How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

 

[Taranis]

"Ukrainian soldiers fire a missile, near the city of Lyssytchansk, in the Luhansk region, Sunday June 12, 2022. GLEB GARANICH / REUTERS"

*BM-21 Grad

[Calamine Waffles]

2 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

I'm inclined to agree with Calamine Waffles that the Su-25 isn't ideal for earlier phases of training, especially since from what I gather (I know Haiduk posted something on the subject a while back) Ukraine already does their equivalent to the lead-in fighter training phase on operational types. However, it is arguably no more complex than a lot of advanced and lead in fighter trainers (T-38 Talon, BAe Hawk, Kawasaki T-4, T-50 Golden Eagle, etc.) Also, the Su-25 has been used in a purely training role: the naval Su-25UTG is solely a two-seat deck landing trainer to teach carrier qualifications on, much like the T-2 Buckeye or T-45 Goshawk. I don't think there was ever much consideration to an operational naval Su-25 (it would be a bit like a "Sea Hog" version of the A-10, which I'm sure the Marines would love, but I can't see the Navy devoting funds or hangar and flight deck space to such an aircraft). Also, at the end of the Soviet era, a handful of Su-28s were built: a stripped-down, unarmed Su-25UB meant as a dedicated trainer.

While I have no experience flying combat jets, I imagine that learning to fly even an Su-25 and handling the weapon systems solo is probably a bit more complicated if you don't have any advanced jet training on an L-39, especially without someone in the back seat to help.

Edited June 13, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[G.I. Joe]

1 minute ago, Calamine Waffles said:

While I have no experience flying combat jets, I imagine that learning to fly even an Su-25 and handling the weapon systems solo is probably a bit more complicated if you don't have any advanced jet training on an L-39, especially without someone in the back seat to help.

Indeed, I am assuming that any extension of the transition from the L-39 earlier into basic/advanced training would have to use the two seat Su-25UB version, which served as the basis for the Su-25UTG and Su-28.

[Calamine Waffles]

For reference re: S-300V1 etc., these are the ranges and ceilings of the various SAM systems used by the ZSU. I'm not sure if the S-200Vs are operational. They are static systems that Russia (theoretically) would have struck early in the war.

https://imgur.com/zIjr4zO

[LongLeftFlank]

12 hours ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express on the artillery situation:https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/how_much_the_russian_artillery_outnumbers_ukraines_in_density_and_amount_of_systems-3260.html
 

Very useful, CalWaff, cheers! I aggregated the key data below to try to put that '900 tubes' chestnut in context. 

Corrections of a material nature are of course welcome, as are credible sources! I will be keeping my eyes out.

1.   TUBES, per Military Balance (2021), less confirmed RU losses, per Oryx (SP+towed). There are of course other losses on both sides, but let's not go down the rabbit hole on losses (he said/she said BS). This is very macro, sizing of the problem.

 -> 120/122mm:  U 421, R 245 - (34+19)

 -> 152mm:  U 742, R 2028 - (93 + 28)

 -> 203mm: U 48, R 160 - (0?)

 -> MLRS/Grad: U 1680, R 3547 - (79)

Western aid:

 -> 155mm USM777s:  U 108

 -> 155mm, other:  U 40-50(?)

 -> Other 'large' calibres:  50

2.  AMMO STOCKS

Ukraine

 -> Bloc calibres at start:  300,000

 -> Bloc calibres received: 225,000

 -> NATO 155mm:  300,000

 -> Rockets: tbd

Russia

 -> 122mm: tbd

 -> 152mm: tbd

 -> 203mm: tbd

 -> Rockets: tbd

****

Anecdata on stocks, consumption rates, and losses:

https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/06/09/initial-request-of-the-armed-forces-regarding-155-mm-artillery-units-has-been-90-fulfilled-by-the-ministry-of-defence-–-oleksii-reznikov/

but...

 

Loss rates, taking due note of @c3k's separate estimate of 625 Russian launchers lost since the start:

 

 

Edited June 13, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Aragorn2002]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12

Quote;  'Russian forces should, in principle, be seeking to seize the bridges rather than destroy them, since Russian troops have struggled to cross the Siverskyi Donetsk River. They could hope to trap Ukrainian defenders in Severodonetsk by cutting off their retreat, but it seems unlikely that the benefit of catching a relatively small number of defenders would be worth the cost of imposing a contested river crossing on Russian troops. The Russians likely expect instead to be able to break out of their positions either around Toshkivka or from Popasna to the north and then encircle Lysychansk or attack it from the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets, thereby obviating the need to seize the bridges or conduct an opposed crossing. Russian troops conducted another unsuccessful attack on Toshkivka, which is likely an effort to renew their drive north toward Lysychansk on the west bank'.

Time to move out. Nichts wie raus. The defenders of Severodonetsk have done  their duty. Risking their loss may be heroic and serve a purpose, but it will also damage morale in the long run. Apart from that retreat will prevent the Russians from having another couple of thousand POW's to show for propaganda purposes, while Ukraine can claim an intelligent way of defending, without too much losses.

Edited June 13, 2022 by Aragorn2002

[G.I. Joe]

1 hour ago, kraze said:

Ukraine means 'center of the country / inside the country' (Kraina = country, U = in) and basically meant the very core area of Ruthenia initially. So Ukrainians are people living in and around the Kyiv area, as opposed to the rest living in the newly colonized lands.

[...]

Interesting, thanks for the clarification and added background. So the original meaning is far closer to "heartland" than "borderland..."

[Aragorn2002]

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2022/06/11/australia-calls-for-greater-transparency-amid-chinas-military-buildup/

Quote "He claimed that China’s military buildup is the largest and most ambitious of its kind by any country since the end of World War II. “It is critical that China’s neighbors do not see this buildup as a risk for them because without that reassurance, it is inevitable that countries will seek to upgrade their own military capabilities in response.”

[Huba]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

The above is why I think 2/24 borders with EU and NATO membership is the best scenario for Ukraine. In the LPR/DPR and Crimea that is probably the majority outlook or close to it. I grant you the Russians are trying get literally every male between 15 and 60 killed in this war, but that isn't going to put the rest of the population in these godforsaken "republics" in happy mood.

Fully agreed here. It really might be quite impractical to try to get those territories back, as now it can probably be assumed to be "enemy land".  We saw how all the dying and destruction hardened UA resolve, I think it is reasonable to assume that in Donetsk or Luhansk, Ukraine is not kept in greatest esteem too- it is UA army that is killing their sons, husbands etc, and who is in the right here is beside the point completely. After the war, make it easy for anyone from that region to migrate to UA and call it a day. Most important is to have a deal that is (at least on paper) permanent, so those breakaway regions won't hinder country's future, blocking EU/ NATO ascension.

Make the new border as defensible as possible of course - it's super strange that this is something we have to consider in Europe, in XXI century, isn't it?

Crimea, in contrast to Donbas has a huge strategic importance, if grabbing it will be possible from military point of view, I see UA going for it. There's a considerable population of Tatars, who are really unhappy under Russian rule and seeing them getting the short end of the stick again will be heartbreaking. If push comes to shove, ethnic Russians (especially the new emigrees living in looted Ukrainian houses) would possibly run back to motherland, alleviating the problem of governing this territory a little bit, but it still will be a huge mess.

 

Edited June 13, 2022 by Huba

[Aragorn2002]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

There's always something interesting in the ISW reports that hasn't found its way into this thread by other means.  For June 12th, it was this bit:

Here's why this is important.

Under normal situations a regiment has three battalions that are kept in different states of readiness instead of being treated as equals as is standard in the US military.  As I understand it, under peacetime conditions each regiment is supposed to have the 1st Battalion ready to go pretty much at any time.  The 2nd Battalion generally provides the forces to top off the 1st Battalion if the need arises.  2nd Battalion normally doesn't deploy, but is kept in a higher state of readiness.  3rd Battalion is not intended to be deployed except if there's a national mobilization.

Some of the higher readiness Russian regiments have (er, had) enough personnel and equipment to field two battalions concurrently.  However, it seems only in rare circumstances have 3rd Battalions been deployed to Ukraine.

3rd Battalion, according to Russian service members, is the dregs of the regiment.  They have the discipline problem soldiers, the ones with serious drug problems, etc.  They pretty much have no contract soldiers and the ones they have fit the "screw up" definition.  Officers are probably similar.  Equipment, for sure, is the worst of what the regiment has.  Even if they have up-to-date equipment at times, it's probably in a less ready state than what's in the other battalions.

This system makes sense as long as the manpower required doesn't exceed what the sum of all 1st Battalions of the Russian Armed Forces can provide.  As we well know, Russia has struggled even with 1st and 2nd Battalions thrown into the fight.  Now it seems they are so desperate that they are going to send the 3rd Battalions into the fight.  The worst of the Russian Armed Forces.  Ukrainians are not likely shaking in their boots

This move is consistent with historical Russian wartime thinking.  Instead of concentrating on reconstituting the forces already in Ukraine, it seems the plan is to bring new forces in.  This means they'll still have their existing weakened 1st and 2nd Battalions, but now weakened 3rd Battalions as well.  And really, how much strength is there in those battalions anyway?  Haven't they been feeding replacements into the other battalions during the last 3 months? 

Steve

And every 3rd battalion needs it's cadre and equipment. More or less the same mistake the Germans did make on divisional level. Raising new Panzer brigades and divisions, instead of keep the already existing, seasoned units at strength. Looks great on paper, but....

On the other hand, it could be another step for the Russians to total mobilisation.

 

Edited June 13, 2022 by Aragorn2002

[chuckdyke]

42 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

It is critical that China’s neighbors do not see this buildup as a risk for them because without that reassurance, it is inevitable that countries will seek to upgrade their own military capabilities in response.”

China will need Russian oil because they won't get it from the Middle East. Exactly the reason they are after the Spratly Islands. It will be some time before they can match the US Navy. But the topic is still the Ukraine.  

Edited June 13, 2022 by chuckdyke

[Huba]

It seems DE, FR and IT leaders will be visiting Kyiv on Thursday 16th. Day before, on 15th, Contact Group for support of Ukraine is convening in Brussels, in person this time. As usual, upping the game regarding material support for Ukraine is to be expected, I think this time from US too, as since signing the lend-lease US didn't offer any new big ticket items apart from the 4 HIMARS.

 

[G.I. Joe]

42 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

It will be some time before they can match the US Navy. But the topic is still the Ukraine.  

Definitely. It's probably safe to say the USN hasn't had a true peer-level opponent since the Battle of the Philippine Sea...Leyte Gulf at the very latest, but earlier on as far back as 1943 would probably be a stronger case. And, with the greatest possible respect to the Royal Navy, no true peer-level ally since at least the late Fifties...

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Very useful, CalWaff, cheers! I aggregated the key data below to try to put that '900 tubes' chestnut in context. 

Corrections of a material nature are of course welcome, as are credible sources! I will be keeping my eyes out.

1.   TUBES, per Military Balance (2021), less confirmed RU losses, per Oryx (SP+towed). There are of course other losses on both sides, but let's not go down the rabbit hole on losses (he said/she said BS). This is very macro, sizing of the problem.

 -> 120/122mm:  U 421, R 245 - (34+19)

 -> 152mm:  U 742, R 2028 - (93 + 28)

 -> 203mm: U 48, R 160 - (0?)

 -> MLRS/Grad: U 1680, R 3547 - (79)

Western aid:

 -> 155mm USM777s:  U 108

 -> 155mm, other:  U 40-50(?)

 -> Other 'large' calibres:  50

2.  AMMO STOCKS

Ukraine

 -> Bloc calibres at start:  300,000

 -> Bloc calibres received: 225,000

 -> NATO 155mm:  300,000

 -> Rockets: tbd

Russia

 -> 122mm: tbd

 -> 152mm: tbd

 -> 203mm: tbd

 -> Rockets: tbd

****

Anecdata on stocks, consumption rates, and losses:

https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/06/09/initial-request-of-the-armed-forces-regarding-155-mm-artillery-units-has-been-90-fulfilled-by-the-ministry-of-defence-–-oleksii-reznikov/

but...

 

Loss rates, taking due note of @c3k's separate estimate of 625 Russian launchers lost since the start:

 

Handy info here on comparative weapon ranges, as well as 155mm systems delivered, for those amateurs like me who haven't been following closely up to now:

https://kyivindependent.com/national/how-western-heavy-weaponry-can-make-a-difference-in-the-war-in-ukraine/

Max ranges, kms: (R = reg. E = special round)

1. Bloc

-> 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya: 18(R)/24(E) km

-> 152mm towed 2А65 Msta-B: 24(R)/28(E) km

-> 152mm 2S5 Giatsint-S SP: 28(R)/33(E) km

-> 203mm 2S7 Pion: 40(R)/47(E) km

-> 220mm BM27 Uragan: 28 km

-> 300mm BM30 Smerch: 70-90 km

2. NATO

M777 towed:

-> 155mm M795: 22 km

-> 155mm M549A1: 32 km

-> 155mm M982 Excalibur: 40 km

CAESAR:
-> 155mm ERFB: 41 km

-> 155mm Excalibur: 49 km

PzH 2000:

-> 155mm DM121 30 km

-> 155mm RAP 67 km

-> HIMARS M142 227mm M31/32: 80 km

-> M270 227mm M31: 80 km

Edited June 13, 2022 by LongLeftFlank
thanks, Huba!

[Huba]

Just a little comment on that range table above:

- M30/31 has at least 80km range (that's the marketed range of MARS II when firing those)

- 2S7 range with unassisted projectile is around 40 km, I'd stick to that as a practical range

Also an interesting piece of data: according to Wiki (but also other easily available sources), 2S7s barrel life is just 450 rounds. For comparison naval 8"/55 gun was good for 700+ EFC, and had an inner liner that could be replaced, and it was a significantly heavier ordnance than 2A44 on Pion.
Compared to 1800 EFC of modern 155mm/L52, it puts 8" guns at a considerable disadvantage in any prolonged conflict.

Edited June 13, 2022 by Huba
can't spell

[Beleg85]

Nothing new but still worth some reading.

5 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

Interesting, thanks for the clarification and added background. So the original meaning is far closer to "heartland" than "borderland..."

Well, the meaning of word itself is much more obscure unfortunatelly. Word"Kraina" could cut both ways- meaning "the land" but also rather "border" or (nomen omen) something "cut out" in older slavic languages Semantically, word for heartland would be "otczyna" or something similar , and while itself "Ukraine" appears rather early in XII cent. latopis, it was in this context- "border country". The semantics of "heartland" comes form XIX cent. historian M.Khruschevsky, and as you can imagine there is still a lot of debates about its meaning, with many parties and emotions involved.

Of course that in no way dimnishes the rights of Ukrainians for their own sovereginity.

Also, on daily basis, common people inhabitng those lands wouldn't call themselves Ukrainians but rather  "Ruthenians" or "Rusichi" (*Rusowie in pl.) which Muscovites started to accquire from XII cent. early on. Later Tzars devised ideology of "Great Russia"(them) and "Small Russia" (anybody else Orthodox and using the script, including modern Bialorussians).

 

We should perhaps have separate thread for history and politics of Ukraine and Russia,  but it is so importnat to the outcome of this war. It's incredibly "ideological" conflict and Russians are unfortunatelly framing it more and more in civilizational rather than purely rational terms.

 

 

Edited June 13, 2022 by Beleg85

[LongLeftFlank]

How Hawt is Ukraine Gonna Get? Pt. 3

 

 

[poesel]

4 hours ago, Huba said:

It really might be quite impractical to try to get those territories back,

I would like to ask @Haiduk about how the Ukrainians feel about those territories? Is this something that they would give away and be content with it?

Loosing or receiving land is a difficult process for one or both sides of the 'trade'. One of the reasons of WWI was the French resentment over having lost Elsace/Lorraine in 1870/71. That was something they could never forgive or forget.
Other example is the loss of German lands to Poland (and a bit to Russia) after WWII. That topic was only finally off the table when every German who had ever lived there was dead.

It would be pointless to achive peace now and 20-30 years down the road, Ukraine attacks what is left of Russia over just those areas. Might be easier, miltary wise, than now but then you have a generation of people who lived there as Russians. They will feel occupied by the Ukrainians and the cycle begins anew.

[Huba]

3 minutes ago, poesel said:

It would be pointless to achive peace now and 20-30 years down the road, Ukraine attacks what is left of Russia over just those areas. Might be easier, miltary wise, than now but then you have a generation of people who lived there as Russians. They will feel occupied by the Ukrainians and the cycle begins anew.

OTOH if UA was to regain those territories tomorrow, these people might feel that way already. It is of course to be decided by Ukrainian side first and foremost, I'm just thinking out loud about the practical side of things. What is of greatest importance, as you said, is to have at least a reasonably permanent solution, and one that politically will not affect Ukraine's future prospects.

[LongLeftFlank]

17 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Speaking for myself, I also don't think it looks "good" for Ukraine in the Donbas.  Collectively, the pressure from the flanks (Izyum and Popasna) and the assaults against the eastern most positions (Severodonetsk and Toshkivka/Bilohorva) are certainly cumulatively reducing Ukraine's ability to hold the salient.  However, there are two big caveats to that worry:

1. Russia has shown that once it makes a breakthrough it quickly bogs down, thus giving Ukraine ample opportunity to reinforce or withdraw
2. Ukraine doesn't need to hold this area because Russia gains nothing real by taking it

I wrote this sector off as a Russia win around the first week or two of the war.  The fact that Russia has been unable to take this area despite two solid months of concentrated effort is extremely positive.  Especially in light of Russia focusing all of its efforts on taking it as their primary strategic goal.

Think about it this way.  If Russian forces were streaming westward through Odessa and to Moldova, this would be a total sideshow for both countries.  But Russia has been defeated there, defeated around Kharkiv, and defeated around Kyiv.  So even if Russia should take this area, strategically it doesn't matter for either nations.  Ukraine isn't defeated and Russia doesn't have a victory it can end the war with.

Steve

Time lapse. It's been a long 6 weeks. 

And as a number of folks have observed here, while the artillery crapstorm intensifies, all the actual Russian advances seem to be petering out, including the Popasna break-in.

The only meaningful advance is halfway between Izyum and Sloviansk, at least 5 weeks behind schedule now thanks to the Dovhenke hedgehog. And even that doesn't seem to be curdling much Ukrainian beer.

So shelling seems to be all they've got at this point? hence my focus on it today (educating myself though I hope others find it interesting).

[Aragorn2002]

33 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

How Hawt is Ukraine Gonna Get? Pt. 3

 

 

This definitely deserves it's own thread!

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

Interesting, thanks for the clarification and added background. So the original meaning is far closer to "heartland" than "borderland..."

This is point of view, which was popular in period of "Independence romantiсism" at the end of 80-th- beginning of 90th. Patriotic Ukrainian society in that time tried to find the place of Ukraine in world hystory, so this researches inevitably led to manipulations by sources and creating of hystorical myths. Of course, on the wave of euphoria of 1991, when Ukraine became independent, many of our intellectuals were throwing out even the thought that the name Ukraine was derived from Russian "okraina" - "outskirts, periphery". But really the word "krayina" as "state" never used in old chronics, this is more late means, probably since 18 century.

But now, when period of romanticism has gone, nobody from our serious historians doubt that "Ukraine" is derived from Ancient Rus word "oukrayina, ukrayina" - "frontier, border land". There is nothing splended in this derivation. This is just objective fact. First mention of word "ukrayina" we can find in Ipatyevska chronicle under 1187 year, but this name related to Pereyaslav Principality. Pereyaslav - the town in nowadays Kyiv oblast, which in that times, was a center of separate principality, which was real frontier with Wild Steppe and nomad tribes. 

When modern Ukrainian lands in 14th century became a part of Great Lituanian Principality, already Lithuaninan rulers named old Rus lans as "ukrayina" - "Kyivan ukrayina", "Volynian ukrayina" etc, with the same sense - "frontier lands". Further theese names often mentioned in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealthm. Active mastering of Wild Steppe in 16th century and rising of Cossacks gradually has been fixed "ukrayina" for lands on left bank of Dnieper with Kyiv and Cherkasy regions, and since the mid of 17th century this name was extended on whole Cossak-controlled territory.  

Edited June 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12

Quote;  'Russian forces should, in principle, be seeking to seize the bridges rather than destroy them, since Russian troops have struggled to cross the Siverskyi Donetsk River. They could hope to trap Ukrainian defenders in Severodonetsk by cutting off their retreat, but it seems unlikely that the benefit of catching a relatively small number of defenders would be worth the cost of imposing a contested river crossing on Russian troops. The Russians likely expect instead to be able to break out of their positions either around Toshkivka or from Popasna to the north and then encircle Lysychansk or attack it from the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets, thereby obviating the need to seize the bridges or conduct an opposed crossing. Russian troops conducted another unsuccessful attack on Toshkivka, which is likely an effort to renew their drive north toward Lysychansk on the west bank'.

Time to move out. Nichts wie raus. The defenders of Severodonetsk have done  their duty. Risking their loss may be heroic and serve a purpose, but it will also damage morale in the long run. Apart from that retreat will prevent the Russians from having another couple of thousand POW's to show for propaganda purposes, while Ukraine can claim an intelligent way of defending, without too much losses.

I can make no sense out of the Russian plan here.  I can make sense out of the Ukrainian one.

If the Russians plan to "breakout at Popasna" then taking Severodonetsk is not a require pre-condition - so why do it?  Taking the far bank positions offers no advantage to an encirclement battle coming from the West.  Further if Russia could do that encirclement, then do it and cut off both Lysychanks and Severodonetsl from supplies and support...now!  

"But could this not be a Russian attritional strategy as well?"  Maybe, but employing attrition as the attacker is kinda upside down, unless you have a massive resource overmatch and can afford the upside down loss equation - and Russia cannot at this point.  Further the Russians are also losing another resource they cannot afford; time.  No, Severodonetsk has the hallmarks of a political vanity piece, which is normally what happens when military logic stops applying.

Ukraine employing an attrition strategy, particularly against Russian artillery and logistics, makes all sorts of sense.  That, and they employed similar strategies in the opening phase of this war, Mariupol in particular.  The UA is not "trapped" by any stretch.  It has plenty of opportunity to withdraw...so they are staying for a good reason.  As to "cutting off Ukrainian defenders" on the far bank of the Siversky Donets; the Ukrainians know that river a lot better than the Russians and they likely know where ford sites and ferry crossings can be establish.  Further the Russians have not demonstrated the acme of ISR integration so I am betting the UA is hedging that they can keep defenders supplied for some time by means other than the bridges.  

This bring up an interesting point that should be underlined: we have asymmetric strategies at play here.  The Russians are focused on terrain gains to demonstrate "victory", while Ukrainian defence has the overall strategic goal of "killing more Russians".  We should keep this in mind - it won't explain every operation, but it appears as the overarching design for each side.

[panzermartin]

Is Stoltenberg admitting that Ukraine must give away territory for peace, for the first time?