How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

57 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

He is just soldier or sergeant or junior officer - I don't know. And this is just a "view from the trench". About motorized infantry it obviously was a figure of speech, but not far from the truth. The number of motorized infantry battalions armed with BRDM-2 or trucks and territorial defense battalions (trucks), air-assault batalions (BTR-80/70, armored cars/MRAPs and relatively less number of BTR-3/BMD with 30 mm guns) is much higher than mech.infantry battalions armed with BMP-1/2/BTR-4. And even mechs now in defense warfare mostly fight in the trenches or in ambushes, or hit and run actions, where they use own IFVs mostly like transport and fire supoprt, but not as asset to direct fight with hordes of Russian armor. According to ORIX we already lost 96 IFVs (he counts as IFV all stuff, armed with 30 mm gun). And this is only visible loses. This is 3 full mech. battalions wiped out.

So, if we want to liberate our territories after Russians will be grinded and moved to defense, we will need new artillery - Soviet systems will burn in the flame of war - even if they will not be destroyed, they just will shot out own barrels and we will not get such outstanding accuracy. We need in new armor for infantry carring. Let it be even old BMP-1, M113 and Marders. Because it anyway better that pick-ups and legs.    

An NCO’s ground view is something to take seriously in my experience.  They view from trench level but you can’t find a more honest assessment if you tried.

Well my friend, my assessment is that Ukraine is going to win this war on its terms unless a major strategic shift happens.  Beyond relatively light forces breaking my reality (again) in this phase of the war, I am noting a real change in political tone in the west.  Both US Sec State and Def are framing this war differently, as in the end-state is a severely beaten Russia, as in broken for a decade or two.  In my experience political signalling like that only happens when military assessments are all showing the same thing; politicians are skittish creatures (even appointees).  

Based on the numbers about a Divisions worth of western artillery is on the way with a lot of ammo.  These are not dumb lobbing systems either, we are talking digital integrated ones.  I am sure trainers will come with them, even into Western Ukraine.  The West is going to owe Ukraine more than few solids after this one, and it is definitely in our interest to keep Ukraine westward facing.

My honest advice is to Holdfast, your turn will come. 

Edited April 26, 2022 by The_Capt

[JonS]

6 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

I wonder how long it takes to actually cross train an arty crew from, say, a 152mm towed howitzer to a 155mm towed howitzer

In the artillery system I'm used to (towed guns, computer fire control system, voice comms, manual survey transitioning to semi-automated survey) there are a range of jobs from simple to hard to complex to artisanal.

Being a forward observer is physically demanding, takes a lot of training. The process of adjusting rounds onto a target to get to FFE is fairly straightforward and can be rote learnt for most mission types and conditions with a few weeks of intensive training and a large ammo budget. But integrating the effects of fires with the maneuver arms commander's intent (ie, the whole point of having an FO at all) is more art and black magic than it is science, and takes a lot of time, experience, reflection, and mutual trust to develop. But, the good news is that all of this paragraph is largely independent of the gun used - a well trained FO party will be able to adapt to an entirely new gun with a just a few key pieces of info specific to the gun.

Command post procedures for turning orders from the FO into orders for the guns are similar; the drills don't really change just because the gun has changed. But, that does assumes that the technical data for the particular gun is loaded into the fire control system. It also assumes that the fire discipline that informed the design of the gun is compatible with the fire control system (FCS) that's being used. With modern FCSs the role of the CP has largely transitioned from a place were a bunch of smart people do a lot of maths under pressure in a poor working conditions, into a place where gross error checks are conducted to make sure some numpty hasn't fat fingered a number on the data entry keyboard. Knowing the steps and process is still important, but again the good news is that all of that is largely independent of the specific gun being used.

It's on the gun line and along the log chain that the differences really start to become apparent. Can the ammunition movement and handling system be utilised with the 'new' gun's ammo - if not, how long will it take to train personnel to employ the specific kit? How is survey for the new gun achieved, and is the output of that compatible with the FCS being used? And, finally, how many personnel are required to man each gun, what are their roles, and how do they execute them. Someone above also pointed out seemingly simple things like making sure that instruments are annotated in the language being used. Also to be considered is whether the vehicle fleet will be changing with the guns - can the old tractor tow the new gun? If not, you'll also have to factor in driver courses. The gun and vehicle maintainers will also need to be trained and equipped to service the new fleet.

All of this trainable, but training does take time. The time taken also depends on who and what you're training - if it is a fully ready battery transitioning to a new gun with a partially new vehicle fleet, but retaining their old FCS, you could probably get up to speed in 2-4 weeks, with most effort allocated to the maintainers, then to ensuring that the gun crews get the new drills really squared away. But if they also have to learn an entirely new FCS, you'll probably need to add at least another month to get the command post up to speed. All of this has the underlying assumption that the battery has no other tasks during this time, and is fully and completely oriented to learning the new gun and systems. If you're just grabbing folks off the street, with no prior knowledge ... yeesh ... then you're probably talking about 6 months before they're ready to go, since you're effectively creating an entirely new unit from scratch and while for them the specific gun doesn't matter (learning one gun is much the same as pretty much the same as any other if you're doing it all from scratch) there are a whole bunch of other soldier skills that can't be taken as given.

Preceding that training - or re-training - is the courses required to get the trainers up to speed; training the trainers. We've already seen hints of what seems to be a lot of that going on in various parts of Europe and the US.

Edited April 27, 2022 by JonS

[Kinophile]

Thank you, @Haiduk. That's exactly the kind of primary source that clarifies many, many things through its sheer honesty. 

I'm interested in this sentence:

Quote

"And our light motorized infantry brigades will turn out to mech.brigades".

What vehicles are you expecting them to receive? BMP/BTRs? Or NATO types?

Would this mean the more experienced, reliable TDF units would get upgraded/incorporated to Regular Army?

[JonS]

19 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

it is definitely in our interest to keep Ukraine leaning west and facing east.

FTFY

[Homo_Ferricus]

On topic of how secure are UA LOCs--this excellent UA youtube channel yesterday mentioned in his "strategic challenges" segment that Russian missiles struck railyards where locomotives were stored. Apparently a very distressing fact as these are not very replaceable, especially granted that Ukrainian railways are of different gauge than European ones. Ukraine is probably about as dependent on their railways as Russia I would imagine. Hard to deliver large amounts of the heavy stuff to the front with only random lorries and sprinter vans clogging the roads.

 

[Huba]

2 minutes ago, Homo_Ferricus said:

On topic of how secure are UA LOCs--this excellent UA youtube channel yesterday mentioned in his "strategic challenges" segment that Russian missiles struck railyards where locomotives were stored. Apparently a very distressing fact as these are not very replaceable, especially granted that Ukrainian railways are of different gauge than European ones. Ukraine is probably about as dependent on their railways as Russia I would imagine. Hard to deliver large amounts of the heavy stuff to the front with only random lorries and sprinter vans clogging the roads.

 

Like I mentioned above, theres around 2500 locomotives in UA stocks according to Wiki, there's room for some attrition  Sourcing more would be difficult, but some should be available from the Baltics and Finnland. I don't know about conversions from standard gauge, but with sufficient lead time, maybe it would also be doable ?

[Vacillator]

1 minute ago, Huba said:

I don't know about conversions from standard gauge, but with sufficient lead time, maybe it would also be doable ?

I imagine this isn't easy, but it's probably do-able with lead time. 

If there's 2500 minus just a few so far, then maybe not so much of a problem yet.

[sross112]

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

Like I mentioned above, theres around 2500 locomotives in UA stocks according to Wiki, there's room for some attrition  Sourcing more would be difficult, but some should be available from the Baltics and Finnland. I don't know about conversions from standard gauge, but with sufficient lead time, maybe it would also be doable ?

In the comments on that video there were some folks that sounded like they had railroad experience. They answered questions of this type and said that it was possible to convert the locomotives over to a different gauge. I'd think the biggest limiting factor on doing that would be the facilities you would need. I'm sure they are out there but I'm assuming they are few and far between. So mass conversion in a short time is probably not possible, but over time it could certainly be done. 

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, sross112 said:

In the comments on that video there were some folks that sounded like they had railroad experience. They answered questions of this type and said that it was possible to convert the locomotives over to a different gauge. I'd think the biggest limiting factor on doing that would be the facilities you would need. I'm sure they are out there but I'm assuming they are few and far between. So mass conversion in a short time is probably not possible, but over time it could certainly be done. 

To be truthful, I checked again and according to Wiki in 2020 there were:

• Number of freight (goods) wagons – 85,200
• Number of passenger cars – 3,883 (in active operation - 2,681)^[35]
• Number of locomotives – 1,944 (electric - 1,627, diesel - 301)

So a tad fewer then I remembered, but still a huge number. About the conversions, nice thing is that we could put Polish and German train industries to it if need be, and then move the locomotives as cargo to gauge break points. As with any battle of logistics, if it really comes to it, it is all about production vs attrition ratio and I'm sure Russians are on the losing side here. Maybe if all AD failed and Su-34 flew high and just dropped GBUs at will, the trains would fail, but I can't see that happening.

Edited April 26, 2022 by Huba

[sburke]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Preceding that training - or re-training - is the courses required to get the trainers up to speed; training the trainers. We've already seen hints of what seems to be a lot of that going on in various parts of Europe and the US.

I know it is crediting the Russians with more forethought than they have displayed so far, but I wonder how western heavy aid considerations went into launching the Izyum halfhearted offensive when they did.  There is a lot of hurt on the way.

[Battlefront.com]

Short article on the explosion of LPR and collaborationist "people's mayor" in Kriminna on the 25th.  Some 30 people were killed:

https://censor-net.translate.goog/ua/news/3337050/pid_chas_vybuhu_u_meriyi_kreminnoyi_zagynuv_okupatsiyinyyi_mer_ta_blyzko_30_yiogo_ohorontsiv_gayidayi?_x_tr_sl=uk&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp

Steve

[dan/california]

 

47 minutes ago, Homo_Ferricus said:

On topic of how secure are UA LOCs--this excellent UA youtube channel yesterday mentioned in his "strategic challenges" segment that Russian missiles struck railyards where locomotives were stored. Apparently a very distressing fact as these are not very replaceable, especially granted that Ukrainian railways are of different gauge than European ones. Ukraine is probably about as dependent on their railways as Russia I would imagine. Hard to deliver large amounts of the heavy stuff to the front with only random lorries and sprinter vans clogging the roads.

 

The Russians seem to have a fair bit of ability to hit things that aren't moving, bridges being the obvious and most problematic example. They seem to virtually no ability to strike actual trains or truck convoys while they are under way. Which is sort of 100% opposite the allied air campaign in France in 1944. Fighter bomber were hunting actual trains at will, but just didn't have the ability to drop bridges. It is an interesting contrast between the two eras. 

Thusly the Ukrainians need a well thought out system that to extent possible never presents large fixed targets. Have locomotives drop train cars in ones and twos and grab empties the same way. Try to get trucks thru thru the peak danger areas with the minimal concentration and stopped time. To the extent humanly possible just don't give the bad guys a target worth an SRBM, that sits still long enough for the Russians to close the loop on their disastrous command and control system. All of which is COMPLICATED but theoretically possible. Don't know what you do about the bridges short of Patriot systems parked at every one.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

 Beyond relatively light forces breaking my reality (again) in this phase of the war,

The post war debate about the utility of mass is going to be intense. Both "the Russians are utterly incompetent side", and the "this is a new era of ground warfare side" have a lot of supporting evidence to work with.

[akd]

Seems likely TB2 was used in the strike on fuel infrastructure in Bryansk (which makes Russias threats to retaliate against Britain for “provoking” Ukraine to use foreign-supplied munitions against targets inside Russia with statements made today extra silly).

 

[Homo_Ferricus]

45 minutes ago, Huba said:

To be truthful, I checked again and according to Wiki in 2020 there were:

• Number of freight (goods) wagons – 85,200
• Number of passenger cars – 3,883 (in active operation - 2,681)^[35]
• Number of locomotives – 1,944 (electric - 1,627, diesel - 301)

You've got to wonder how many of those engines are usable. I assume a proportion of them are in disrepair, parted out, in deep storage, clerical errors... all that stuff. 

Not to be too pessimistic, though. I admittedly know nothing about trains.

[Huba]

Just now, dan/california said:

 

The Russians seem to have a fair bit of ability to hit things that aren't moving, bridges being the obvious and most problematic example. They seem to virtually no ability to strike actual trains or truck convoys while they are under way. Which is sort of 100% opposite the allied air campaign in France in 1944. Fighter bomber were hunting actual trains at will, but just didn't have the ability to drop bridges. It is an interesting contrast between the two eras. 

Thusly the Ukrainians need a well thought out system that to extent possible never presents large fixed targets. Have locomotives drop train cars in ones and twos and grab empties the same way. Try to get trucks thru thru the peak danger areas with the minimal concentration and stopped time. To the extent humanly possible just don't give the bad guys a target worth an SRBM, that sits still long enough for the Russians to close the loop on their disastrous command and control system. All of which is COMPLICATED but theoretically possible. Don't know what you do about the bridges short of Patriot systems parked at every one.

Well for targeting the mobile stuff youe have to be there with your radar actively scanning for target, and then close in and attack - this show the true strength of UA AD, as Russians don't event attempt do it. Even relatively close to front lines they prefer to strike stations/ yards instead of moving trains ( remember Kramatorsk? I'ts almost in artillery range).

As to the bridges I had a lengthy discussion about those elsewhere with my position being that Russians are not able to strike those effectively with available forces. I'll line the argumentation and I invite you to criticize it, I'm happy to be proven wrong:

- first most high level argument is that if they could've, they would've, at this stage of war at least. They don't cause they can't

- technically, as the only means available are cruise and ballistic missiles, and the crossings are quite numerous, it is really hard to take and keep those down. Average launch rate as of today is less then 30/ day. Subtract weapons unsuitable due to range or warhead type. Subtract ones that AD will shoot down. Now is that enough to really keep the crossings down if UA side actively starts fixing those as soon as shooting stops? Keep in mind that you also have other targets across the country to hit, like oil storage etc.

- from all the crossings of the Dnipro, some go through dams like in Kamyanske or Kremenchuk - those are 20m thick concrete constructions that should be invulnerable to anything short of MOP or nuclear weapon. If you somehow broke one, it would destroy a city downstream, even Russians would look very bad if they did it. Even one of those functioning should allow for a hundred or so trains to pass daily, enough for a whole Eastern Front.

If you add all of this up, it looks to me that decisive campaign against Dnipro bridges is not something Russian side could do. I'm sure they could temporarily increase the missile expenditure and destroy (some of) the crossings, but Ukrainians will repair and process will have to be repeated. It's just unsustainable without manned platforms dropping bombs.

Here is my reasoning based on available data, am I wrong?

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Major Alexey Dineka, 247th Air Assault Regiment, 7th Air Assault Division

 

[Huba]

11 minutes ago, Homo_Ferricus said:

You've got to wonder how many of those engines are usable. I assume a proportion of them are in disrepair, parted out, in deep storage, clerical errors... all that stuff. 

Not to be too pessimistic, though. I admittedly know nothing about trains.

Sure, even at 50% it is probably 5 or 10 times more then needed to haul stuff from Poland to Dnipro.

[SteelRain]

Just a short addition to the Gepard to Ukraine.
In 2020 Germany granted Qatar to buy 15 Gepard's, 16000 Rounds and spare parts. The Gepard's will be used as stationary defense in case terrorists try to strike the soccer world championship 2022 with drones. 

Looks like stationary defense of high value targets in Ukraine would be a good way to use them and free some assets for the front line or to grant additional cover of important infrastructure.

Sadly the twitter thread is only in German.

TL:DR
The Gepard A2 had a 97% hit rate even vs small drones.
The crew consisted of former Gepard Crew members of the Bundeswehr and employees of KMW.

And a lengthy PDF of the first display in Germany in December 2017.

https://www.fla2.de/_downloads/Katar-Vorgeschichte-final.pdf

Edited April 27, 2022 by SteelRain

[akd]

Interesting…

 

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, SteelRain said:

Just a short addition to the Gepard to Ukraine.
In 2020 Germany granted Qatar to buy 15 Gepard's, 16000 Rounds and spare parts. The Gepard's will be used as stationary defense in case terrorists try to strike the soccer world championship 2022 with drones. 

Looks like stationary defense of high value targets in Ukraine would be a good way to use them and free some assets for the front line or to grant additional cover of important infrastructure.

Sadly the twitter thread is only in German.

TL:DR The Gepard A2 had a 97% hit rate even vs small drones. Lets hope they upgrade them to A2.

And a lengthy PDF of the first display in Germany in December 2017.

https://www.fla2.de/_downloads/Katar-Vorgeschichte-final.pdf

That would be the most sensible option I think, shortening the needed training and integration time.

As for efficiency, the Polish PZA Loara SPAAG from the nineties that was quite similar and used the same 35mm guns, reportedly could localize, track and shot down mortar rounds, and that using standard FAPDS ammo (albeit with huge expenditure of it).

Edited April 27, 2022 by Huba

[chuckdyke]

He makes an excellent point about situational awareness it is more important than the cannon or the armor. Even if the Russians had a tank like the Abrams in regards armor and armament, they still would have been knocked out by modern AT systems. Situational awareness is created by modern battlefield command systems if the tank has a good chance to survive on the modern battlefield. It matters more now of what we put inside and outside the fighting compartment of a tank. 

 

Edited April 27, 2022 by chuckdyke

[Fenris]

A little more help from down under

Quote

Australia will send Ukraine 6 M777 155mm  Howitzers. This brings the total number of M777s being sent  to 100 (90 from USA and 4 from Canada).

 

[Kinophile]

57 minutes ago, Huba said:

Well for targeting the mobile stuff youe have to be there with your radar actively scanning for target, and then close in and attack - this show the true strength of UA AD, as Russians don't event attempt do it. Even relatively close to front lines they prefer to strike stations/ yards instead of moving trains ( remember Kramatorsk? I'ts almost in artillery range).

As to the bridges I had a lengthy discussion about those elsewhere with my position being that Russians are not able to strike those effectively with available forces. I'll line the argumentation and I invite you to criticize it, I'm happy to be proven wrong:

- first most high level argument is that if they could've, they would've, at this stage of war at least. They don't cause they can't

- technically, as the only means available are cruise and ballistic missiles, and the crossings are quite numerous, it is really hard to take and keep those down. Average launch rate as of today is less then 30/ day. Subtract weapons unsuitable due to range or warhead type. Subtract ones that AD will shoot down. Now is that enough to really keep the crossings down if UA side actively starts fixing those as soon as shooting stops? Keep in mind that you also have other targets across the country to hit, like oil storage etc.

- from all the crossings of the Dnipro, some go through dams like in Kamyanske or Kremenchuk - those are 20m thick concrete constructions that should be invulnerable to anything short of MOP or nuclear weapon. If you somehow broke one, it would destroy a city downstream, even Russians would look very bad if they did it. Even one of those functioning should allow for a hundred or so trains to pass daily, enough for a whole Eastern Front.

If you add all of this up, it looks to me that decisive campaign against Dnipro bridges is not something Russian side could do. I'm sure they could temporarily increase the missile expenditure and destroy (some of) the crossings, but Ukrainians will repair and process will have to be repeated. It's just unsustainable without manned platforms dropping bombs.

Here is my reasoning based on available data, am I wrong?

Youre reasoning is sound to this civvy civ, I'm hoping youre right, but I'm going to give another devil's advocate pass, just for my own persnickitiness.

Re could-have/would-have - not quite a definitive closer; by that retroactive deterministic rational they would have taken Kiev if they could have, but they couldn't so they didn't. Which is not quite true - a lot had to go right for Ukraine for it to win that fight. A lot could easily have gone wrong. Kiev was in no way predetermined.

The same goes for the air war - Russia easily has the tech and numbers to achieve full air superiority; but political considerations ("special operation") limited its initial strategic orbat which, when it failed to achieve A/S, left no further opportunity to gain it.

Even so, the capability still exists. Its a question of priorities and right now the slap & tickle in the fields is winning out. But If RUS goes full mobilization then Russian air dominance is a definite possibility. A proper air campaign, with a relentless focus on rapidly degrading UKR SAM defense is perfectly achievable - if the decision is made to do so. It hasn't been yet, not in the way it needs to be, ie pause ground activity until air dominance is properly achieved. The RuAF cannot sit on two stools and achieve success in both (air war v ground war). Even the US did air war first, the ground in Iraq, both times. It just more sensible to focus on a single strategic task which then enables the next. RuAF is fully aware of this concept but Kremlin gob****es shafted them (thankfully) by limiting the nature of the operation, confusing the situation and not appointing a single overall commander. The eventual appointment of a mud-humper as commander of the invasion probably reinforces the ground war emphasis and retards the RuAFs internal political capital to get to do what it should be doing, crunching the UKR AA/AD.

TL/DR my angle here is that the RuAF is currently prioritizing the operational ground grind at the cost of a true strategic air campaign. Or rather, the Kremlin is doing so. But the technical and platform capability still exists to turn around the air war, its a question of the decision being made at the cost of other wants.

But Putler wants his May 9th geriatric handjob with soiled ribbon on, so the ground war it is.

Finally, I would be very wary of noting large numbers of anything in Ukraine and assuming that that is what is actually operational and resilient enough for the task at hand. 500 diesel locomotives sounds great, but I highly doubt that's actually 500 running around,  hot n ready, spanky nice machines. I'd lay odds that at most its 300 actually available. Repairs, upgrades, end of life, etc all take their toll. I'm ignoring electrics as I believe its diesels that do the heavy lifting at speed - I think? Happy to be corrected.

Enjoying this push and pull, please squash me with better reasoning

Edited April 27, 2022 by Kinophile

[sross112]

Transnistria

Ok, so we have the FSB or someone stirring things up there. They got their military  and the Russian BTG's on full alert.

The Russians hit the only bridge linking the southern part of Odessa Oblast.

 

Apparently a dozen ships have moved into the Southern Naval Base which is apparently used for staging operations.

Do you think the RuN will make a landing in southern Odessa Oblast? Looks like good beaches for it and not sure what defenses would be down there as it looks like no large towns.

When I search for why it really doesn't make much sense, especially since they hit the bridge. If the bridge is the only access from Odessa it is also the access to Odessa. So there really isn't a threat there and really no forces would need to be shifted to cover it from other areas. What they have locally in Odessa should be enough. It does give Putin a talking point about taking a chunk of land and it would put Odessa in artillery range which maybe he thinks can be a card to play for negotiations?

Or does this have something to do with Transnistria? Blow the bridge to protect the flank and help relieve the beleaguered and surrounded Transnistrians? Do they think they could bring enough combat power over to maybe start up a shooting war between Moldova and the separatists? This would be a huge provocation to Romania and probably NATO. 

I'm trying to make sense of how anything around there makes sense or helps Putin with his war goals in Ukraine. I wouldn't think Ukraine would divert anything that way short of some sort of RA invasion from there. The only way to move more troops from the southern part of the Odessa Oblast into Transnistria is through Moldova. I can't imagine Moldova would consent to the RA moving through their territory. 

It doesn't make a lot of sense to me but I guess it doesn't have to. If it makes sense to Putin that is enough. Just definitely think something is brewing.