How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

 

21 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

I've been noodling around this one as well and am miles off finishing but I've done enough to work out in terms of ground alone that a Russian attack is going to be a big ask.

 

Nice analysis!

I'd also add to your skepticism that forces responsible for the southern portion of COA 1, 2, and 3 have so far proven incapable of making much headway.  Reinforcing them to change the balance of power requires additional BTGs which Russia doesn't seem to have available to it.  Therefore, I think the moves from the south will only be feasible with the existing (or slightly beefed up) forces if the attacks from the north make rapid progress into the rear of the defending Ukrainian forces.  And yet, how realistic is it that the northern attacks will succeed without similar pressure coming from the south? 

Even if COA 1 is initially successful beyond all expectations, what good will that do if COA 2 and 3 are stuffed up?  Mariupol has held out for more than a month on little more than determination and favorable terrain, two things which the Ukrainians have going for it in this area as well.  Not the same type of terrain, obviously, but still militarily problematic for the attacker.  Further, the Ukrainians have heavy equipment and armor available to it within this area, which the Mariupol defenders do not.  This means COA 1, even if it succeeded, would be akin to someone cornering a tiger.  Worse, it's more like someone cornering a tiger with at least a couple of ferocious cats at his back.

What I see from your view is a more detailed reason to think the Russians are doomed to fail.  Provided, of course, they even get the attack off the ground.  There's reason to doubt they will.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, Huba said:

I just came across those photos. Yay or nay - is this Moskva? Are those legit and not photoshopped?

 

Yeah, those are real and unless Ukraine blew up another ship of the same class as this one, that's the Muskova.  The listing and damage are consistent with the reports.

Steve

[Combatintman]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Nice analysis!

I'd also add to your skepticism that forces responsible for the southern portion of COA 1, 2, and 3 have so far proven incapable of making much headway.  Reinforcing them to change the balance of power requires additional BTGs which Russia doesn't seem to have available to it.  Therefore, I think the moves from the south will only be feasible with the existing (or slightly beefed up) forces if the attacks from the north make rapid progress into the rear of the defending Ukrainian forces.  And yet, how realistic is it that the northern attacks will succeed without similar pressure coming from the south? 

Even if COA 1 is initially successful beyond all expectations, what good will that do if COA 2 and 3 are stuffed up?  Mariupol has held out for more than a month on little more than determination and favorable terrain, two things which the Ukrainians have going for it in this area as well.  Not the same type of terrain, obviously, but still militarily problematic for the attacker.  Further, the Ukrainians have heavy equipment and armor available to it within this area, which the Mariupol defenders do not.  This means COA 1, even if it succeeded, would be akin to someone cornering a tiger.  Worse, it's more like someone cornering a tiger with at least a couple of ferocious cats at his back.

What I see from your view is a more detailed reason to think the Russians are doomed to fail.  Provided, of course, they even get the attack off the ground.  There's reason to doubt they will.

Steve

I just threw the arrows in from the south because theoretically there are forces available there - as I said, I haven't deep-dived the Russian laydown yet, but my initial read of what's going on there is pretty much on the same page as you.  The COAs are one or the other, even with my limited look into what is on the ground I know that there are definitely not enough forces to pull off all three COAs concurrently although the push west as part of COA3 could be employed to support COAs 1 and 2.

[Huba]

So the talking head says that Russia has to brace for long sacred war against Ukraine (and the West). Diplomacy sound less and less like and option. In general it looks to me that Putin might already understand in what **** he's in, and decided that to salvage the situation, he has to choose the North Korean path. Makes sense if holding to power is your only rationale.

 

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, Hapless said:

 

Disregard

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

I just threw the arrows in from the south because theoretically there are forces available there - as I said, I haven't deep-dived the Russian laydown yet, but my initial read of what's going on there is pretty much on the same page as you.  The COAs are one or the other, even with my limited look into what is on the ground I know that there are definitely not enough forces to pull off all three COAs concurrently although the push west as part of COA3 could be employed to support COAs 1 and 2.

I figured you had them set up as individual cases for Russia to choose from, however COA 1 only matters if there's some way to clean out the pocket it creates.  Since you mapped out the logical way of doing that (COA 2 and 3), I went with the notion of pursuing all three with the bulk of their 22 BTGs coming from the north.  COA 2 and COA 3 would use existing forces with some reinforcement from the pool of 22 BTGs.

Even if we assume each of the 22 BTGs is at 1000 men per (which is unlikely), that's still not enough force to do all of this.  In fact, I'd push the notion it's not enough to do COA 1.

The Russians are simply screwed.

Steve

[Kinophile]

@Combatintmanand @The_Capt have won the Week, I think.

[The_Capt]

56 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

I'll see your Flight Simulator and raise you map army ...

MilitaryMap - Plan your Mission

I've been noodling around this one as well and am miles off finishing but I've done enough to work out in terms of ground alone that a Russian attack is going to be a big ask.

The images above are different map/imagery sets of the same area with the red line being the approximate FEBA as of a few days ago.  The area shown is basically Izyum-Slovyansk-Kramatorsk.

The broad COAs for Russian are basically:

• COA1 - Deep Envelopment.
• COA2 - Medium Envelopment.
• COA3 - Shallow Envelopment.

Of the three COAs - COA1 offers the best opportunity for manoeuvre and is the preferred COA.  COAs 2 and 3 both involve moving through severely restricted terrain and a battle for Slovyansk.  As a guesstimate, moving through the woods to Slovyansk will swallow up a minimum of three BTGs if the Ukrainians choose to disrupt the advance on the approaches to Slovyansk.  Slovyansk cannot be bypassed which means that if it is going to be defended, it will require a minimum of 4-5 BTGs to subdue.  A number of 22 x BTGs has been banded around for the force assembling in Izyum meaning that COAs 2 and 3 will expend nearly a third of the available combat power in Izyum covering the first 35km.  That is assuming that Russia can knock Slovyansk over easily for which there is little evidence to suggest that it is capable of doing so should it be defended.  It will also probably take at least a week to clear out the defenders which means that COAs 2 and 3 stand little chance of achieving a face saving "victory" by 09 May.  In fact COA 2 will definitely fail to deliver on that timeline.

Map Army Files are below if anybody wants to rummage around the detail bearing in mind this is WIP.

BAE.milxlyz 134.49 kB · 2 downloads Russian FLOT 10 Apr.milxlyz 16.84 kB · 0 downloads

 

COA 1 may be most dangerous from a UA perspective but that is a long haul with pretty exposed flanks.  The terrain is more open but that may not be a good thing as we discussed, and it is not as open as it may look.  That is a lot of ground for things to go wrong and for a UA c-attack.

Dunno, they all kinda suck to be honest, I would not be biting this off at all based on the condition of the RA right now.  Take Mariupol, maybe snatch a few hundred meters of ground and try to dig in.  You get that land bridge and the remains of a major city, which is something.  I would abandon that whole northern frontage around Izyum (call it another feint) and try slow grind from the south.  You cut the frontage down to about 400-500kms and have very short supply lines to worry about - but they will still get mauled by UA deep strike.  Based on the condition of the RA big bold sweeping maneuvers just don’t seem reasonable, particularly after they have given the defenders weeks to get ready.

My hope is that the RA realizes this and pulls out, returning to pre-24 Feb conflict lines.  That is the best military course of action for the RA right now…go home and sit in a corner and think about what you have done.  But I think we all know that is not likely to happen.

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@Combatintmanand @The_Capt have won the Week, I think.

Heh, he just couldn’t resist showing up an officer.  Trust me, if it comes down to believing me or @Combatintman when it comes down to intel analysis, go with him every time.

[akd]

55 minutes ago, Huba said:

I just came across those photos. Yay or nay - is this Moskva? Are those legit and not photoshopped?

 

That is Moskva. No reason to think they aren’t legitimate.  As you can see, a storm didn’t sink her.  Massive damage did.

Edited April 17, 2022 by akd

[Kinophile]

Yup, that WAS the Moskva. >:D

[dan/california]

57 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

I'll see your Flight Simulator and raise you map army ...

MilitaryMap - Plan your Mission

I've been noodling around this one as well and am miles off finishing but I've done enough to work out in terms of ground alone that a Russian attack is going to be a big ask.

The images above are different map/imagery sets of the same area with the red line being the approximate FEBA as of a few days ago.  The area shown is basically Izyum-Slovyansk-Kramatorsk.

The broad COAs for Russian are basically:

• COA1 - Deep Envelopment.
• COA2 - Medium Envelopment.
• COA3 - Shallow Envelopment.

Of the three COAs - COA1 offers the best opportunity for manoeuvre and is the preferred COA.  COAs 2 and 3 both involve moving through severely restricted terrain and a battle for Slovyansk.  As a guesstimate, moving through the woods to Slovyansk will swallow up a minimum of three BTGs if the Ukrainians choose to disrupt the advance on the approaches to Slovyansk.  Slovyansk cannot be bypassed which means that if it is going to be defended, it will require a minimum of 4-5 BTGs to subdue.  A number of 22 x BTGs has been banded around for the force assembling in Izyum meaning that COAs 2 and 3 will expend nearly a third of the available combat power in Izyum covering the first 35km.  That is assuming that Russia can knock Slovyansk over easily for which there is little evidence to suggest that it is capable of doing so should it be defended.  It will also probably take at least a week to clear out the defenders which means that COAs 2 and 3 stand little chance of achieving a face saving "victory" by 09 May.  In fact COA 2 will definitely fail to deliver on that timeline.

Map Army Files are below if anybody wants to rummage around the detail bearing in mind this is WIP.

BAE.milxlyz 134.49 kB · 1 download Russian FLOT 10 Apr.milxlyz 16.84 kB · 0 downloads

 

So basically the road system dictates that  from Izyum they attack southeast towards Barvinkove, southwest towards Slavyansk, or both. There is a small river running more or less east west through Barvinkove. It enough of an obstacle to let the Ukrainians really slow or outright stop them right there? I am assuming the Ukrainians are reading these maps, or better ones. I am a lot less sure what the Russians are reading.

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Dunno, they all kinda suck to be honest, I would not be biting this off at all based on the condition of the RA right now.  Take Mariupol, maybe snatch a few hundred meters of ground and try to dig in.  You get that land bridge and the remains of a major city, which is something.  I would abandon that whole northern frontage around Izyum (call it another feint) and try slow grind from the south.  You cut the frontage down to about 400-500kms and have very short supply lines to worry about - but they will still get mauled by UA deep strike.  Based on the condition of the RA big bold sweeping maneuvers just don’t seem reasonable, particularly after they have given the defenders weeks to get ready.

Assuming that's what happens, they suffer more losses but not as severe as if they went with the offensive. What is the next step for Ukraine then? They might concentrate on attrition while reinforcing and refitting their force, absorbing new western equipment etc, but ultimately they will have to go on offensive I'd think?

[Huba]

Just now, dan/california said:

I am a lot less sure if the Russians can read.

There, fixed that for you.
 

[Battlefront.com]

Interesting article I stumbled upon while checking up on some Russian ultra nationalists. It is from just about 1 year ago:

https://khpg.org/en/1608809793

It centers on Vladislav Surkov, the "Gray Cardinal", largely thought of as responsible for the Novorossiya concept and the DLPR specifically.  The primary point of the article is discussing Surkov's belief that Russia needs to periodically kill off its problematic byproducts of being a Fascist state.  What better way to do it than as cannon fodder to secure a larger goal for Russia... the seizure of Ukraine for Russian use:

Quote

Given Surkov’s wish to export all that is chaotic abroad “for disposal”, it is worth recalling the recent revelations of far-right Russian nationalist, Dmitry Demushkin.  In at least two interviews, first in May 2021, then in August, Demushkin recounted how he had been approached by the then Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin to gather nationalists to fight in Ukraine. 

Demushkin refused, explaining in the second interview that, firstly, he does not recognize the ‘fight for a Russian World’ outside the Russian Federation.  His second reason is highly telling.  Like Putin, Demushkin’s chauvinist nationalism claims that Russians and Ukrainians are one and the same people.  Unlike Putin, that for Demushkin means that Russians should not go to Ukraine to kill Ukrainians.  He and his people also understood, he says, that they would simply be sent to Donbas as cannon fodder, and that, even those who were not killed, would not be able to return.  In short, they understood, that they were being sent “for disposal”, and essentially spells out the reasons.  He explained that they were the most talked about  ‘nationalists’ in the media, and their very existence, the ‘Russian March’ and other headline-making nationalist events did not gel well with Moscow’s repeated attempts to present the new government in Kyiv as ‘fascist’.  Better to get rid of them by sending them to Ukraine where they can be of use to Moscow by killing Ukrainians.  Demushkin asserts that he was first subjected to torture as the FSB’s force of ‘persuasion’, and that the series of prosecutions and terms of imprisonment were a direct consequence of his refusal to cooperate.

Anybody think we're seeing this play out now?  Yeah, I thought you might

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Dan, I fixed your trigger fingered post barrage with my Delete super power

Steve

[Ultradave]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

I just came across those photos. Yay or nay - is this Moskva? Are those legit and not photoshopped?

 

Sure looks like it. That elevated helo deck, and you can just see the inclined missile tubes through the smoke. Definitely looks like the Moskva.

Dave

[dan/california]

Sorry about that...

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Dan, I fixed your trigger fingered post barrage with my Delete super power

Steve

 

[Huba]

Here's a nice analysis of the photos:

https://twitter.com/vcdgf555

 

Edited April 18, 2022 by Huba

[akd]

A bit better resolution:

 

[panzermartin]

12 minutes ago, Huba said:

Here's a nice analysis of the photos:

https://twitter.com/vcdgf555

 

Interesting. What is the purpose of an AD ship close to enemy shore with shut down air defense sensors? Bizarre 

 

[BeondTheGrave]

23 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Interesting. What is the purpose of an AD ship close to enemy shore with shut down air defense sensors? Bizarre 

 

Between this and @Huba's thread, seems a lot like there were (shocker here) some serious shortcomings with the way the ship was handled. Anyone want to bet the ammunition detonation was the result of poor maintenance or mismanaged handling?

This quoted thread suggests the AD systems were inactive during the attack, probably only the main tracking radar was powered up and tracking the incoming TB-2. Some failure led to an ammunition fire in the front of the ship. A lack of proper damage control let the fire spread out of control allowing a magazine to catch fire and explode. Then the captain (or one of his subordinates if the captain was indeed killed during the initial stage of the recovery effort) ordered his crew to abandon ship. If you believe the analysis of Huba's thread, seems like this order was given prior to the ship being in extreme danger of sinking, ie too early. Probably thats what were seeing in these photos and what really caused her total loss. By the time anyone got her under tow or decided to put out the fire it was just too late, the damage too significant. One might compare this to the USS Stark attack. Indeed the famous photo of the Stark doesn't look that far off in terms of list or fire. Maybe the Stark got 'lucky' and was hit on the superstructure, maybe the Moskva was hit directly in the magazine or in a missile tube that started the initial fire. No way right now to know. But on the Stark the crew rallied and salvaged the situation long enough to recover the ship and minimize losses. but here the exact opposite seems to have occurred. 

Suggests that, yet again, the Russian military is suffering from extreme and significant systemic issues including bad training, low on the ground (deck) standards, low morale, bad combat AND support doctrine, and a command level that doesnt care about much beyond their own skin. And this situation just reinforces that indeed its effecting every branch and every level of service. 

[dan/california]

TheUkrainians appear to be quite willing to dispute who is going to encircle who, if this map has any bearing on reality. If valid this seems to support Steves position that the Russians are COMEPLETELY fought out.

[chuckdyke]

Modern day recon and espionage. 

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

Assuming that's what happens, they suffer more losses but not as severe as if they went with the offensive. What is the next step for Ukraine then? They might concentrate on attrition while reinforcing and refitting their force, absorbing new western equipment etc, but ultimately they will have to go on offensive I'd think?

UA will definitely gone on the offensive so this would be a test for the RA to see is if a stalemate is even possible.  It may, it would turn this war into a longer grind that Russia will still not be able to win but of all the bad options of the “we gotta stay here and die because Putin says so”, a narrow frontage to try and hold that land bridge is the least terrible.  With enough mass and digging enough holes and they may be able to pull off something.

The UA will likely start isolating and chewing up that defence piecemeal but it will take time and be costly.  The Russian LOCs will be shorter but still vulnerable but this might (and I stress “might”) buy time and a position at the negotiating table.  Of course having committed a lot of atrocities and warcrimes means that the Ukrainian position has likely hardened well past a “victory with honour” exit point for Russia (well done, idiots) so they are more likely to be in for long war that for a lot of previously posted reasons Russia cannot afford, even if this strategy were to work.  And let’s not forget the very real possibility of a complete RA collapse as attrition piles up and replacements with less training, less kit and almost no time to integrate become the “backbone” of the occupation force.

I am with Steve on this, Russia has lost this thing on both a political and military strategic level, that part is done.  Operationally they still can try things that may stretch things out in order to dress up this up enough to call it a “win” in order to avoid or at least delay the looming domestic crisis back in Russia.

 

 

Edited April 18, 2022 by The_Capt