How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Calamine Waffles]

1 hour ago, Taranis said:

It's not the software I used. I think it's the export software (unless there is massive software update since I left). Nexter is written in large on the software which could well show that it is indeed an export version. This would explain why the software is in English. The time that an update in Ukrainian would have taken (and the money above all...) may explain why this was not done.

As I recall, it has been reported that at least some of the CAESARs sent to Ukraine were originally meant for export.

[Taranis]

6 minutes ago, Huba said:

It makes sense I think, there probably wasn't enough time to integrate CAESARS with upper level artillery management system that UA  uses, hence the digital system is operated in "manual mode". 

Reportedly Germans are integrating their Pzh2000, as was claimed by some article I linked few days ago (although I't might've been de-bunked by users here IIRC). I'd think that having it integrated directly gives you some time advantage, but is it really that significant? I'd think you save seconds, maybe a minute that way?

Absolutely, the non-integration made it much easier to send and save time. Maybe an integration is planned for the long term, who knows? We see that they are doing very well without this integration. It is sure that it is always faster to receive the elements directly and above all it avoids typing errors in the rush. Apart from reliability, the time saving is not huge either because the cannon remains automated (conversion of coordinates into firing elements, etc.). The gun commander just needs to enter the elements and then get out of the vehicle (15-20 seconds?).

[Calamine Waffles]

2 minutes ago, Taranis said:

The gun commander just needs to enter the elements and then get out of the vehicle (15-20 seconds?).

Can it not be fired with the crew in the cabin?

[Taranis]

Just now, Calamine Waffles said:

As I recall, it has been reported that at least some of the CAESARs sent to Ukraine were originally meant for export.

I do not know more. What I had been able to read was that the CAESARs given to the Ukrainians were not diversions of those whose contracts already existed and that they came directly from the stock of the French army (reducing the quantity available for the French army by 1/4 or something like this). The Ouest Europe (Western Europe) camouflage would confirm it. However, since there are more CAESARs that have been delivered than expected, we may not know everything. Changing software is really easy (like with a USB key). I remember that's what NEXTER and the command did to come and update our CAESARs.

[Taranis]

1 minute ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Can it not be fired with the crew in the cabin?

Unfortunately no. You really have to see it as a towed gun mounted directly on its tractor and not as an SPG. The crew must load the shell on the stretcher (the rest is done hydraulically), add the propellant charge etc. The shells are stored on the sides and therefore require to be installed on the stretcher. Barrel angle and movement can only be achieved with rear command box as well as for firing. When firing (depending on the number of propellant charges) the cabin at the front rises (up to about 1 meter in Afghanistan at maximum propellant charge). It could be dangerous for the crew.

[Calamine Waffles]

6 minutes ago, Taranis said:

I do not know more. What I had been able to read was that the CAESARs given to the Ukrainians were not diversions of those whose contracts already existed and that they came directly from the stock of the French army (reducing the quantity available for the French army by 1/4 or something like this). The Ouest Europe (Western Europe) camouflage would confirm it. However, since there are more CAESARs that have been delivered than expected, we may not know everything. Changing software is really easy (like with a USB key). I remember that's what NEXTER and the command did to come and update our CAESARs.

Well, as far as the ones we've seen, it looks like they're on Renault Sherpas, which would indicate they are indeed the French service ones.

  

Just now, Taranis said:

Unfortunately no. You really have to see it as a towed gun mounted directly on its tractor and not as an SPG. The crew must load the shell on the stretcher (the rest is done hydraulically), add the propellant charge etc. The shells are stored on the sides and therefore require to be installed on the stretcher. Barrel angle and movement can only be achieved with rear command box as well as for firing. When firing (depending on the number of propellant charges) the cabin at the front rises (up to about 1 meter in Afghanistan at maximum propellant charge). It could be dangerous for the crew.

I see, well, they have to deploy anyway to fire, so I don't think it makes that much of a difference.

Edited June 7, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[Sarjen]

Interesting view on the domestic car market in Russia. 
 

 

[Huba]

If the Turks are to move it on their ships, given the risks involved, it sound like a deal to me. Prices are already up so much compared to last year that  UA will come on top anyway.

 

Edited June 7, 2022 by Huba

[Kinophile]

@Battlefront.comthank you.

 

[sross112]

11 hours ago, Kinophile said:

But its pretty clear a lot had to go right also for the Ukrainians.

The only real things that I see as going "right" for Ukraine is the early intel/ISR support from the west and the weapons pipeline getting into place prior to hostilities. The ISR support is probably the biggest game changer and advantage that they had going into this. I don't see where anything special went right for the UA on the tactical/operational side so much as their successes and tactics were just the net result of everything bad the RA did. 

1. Their overall operational plan. = Too many axis of advance, UA able to fight separate fingers instead of whole fist.
2. Fail to black out comms. = Ukrainian crowd sourced recon and intel.
3. Fail to control information. = Ukrainian government able to garner large amounts of international support by controlling the narrative.
4. Didn't gain air supremacy. = UAF still hitting back, uninhibited UA logistics and no strikes beyond FEBA anymore.
5. Failed logistics chain. = Reduced RA operational tempo, tons of abandoned equipment, low RA morale all result in giving the UA more time and better chances for defense.
6. Failure to implement combined arms. = Easier defense for UA with higher losses to the RA.
7. Poor force structure/lack of infantry. = UA and TD able to operate with lots of freedom behind the lines attacking logistics. Unescorted armor easier pickings. 
8. Timing. = Weather and ground conditions prevented RA from maneuvering off hardened roads making all movements predictable.
9. Kill lists/atrocities/war crimes. = Steeled Ukrainian resolve, concreted international support for Ukraine.
10. Corruption. = Lack of top tier kit, undermanned units, under trained units, cobbled together units, patronage based promotions, etc that resulted in the paper bear of the RA.

So really it boils down to the greatest advantage was that they were attacked by Russia and not someone with their poop in a pile. 

This also bleeds into the "Could the US have done better?", "How does this change western doctrine?" and "Does this war mean the death of the tank?" type questions that we see pop up from time to time in the MSM. It is really apples to oranges and the only big thing I can see coming out of this is the UAV numbers/usage/doctrine/etc. 

If you swapped out the Russian forces for US forces you would have pretty much the entire US army and couple Marine Divisions equaling less than 100 battalions or "btg" equivalents. Could the US defeat the UA? Absolutely. This scenario is completely upside down from the list above. Ukraine doesn't get the ISR advantage and is under the microscope itself. 8 out of 10 above suddenly don't apply, we can leave timing and operational plan in place. Apply basically a Desert Storm format with an air campaign that leaves no UAF and mitigated AA with UA units pounded for 30 days or more before ground forces go. Then that degraded force has to fight a real army with real training, top tier gear, effective logistics, good leadership and bunches of planes with JDAMs just waiting for targets. Oh, and pretty much every piece of equipment the UA operates is no longer competitive in range, accuracy or precision.  

I'm not saying it would be bloodless and I'm sure the remnants of the UA would fight like hell, but in the end there is no doubt to the outcome militarily. So is the tank dead and western doctrine outdated? No, Russia just sucks.

Could the US military complete the political objectives of the Kremlin? Absolutely not. As it has been pointed out here any army looking to occupy Ukraine would need millions of boots on the ground and it would still make Iraq 2006 look like a happy quinceanera on a warm summer day. 

I'm sure this war will be studied and picked apart for a long time and there will be a lot of lessons learned, but I see the majority of those lessons will be the what not to do's given to us by the RA. 

[Harmon Rabb]

Some news concerning Ukraine getting new howitzers. 

 

Edited June 7, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[A Canadian Cat]

On 6/5/2022 at 7:41 PM, Battlefront.com said:

But that's just me dreaming of New World Order 2.0

You conspiracy theory nut you

 

16 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

It is unclear if Russia can afford to continue lavish spending on the military at the expense of the people's well being.  It's been doing that for most of the last 8 years and there are signs even before this war that misappropriation of national priorities was starting to strain the social contract between Putin and the people.

We see lots of signs that that lavish spending was not really applied to the military. We saw tanks going into battle without ERA installed, we saw second and third grade equipment show up with units that were said to be using the most modern equipment, we saw prepared rations that were long past their consume date. Even if he could maintain previous spending levels, clearly lots of money is going into various people's pockets rather than the military.

[poesel]

7 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I think it is just stupid to exchange 1:1.

Greece has about 150-200 BMPs. So a slightly better ratio. 
Personally I would prefer that both batches would go directly to Ukraine. Neither country really needs those vehicles. 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

So really it boils down to the greatest advantage was that they were attacked by Russia and not someone with their poop in a pile.

Not wrong, but not entirely correct either.  Ukrainian defence was brilliant in the opening phase of this war.  We don't know much and likely will not get the full story for some time, however, the plan for the Phase I defence was decisive in itself.  If the UA had tried to fight the same way as the RA and sought decisive battle, it could have gone poorly.  Instead what we saw was a hybrid warfare campaign for the history books.

First Ukraine had (and still has) information superiority.  They are on their home ground and were also being fed western intel from before the war started.  This mean that in places like Hostemel, they could concentrate and defeat the RA initial moves in detail.  I think Hostomel is also a battle for the history books and was decisive in this war.  The RA tried to use SOF and Light in concentration and failed enormously, once again underlying that when misemployed SOF and Light are extremely vulnerable [aside: it is odd on all the talk of the "death of the tank" but we have not seen a lot on the "death of airborne/heliborne].  Russia made that airfield snap central to their main effort, it was their Plan A, and it collapsed in a couple days.

Second, Ukraine set up what I can only describe as an unconventional warfare defensive campaign.  This was hybrid in nature (a mix of conventional and unconventional forces) and looks a lot like what the Norwegians have set up in their Northern districts - for obvious reasons.  Basically, we had TD and irregular forces defending their local regions, backed up - and very importantly linked by UA SOF.  These forces were already in location along that very long initial front line and armed with next-gen smart-ATGMs, UAVs and comms.  Those comms linked them back to UA artillery creating an entirely distributed defence network - or at least that is my working theory.  The Russians sticking to road networks, lit up by ISR of all sorts were then hammered all along their own system - F ech, A ech, B ech and all the way back to SLOC nodes.  All that Russian armor/mech, the ready-force of the RA was cut to pieces in the first month of this war by that system; this wasn't "war amongst the people" this was war of the people. 

Third, Ukraine's political level, assisted by a massive social media effort allowed Ukraine to win the strategic narrative, even before the war crimes.  We all started to cheer for the little guy and realized that this war was an political and strategic opportunity.  All that money and aid, essentially the military industrial complex of Ukraine, was riding on getting this part right...and the Ukrainians did it very right.

I am not like Steve to be honest.  I had no idea how this war was going to go before it started.  It wasn't until about 72 hours in that it became very apparent that something was happening that no one in the business predicted.  That is when the sickness symptoms of the Russian system began to appear. 

Could Russia have won? Of course, no war is pre-determined.  Ukraine could have split or simply failed to resist - they could have ignored western intel, Zelenskyy could have run and/or capitulated.  Or the Russians could have had a much better plan - why they did not make the capture of Lyviv and disruption of all western support the main effort is beyond me.  But they did not, and now they really cannot.  No matter how this little dance in the Donbas goes, Russia has lost this war already.  There is no renormalization after this.  Sweden and Finland are not going to change their minds, those sanctions are going to stick as economies re-wire.  Ukraine is not going to "de-militarize" nor is it going to go quietly back into Russia's sphere with a friendly government.  Russian hard power is empty, to the point that I would not be surprised to see more disruptions in it near-abroad- Russia as a state might already be dead, it just does not know it yet.

Edited June 7, 2022 by The_Capt

[Huba]

M109s hit by CB fire. And an angry rant about how not to use SPGs:

And an even angrier rant from Italian TV. TBH I'm shocked that anybody in the West would like to talk to Solovyov and his goons on live TV. Or interview Lavrov as in case of French TV. Freedom of speech and pluralism is one thing, but this is just giving an outlet to an enemy propaganda. On the other hand, Russia is probably not perceived this way in Italy of France - and that's why CEE is looking up to UK and US instead of EU for anything security related.

 

[Taranis]

19 minutes ago, Huba said:

M109s hit by CB fire. And an angry rant about how not to use SPGs:

And an even angrier rant from Italian TV. TBH I'm shocked that anybody in the West would like to talk to Solovyov and his goons on live TV. Or interview Lavrov as in case of French TV. Freedom of speech and pluralism is one thing, but this is just giving an outlet to an enemy propaganda. On the other hand, Russia is probably not perceived this way in Italy of France - and that's why CEE is looking up to UK and US instead of EU for anything security related.

 

I read at the beginning of the "Special Military Operation" that there was something like 1/3 of the French or even more who thought that Russian propaganda was true, that NATO was threatening Russia, etc. Conspiracy is all the rage in Western Europe. Look at COVID how many people think it's a US bioweapon to scare and control people...Sometimes I really feel like I'm in another world.

People don't realize that History is being written now and future generations will see us as if we were buying gas from Hitler

Edited June 7, 2022 by Taranis

[Taranis]

Page 9 : "if the French place the responsibility for the situation in Ukraine above all on Vladimir Putin, a non-negligible part also believes that the Ukrainian President and the Westerners are also partly responsible"
Red = Yes a lot of responsibility
Pink = Yes a small share of responsibility
Green = No, no responsibility

[Cederic]

12 hours ago, sburke said:

huh  kind of a play on the whole Stalingrad sniper battle?

Sniper. The White Raven (2022) - IMDb

Might have to check this one out as well

Cyborgs: Heroes Never Die (2017) - IMDb

I see your fiction and raise you a documentary: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt7974772/

In short: it's a film of love and hatred. A man that hates the people he's trying to kill, and the people that love him for it.

Is it propaganda? Probably. Still very interesting nonetheless.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Taranis said:

Absolutely, the non-integration made it much easier to send and save time. Maybe an integration is planned for the long term, who knows? We see that they are doing very well without this integration. It is sure that it is always faster to receive the elements directly and above all it avoids typing errors in the rush. Apart from reliability, the time saving is not huge either because the cannon remains automated (conversion of coordinates into firing elements, etc.). The gun commander just needs to enter the elements and then get out of the vehicle (15-20 seconds?).

I think some of the integration stuff NATO countries are used to is simply not necessary for Ukraine because their existing systems for handling targeting is pretty well established *and* effective.  It's not like Ukraine is trying to figure out how to use artillery, they are just in need of figuring out how to use specific systems.

We also have to think of things in relative terms.  Even if Ukraine can't use a particular system as well as a NATO country might, are they able to gain significant advantages over what they already have?  It seems pretty clear form what Taranis is saying, seemingly verified by frontline reporting, the answer is a clear YES.  That's really all that matters.

Plus, any system that Ukraine gets that uses NATO ammo, even if it is a "dumb tube", is an advantage because clearly they are running out of Soviet ammo types.  Having a gun that is out of ammo kinda sucks

Steve

[Armorgunner]

Film from French TV, about Ukrainian use of Caesar 155mm Artillery. Warning tho. At 1:53 Drone film, of several dead Russians quite close.

 

 

[Armorgunner]

Ukrainian SOF, destroys BMP 2. First person view, from the SOF firing. Then drone film, of the result.

 

 

 

 

Edited June 7, 2022 by Armorgunner

[Armorgunner]

Close hit, to a Russian APC. Several wounded, or dead.

 

 

[Seedorf81]

Yesterday on Belgian-tv a documentary on the Wagnergroup and their shocking activities in Africa and Syria.

Two striking quotes from a (former) Wagner-mercenary:

- "During the Chechen-war the army adopted the following procedure: before an attack, it is absolutely vital to create a 'green' zone" (safe zone). In order to achieve that, you do a complete house-to-house search of that area. If you find any weapon, you kill all the occupants."

- "What the West doesn't seem to understand, is that our war is not with Ukraine, but with Nato and western values."

He didn't lie.. Yikes.

 

 

Edited June 7, 2022 by Seedorf81

[FancyCat]

2 hours ago, poesel said:

Greece has about 150-200 BMPs. So a slightly better ratio. 
Personally I would prefer that both batches would go directly to Ukraine. Neither country really needs those vehicles. 

Turkey.

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Well, as far as the ones we've seen, it looks like they're on Renault Sherpas, which would indicate they are indeed the French service ones.

In one of the videos posted above I could see a repair to the rear of the front passenger seat.  So at least some of these appear to be "used" and not from diverting new production to Ukraine.

Steve