Russian tactics -lessons learned

[theforger]

EvilTwin posted this link on ChrisND's youtube stream at the weekend....thought it was a great read

Just in case you haven't seen this, I think you might want to take a look at this. Very enlightening. http://www.scribd.com/doc/274009061/Lessons-Learned-From-the-Russo-Ukraine-War#scribd

[gnarly]

Nice find, bookmarked for a leisurely read.

[Euri]

Form a quick read, this is very very interesting. 

[Thewood1]

That is a great report to read...it mirrors many of the things you see in CMBS.

[Erwin]

Very interesting.  Thanks...

[Nidan1]

Very interesting and unique paper. Explanation of UAV usage was particularly informative.

Thanks for posting.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

 

Yup…this is a good find.

 

Currently probably the best overall review that is free. Best I have come across.

 

The odd comment looks odd. But superb stuff.

 

Thanks,

All the best,

Kip.

 

[Euri]

One interesting point from the paper:

It seems that some T90-MBT deployed in Ukraine has in addition to ERA, "using radar to detect an incoming missile, the active armor system fires a shotgun like spray of pellets which disables the guidance at the head of the missile as it approaches the tank", a system labeled by Ukrainian ATGM crews as a "magical shield" . Is this supposed to be the Shtora-1 system, or something else?

[Battlefront.com]

It is definitely a very interesting report, however as with all reports there must be some skepticism about the details within.  Especially when a report is one of the first of its kind (i.e. not a lot of corroborating information).

We discussed this internally the first week it was released (July 2015) and here are some thoughts about errors.   Some thoughts are from me, some are from contacts with unspecified duties within the ATO at the time.  I'll have to leave it at that

- Factually wrong about the drone shoot downs.  OSCE has only lost one drone (Austrian manufacture, not German) and they're not sure what happened to it.  They are suspicious that it was ice and not enemy action.  However, jamming is happening all the time and it screws up info gathering but hasn't resulted in a loss yet. (note since July there has been at least one OSCE drone downed by Russian actions, though it is unclear exactly what happened because DPR fighters refused to allow OSCE to investigate).

- The author seems to think the losses are most due to a combo of bad Soviet tank designs and poor maintenance.  That skips over the fact that most tanks have been put out of action by massed artillery fire.  Not just slightly damaged, but totally trashed. 

- Missed pointing out the big Achilles Heal of the Russian strategy... the motivation of the people on the ground.  Motivation on the separatist side isn't great, motivation on the Ukrainian side is excellent.  He hinted at some of these things, but didn't talk about how this is the single biggest factor in the strategic defeat of Putin's plan for Ukraine.  In fact, come to think of it I don't think the author did a very good job describing what Putin's likely intentions were for Ukraine last Spring and where things wound up.  In any case, local Donbas population's lack of enthusiasm for the war is a major factor.

- Drew the wrong conclusions about ATGMs.  Ukraine doesn't have many and they are all pretty old types.  One reason why a Ukrainian AT gunner might not want to pull the trigger is because he's the only one and taking on 3-5 tanks probably means getting wiped out in the process.  Soviet era ATGMs were designed for mass fires so that duds, misses, and limited points of fire could be compensated for by sheer numbers.  The Israelis learned this lesson the hard way several times (which I suppose means they didn't actually learn the lesson!).

- He downplays, or in fact doesn't much discuss, the possible negative ramifications for the West (in particular the US) if they ignored Russia's warnings and armed Ukraine with Javelins and other weapons.  While it can be debated if being cautious is the right answer to Russia's attempts to keep this fight one sided (i.e. Russia can arm/supply the "separatists", but NATO can't arm a sovereign state being attacked by proxy), the author should not pollute an on the ground fact finding report with things he really isn't in a position to effectively comment about.

 

Beyond these comments, one must keep in mind that events are always in a state of flux and a report is not.  A specific point noted in Spring might not be true even by the time the report was published, not to mention another 6 months later.  Therefore, it is critically important to keep in mind that even if this report was 100% accurate as of June, it might not be fully applicable to today's circumstances either in detail, character, scope, or anything else of that nature.  And of course it's better to assume that the report isn't 100% accurate anyway.  See above

Steve

Edited October 2, 2015 by Battlefront.com

[slysniper]

Just read some parts of it.

But lets see, my take away.

 

All those years of hearing how the tank is obsolete and we need faster, lighter and a more mobile force is, has been and likely always will be a bunch of bull.

Until light transport and weapons can defend against major weapon systems and survive, its a concept of fantasy.

 

Arty is still the weapon producing most of the losses in any type of conventional warfare.

 

infantry is a bad thing to be on the modern battlefield. Just a target waiting to be destroyed. (of course it would be hard to recruit young men if they understood the truth that being a grunt means you are the tool to place at a location to hold until the enemy can dig you out by using every thing they have to kill you)   Just not the way it is shown in the movies, is it.

Drone warfare is the future, development in all aspects of that could be the next major area as to a military advantage on the battlefield.

If you can control the air with drones and defeat counter measures, it could be a focus of the future.

 

 

 

 

 

[kevinkin]

Hi .. in from the Red Thunder forum for a change of pace.

Can we say automation is to 21st century warfare as mechanization was to 20th century warfare? Perhaps mechanization is more fundamental. Automation combines mechanization plus the rise of information technology (GPS and SATCOM e.g.).

From a cost - benefit perspective, the infantry ratio has completely reversed in the past 100 years. At least for developed nations. The cost to society of raising a child just to lose them on the modern battlefield is massive compared to the loss of smart weapon systems. Putting a crew in a modern MBT seems awfully expensive too. The firepower of today's artillery comes at a reasonable cost as long as the trained human technicians are out of harms way as much as feasible.    

Kevin

[kipanderson]

Steve, hi,

 

“Motivation on the separatist side isn't great, motivation on the Ukrainian side is excellent.  He hinted at some of these things, but didn't talk about how this is the single biggest factor in the strategic defeat of Putin's plan for Ukraine. “

 

Just to point out that there is somewhere out there a high quality alternative view.

 

I don’t follow these things as closely as you and don’t doubt there are some Ukrainian units with high motivation. However I very specifically remember reading not long ago an article that addressed this very issue.

 

The writer pointed out that the Ukrainian army suffered low moral with high desertion/refusal to turn up rates. And explained that most Ukrainians didn’t think it worth risking their lives to try and recover territory that was largely populated with Russian speakers or may have used term such as ethnic Russians. And they vote with their feet.

 

I only read sources such as the Financial Times and various Jane’s publications on this subject. I know you read Jane’s too.

 

As for the final outcome time will tell.

 

I don’t get involved in these discussion because it takes too long and also I have learnt over the years that the written word tends to sound far harsher and angrier than the spoken word. I am generally a cheerful bloke, unless provoked by a thug as is true of most, but the internet I don’t think of a good place for politics.

 

But to get back on topic, there is certainly an authoritative source somewhere out there, probably FT or Jane’s, who disagree about who is motived. Not a BBC reporter doing two minute piece to camera witnessing a Ukrainian withdrawal.  

 

Lucky to have CM at all, just look at the competition..

All the best,

Kip.

 

[Holman]

It seems to me that tanks are especially ripe for automation since they now depend so little on the physical body of the crew.  Awareness, yes; motivation, yes; training, yes.  But the crew's situational awareness and weapon use are already so mediated by electronic interfaces that there seems to be little to lose by moving them off-site the way drone pilots are off-site.  Plus, this would allow tank designers to do away with everything focused on keeping the crew alive, leading to faster, more robust, better-armed AFV's.

 

[slysniper]

It seems to me that tanks are especially ripe for automation since they now depend so little on the physical body of the crew.  Awareness, yes; motivation, yes; training, yes.  But the crew's situational awareness and weapon use are already so mediated by electronic interfaces that there seems to be little to lose by moving them off-site the way drone pilots are off-site.  Plus, this would allow tank designers to do away with everything focused on keeping the crew alive, leading to faster, more robust, better-armed AFV's.

 

The tank crew is in many ways the maintenance crew also. So I am not sure armor will become drones all that fast. But Its not a concept that is impossible either.

For sure tech is impacting the battlefield. The question I always have is if a major conflict does happen and it somehow is a prolonged war. How much of the high tech stuff is going to last. I think the supplies and the cost to keep producing it could disappear and in a prolonged war it would be interesting to see if the high end weaponry is still a major factor by the end of the conflict.

[Battlefront.com]

Just to point out that there is somewhere out there a high quality alternative view.

Just to point out that somewhere there is someone who thinks this isn't a "high quality" anything "

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/say-it-aint-so-phil-ukraine-russia-open-source-analysis/

While I certainly take issue with some of the things Karber wrote, I do think that most of his report is accurate enough to take seriously. At least for now.  Later on, when there is more scholarly work done by a wider array of sources, that may change.

Just to point out that there is somewhere out there a high quality alternative view.The writer pointed out that the Ukrainian army suffered low moral with high desertion/refusal to turn up rates. And explained that most Ukrainians didn’t think it worth risking their lives to try and recover territory that was largely populated with Russian speakers or may have used term such as ethnic Russians. And they vote with their feet.

I'd be curious to see that report if you can find it.  As I said above, one has to be VERY careful about citing a time period when making judgement statements.  What was true at one point in time for a particular side can not be carried forward "as is" or assumed to be true at an earlier time. Be it equipment, morale, clothing, etc.  While the Ukrainians still have a long ways to go to meeting NATO standards,  they've come an even further way since the start of the conflict. 

As for recruiting numbers, the last official ones I saw showed that they filled their quotas quite easily.  This is an important thing to note because one of the things that weakened the Ukrainian armed forces prior to the war was the ability to buy one's way out of military service.  That plagued the system horribly at the start because pretty much everything was being done according to how they were done before (including massive fraud and corruption).

It is true that a large segment of the Ukrainian population would rather give Donbas to Russia and not invest another life or Hyrvnia into retaking it.  I do not know what the opinion is today, but it was about 60% this past winter.  That said, there are no widespread movements to "sue for peace" as Putin had hoped for.  Which seems to indicate that the Ukrainian population is more ambivalent towards a military solution than they are actively opposed to it.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/08/ukraine-poll-support-neutrality-split-on-war/24620853/

Though keep in mind that general population's view of war is not necessarily the same as troops at the front.  Look at American opinion polls during the worst of the Iraq war, yet that was absolutely not reflected in the morale and fighting spirit of the forces involved.  It also didn't have too much of a depressive effect on recruiting (except for a brief period of time, IIRC).

But to get back on topic, there is certainly an authoritative source somewhere out there, probably FT or Jane’s, who disagree about who is motived. Not a BBC reporter doing two minute piece to camera witnessing a Ukrainian withdrawal. 

 While I am sure that morale is not equally high throughout all units, nor is quality of equipment, the Ukrainian armed forces today look nothing like anything they have EVER had before.  I've seen plenty of reports of this, including first hand reports from someone I trust.  I also see the battle reports and can make assessments from those as well.  Especially when compared to the ones I read in the past.

The primary reason that I still follow this war so closely even 1.5 years after it started is because things do not remain static.  There is always something new to learn and older information to update.  Which is why I keep saying that it is critically important to put things into the context of when an observation was made.  What was true 2 months ago might not be true today.  Therefore, one has to keep up with new information or their concept of what is going on will likely get out of step with what is going on today and what might go on tomorrow.

Regardless, my point about relative morale is still solid even for the time period of the report we are talking about.  The Ukrainians, overall, had a much higher motivation to fight than the separatists.  Which is understandable since a large chunk of the separatists are not Ukrainian and a chunk of them are fighting only for money/adventure and not a deep seated belief system.

Steve 

 

Edited October 5, 2015 by Battlefront.com

[Ashez]

As for recruiting numbers, the last official ones I saw showed that they filled their quotas quite easily.  This is an important thing to note because one of the things that weakened the Ukrainian armed forces prior to the war was the ability to buy one's way out of military service.  That plagued the system horribly at the start because pretty much everything was being done according to how they were done before (including massive fraud and corruption).

It is true that a large segment of the Ukrainian population would rather give Donbas to Russia and not invest another life or Hyrvnia into retaking it.  I do not know what the opinion is today, but it was about 60% this past winter.  That said, there are no widespread movements to "sue for peace" as Putin had hoped for.  Which seems to indicate that the Ukrainian population is more ambivalent towards a military solution than they are actively opposed to it.

Regardless, my point about relative morale is still solid even for the time period of the report we are talking about.  The Ukrainians, overall, had a much higher motivation to fight than the separatists.  Which is understandable since a large chunk of the separatists are not Ukrainian and a chunk of them are fighting only for money/adventure and not a deep seated belief system.

Steve 

 

Massive fraud and corruption is still there. you can still buy one's way out of military service with ease, You can go study to Poland or Belarus, there is no problem. Quotas are still filled easily - not because of morale growth - but because serving in armed formations is one of the few ways to avoid effects of extreme poverty and lack of semi-proper health care. Staff in many hospitals will not use latex gloves if you don't bring your own. Whole country can fall into chaos any day, Ukraine needs help - BIG investments, not placeholder loans that barely allow to buy gas from Russia to survive winter.

I don't also get get your 'high motivation' thing. There is no uniform 'high motivation' in Ukrainian forces. There is a regular army (Russian speaking in majority  and still saturated with many pro-Russian officers), volunteer groups, nazi right sector groups and almost as many mercenaries as the opposing side has. On the other hand majority of separatists are Russian speaking Ukrainians (surprise!) whose cities had been bombarded for a year by Ukrainian artillery (and I don't mean frontline fighting) and who were repeatedly refered as 'bugs' or 'sub-human' by Ukrainian government:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBy7tQ124Fk

Their motivation and morale proved to be very solid during the conflict and accusing them of fighting only for money and lack of belief system is something disturbing and often comes hand in hand with a process of enemy dehumanization.

You should also be aware that US sources attitude varies from biassed to an outright lie, where distorting news and data and interpreting them to fit pre-built assumptions is most common.

I was reluctant to write this post at first - knowing how unwelcome - it was going to be for some, but I want to warn people who try to base their knowledge about this conflict on this forum: DON/T.

[Battlefront.com]

Massive fraud and corruption is still there. you can still buy one's way out of military service with ease, You can go study to Poland or Belarus, there is no problem. Quotas are still filled easily - not because of morale growth - but because serving in armed formations is one of the few ways to avoid effects of extreme poverty and lack of semi-proper health care. Staff in many hospitals will not use latex gloves if you don't bring your own. Whole country can fall into chaos any day, Ukraine needs help - BIG investments, not placeholder loans that barely allow to buy gas from Russia to survive winter.

All true, of course.  Sadly it is true for the US when it had conscription.  The middle class and rich could avoid military service very, very easily.  Now that there is no conscription, that problem has gone away.  However, the incentives to join the military are more complicated.  Education, health care, and employment are available to poor people who couldn't afford them otherwise.  Some think this is a good thing, others think it is very bad.

From what I've read, the same is true in Russia and lots of other countries.  Which isn't surprising since this is the way wars have been fought for thousands of years.

The huge levels of corruption in Ukraine will take decades to overcome.  The good news is that the country appears to FINALLY be going down that road.

I don't also get get your 'high motivation' thing. There is no uniform 'high motivation' in Ukrainian forces. There is a regular army (Russian speaking in majority  and still saturated with many pro-Russian officers), volunteer groups, nazi right sector groups and almost as many mercenaries as the opposing side has.

Ukraine has "mercenaries" numbering, at most, a few hundred (I've never seen evidence of more than a few dozen at any one time).  DPR/LPR's are measured in tens of thousands at any given time.

On the other hand majority of separatists are Russian speaking Ukrainians (surprise!) whose cities had been bombarded for a year by Ukrainian artillery (and I don't mean frontline fighting) and who were repeatedly refered as 'bugs' or 'sub-human' by Ukrainian government:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBy7tQ124Fk

Their motivation and morale proved to be very solid during the conflict and accusing them of fighting only for money and lack of belief system is something disturbing and often comes hand in hand with a process of enemy dehumanization.

You should also be aware that US sources attitude varies from biassed to an outright lie, where distorting news and data and interpreting them to fit pre-built assumptions is most common.

I think your view is vastly more biased than my view.  The dehumanizing of Ukrainians started before the war, with the anti-Maidan propaganda coming from Russia.  Russian media still portrays Maidan as a bunch of Nazis that were controlled by CIA, not regular Ukrainians who were tired of Russian dominated Soviet style corrupt government.  Since the war started Russian propaganda has made sure that Russians view Ukrainians is either Nazis or mindless tools of the West.  This required a large amount of lying and distortion.  Ukrainian media didn't run stories about DPR/LPR fighters crucifying babies, did it?

And if you want to see dehumanizing behavior, perhaps you've missed the videos that shows Givi doing such things as having captured Ukrainian soldiers kneeling while he shoves their uniform badging into their throats.  Or the fact that he has bragged of murdering captured Ukrainians because they don't deserve to live on the same Earth as him.  And it is not just Givi... I've seen statements from many DPR/LPR leaders and fighters to the same effect.

But it is also true that Ukrainians view the DPR/LPR as "terrorists".  And so of course the media talks about them in those terms.  Although Russia is funding, equipping, supplying, and training the DPR/LPR forces, the local Ukrainians should not all be called "terrorists" since some of them do believe they are fighting for their own survival.  Likewise, not all of the Russians fighting in Ukraine are doing it for money and adventure.  Some really do believe they are supporting their "brothers".  Of course they believe this in part because that's what they've been told by Russian state media and nationalist groups that have the government's blessings, but I digress

I was reluctant to write this post at first - knowing how unwelcome - it was going to be for some, but I want to warn people who try to base their knowledge about this conflict on this forum: DON/T.

I agree.  People should seek out more information than what is on this Forum.  I might suggest you do as well, since you apparently are seeing only one side's account and believing it fully.

Steve

Edited October 5, 2015 by Battlefront.com

[BTR]

Read the full report twice (both times in one sitting). Fairly interesting observations in terms of fire and maneuver advancement linked to UAV proliferation, this really was the meat of this paper for me. I don't necessarily agree on his points about ATGM vs Armor counter-revolution since, in my eyes, neither side had a properly modern counter-armor equipped force. There were many reports on both sides about expired munitions and unreliable guidance equipment which is only natural since both sides are using mostly surplus and storage material. Perhaps this point still holds true in light of this particular conflict, but looking at Yemen I don't think this is a proliferated change in balance. Declining survivability of light infantry vehicles point felt a little bland for me since this has been a fairly recognized trend. 

Again, the force composition and the amount of Russian support made me chuckle. I am still waiting on those sat images from 2014 showing those multiple battalion tactical groups. At least before the action. Something like this:

 

PS: I very much dig the new forum design. 

Edited October 5, 2015 by BTR
Appreciating new forum style.

[DougPhresh]

As a former artilleryman, I can't help but glow with pride at 85% of casualties being caused by indirect fires.

Two mechanized battalions being pulped by IDF in 3 minutes reads like something from a worst case prediction of a Fulda Gap confrontation.

I'd be interested to know how the smaller Russian artillery systems like 2B9 Vasilek, 2S9 Nona (and derivative BTR-based 2S23 Nona-SVK and very advanced 2S31 Vena) have done. They're weapons systems I'd like to see in the future as on-map options for battalion-level fires.

Is there a way to model the Russian use of thermobaric and cluster munitions?

e: I'd also be curious to see if one-shot thermobaric launchers like RShG-1 are being used in combat as well as the RPO and if so, would they be modeled as being acquirable from transports like RPG-22/26 are?

What's not to like about the Vena?

Edited October 5, 2015 by DougPhresh
added q WRT RShG / pic of vena

[Battlefront.com]

Read the full report twice (both times in one sitting). Fairly interesting observations in terms of fire and maneuver advancement linked to UAV proliferation, this really was the meat of this paper for me. I don't necessarily agree on his points about ATGM vs Armor counter-revolution since, in my eyes, neither side had a properly modern counter-armor equipped force. There were many reports on both sides about expired munitions and unreliable guidance equipment which is only natural since both sides are using mostly surplus and storage material. Perhaps this point still holds true in light of this particular conflict, but looking at Yemen I don't think this is a proliferated change in balance. 

It is very difficult to asses the armor and anti-armor theories beyond this particular conflict.  For the most part armor was used in small numbers in any one place and the anti-tank capabilities were generally poor.  This has implications for similar battlefields, such as Syria, but not much for a straight up conventional war between modern forces.

Declining survivability of light infantry vehicles point felt a little bland for me since this has been a fairly recognized trend. 

Yup.  And the reasons they are still used is because they offer forces something other than protection... mobility at an affordable price.  The most important thing in a battle is showing up.

Again, the force composition and the amount of Russian support made me chuckle. I am still waiting on those sat images from 2014 showing those multiple battalion tactical groups. At least before the action. Something like this:

If you don't believe the evidence that already exists, I doubt that even a picture like that would change your position.

However, there's definitely a problem in this report which is fairly consistent with war reporting in general.  A statement that "such and such Russian regiment" is in Ukraine is not accurate.  It is more accurate to say "personnel from such and such Russian regiment" is in Ukraine.  The difference is the first statement implies the whole regiment is there, the second implies the opposite.  Sadly, reports too often go with the first type of description and that causes unnecessary confusion for people (like us) who are trying to make sense of what is going on.

Russian Army maneuver groups are roughly 500 personnel.  If five were in Ukraine on a particular day that's only 2500 personnel in total.  This is a small enough number that it can be easily inserted at different points along the Ukrainian border at different times (even if phased a couple of hours apart) in a way that would make it impossible to have a cohesive picture of even one group, not to mention five.  That said, there's plenty of videos of Russian equipment of company size moving on highways through Luhansk and Donetsk from the border and towards the fighting. 

Let's also keep in mind that the concept that the nature of fighting in Ukraine is more-or-less at a much smaller scale for the most part.  The forces involved usually number in the hundreds, not thousands.  When they do get larger than thousands it is only a few thousand and not more unless you start looking at a larger segment of front.  Which is why several thousand Russian forces can have a much larger impact than their numbers would suggest.

Steve

[BTR]

It is very difficult to asses the armor and anti-armor theories beyond this particular conflict.  For the most part armor was used in small numbers in any one place and the anti-tank capabilities were generally poor.  This has implications for similar battlefields, such as Syria, but not much for a straight up conventional war between modern forces.

A glimpse of proper ATGM usage was demonstrated in Yemeni conflict. With both a fair amount of varied armor and, if I understand correctly, a lot of skilled operators there being military or ex-military. Not much sign of a reversal, but of course we only get to know the successful attempts over video. 

 

Russian Army maneuver groups are roughly 500 personnel.  If five were in Ukraine on a particular day that's only 2500 personnel in total.  This is a small enough number that it can be easily inserted at different points along the Ukrainian border at different times (even if phased a couple of hours apart) in a way that would make it impossible to have a cohesive picture of even one group, not to mention five.  That said, there's plenty of videos of Russian equipment of company size moving on highways through Luhansk and Donetsk from the border and towards the fighting.

That's pretty reasonable. Small scale involvement has always what I was behind as an idea, and I think it is a most reasonable approach. A lot of people however, were quoting literal hordes of Russian tanks Fulda style. The fabled "several battalion tactical groups" I think came from a Ukranian field report after Ilovaisk and quoted straight as fact, I do however think that even 2.5 to 4+k(higher estimate) concentrated in one area would be detectable. Company tactical groups, of armor or otherwise, I can definitely agree with, which has sort of always been my point of view on the involvement. 

[Battlefront.com]

A glimpse of proper ATGM usage was demonstrated in Yemeni conflict. With both a fair amount of varied armor and, if I understand correctly, a lot of skilled operators there being military or ex-military. Not much sign of a reversal, but of course we only get to know the successful attempts over video. 

I've not been following the fighting there as I have elsewhere.  Sounds like I should!

That's pretty reasonable. Small scale involvement has always what I was behind as an idea, and I think it is a most reasonable approach. A lot of people however, were quoting literal hordes of Russian tanks Fulda style.

And there were reports, at the time, of 1000-2000 Ukrainian forces killed in that area.  Now we have some better information.

The fabled "several battalion tactical groups" I think came from a Ukranian field report after Ilovaisk and quoted straight as fact, I do however think that even 2.5 to 4+k(higher estimate) concentrated in one area would be detectable. Company tactical groups, of armor or otherwise, I can definitely agree with, which has sort of always been my point of view on the involvement. 

There was a large surge of Russian armed forces in the September-August time frame for sure.  They were divided into roughly four areas simultaneously, therefore at least 4 independent forces were involved.  One struck north to break through to Luhansk (smaller groups came over the border to the north west), the second was along the Donetsk (city) and Krasnyi-Luch axis, the third came directly over the border (Krasnodarovskiy) and struck towards Ilovaisk, the fourth took Novoazovsk and moved towards Mariupol.  Which means there were at least four groups (probably more) operating at one time.  But between the summer intervention and the final phase of Debaltseve, it seems regular Russian forces operating within Ukraine were mostly limited to special forces and militia.  Therefore, if one wants to study the maximum number of Russian regular forces in Ukraine at one time, August-September 2014 is the place to look.

Again, the ability to research this is complicated by the fact that reports say things like "9th Motor Battalion was here and 6h Tank Brigade was there", when in fact it was probably battalion sized groups consisting of elements of these (and other) units.

Steve