Reassessment of Italian Combat Prowess

[dieseltaylor]

And your view on fighting experience levels? : )

The Americans started out knowing almost nothing, but they learned, however slowly and painfully, and soon overtook their insular brethren.

Sounds good but a paucity of corroboration or even examples. Granted radial engines and Nordenfeldt sights. The armour/infantry cooperation may be a reflection of what books you read rather than fact. There is no doubt that there were some tragic examples of English bad judgement but there are also cases of good cooperation.

This a is a tragic example perhaps senior officers too get battle wearied:

In Normandy at 3.00 pm on 20 July 1944 Lt Col Rea Leakey, took command of 7 RTR from the wounded and partially blinded Lt Col George Gainsford. The Regiment had been badly mauled and had lost half of its officers in action. The forward squadrons, 'A' under Dick Jocelyne and 'B' under Allan Taylor were each supporting infantry battalions who had together just re-captured the village of Maltot, dominated by the notorious Hill 112.

Rea Leakey wrote 'At dawn my Adjutant woke me and said that the Divisional Commander wanted me to report to his Head Quarters immediately. So it was some 30 minutes later that I appeared before this Senior Officer in a beautiful Normandy orchard some five miles from Hill 112. Major General Thomas, whose nickname was 'Von Thoma', was a ruthless tough soldier, a gunner by 'trade' commanding an Infantry Division. Like many of the infantry divisions his had suffered heavy losses in the Normandy 'bocage' country. His Division had captured Maltot, but had been counter-attacked and driven out. On that occasion 9 RTR had supported the attack, and Thomas considered that they had pulled back and left the Infantry to themselves.

This was understandable because the armoured regiments had been trained only to operate by day, and at the end of the battle withdrew to replenish and carry out repairs.

This fiery little general looked me up and down, probably noted my footwear – plimsolls cut to accommodate swollen feet - and understandably took a dislike to me. I don't blame him. 'Where are your squadrons ? Back replenishing, no doubt, and leaving the infantry with no support, as usual, I suppose". I explained to him that this was not the case. 'A' and 'B' Squadrons were forward in the village with the two Wiltshire Battalions. 'C' Squadron with the Somersets were in reserve some two miles back from Maltot. General Thomas 'blew up'. 'That squadron should be well forward, there", he said, pointing to the slopes of Hill 112 and some 400 yards from the village. I tried to explain to him that there was no cover for them, but also that they would be sitting targets for Tiger tanks on Hill 112. 'Do as you are bloody well told. Order them to move there immediately and don't argue", he shouted. 'I refuse" I replied. He went pink in the face, strode over to my scout car, picked up the radio microphone and started to shout orders for 'C' Squadron. As he had little idea of our codes the orders were meaningless. I gave in, and told the poor young Squadron Commander to proceed into the 'valley of death'. As I put the microphone down the General picked it up and shouted his final order. 'This is the General speaking. Bloody well get a move on or you will be sacked." He knew only too well that the minute his back was turned I would cancel the order so he propelled me deeper into the orchard and proceeded to tell me what he thought of me and my ancestors. When eventually I was allowed to leave the Divisional Headquarters many minutes had passed and worse was to follow – I could not get through to my Regiment on the wireless.

I arrived in Maltot village in time to see the twelfth 'C' Squadron tank 'brew up' and the Squadron virtually ceased to exist. It was my turn to loose my temper and I did. I transferred to another scout car and sent the following message to my Adjutant. 'Tell General Thomas that I am on my way to General Montgomery's Headquarters to get him sacked.' When I arrived the two generals were outside the famous caravan obviously discussing my future. I think I would have strangled him if I had been allowed to get near him. It was only after he had gone that the C-in-C sent for me. I was about to tell him that it was now impossible for me to go back to my Regiment after this disaster, but he stopped me. 'I know all about it – most unfortunate – but I order you to return to your Regiment immediately and resume command. By the time you rejoin them you will find they have moved from Thomas's Division, and I assure you that you will never serve under him again – never!" Monty kept his word.'

Post script. In early 1946 Rea Leakey was commanding 5 RTR in Rhine Army. General Thomas, as Corps Commander, paid a visit to the Regiment. He arrived alone without any staff officers. At the end of his visit he asked to speak to the officers in the mess. Rea Leakey recalls 'His talk to us went something like this.' 'My main purpose in visiting you today is a very personal one. In June and July 1944 I was commanding 43 Infantry Division in Normandy. In one of our most successful battles we captured the village of Matlot beneath the slopes of the notorious Hill 112. The next morning I summoned the Commanding Officer of 7 RTR to my Headquarters. To cut a long story short I ordered him to move his third squadron to take over a position on Hill 112. He refused but I bullied him into giving the order and made sure that he would not cancel it when I let him return to his scout car because I knew he would cancel it. The squadron was destroyed and the fault was mine. I have come today to apologise."

Such were the pressures on commanders in battle.

[Vanir Ausf B]

For what it's worth -- and some have said in the past that it isn't worth much -- Dupuy's efforts to measure combat effectiveness showed US forces having a slightly higher effectiveness than UK in Italy, CEV .77 and .65 respectively.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000010.html

[Georgie]

For what it's worth -- and some have said in the past that it isn't worth much -- Dupuy's efforts to measure combat effectiveness showed US forces having a slightly higher effectiveness than UK in Italy, CEV .77 and .65 respectively.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000010.html

Sounds to me like that amount of difference would fall within the margin of error for the study. The US and British troops must have been about even by '44 and any difference in how they performed a task would , I believe, be because of difference in the quality and strength of the opposition the terrain the quality of individual units, leadership and weapons suitability for the task and on and on.

[dieseltaylor]

Yes. There is no QJM/TNDM methodology in the data from the EPW reports. As such, none of the conditions of combat (terrain, weather, force mix, air support, etc.) are accounted for. One still notes definate patterns, though.

I am not sure what was included in the CEV calculations but one is intrigued to know whether battles like Cassino were included. Also the use of battleship size supporting artillery for Anzio and Salerno might creep in ...

As you can see my gut reaction is that I need to know more before trying to equate CEV. However I would not be surprised if the larger US squad and the better firepower were a significant benefit. Also we have to bear in mind that many UK troops may have already been fighting for a couple of years and become less gung-ho. However if these are stripped out of the equations it may be fairer! but does not reflect the reality on the ground.

[dieseltaylor]

This is quite amusing from Jan 1944:

Disembarkation leave began at once on the following scale:-

Those abroad for less than 2 years -2 weeks

Those abroad for less than 4 years -3 weeks

Those abroad for more than 4 years-4 weeks

It was mostly finished by mid February when Privilege Leave began. Lt Col and Major Wainman set an example to the Regt by getting married shortly after returning home and their lead was widely followed.

You can see what happens when men are together a long time. I hope they were very happy together : )

[Vanir Ausf B]

Sounds to me like that amount of difference would fall within the margin of error for the study. The US and British troops must have been about even by '44 and any difference in how they performed a task would , I believe, be because of difference in the quality and strength of the opposition the terrain the quality of individual units, leadership and weapons suitability for the task and on and on.

I don't know if that is within the margin of error or not. However, Dupuy's same calculations showed US and UK combat effectiveness during the Normandy campaign to have been essentially the same. So the point is that at least from mid-1943 to the end of the war the comparison of US and UK performance is in no way similar to the comparison of Italian and German.

[costard]

This is quite amusing from Jan 1944:

You can see what happens when men are together a long time. I hope they were very happy together : )

Got a giggle out of that.

Thanks for the blurb on 7RTR too - a description of men of character. I find it interesting that they were both kept on and that the Lt-Col was promoted further along the track.

[Michael Emrys]

...the Brits seem to have had a very hard time admitting their shortcomings and mistakes. Thus, they were very slow to learn from them.

Sounds good but a paucity of corroboration or even examples.

The books are full of them. You might start with Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day. It was written by a British scholar and based on contemporary documents, so pro-US bias seems unlikely.

In any event, my goal is not to prove the British and Commonwealth forces were absolutely incompetent, a proposition to which I do not subscribe, but that they had no call to look down their long noses at the Americans.

Michael

[dieseltaylor]

Blimey ME you buy expensive books!

I was looking at other critical books of the UK performance post D-Day and I was struck by the higher considerations that meant you used sub-optimal tactics but that also conserved life. I am no fan of Montgomery but perhaps I need to read more of the high level stuff.

The book discusses how the political concerns and higher strategic imperatives influenced the operational methods Montgomery stamped on 21st Army Group. The central tenets of Montgomery's command and operational style are dissected and examined in light of his practice. Overall, the author concludes that the British were right not to try and match the Germans tactically and were right to conduct their operations in the manner in which they did. Additionally, the author shows that Montgomery's subordinates - Dempsey and Crerar - where not the ciphers they are so often portrayed as and also highlights Montgomery's failings. These are important conclusions and deserve to be widely read.

As for the US 's suggested ability to be more effective at adapting to whats on the ground I am left with the feeling that with a very small officer class to command the citizen army more brains came through. Rather like Monash in WW1.

Officers learn about the last war, new intake deals with the here and now. Also I suspect the newer officers included more technology savvy men.

[Michael Emrys]

Blimey ME you buy expensive books!

If you want to know things, you have to pay the price. I may have ordered a used paperback as I don't recall paying the full price of a new one.

I was looking at other critical books of the UK performance post D-Day and I was struck by the higher considerations that meant you used sub-optimal tactics but that also conserved life. I am no fan of Montgomery but perhaps I need to read more of the high level stuff.

I believe you are quoting from a review of Colossal Cracks, yes? While I have maintained for a long time that Montgomery was a much better general than his harshest critics would have us believe, and therefore would agree with much of the author's overall assessment of his performance, I wasn't really happy with this book. It seemed to me that he was arguing from conclusion to premise instead of the other way around. That is to say that I didn't find his argument very compelling. Plus he seemed to be going out of this way to blackguard Monty's subordinates, which I found distasteful.

As for the US 's suggested ability to be more effective at adapting to whats on the ground I am left with the feeling that with a very small officer class to command the citizen army more brains came through. Rather like Monash in WW1.

Officers learn about the last war, new intake deals with the here and now. Also I suspect the newer officers included more technology savvy men.

I couldn't agree with you more. That's been my position for years. While the professionals can bring a necessary element to the mix, it seems to me that frequently at the company and battalion level the guys who were just in for the duration adapted faster to the conditions of this war and used common sense combined with a dab of originality. The same thing was seen in Vietnam. The career officers all too often were just there to get their ticket punched and move on to their next promotion. Not all of them were bad or indifferent to the welfare of their men, but there was an awful lot of rot among them. It was often the case that it was the OCS and ROTC guys who were trying to figure out how to win the battle and keep their men alive.

Michael

[Secondbrooks]

Is it not a US tradition to refer to younger generations as Junior? : ) Just because you are larger than your father does not change the fact.

Just as a point of interest the US that fought longest in the European theatres was the 3rd Infantry Division with 531 day [he next five units were 531,511,500,443,421, and 400] So in terms of experience a less than English divisions. The famous 7th Armoured , the Desert Rats, did prove that men can only go on fighting so long before they begin to feel that they have done their bit and more. Then surviving becomes important to them than glory.

Yeah. This.

Not that it would necessarily make grand scale impact but i think it hasn't got attention it deserves.

From Finnish warhistory and personal accounts i've read one could say that capacity of personel reached it's peak at first (or second) major campaign, since then men simply started to loose their edge. Finnish Army at winter -44 after main fightings thru 5 years had tons of experience on war (and not as beaten as Germans were) but personel on all levels were weary and lost their edge long time ago. Even at war this could be seen as Finns mainly sat on their arse from winter -41 to summer -44, personel in all levels became less and less professional and discplined.

Yes, they might have become more experienced but if their training was already proper (as Finns were) it didn't make that big impact on performance as enlisted and NCO plus Junior Officers started to think more on their own terms (=mainly survival and getting it easy). Again i'm talking about company/battalion/regiment levels. On higher levels there were lots of things to learn thru out WW2 and for them question of experiences of war is much more important.

I simply doesn't notice similar 'level up'-attitude on accounts of those persons whom served from -39 to -44. Infact alot of them does think -39 and -40 as their prime, not so much because of Soviet incompetence (which on front lines wasn't as obvious) but because back then they were much more motivated and committed to fight, while in -44 they were much more interested in fleeing and surviving and it required quite harsh acts from officer level to force men to fight.

I don't wish to enter pissing contest with this because i do think that forexample -44 German army was overall better than -40, but like to bring it out because one could think that with German army things were far worse than that.

Bigduke6 once wrote about how experienced units can become real trouble for their superiors as they start to get smarter and smarter on subject of how to spare themselves from unpleasant things. While green units/individuals are more willing to do what their command wants them to do. So veteran units might infact be among last who gets to objective, probably doesn't make main push, evades it's responsibilities/duties as it sees fit and possible flees when it sees right moment for it. And so on. ¨

On wargames it's much more black-white, veteran unit is always better.

[womble]

On wargames it's much more black-white, veteran unit is always better.

Most wargames, true, but CMx2 allows designers to have Veteran units with atrocious morale and leadership qualities, and couch-potato levels of personal stamina, while still handling their weapons, spotting enemies and seeking cover with Veteran, or even Elite, competence, and I think being less prone to "Panic" when "Shaken". While designers and QB players probably don't use such combinations very often, they'd certainly reflect some of the "war weary veteran" behaviours you note.

[Michael Emrys]

@ dieseltaylor

I may have ordered a used paperback as I don't recall paying the full price of a new one.

I looked it up and I paid $41.88+tax, so call it $45 more or less. That was probably a new paperback; I notice that the price has gone up rather sharply since then (15 months ago).

Michael

[JonS]

I got my copy several years ago (March 2003, according to my records :eek: ) and have no idea what I paid for it, but I see The Book Depository has it for US$49.

[dieseltaylor]

Wow still serious money. I rely on the two local library systems and the second-hand bookshops. One of the advantages of a heavily populated area.

On the nature of morale I was playing the intro scenario recently looking at the new commands and one of my squads got shredded over several minutes until just one was left - he was rattled!. I felt this perhaps a tad optimistic.

The complaint about veterans becoming less willing to die is borne out by some unit memoirs I have. Its a matter that no one really wants to highlight in the mainstream.

I am finding the more I learn of war and the stupidity with which most start the more of a pacifist I become.

[JonS]

The complaint about veterans becoming less willing to die is borne out by some unit memoirs I have.

Yeah, but that's a process that plays out over weeks and months, not the course of a single 20-40 min battle.

And it goes the other way too. If you haven't already read it, I highly recommend Farley Mowat's WWII memoirs ... and no birds sang. There is a section towards the end in which a by-then veteran company commander ... no. I won't spoil one of the most powerful passages in the book. Get it. Read it. It's well worth the time and the £12.16 from The Book Depository (free postage). Any part-way decent library is bound to have a copy or two too.

[MikeyD]

did prove that men can only go on fighting so long before they begin to feel that they have done their bit and more.

Someone had posted a graph earlier that charted the relative utility of troops in rleation to their combat exposure. It was most certainly a bell curve. The time of peak performance was relatively brief. I recall the two categories at the far end of the graph were 'berzerker' and 'comatose'.

[JonS]

Mike,

this one? I would treat that graph as very much indicative, rather than specific. It's very useful for describing trends and large group behaviour but note, for example, that there is absolutely no scale on the vertical axis, and there's no hint of error bars.

This is also interesting. This particular section made me laugh cynically:

A tour of 240 days would increase replacement costs only by 5 percent. Although policies can be set so as to minimize the added cost, and so as to reflect the experience of the particular theater, it is important that the goal not be too remote to affect incentive. These estimates represent a stable condition and do not reflect the immediate costs of instituting such a policy, which would be somewhat higher.

[snip

The justification for restricting the policy to infantry battalions is that no other unit suffers comparable attrition rates. Complaints which might arise from other personnel could be amply met by offering them the option of transfer to the combat infantry.

[Sgt Joch]

JonS, that article also brings up an interesting point which does not appear to have been looked at in detail by anyone, namely that around 2% of all men are sociopaths or have sociopathic tendencies.

I have always wondered if sociopaths, who generally do not perform well in civil society, turn out to be over represented in the "war hero" category, i.e. the top fighter aces, snipers, combat leaders, etc., since being a "sociopath" is probably a plus in a combat environment.

thoughts?

[JonS]

thoughts?

I'm not a psychologist, by any stretch, but I'd say that's pretty much a given.

You could create some superficially plausible theories around so-called 'elite' units (SAS, paras, Rangers, Commandos, SS combat units, etc) specifically selecting for sociopathy/psychopathy (either by self-selection - those units are inherently more attractive to sociopaths - or via the formal selection and training process), and that being an at least partial explanation for their elevated combat performance. Which would also tend to depress the numbers of sociopaths in 'regular' units ... which was actually a complaint the British made during WWII - all the private armies formed during Britain’s period of weakness in 1940-42 were siphoning off the 'good' soldiers, leaving most line infantry units much the worse. I'm not sure how you'd go about testing or proving those theories, but they do have a certain appeal.

On the other hand, Wigram's "Dear Brigadier" letter from Sicily talks about 'gutful' men at a ratio of somewhere around 10-20% in regular line infantry battalions, and if you squint a little bit those "gutful" men could be considered to be largely composed of the 2% sociopaths. I guess that's one of the advantages of a conscription-based military - sociopaths are more-or-less evenly distributed throughout the organisation, rather than self-selecting and ending up concentrated in a few places.

an interesting point which does not appear to have been looked at in detail by anyone

Specifically in terms of CM, I think this can be modelled via the 'fanaticism' setting.

[costard]

JonS, that article also brings up an interesting point which does not appear to have been looked at in detail by anyone, namely that around 2% of all men are sociopaths or have sociopathic tendencies.

I have always wondered if sociopaths, who generally do not perform well in civil society, turn out to be over represented in the "war hero" category, i.e. the top fighter aces, snipers, combat leaders, etc., since being a "sociopath" is probably a plus in a combat environment.

thoughts?

Non-performers in a given civil society are unlikely to perform in an organisation based around that civil society (shared language, myths, populace, etc). So, unless there is a deliberate selection process for manifestly pathological traits, you wouldn't expect there to be an over representation in the armed forces of sociopaths. The level of trust required to get people to do things that require that they put their lives at risk is such that the risk is mirrored - bad leaders get shot by their own troops, poor performers stay at the bottom rank or get shifted out (e.g. sent to combat infantry or jailed (or even shot) for cowardice). You could say that a selection process working against the manifestation of socio-pathological traits is present. A problem lies with the fact that most modern militaries are in fact "led" by politicians with their claim of representing the populace as a whole. Banking and politics is a whole 'nother world in terms of selection for sociopathic behaviours. So far.

[dieseltaylor]

JonS. Darkly amusing but Very interesting reading which I have just skipped through but I did notice on the scan

Effective Combat Life of Infantrymen

The effective combat life of the average infantryman appears to depend largely upon how continuously he is used in combat. The British, for example, estimate that their riflemen in Italy will last about 400 regimental combat days, about twice as long as U.S. riflemen in the heavily used U.S. divisions in Italy. They attribute this difference to their policy of pulling infantrymen out of the line at the end of 12 days or less for a rest of four days. The American soldier in Italy, on the other hand, was usually kept in the line without relief for 20 to 30 days, frequently for 30 to 40, and occasionally for 80 days.

Funnily enough I expected something on the British regimental system and I believe eventually copied by the US as adding extra cohesion.

As for Mowat neither library system can provide!! : (

Anyway this would be of interest to ME on US training and the 90th and why Divisions perform badly

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506897

[MikeyD]

I'm reading a (very thick) military history of the dark ages and medieval Europe. Commonly given estimates for armies of the time - especially for 'enemy hordes' are often grossly inflated, oftentimes by more than a factor of 10 or 20. The proportion of citizenry that is 'warlike' in anything like a civilized society has always been small, even for nominally civilized societies. Districts of France that had conscripted tens of thousands of soldiers for WWII had only fielded a one or two dozen 'knights' 800 years earlier. Putting on a uniform and drilling on the parade ground does not automatically confer a 'warrior' mentality to the wearer.

[JonS]

Mikey, there's a couple of things to consider there.

Firstly, populations have grown quite a bit since the dark ages from ~16M in France in 1200 to ~42M in 1939.

Secondly, 'knights' isn't really a synonym for 'levée en masse'. The knights of the dark ages would be - broadly - the equivalent of officers in WWII. It is likely that a district that fielded one or two dozen knights in 1200 only produced ten or twenty dozen officers in 1939.

[Michael Emrys]

I am finding the more I learn of war and the stupidity with which most start the more of a pacifist I become.

Ha ha! I first set foot on that path about 45 years ago. Yeah, war is a very disgusting business. But the next stage on the path is realizing that disgusting as it is, sometimes you still have to fight. Just not as often as the bosses tell us maybe.

Michael