases they wouldn't choose it even if it was (can't just level their own cities). So perhaps the one way UA could amass similar, or possibly even greater firepower is by the use of PGMs and superior ISR? It wasn't on the table till a week or two ago. but since GMLRS arrived, it's use become the most spectacular success. What I'm thinking is that to achieve any breakthrough, best tool UA has/ will have are the tube/ rocket guided munitions. They have guns capable of launching Excaliburs to great range, and fast. They have  1000 rounds from the last package, and more to come. They have proven capability with GMLRS, and the number of launchers will soon triple. They have superior ISR. Finally, with the SMart/ BONUS shells they even have limited ability to target moving targets at great ranges - like SPGs on the move in the rear of the battle zone. At the moment most of this is still on the way, and what is in theater is used piecemeal against high value targets. I imagine it will change if UA was ever to commit to attack. All this "smart" firepower, concentrated in relatively small sector and used for preliminary bombardment, and then in combination with advancing forces/ drone reckon in support might have an interesting effect. Especially it might allow for dealing with RU artillery in a very fast and brutal manner - untill PGMs and drones are not exhausted of course, but this whole idea rests on the assumptions of having 3 smart rounds for every Russian gun in the vicinity. From numbers perspective it seems quite achievable.

What's worth noting is that this type of mass PGM use was historically never available to any army advancing in conventional setting - even during initial phases of Iraqi Freedom, most of PGMs were air dropped and not GPS guided to allow for massed fire-and-forget launch, the way that will become available for UA very soon.

One thing that idea doesn't solve is of course RU airpower, that needs a technical solution on it's own, but it seems to be worked on. 

Does it sound plausible at all?

Yes, 100% plausible. The entire Ukrainian strategy at this point is to substitute enormous amounts of GMLRS/precision and drones/ISR superiority for a functioning air force with air supremacy. It will be revolutionary if it works , since you are talking about getting 70% of the capability for about 5% of the cost. 

 

[A Canadian Cat]

20 hours ago, hcrof said:

I don't want to sound cynical but that video is not going to convince many of the useful idiots...

Possibly, some people just don't listen to facts, but the key piece is the point that there is no treaty or agreement that states anything like the Russian line. You can check that out for your self. So, it will work for may people who are just uninformed.

An example came up just the other day. My future son in law made some comment about Russia having a right to be upset because of NATO expansion against agreements. My mother in law thought that was reasonable. I was able to change both of their minds by simply saying what the video says - you show the me the treaty or the agreement that says anything like that NATO agrees not to expand. Plus tell me about the international agreement that states that nations do not have the right to determine what alliances they should join or form.

They could not find anything.

Minds changed.

There are a non trivial number of people in the west who just do not know the facts and they keep hearing the Russian propaganda repeated by their own journalists.

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

[The_Capt]

On 7/13/2022 at 12:09 PM, Aragorn2002 said:

Sobering. Please comment.

Ok, time to swing back to this one.  This guy sounds like he knows what he is talking about to me.  A few points that I am not sure I am comfortable with:

- He does not really use "shaping" correctly, or at least in terms as we understand the term in the west.  Shaping operations are defined as "an operation that establishes condition for decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and terrain." (https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf)  What Russia did at the beginning of the Donbas phase does not really fit any of those criteria.  His description sounds more like positioning.

- Three guys walking down a road, somewhere, is not a rout.  The UA had weeks to decide to get out of "the cauldron" as the RA was moving by inches.  If units got caught or were sacrificed, that is one thing, but nothing in the RA rate of advance speaks to conditions for an uncontrolled withdrawal.  Nor have we seen any evidence on open source to back this up - large amounts of Russians with trophy equipment, or PoWs.  So I challenge that assumption right up front.  

- The defensive lines he draws pretty much match our own here, and make sense.  

- I am allergic to bold drawn arrows in this war; I have been let down too many times.  Neither side has been able to make large muscle movements since March (with the possible exception of Kharkiv), so the idea that "this is it, the Russians will now spring the trap!" is not credible until we see some actual success.

- Force ratios.  Seriously, what is wrong with the professional military community?  They keep turning to these quantitative-only force ratio assessments, even though they completely failed us in this war to-date.  And here on an analysis/assessment video on 08 Jul , I am still seeing "this many Bns vs this many BTGs" and we are supposed to take something from it.  What is the qualitative assessment?  I don't care if Russia has 4 times the numbers of troops, if those troops are all old men and scared kids with three weeks training, no radios, no cas evac, scrounging locally for food and unable to employ heavy weapons effectively; those are not troops, they are a uniformed mob waiting to die.  The good analyst here even points to the increasing "Russian forces vs dwindling Ukrainian ones" as a concern...but what are those increasing Russian forces made up of?

Other points:

- M777 losses are concerning as they are supposed to outrange Russian guns for the most part.  I have to wonder if there is a problem with positioning within the UA, or is this just the cost of doing business.  Russian c-battery seems to be pretty quick, which leaves me wondering why their offensive fires are so "not".  From what we have seen the Russians have basically gone WW1 on massed fires, while c-bty in seconds minutes takes pretty powerful ISR (detection and ranging) support; however, I would let the arty specialist weigh in on this one.  I also take UA messaging carefully, at the levels talking there is a strategic narrative to continue to push the west to strengthen support and provide help.  Problem is that if Ukraine cries for help too loudly, or amplifies things, the West will get nervous and wonder if we have backed the right horse...and we have a bad history with backing the wrong horses. 

-This video is from 08 Jul, so we now know that Russia has been in at least a week long operational pause.  We have yet to see Russia able to keep anything that resembles a threatening operational tempo, this is a very slow grind.  It works, but so slow and costly.

As to long war, short war.  Well at coming up to 5 months, this war is already longish by western standards when compared to its intensity.  The answer is that both are possible at this point but there are a lot of unknowns.  I would boil it down to Western Will vs Russian Will - and here I mean the will of actual Russians, not Putin and his cronies.  Western Will is fiscal, self-centered and frankly has the resolve of a skittish milk maid on a good day.  I have zero doubts about Ukraine, it has mobilized, to the point that killing Russians has taken on cultural significance - the Ukraine after this war will not be the same one that went in. 

The West, if it keeps pushing weapons, ISR and money, can keep this going forever...but, it may have to actually make some sacrifices to do so, and that does have me worried.  We are not really good at sacrifice on a large scale right now, and have not been since the 60s in reality.  We got burned, and lied to by leadership back then, and ever since we have a weird relationship with sacrifice.  "Sure I support Ukrainians...just don't ask me to do anything about it." is a disturbing trend.  This is not new, just look at GWOT and how the US had to tie itself in knots to avoid anything that hinted at conscription in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g. stop-loss, etc).  At the beginning of this war the amount of unity was refreshing but whether we have the attention span and will to keep doing this is not a done deal.  I suspect we are in too deep to pull out now and every time the Russians are dumb enough to commit war crimes it helps us keep that unity; however, as the costs continue to rise, it is a concern moving forward.   That said, some things are already too big to back away from, such as the momentum NATO has right now.  So if asked I will always list Western Will as a concern but signs are pointing to us remaining unified and "all in", at least for now.

Russian Will is another beast altogether.  Putin and his gang are like the US back in '06, they are doing everything possible not to mobilize, while mobilizing.  They are doing so for a reason, and that reason is that Russian Will for this war is very likely not homogeneous, not solid across the entire federation.  Russia has almost adopted a Western proxy position by pushing as many LNR/DNR conscripts, and contractors into the fight as possible in order to minimize the effect on the Homefront.  But high intensity warfare is just to big to hide, the losses from this war already make it the most high intensity conflict of the 21st century, so how long is Russia willing to do this?  How long will they support Putin in doing this?  This is the calculus that is not on Putin's side.

So back to long vs short war.  My guess is that if this war does not slow down, it will likely still be short; either the West or Russia (likely Russia) will run out of runway on this thing at this rate of burn.  [Note the Ukrainians are not part of this calculus as far as I can tell, they are totally in it regardless...and who can blame them].  If this war slows its burn down, say to the sort of thing we saw in the Donbas before this whole thing, then long becomes a real possibility.  If the UA cannot solve for offence, that is a real possibility...but I am thinking that once the RA runs out of gas, or calls a political "win" the UA will then start going to work on them. 

Of course, back to a point we have made from way back...at this point when the war ends is really moot, which is sad really.  Russia has already lost any initial strategic objectives except regime survival, which is also a maybe.  In fact it has lost so much political strategic ground by this point that even if they somehow took all of Ukraine, this would still be a loss (see: loss of credible power, sanctions, isolation, Sweden and Finland/NATO, etc).  Which makes this whole fiasco so tragic as people keep dying, well past a rational point.

Edited July 15, 2022 by The_Capt