How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

8 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

I agree voices calling for the "final solution" on the russian nation are rather shortsighted. But wouldn't also what you propose kinda resemble Germany post WW1? 

I recall a Twitter thread where the poster noted that sanctions for the purposes of regime change essentially never work and that sanctions for that goal will always fail, but for goals like preventing Russia from rearming easier, then that's way more achievable.

 

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Possibly, at least in the short term.  However, unlike containment of Germany through a punitive formal treaty the form projected on Russia would likely be better served by a version of the Cold War strategy of containment through alignment with everyone afraid of them - until we can negotiate with something rational inside Russia itself.

Like WW1 Germany, it may very well bring the crazies out of the woodwork; however, here we may have to get pulled into subversive active measures to ensure that they do not get "too crazy".  Also like pre-WW2, the bill is on us with respect to resolve - if that fails we could be back to this in 25 years.

Do not get me wrong, this is a mess that will need to be actively managed for at least a generation or two...that is what 24 Feb really meant.

 

I think you are overestimating the CIA a little too much. Considering that Germany only broke for peace due to invasion about to take place and Russia vs the west is no where near such a point of occurring, there isn't any real path that results in trials or reparations happening. The cold war where the Soviet Union collapsed "and the West won" only reinforces my point that change can only happen internally. And as many have stated, the limits of that collapse continue today, a Russia that 30 years later, is invading wholesale all of Ukraine. So even that internal led collapse didn't prevent this outcome today.

[Huba]

1 minute ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

This looks like the Russians are demo'ing the wreck of the Alligator class that is still lying there. It's the exact location.

Not according to this guy, who's as trustworthy as "Twitter experts" get. And hello back, haven't see you around for a while

 

[Taranis]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

So what is your general opinion about the VAB? Is it a well liked vehicle, or something people have to put up with? The technical specifications can be found online, but this kind of insight would be great

And another question. I just read an article (in Polish) about French equipment that could be potentially supplied to Ukraine by French army, and it's quite a list. Apart from VABs, author mentiones ECR-90s and AMX-10RC,  as well as AMX-10P as that you supposedly have hundreds of in storage. But he also mentions AMX-30 AuF1 and AuF2. Of the first type there might be even upt to two hundred vehicles in storage, and around 30 of the AuF2 type also. I wasn't aware that France has that much stuff stored, would you know if that's true, and in what state those guns might be?

Well, the VAB from the Cold War is starting to become an aging vehicle, but it's the same for any BMP-1, YPR-765 or Leopard 1 that we can send. It's an APC and not an IFV so don't expect too many miracles. It will strengthen Ukrainian mobility while being protected. Given that the current big problem is Russian artillery, one of the characteristics of APCs is to provide theoretical mobility while being protected from artillery. I would say that its strengths are really its availability (it's not a difficult vehicle to produce, we have a lot of them), its versatility (as in my example in the previous post, we see that it's a mule that supports many versions, anti-tank, ambulance etc). It is a vehicle that is shorter than a BTR while remaining much more comfortable and easy to access (rear doors). For information the engine is in the middle of the vehicle and there is a small "tunnel" which allows to reach the front and the back of the vehicle but honestly with a bulletproof vest, ammunition etc it is not passable (without the latters is done quite easily). That said, it still allows you to pass ammunition boxes from front to back and vice versa. It is in line with the French doctrine of the Cold War: mobility! Its flaws, like many APCs, is its rather weak armor I think and weak armament depending on the version (the most common was the 12.7mm). There is also a 20mm cannon version but I have only rarely seen one in real life and I did not see any on the previous video. The cupolas present were standards accepting the 12.7mm (.50 cal)

At the beginning of my military career, there were 2 types of regiments (US battalions equivalent) of artillery: those with AuF-1 (SPG) + 120mm RTF-1 mortar and those with TRF-1 (towed) + 120mm RTF-1 ( there was also 1 regiment with MLRS but let's move on). Some time later and when I arrived in the unit, all the regiments switched to CAESAR + 120mm RTF-1 (some also kept the TRF-1, for example the 35th RAP (Airborne)). So we see that around 2010-2011, a large quantity of AuF-1 were put in reserve so I think it holds together and it's not that old. I also remember having seen in maneuver (I will not specify the place ) many AMX-30s were in storage. During the same period the AMX-10P was replaced in the infantry regiments by having VBCI. For example, in Afghanistan, the 1st Riflemen in 2011-2012 no longer had AMX-10Ps but only VBCIs and VABs. Currently the 1st RInfanterie is replacing VABs with VBMR Griffons. All this shows that there is and will be stock. Concerning the AuF-2, I didn't know it too well and I don't remember that in unit there was a distinction made. Did some units only have it? I don't know but we were always talking about AuF-1.

The AMX-10RC would be very interesting because of its firepower for its category (105mm on wheels!) but what was very effective during the Cold War is surely outdated now but good since we see the arrival of T-62s ...

[The_Capt]

32 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I actually contest that Russia and Putin understand that Russia is unable to form a third pole to compete against China or the West and that it's only for domestic consumption, in that your separating the elite from the mass of Russia in their goals. It's far more likely the elite, and Putin are true believers in this project.

I am going to leave the rest as it is wrestling with How and frankly, I do not think we are there yet.  We are trying to define Why and What.  My post was to outline the most likely desired Strategic Endstates from our perspective - not predict what will actually happen.  All war is negotiation and figuring out what that space looks like is a whole thing in itself.

However, if what you say above it true then this highlights the requirement for regime change even further.  First, we cannot re-normalize with the Putin regime and not threaten our own Endstates, more so if that regime truly believes the "third pole" theory, a "USSR v 2.0", then they must be removed completely, as a third (unstable) power pole is 1) irrational and 2)destabilizing to the point it threatens our interest directly.

I think that the cynical kleptocracy that Putin and his gang have undertaken does not signal a Father of an Greater Empire narrative in the least.  It looks more like "public consumption bullsh*t while we get take everything we can".  But if I am wrong it does not change the Strategic Endstates as noted...it highlights them. 

[Der Zeitgeist]

7 minutes ago, Huba said:

Not according to this guy, who's as trustworthy as "Twitter experts" get. And hello back, haven't see you around for a while

Yes, I needed a bit of a "vacation", so to speak and got out of the constant drumbeat of Twitter, Telegram, Discord and forum threads about the war for a month or so. I highly recommend it to clear one's head. 

[FancyCat]

26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Also like pre-WW2, the bill is on us with respect to resolve - if that fails we could be back to this in 25 years.

Do not get me wrong, this is a mess that will need to be actively managed for at least a generation or two...that is what 24 Feb really meant.

On one hand it is undoubtedly a failure that this war has occurred and certainly the west holds some blame for not taking stronger positions against Putin earlier. Certainly stronger positions towards Ukraine joining NATO or EU may have helped prevent war. But it's important to note that even after 1991, Russia still enacted violent actions towards it's neighbors and breakaway states that illustrated the limits of both that internal collapse in the Soviet Union and the ability of the West to bring change. And while the west could have taken more stronger positions then, certainly a more dominant west would have simply validated Russian fears with intervention and cause more spreading conflict. (Nukes..)

What I'm saying is there isn't going to be a way to nearly tie this up in a bow. In 25 years this may well go down again. All the West can do is prep and act with restraint. A lot was done right past 1991 mind you. Eastern Europe is undoubtedly a success story, even if still painful and bloody for some states. Russia can only try to take Ukraine, instead of invading the Baltics or Poland. NATO, EU themselves have not collapsed, a victory of its own deserving acclaim. All the west can do to prep is ensure the eastern flank remains strong, and includes Ukraine. If we keep the EU and NATO in 30 years, it may never even happen.

No need to take down Russia in any sense.

[sburke]

Mysterious Oligarch Deaths Are 'Not a Coincidence': Russian Banker (msn.com)

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Looks like that oil rig that was hit by the Ukrainian military in the Black sea is still burning.

Russians yestarday claimed their platform Tavrida was hit again with UKR missile. Helicopter landing site was destroyed. Our official sources didn't tell about this

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

What I'm saying is there isn't going to be a way to nearly tie this up in a bow. In 25 years this may well go down again. All the West can do is prep and act with restraint. A lot was done right past 1991 mind you. Eastern Europe is undoubtedly a success story, even if still painful and bloody for some states. Russia can only try to take Ukraine, instead of invading the Baltics or Poland. NATO, EU themselves have not collapsed, a victory of its own deserving acclaim. All the west can do to prep is ensure the eastern flank remains strong, and includes Ukraine. If we keep the EU and NATO in 30 years, it may never even happen.

No need to take down Russia in any sense.

I suspect that we are agreeing loudly in many regards.

There is no way to tie this up neatly - we can define Endstates, we then have to negotiate with them continuously.  In fact all parties will need to.

There is "taking Russia down", and then there is "taking Putin down" the man and his cronies are not the Russian state.  There is no way we can renormalize with the current Russian regime...none.  If we do we abandon the modern rules of war completely, we admit that there is no global order nor are we its champions; the impacts of this are profound.

If Putin stays in power we will likely isolate Russia completely - Europe is already on a one way trip to doing this.  We will not be lifting sanctions and Russia is very likely to become weaker and more vulnerable over time.  Militarily we will box Russia in and continue to compress - plan for that is already in motion.  Russians will eventually have to decide how much pain they can take - so you are correct in it being an internal decision.  Internal mechanism can be "encouraged" by external forces, plenty evidence of this and we will do this as well.  So Endstate = Russia: Contracted, Compressed, Constrained and Contained...until Russia finds, or is assisted in finding, an SOB we can actually work with.

I am not sure what part of this is "neat little bow".

Edited June 28, 2022 by The_Capt

[billbindc]

Compression is definitely the word for it. One big concern right now is a Russian lunge into the Baltics. By this time next year, that will be an exceedingly costly option for Putin.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/27/nato-300000-troops-high-alert-russia-threat-ukraine

[Grigb]

10 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

I don't know, I'm reading this thread since day 1 and I have encountered quite a few posts about the "fundamentally flawed", since the dawn of times, russians. 

So, there was no any comments about extermination of RU people except claims by RU side. Instead, there was critic of the fundamentally flawed RU imperial culture.

Let me remind you that RU side sees foreigners and especially Ukrainians as fundamentally flawed.  Whether that means extermination, I will leave up to you to decide.

 

[Jammason]

First post of long-time thread lurker to make this comment in the hopes of being informed by responses it might provoke:

It seems to me what this thread gets right is the massive stupidity of the initial invasion plan and the ineptitude with which it was carried out, plus the skill and will of the Ukrainian defense. And while assessments of Russia’s more recent change in strategy and tactics toward the Donbas have been more sober, it seems to me the group’s thinking generally doesn’t take into account a real and significant difference between the two phases of the war: There is a large number of people in Donetsk and Luhansk who DO NOT want to be part of Ukraine.

Setting aside the “hows” of the 8-year long Russification of the Donbas (and Crimea), which is a fascinating topic in its own right, the fact is it’s not just Russia fighting the UKR army here. The (vast?) majority of the casualties are Ukrainian on Ukrainian, which I’m sure is seen as a win-win for Putin. But through this lens, it is harder to see statements like “it’s easier to defend territory than attack” as a reason for the inevitable collapse of the RU army: The DPR and LPR *are* on defense. It’s the Ukrainians who are attacking. Militarily, the new, saner objective favors RU artillery superiority, so the many handy stories of infantry incompetence are less relevant. Also, I don't know how UKR & allies solve the problem of cruise missiles being fired from bombers flying within RU airspace. This war is going to be *a lot* tougher than a simple projection of RU's performance in the early months would have one think.

Further, “righteous points” are scored by Russia with the change in objectives (to be sure, it requires amnesia regarding the initial invasion or a belief in the military “feint” line, which is being swallowed by the US far right): They are simply acting like the French did in support of the American Revolution (yes, the French committed troops and deployed their navy in addition to sending money and weapons). These poor Russian-speaking—and increasingly Russian identifying—republics are being denied their freedom; we, noble mother Russia, are just helping them fight for independence.

The true believers in the Donetsk and Luhansk are the ones fighting an existential fight: Win or die. This is an argument typically given for why the Ukrainian army will eventually triumph, but the dynamic might be even more acute for the DPR and LPR. This might be their last and only chance at independence (forgetting what you and I know about a Belarusian-style “independence”).

In short, I don't see the inevitable collapse of the RU army. Seems to me their path to "claimed victory" is at least as foreseeable as is Ukraine's *actual* victory.  Whoever prevails, I’m not sure the insurrection and reconstruction struggles will be any easier if Ukraine wins or the Russian-backed separatists.

[Harmon Rabb]

News from Berdyansk.

Edited June 28, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[Grigb]

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 So Endstate = Russia: Contracted, Compressed, Constrained and Contained...until Russia finds, or is assisted in finding, an SOB we can actually work with.

There is one internal factor that needs to be taken into account. RU relies heavily on Soviet infrastructure. There was no any major modernization programs. Ru is crumbling slowly even without external pressure. Even without war RU would have 5-10 years. With the war and sanctions, I am afraid less than 5 years.

Quote from civilian "Girkin" about RU infrastructure right before the war.

Quote

Wear and tear
The figures of the day (or rather, of the week) are utility bills, which have increased multiples everywhere this month. The messages are coming from Moscow, but it is happening everywhere.

The accounting logic is obvious here: at the end of the year, a recalculation and reconciliation with the actual expenditure of resources was carried out. The difference was spread to consumers and rolled up in bills.

In reality, the situation also looks banal. The network infrastructure is in critical condition. Even without theft, it is a source of colossal losses — water, gas, energy. Theoretically, these are the problems of network owners, in fact it is easier for them to close the hole at the expense of the consumer. Plus an increase in the tariff, of course. The tariff increase is unpleasant, but it allows you not to psychologically injure the consumer. However, when the tariff cannot be raised due to political considerations, the gap begins to accumulate. And it is closed with a one-time action. It might work or might not.

The problem is that the wear of networks is so catastrophic even in large metropolitan areas that there is simply no resource capable of simultaneously solving the problem of current repairs and replacing the network economy that has exhausted its resource. Five years ago, the amount needed to replace the exhausted network infrastructure of St. Petersburg was estimated at about a trillion rubles. I think it's more now. Which in itself only means that the system is in critical condition before the first serious accident. Which, of course, will be closed, but the overall stability will fall even more. The consequences are clear.

By the way, St. Petersburg is a unique city in this respect in terms of water and heat supply, it has only one analogue on the territory of the former Soviet Union -Kiev. The uniqueness is due to the uneven distribution of generating capacity and consumption, separated by the riverbed. This creates additional threats to the stability of the entire system. A few years ago, a major accident at a thermal power plant occurred on Vasilyevsky Island, it was eliminated, but the systemic stability of the entire urban infrastructure has greatly decreased since that moment.

At the same time, the state pursues a policy of self-exclusion from all social projects. Therefore, we cannot count on state programs to replacing networks. The state tritely cheated by privatizing the network economy after a decade of pumping out a resource from it in the 90s. Instead of creating conditions for external investment, it followed the path of dumping this burden, which led to a smoother, but still deterioration of the situation. Both on the scale of individual cities and across the country as a whole.

By the way, the water disaster in Crimea is a direct consequence of the policy. The main water losses occur in the networks. But for 8 years, the government has not been able to create a project to completely replace the completely worn-out network infrastructure. It turned out to be cheaper to look for water under the Sea of Azov than just to replace the pipes. However, water was also not found, and therefore last year's rains, which poured water into reservoirs, only delayed the next crisis. For a year or two, no more. Then the drought will come to the peninsula again.

All this is happening all over the country. But the regime has no task to equip the country. It is easier for them to spend billions on moving tanks back and forth than on everyday and boring work. In which the Fuhrer and his entourage do not understand anything, and therefore are not going to do anything.

We will have to pay for everything. First with money, then with periodic and increasingly large—scale crises and catastrophes. Truly, after Putin's regime, there will be nothing in the country that does not need to be built from scratch and anew. This collective Midas turns everything he touches into ****.

Moscow does not govern anything. It just pumps money out of local regions till they start disintegrating due to crumbling infrastructure. The feared African scenario is actually default scenario. Empire will disintegrate regardless of West actions.

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, Jammason said:

The true believers in the Donetsk and Luhansk are the ones fighting an existential fight: Win or die. This is an argument typically given for why the Ukrainian army will eventually triumph, but the dynamic might be even more acute for the DPR and LPR. This might be their last and only chance at independence (forgetting what you and I know about a Belarusian-style “independence”).

In short, I don't see the inevitable collapse of the RU army. Seems to me their path to "claimed victory" is at least as foreseeable as is Ukraine's *actual* victory.  Whoever prevails, I’m not sure the insurrection and reconstruction struggles will be any easier if Ukraine wins or the Russian-backed separatists.

I have to admit this has been a bit of an itch at the back of my head as well.  I think there is definitely an element of this at play but I am not sure how much.

DPR and LPR elements of obviously picked a side with Russia, even before the war.  How committed they are in "liberating" themselves is not clear, nor how that applies to the map.  LNR and DPR forces are reportedly being used as cannon fodder - I do not think we can call them proxies as Russia is still far to heavily involved in all this; those weren't 900 LNR guns around Severodonetsk.

Of course grown ups try to negotiate these sorts of things first, as opposed to attempting a full fledged invasion.  

If I was in the LNR or DPR and fighting on the Russian side, beyond being employed to catch shrapnel, a major question I would have is "who is going to pay to rebuild our newly liberated nation?"  The Ukraine has the West, but LNR has Russia and I would not be entirely comfortable that they are going to be coming to fix anything in my lifetime.

As to the RA collapse, well my thinking is that it is already collapsing and has been for a couple months now; this is why we have seen a devolution in its tactics.  I do not believe that the Russian Forces are anywhere near able to conduct operational level of warfare today in comparison to 24 Feb - and joint warfare has simply left the building.  They are able to conduct WW1 style tactical warfare - and maybe, just maybe, might be able to pull off mechanized/combined arms warfare but we have been waiting for that one for awhile, and I suspect their ability to sustain it is already broken.

Everyone seems to be waiting for a complete dramatic collapse like we saw in March - it may very well happen but some pre-conditions/indicators need to happen first.  For example, the Russian offence must stop or simply be no longer possible.  Once the Russians go on entirely on the defence (and if you look at the line, they are already there except for Donbas), we enter into a new phase of this thing.

But hey, buckle in, it has been a crazy ride so far and anything can happen...and it isn't over yet.

[Zeleban]

14 minutes ago, Jammason said:

Первый пост давнего наблюдателя ветки, который оставил этот комментарий в надежде получить информацию о ответах, которые он может вызвать:

Мне кажется, что эта нить угадывает, так это массовая глупость первоначального плана вторжения и неумелость, с которой он был осуществлен, плюс мастерство и воля украинской обороны. И хотя оценки недавнего изменения Россией стратегии и тактики в отношении Донбасса были более трезвы, мне кажется, что мышление группы в целом не принимает во внимание реальную и существенную разницу между двумя фазами войны: большое количество людей в Донецке и Луганске, которые НЕ хотят быть в составе Украины.

Если оставить в стороне «как» 8-летней русификации Донбасса (и Крыма), которая сама по себе является увлекательной темой, факт заключается в том, что не только Россия воюет здесь с армией УКР. Подавляющее (подавляющее?) большинство жертв — украинцы на украинском языке, что, я уверен, рассматривается как беспроигрышный вариант для Путина. Но сквозь эту призму труднее рассматривать утверждения типа «защищать территорию легче, чем нападать» как причину неизбежного развала армии РУ: ДНР и ЛНР *стоят* в обороне. Это украинцы атакуют. В военном отношении новая, более разумная цель благоприятствует артиллерийскому превосходству РУ, поэтому многие полезные истории о некомпетентности пехоты менее актуальны. Кроме того, я не знаю, как UKR и союзники решают проблему запуска крылатых ракет с бомбардировщиков, летящих в воздушном пространстве RU.

Далее, «справедливые очки» Россия набирает с изменением целей (правда, для этого нужна амнезия относительно первоначального вторжения или вера в линию военного «финта», которую проглатывают ультраправые США): просто действуют так же, как французы, поддерживая американскую революцию (да, французы направили войска и развернули свой флот в дополнение к отправке денег и оружия). Этим бедным русскоязычным — и все больше идентифицирующим себя русским — республикам отказывают в свободе; мы, благородная матушка Россия, всего лишь помогаем им бороться за независимость.

Истинно верующие в Донецке и Луганске ведут экзистенциальную борьбу: победи или умри. Обычно это аргумент, почему украинская армия в конечном итоге одержит победу, но динамика может быть еще более острой для ДНР и ЛНР. Это может быть их последний и единственный шанс на независимость (забывая то, что мы с вами знаем о «независимости» в белорусском стиле).

Короче, я не вижу неминуемого краха РУ армии. Мне кажется, что их путь к «заявленной победе» так же предсказуем, как и *фактическая* победа Украины. Кто бы ни победил, я не уверен, что восстание и борьба за восстановление будут легче, если победит Украина или поддерживаемые Россией сепаратисты.

A very common (and false) opinion in Western countries that the inhabitants of the eastern part of Ukraine do not want to live as part of Ukraine. This should not be surprising, since Russia has invested heavily in promoting this opinion. DPR and LPR conscripts fight under duress. In the ranks of the DPR and LPR troops, they are held back by fear of reprisals.

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, Grigb said:

There is one internal factor that needs to be taken into account. RU relies heavily on Soviet infrastructure. There was no any major modernization programs. Ru is crumbling slowly even without external pressure. Even without war RU would have 5-10 years. With the war and sanctions, I am afraid less than 5 years.

Quote from civilian "Girkin" about RU infrastructure right before the war.

Moscow does not govern anything. It just pumps money out of local regions till they start disintegrating due to crumbling infrastructure. The feared African scenario is actually default scenario. Empire will disintegrate regardless of West actions.

Oh man, that is a good point - everyone forgets the infrastructure.

God, we could find ourselves propping up some SOB in Russia that we can live with before this is done.  I guess it just re-underlines my point: this is a very long term massive crisis management situation, and we need to be much better than we were last time.

[Centurian52]

I am nearly 60 pages behind now. I give up on catching up, this is my new starting point. I look forward to reading all however many thousand pages this thread ends up reaching when the war is over.

Edited June 28, 2022 by Centurian52

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

43 minutes ago, Grigb said:

So, there was no any comments about extermination of RU people except claims by RU side. Instead, there was critic of the fundamentally flawed RU imperial culture.

Let me remind you that RU side sees foreigners and especially Ukrainians as fundamentally flawed.  Whether that means extermination, I will leave up to you to decide.

 

I see guys you're having fun here.

[Haiduk]

D-20 howitzers of 128th mountain-assault brigade in action

D-30 of Kraken special purpose unit hit the house, occupied by Russians

 

Edited June 28, 2022 by Haiduk

[Vacillator]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

D-20 howitzers of 10th mountain-assault brigade in action

They seem to be enjoying their work .

[Huba]

Rumors are confirmed

 

And more rumors:

 

Edited June 28, 2022 by Huba

[Harmon Rabb]

Absurd does not even begin to describe some of the statements coming from Moscow.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Kofman on a tweet storm. A few nuggets:

• The Russian goal in Donbas is likely to setup a battle for Slovyansk/Kramatorsk, with an axis of advance from Izyum and another from the east, assuming they were able to get past Bakhmut. This objective appears aspirational at best.
• The offensive in this part of the battlefield is likely to drag on, perhaps well into July or August. Though both sides are liable to become exhausted due to losses of manpower and materiel.
• Kherson is where a future UA counter offensive could play out. Despite the present focus on the Donbas, economically and strategically Kherson is more significant, and it is where UA ability to conduct offensive operations will likely be tested in the future.
• The general lack of force availability (on both sides) has forced this into an attrition war. The Russian military holds a substantial advantage in fires, although not a dramatic advantage in manpower and materiel, hence a lack of momentum in operations.
• The Russian mil is using LDNR as dismounted infantry, and trying to cobble the rest together (VDV, Motor rifle units, Wagner formations) into groups capable of offensive maneuver. They shift more capable forces around the battlefield to attempt localized advances.
• On the UA side, significant losses in recent months have led to a growing dependence on territorial defense forces and lower quality replacements. However, the situation does not suggest UA forces are anywhere near collapse in the Donbas.
• Ukrainian discourse in recent weeks had begun to paint a bleak picture in part to motivate faster delivery of Western military aid. UA is in a capability trench, low on ammunition, with losses mounting, in need of artillery & MLRS to attain some parity in an attrition war.
• HIMARS will allow UA to conduct strikes at tactical-operational depths, hitting Russian logistics & C2. But this capability is being provided in installments and the impact could be greatest when it is first introduced, before Russian forces attempt to adapt.
• Overall, local mil balance in Donbas favors Russia, but long term trends still favor Ukraine. However, that estimate is conditional on sustained Western military assistance, and is not necessarily predictive of outcomes. This is likely to be a protracted war.

 

 

[cesmonkey]

55 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

A very common (and false) opinion in Western countries that the inhabitants of the eastern part of Ukraine do not want to live as part of Ukraine. This should not be surprising, since Russia has invested heavily in promoting this opinion. DPR and LPR conscripts fight under duress. In the ranks of the DPR and LPR troops, they are held back by fear of reprisals.

Is there a better source for judging the sentiments of various regions of Ukraine towards belonging to either Ukraine or Russia than this?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Ukrainian_independence_referendum#By_region